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STOIARY
This study is concerned with the effects of Opposition status upon 
certain policy positions adopted by a major British political party. 
Initially five interconnected hypotheses about party policy-making in 
Opposition are extracted from the existing literature. These hypotheses 
cover such matters as the role of party opinions in policy formation, 
the maintenance of policy positions, the nature and presentation of policy 
content, and the implementation of policy once the party returns to power.
In the remainder of the thesis the hypotheses are tested in relation to 
the policy-making activities of the 1964 to 1970 Conservative Opposition 
in four linked policy areas: national economic planning, prices and incomes
policy, regional policy and policy for the structure of industry.
The subsequent analysis falls into four parts. In Farts One and 
Two the context of Conservative Party action during the 1964 to 1970 
period is examined. In Part One five roles which have traditionally been 
attributed to constitutional Oppositions in the United Kingdom are 
identified, and their relevance to the policy-making activities of the 
1964 to 1970 Conservative Opposition is assessed. In Part Two the policy- 
making process of the 1964 to 1970 Conservative Opposition is analysed.
The various.policy channels which had access to the Party's key policy­
making centre are outlined and it is shown that, in contrast to periods 
when the Party was in Government, in Opposition the opportunities available 
to intra-party policy channels to influence the content of Conservative 
policy were extended, and, conversely, those available to extra-party 
channels declined. In addition, the nature of Conservative ideology and 
the opinions of Conservative partisans are considered. Two ideological 
tendencies are isolated (a dirigiste, liberal tendency and an etatiste, 
tory tendency), and it is argued that during the 1964 to 1970 period the 
balance of opinions amongst Conservativex^artisans was biased towards the 
liberal viewpoint.
Part Three contains a detailed analysis of the evolution of policy 
in the four selected areas during (i) the Conservatives' initial period as 
Government prior to 1964, (ii) their subsequent period as Opposition 
(1964-1970), and (iii) their period in office once returned to power 
(1970-1974). Particular attention is given to the influence of Conservative
IX
Party opinion upon the formulation of policy, and the Conservative 
Opposition's responses to the development of the 1964 to 1970 Labour 
Government's prograimue. In addition, the differences between policies 
formulated by Conservatives as Opposition and those formulated by them 
as Government are noted.
In Part Four the preceding sections are drawn together. The 
original hypotheses are assessed and reformulated in the light of the 
evidence presented in Part Three, Three sets of possible explanations 
of the way policy stances altered and developed during the Conservatives 
1964 to 1970 period as Opposition are considered. Initially factors 
relating to the personalities and beliefs of key policy-makers and the 
overall pattern of events are evaluated, and, while not denying the 
validity of these approaches, it is argued that Opposition status also 
has explanatory force and deserves consideration. Finally, the policy 
consequences of three features of the party as Opposition (its policy­
making structure, its policy-making responsibilities and its goals) are 
analysed, and it is shown that taken together, these features are liable 
to produce forms of policy-making and types of policy outcomes which are 
significantly different from those pursued by the party as Government.
The study suggests, contrary to a widely held viewpoint, that 
party policy statements publicised in Opposition do not offer a reliable 
means of judging or predicting the policy behaviour of a political party 
when, and if, it returns to power. In addition, the evidence produced in 
the thesis implies that the apparent failure on the part of recent 
governing parties to fully implement their electoral programmes is to some 
extent a product of the institutional and political conditions which 
characterise British Opposition politics itself. Thus, the conclusion is 
drawn that the remedy for any lack of continuity between policies public­
ised in Opposition and policies implemented in Government lies, not only 
in strengthening Opposition parties via-â-vis Governments or Ministers 
vis-a-vis civil servants, but also in the adoption by Opposition groups 
of more modest policy-making functions than has recently been the case.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in the notion of 
political opposition. The first major work concerned specifically with 
this concept was a cross national study published in 1966 under the editor­
ship of R. A. Dahl^. At roughly the same time a quarterly journal of 
comparative politics entitled Government and Opposition was founded and 
this, in its early issues, served as a forum for studies based on the 
notion of opposition . Two years later lonescu and de Madariaga published 
their study of opposition which, they claimed, "attempted a survey of the
development, the present role and the future possibilities" of the institu- 
3tion . More recently two selections of articles from the journal of 
Government and Opposition have been issued under the editorships of 
Rodney Barker and Leonard Schapiro^. Finally, in 1973 Punnett's major
study of the institutional aspects of Parliamentary Opposition in the
5United Kingdom became available . All these studies have been of two 
kinds: either of a theoretical and evaluative nature, mainly concerned
with the definition, classification or general history of opposition in 
its universal aspects^, or they have consisted of studies of the operation 
of particular oppositions in given political systems^. Of a slightly 
different nature, but nevertheless relevant, is Hoffman's analysis of the
1. R. A. Dahl, (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies,
New Haven 1966.
2. In the Foreword $6 the first issue of this journal the editor stressed 
that "the extraordinary neglect of Opposition... both by historians 
and political scientists justifies such a forum of study". Government 
and Opposition, Vol.I, No.l, October 1965, p.l.
3. Ghita lonescu and Isabella de Madariaga, Opposition, London 1968, p.v.
4. Rodney Barker (ed.), Studies in Opposition, London 1971; Leonard 
Schapiro (ed.), Political Opposition in One-Party States, London 1972, 
German and French scholars have shown some interest in the theoretical 
aspects of opposition. For a list of their work, see lonescu and de 
Madariaga 1968, op.cit., footnote, p.2
5. R. M. Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition, London 1973.
6. For the definition and classification of oppositions see, R.A. Dahl 
1966, op.cit., pp.xvi-xvii and pp.332-47; Rodney Barker 1971, op.cit., 
pp.5-9; and Giovanni Sartori, "Opposition and Control: Problems and 
Prospects", Government and Opposition, Vol.I, No.2, January 1966,
pp.149-154.
7. Dahl 1966, op.cit., chapters 1-10; Government and Opposition, Vols 1,
2, 3, 4 and 5, selections; Punnett 1973, op.cit.
Û
1945 to 1951 Conservative Opposition , Unlike the other works mentioned 
above, his study is mainly in the form of a straightforward historical 
account and is not anchored to the concept of opposition as such*
In this study 1 consider what consequences factors peculiar to the 
situation of being in Opposition may be said to have had upon the policy 
produced by a major British political party. Until recently little 
attention has been given to the policy-making aspect of British Opposition 
politics but the issue has been a matter of some debate in the press, 
amongst politicians and within academic circles, and a number of specula­
tions have emerged. Within the space of the next few pages I attempt to 
review this 'conventional wisdom' and to extract from it certain proposi­
tions which may serve as hypotheses capable of investigation within the 
remainder of this study.
Some observers have suggested that a party as Opposition is, both in 
terras of its organisation and policy output, liable to be different from 
the same party as Government. This point was outlined by Saul Rose in 
1956^, and has since been elaborated into the broader proposition that in 
Opposition political pressures from within the party are likely to predomi­
nate and policy content is, therefore, liable to conform to partisan norms 
and attitutdes to a greater extent than in Government^^. Others, such as 
lonescu and Menzies, have suggested that Opposition parties will develop
policies which are distinct from those being pursued by the governing 
11party , and the latter has argued that this cultivation of difference
8. J. D. Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition; 1945-1951,
London 1964.
9* Saul Rose, "Policy Decision in Opposition", Political Studies, Vol.4,
No.2, 1956, p.128. See also, R. T. McKenzie, British Political 
Parties, Second Edition, London 1963, p.642.
10. See, Punnett 1973, op.cit., pp.380-1 and p.389; Nigel Harris, 
Competition and the Corporate Society, London 1972, p.141; Max Beloff, 
^ % e  Leader of the Opposition*', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 11, 1958,
p.158; Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain", 
in Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Political Parties » New York 1967, pp. 103-4; 
R. K. Alderman, "Pariiamentary biscipline in Opposition; the Parlia­
mentary Labour Party, 1951-1964", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.21, No.2, 
1968, p.124-36.
11. lonescu and de Madariaga 1968, op.cit.» p.87; Sir Robert Menzies,
The Measure of the Years, London 1970, pp.13-20, See also. Editorial, 
The Times, 7 October 1965; and for a theoretical examination of the 
same point, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy,
New York 1957, pp.55 and 98,
12should he the chief objective of the party as Opposition .
An additional factor has been noted by Punnett who has suggested that,
in Opposition, party leaders often avoid dealing with awkward or unpleasant 
1 13issues • So that there may be a tendency on the part of Opposition policy 
makers to shelve or gloss over matters considered to be controversial or 
divisive. Moreover, both Richard Rose and Hoffman have alluded to the 
apparent tendency of Opposition parties to produce policies of a non­
explicit nature^^, while Punnett has speculated that detailed policies
formulated in Opposition may serve to limit the flexibility of party
15policy-makers once returned to office *
Finally, it has been suggested that policies formulated in Opposition
may prove impracticable or unpalatable once the party returns to power^^#
For example, a number of observers have claimed that the activities of
both the 1964 to 1970 Labour and the 1970 to 1974 Conservative Governments
reveal a wide disparity between intentions outlined in Opposition and
actions carried out in power. Some of these observers have suggested that,
in Powell's phrase, this "divorce of party from policy" has contributed to
a widescale public disenchantment with the existing "two party" system ad
exhibited in voting patterns in recent by-elections and the 1970 and 1974 
17General Elections . Others, most notably Richard Rose, have been led to 
question the party government model of British politics whereby parties, 
once elected to office, are assumed to control thé apparatus of government
12. Menzies 1970, op.cit., p.20
13. Punnett 1973, op.cit.» pp.228 and 291. See also, Hoffman 1964, 
op.cit., p.179.
14. Richard Rose, "The Variability of Party Government", Political
Studies, Vol. XVII, No.4, 1969, p.427; Hoffman 1964, op.cit., p.179.
15. Punnett 1973, op.cit., p.210
16. Samuel Brittan, "Some Thoughts on the Conservative Opposition",
Political Quarterly, Vol.39, No.2, 1968, p.151; Punnett 1973, 
op.cit., p.210; Editorial, The Times, 7 October 1965.
17. Enoch Powell, "Reducing Parliament to a Charade", The Times,
11 March 1974; see also, Powell's speech at Chester as reported 
in The Sunday Times, 7 April 1974; Peter Jenkins, "Who Can Fail the 
Least**, The GuaN , 27 February 1974.
and to be capable of carrying through their electoral programmes'^. These 
speculations have raised the issue of whether a party as Opposition can, 
or even should, formulate policies in preparation for future office^^.
In the light of the preceding discussion it is possible to suggest 
five interconnected hypotheses relating to the policy-making activities of 
a British political party as Opposition. These will be investigated in 
the remainder of this study.
1. Policy-making in a party as Opposition will be different 
from policy-making in the same party as Government. In 
particular, policy-makers (party leaders) will be more 
attentive to party opinions and policy content will 
conform more closely both to these opinions and to the 
party's ideology.
2. As Opposition a party will attempt to make its policies
appear distinctly different from those being pursued by 
the governing party.
3. As Opposition a party will forego or retreat from policy
positions previously maintained by it as Government which 
(a) have been , or are liable to be, controversial in terms 
of party ideology, and which (b) are adopted and maintained 
by its successors in office.
4. After returning to Government policy positions previously
adopted in Opposition will, in certain instances, prove 
either (a) impracticable or unpalatable or (b) limit the 
freedom of manoeuvre and flexibility of policy-makers.
5. Policy made in Opposition will generally be non-explicit 
in nature and party policy-makers will avoid, whenever 
possible, making precise commitments to future action.
18. R. Rose, "The Variability of Party Government" 1969, op.cit.;
Richard Rose and Harve Mbssawir, "Voting and Elections: A 
Functional Analysis", Political Studies. Vol.XV, No.2, 1967, 
pp.198-199. ’
19. The question as to whether a party should formulate policy in
Opposition has been a matter of debate for a number of years,
see Richard Grossman, Labour in the Affluent Society. Fabian
Tract No.325, 1960; Bernard Crick,Two Theories of Opposition", 
New Statesman, 18 June 1960.
In attempting to investigate these hypotheses the following steps 
appear to be indicated: first, X must choose as a primary focus of study
the policy-making activities of a British party during a period as 
Opposition. Secondly, I must identify certain policy areas in xdiich, 
when in Government# the party's policy-makers adopted and pursued policies 
which were (a) innovative in terms of policy development and controversial 
in terms of certain strands of party ideology, which (b) remained matters 
of political debate during their party's subsequent period as Opposition, 
and which were (c) adopted and maintained by policy-makers in the party 
which succeeded them in office. Finally, X must trace the evolution of 
policy in these areas during (i) the party's initial period as Government, 
(ii) its period as Opposition and (iii) its period in office once returned 
to power.
As far as the first step is concerned I have chosen to concentrate 
analysis upon the Conservative Party as Opposition during the 1964 to 
1970 period. This has the advantage of not having previously been studied 
in detail, while the experience of these years directly contributed to 
some of the speculations contained in the 'conventional wisdom* outlined 
above.
In relation to the second step I propose to examine the management 
of the economy area with special reference to the emergence of what may 
be termed Tory Planning in the early 1960s. This I have broken down into 
a number of linked but separate policy areas: namely, national economic 
planning and the National Plans, prices and incomes policy, regional 
policy, and policy in relation to the structure of industry. I have 
chosen these areas, first, because they appear to be ones in which the 
1959 to 1964 Conservative Government embarked upon long-term, discrimina­
tory and interventionist programmes of action which might be regarded as
having been at odds with some strands at least of Conservative thinking 
20and beliefs . Secondly, all the policy areas relate to issues which
20. Conservative beliefs are discussed in Chapter 5, below.
appear to have remained matters of political debate during the 1964 to 
1970 period of Conservative Opposition. Thirdly, in each of these policy 
areas there appears to have been some degree of continuity between the 
policies pursued by the Conservative Government and those supported by 
their Labour successors. For these reasons the four policy areas selected 
would appear to offer interesting and promising test cases for the 
hypotheses previously outlined.
Finally, although I am mainly concerned with the Conservatives* 
period as Opposition, I propose to consider policy development in each 
particular policy area during the years from around 1960 to 1974. This 
will enable me to examine the activities of the Conservative Party as 
Opposition and to compare and contrast them with its activities during 
its preceding and subsequent periods in office.
Before considering the development of policy in each of the four 
policy areas, however, I intend to examine the wider constitutional and 
political context of the Conservative Opposition's policy-making activities.
As my main concern is with the effects of Opposition status some initial
therefore,
consideration should be given to this matter and I shall,/tentatively 
assess what is implied in this term and what consequences the situation 
of being in Opposition may be said to have for party action. In addition,
X propose to outline and examine factors peculiar to the particular 
Opposition party, such as its organisation and the shared attitudes and 
beliefs of its members. Both these matters would appear to be relevant to 
a discussion of policy-making in Opposition and may usefully be mapped 
out before more detailed aspects of policy formulation are considered.
There are obviously conceptual and practical problems involved in
a study of this nature. In particular, isolating the influence of
'Opposition status' from that of other variables, such as the personalities
and beliefs of policy-makers and the overall pattern of events, is liable
to prove difficult. Clearly, for the purposes of both analysis and
explanation, some consideration must be given to these other factors.
The adoption of a case study approach may to some extent help to overcome
this problem, since as Heclo has noted, such an approach is capable of
taking into account changes over time and can bring to hear a "remarkable
21
variety of factors".
21. H. Heclo, "Policy Analysis", British Journal of Political Science, 
Vol.2, No.l, January 1972, pp.93-4.
The contents of this study are divided into four parts. Part One 
considers the history and functions of constitutional Opposition in the 
United Kingdom and analyses the roles adopted and the goals pursued by 
the 1964 to 1970 Conservative Opposition. In Part Two the policy-making 
process of the Conservative Opposition is outlined and analysed, and this 
is followed in Part Three by a detailed investigation of policy develop­
ments within each of the four selected poiidy areas during the period from 
1960 to February 1974* Finally, in Part Four, the points which have 
arisen in the course of the discussion are summarised and evaluated, 
their relevance to the hypotheses is examined and some explanations are 
provided.
The research has been based mainly on published sources, since the
period studied is recent and hence few unpublished documents are available*
Major sources which have been used include Conservative Party publications
and press releases, national newspapers and periodicals, government publica-
22tions. Parliamentary papers, Hansard and biographies and memoirs *
Most of the research, with the exception of Chapter Eleven, was carried 
out between March 1970 and March 1972. This archival research was 
supplemented by a series of nineteen open-ended, unatributable interviews 
with Conservative officials and Members of Parliament. These were 
conducted during the two months prior to June 1972 and were intended as 
a means of clarifying points of fact and interpretation which had previously 
arisen during the period of my earlier researches* I had originally 
contacted thirty-five persons for the purpose of interview. Of these, 
five did not reply, eight were unavailable, and in three cases it proved 
impossible to arrange a mutually convenient time* Most of those inter­
viewed requested that their remarks should not be quoted directly and I 
have, therefore, found it necessary to adopt a coding system whereby 
interview sources are identified by a nuiiiber in the footnote. The names 
of the persons thus noted will be made available to my examiners only*
Of the nineteen who were interviewed, not all have been referred to 
in the thesis. In some cases their remarks were capable of being documented 
from other published sources, in others the interviews, although interest­
ing, revealed nothing new or relevant.
22. See the bibliography at the end of the thesis
In adopting a case study approach I am aware that any generalisations 
which may be drawn from them may only have relevance to the particular 
issues, particular period and particular Opposition studied. However, each 
policy area has been chosen because it appears to offer a promising test 
case for the hypotheses previously outlined and these, it may be suggested, 
have a wider relevance. Thus* although the limitations of the approach 
should be borne in mind, some generalisations, if only tentative, may be 
justified. Moreover, it is not ray purpose in this study to provide a 
detailed analysis of the history and institution of Opposition in the 
United Kingdom. Nor do I set out to provide a definitive outline of 
the policy-making process of the Conservative Party as Opposition. The 
material presented in Parts One and Two is intended as a background to 
and framework for the analysis of the case studies presented in Part 
Three. These form the focus of this study and the preceding discussion 
and the subsequent conclusions are centred upon them.
PART ONE
THE ROLES AND GOALS OF OPPOSITION
In this section I consider factors relevant to the political 
context within which Conservative Party action took place during the 
1964 to 1970 period. The analysis is divided into two chapters.
In Chapter Two I examine the history of the Opposition in the United 
Kingdom and draw some conclusions about the roles which have been 
ascribed to the Opposition during the course of its development.
In Chapter Three I assess which of these roles were adopted and 
pursued with the most persistence by the Conservative Opposition 
during the period under study, and I conclude by considering the 
relationship of the roles thus adopted to the Party's aims and 
objectives.
10
CHAPTER TWO
THE ROLES OF OPPOSITION; THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL OPPOSITION
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
A 'role' may be defined as a "pattern of eicpected behaviour"^.
In its sociological context the term has usuàllÿ been applied to Individual
actors so that each may be regarded as playing a variety of roles such as
2
taxpayer, father, voter, worker and so forth . In this study, however, 
the term is applied at the institutional level so that, seen as a collec­
tive entity, an opposition may be regarded as fulfilling a number of rolesg
or of acting in accordance with certain patterns of prescribed behaviour . 
These roles may be regarded as the product of historical factors peculiar 
to the particular political system under study^.
In Britain the term Opposition with a capital 'O' is generally 
understood to mean "constitutional" or "loyal" opposition^. It is so 
called because it does not contest the legitimacy or question the basis 
of the constitution of the state. In Britain what the Opposition opposes 
is the Government and not the political system as such
1. Michael Banton. Roles, London 1965, p.19.
2. See, S. F. Nadel, The Theory of Social Structure, London 1957, p.12;
Hans Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure,
London 1954, pp.22-3.
3. See, Thomas A. Hockin, "The Roles of the Loyal Opposition in Britain's 
House of Commons; three historical paradigms". Parliamentary Affairs, 
Vol.25, No.l, 1971-72, pp.50-68, see especially footnote 4.
4. The notion of convention as used in writings on the British constitu­
tion may appear to be close to the concept of role. It should be 
understood, however, that in this study the concept of role includes
not only conventiois but also statutory provisions, less formal rules
of behaviour, and the attitudes and preconceptions of the actors 
involved. For a discussion of the nature of conventions see, Geoffrey 
Marshall and Graeme C. Hoodie, Some Problems of the Constitution, 
London 1959, Part II; E.G.S. Wade and G. Godfrey Phillips, cVn^^ titu- 
tional Law, Sixth Edition, London 1960, pp.74-91.
5. FoFT^Harification of this distinction see, Allen Potter, "Great 
Britain: Opposition with a Capital '0'", in R.A. Dahl (ed), Political 
Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven 196 6, p.23.
6. See Giovanni Sartori, "Opposition and Control; Problems and Prospects", 
Government and Opposition, Vol.l, No*2, January 1966, pp.149-154.
For an application of this general point in relation to Italian 
politics see: Silvano Tosi, "Italy; Anti-system Opposition Within 
the System", Government and Opposition, Vol.2, No.l, October 1966 - 
January 1967, pp.49-62.
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To date, as Professor Crick has noted, no comprehensive account of
the development of constitutional Opposition in Great Britain has been
undertaken^. It should be pointed out that it is not the intention to 
provide such an analysis in the courae of this study. A history of the 
British Opposition would require a separate thesis in its own right and 
this task must, therefore, be left to others. Instead what is presented 
in the following pages is rni outline of some of the major landmarks in 
the evolution of the institution. The objective will be to use this 
material so as to yield some conclusions about the various roles ascribed 
to Opposition during the courae of its development.
For analytical and organisational reasons the following account of
the development of 'constitutional' Opposition in the United Kingdom is 
divided into four chronological sections. I begin with the hundred years 
from 1730 to 1830* It was during this period that the main foundations of 
modern Opposition were laid and it is her© that the origins of the institu­
tion are to be located. Next, in the period between the two great Reform 
Acts, from 1832 to 1867, the idea of Opposition as a principle of political 
action was consolidated, although its desirability and validity remained 
open to question. In the third phase, between 1867 and 1914, the develop­
ment of political parties, and the idea of the Opposition as a single, 
organised political group was increasingly accepted. In the final period, 
from 1914 to the present day, the idea of the Opposition as a legitimate 
and important part of the constitution and British system of government 
was acknowledged and the word and the concept of Opposition became a part 
of the vocabulary of everyday political life. The analysis concludes with 
an outline and clarification of the roles which have been accredited to 
the Opposition during the course of its development.
1730-1632; The Emergence of Opposition
As Barker notes, the existence and survival of constitutional 
Opposition depend upon at least two conditions. In the first place 
there must be a clear distinction between the person or persons symbolizing
7. Bernard Crick, "On the Loyal Opposition", Government and Opposition . 
Vol.l, No.l, October 1965, pp.116-121.
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authority and those exercising government. Secondly, political actors 
must he agreed upon the fundamentals of the political system, so that 
the political arrangements of the state and the constitutional rules 
within it are not a matter of political controversy^. In Britain prior 
to the Eighteenth century neither of these necessary conditions existed: 
the distinction between opposition and treason was tenuous and the monarch 
remained the centre of government^. Throughout the century these obstacles 
were progressively eroded and the preconditions assuring the development 
of Opposition emerged.
The decline in monarchical power really began after the Constitutional 
Settlement of 1689^^but, according to Professor Foord, only after the 
Hanoverian succession of 1714 did the conditions which made possible the 
emergence of constitutional Opposition come into existence. The period
from then until 1330, he claims, "constitutes the germinating period of
11the modern institution" • Both Beattie and Foord are agreed that the
first stage in this process was achieved by 1730, for by this date the
12recognition of the existence of Opposition was firmly established .
In part this reflected the decline of Jacobitism which meant that the 
question of the regime's legitimacy had ceased to be a matter of political 
controversy. Thus, according to Foord, from 1731 onwards, those who
opposed the court party were referred to as the "Opposition" and took
13
their seats opposite the Treasury benches .
Although the existence of Opposition was recognised by 1730 it 
was not generally deemed to be either a desirable or permanent feature 
of the political system. In the first place political activity still 
centred upon the crown and the court; Opposition was thus concerned 
with the actions of the Crown and the Ministers of the Grown, and it was.
8, Barker (ed), "Studies in Opposition" 1971, op.cit., pp.8-9
9, See lonescu and Madariaga 1968, op.cit,, p.69.
10, sir David Lindsay Keir, The Constitutronal History of Modern Britain; 
1485-1951, London 1953, pp.268-273.
11. Archibald S. Foord, His Majesty's Oppositions 1714-1830, Oxford 
1964, p.11.
12, Alan Beattie (ed.) English Party Politics, Vol.l, London 1970, p.7.
13. Foord 1964 , op.cit., pp.155-159
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for this reason, generally considered unconstitutional^^. In the second 
place the function of opposing the adiBinistration was not regarded as 
the perogative of organised and persistent parliamentary factions but
1C
as the responsibility of the Commons as a whole . Thus the idea of a 
permanent, organised Opposition was attacked both by the ’King*a Friends * 
and the body of independent Parliamentarians as a limitation upon the 
rights of the monarch in the one case and upon the rights of Parliament 
in the other.
Even those, such as Bolingbroke and Burke, who attempted to justify 
Opposition did not advocate a form of politics which entailed the regular 
alternation in power of Parliamentary groups. Both conceived of Opposition 
only as an efficient instrument for curing temporary ilia in the nation 
and not as a permanent element in the political proceas^^. For example, 
although Burke perceived of the Rockingham Opposition as having a clear 
political role to pursue by using "every ju*t method" by which to place 
"the men who hold their opinions into such a condition as may enable
them to carry their plans into execution, with all the power and authority
l7 . i
of the state" , he did not accept that this should be an ongoing and
persistent process. For him once the temporary ills had been removed,
by the admission to office of the Rockingham group, the justification for
X 8Opposition ceased to exist .
Towards the end of the Eighteenth Century the further development 
of Opposition as an acceptable and permanent part of the political system 
was closely related to the continued decline in monarchical influence.
14 On the relationship between the Crown and politics in the latter
half of the Eighteenth century see R. Pares, George III and the 
Politicians, Oxford 1953; and Herbert Butterfield, George III and 
the Historians, London 1957.
15. See Samuel H. Beer, Modern British Politics, London 1965, pp.22-25; 
and Beattie 1970,Vol.I, op.cit., p.7,
16. See Henry St. John (Viscount Bolingbroke), The Idea of a Patriot 
King, London 1742, pp.168-169; Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Causes 
of the Present Discontents, F.G. Selby (ed.), Glasgow 1912, For an 
analysis of Bolingbroke and Burke the reader may be referred to 
H.C. Mansfield, Statesmanship and Party Government, Chicago 1965.
17. Edmund Burke, *'Thoughon**^, S^lby (ed.) , 1912, op.cit., p.81.
18. Frank 0*Gorman, "Party and Burke: the Rockingham Whigs", Government 
and Opposition, Vol.3, No.l, Winter, 1968; pp.92-110.
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It is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the exact date when the 
Grown and the Court ceased to be the primary element in British political 
life, although Wiseman suggests Pitt’s Ministry of 1784^^. Whatever the 
precise date, however, most students of the period agree that by the
beginning of the Nineteenth Century the monarchy had given up the attempt
20
to rule . Once the sovereign power and the function of government had 
been separated, the acceptance of Opposition as a permanent part of the 
political system was assured. So that, as Foord notes, by the mid 1820s
the institution had become "an essential part of the state’s political
21machinery"
In conclusion: by 1832 the existence of the institution of Opposition
had been recognised and accepted as permanent, although not necessarily
22
desirable , feature of the British system of government. Moreover, as 
Mansfield claims, once Opposition had been accepted as a permanent element 
in Parlianmntary life the idea that the alternation of governments was 
both desirable and constitutional became firmly established • This did 
not mean, however, that the diffuse and continually changing alliance that 
was the Opposition attempted to present itself as a real alternative to 
the existing administration. Nor did it mean that a regulated system of 
alternating party governments was the norm* In the first place the absence 
of a simple (am party system meant that when a Government fell the Opposi­
tion might not be able to take its place^^ * Secondly, the idea of the 
Opposition as an alternative administration with an alternative programme 
was totally unknown at this time.
TE-Jhat was increasingly accepted was the idea that it was legitimate
l9 . H.V. Wiseman, Parliament and the Executive, London 1966, p.l.
20. See Sir Ivor Jennings, Party Politics, Vol.3, the Stuff of Politics,
Cambridge 1962, p*177; H.J. Hanham, The Nineteenth Century Constitu" 
tion: Documents and Commentary, Canhridge 1969, pp.24-30;
A.J. Anthony Morris, Parliamentary Democracy in the Nineteenth 
Century, London 1967, pp.75-6; E. Neville Williams, The Eighteenth 
Century Constitution: 1688-1815, Cambridge 1960, pp.70-2.
21. Foord 1964, op.cit., p.470
22. See Barker (ed.) 1971, op,cit., p.12; E. Neville Williams 1960,
op.cit., p.71.
23,. H. G. Mansfield 1965, op.cit., p.16
24. See Allen Potter, "Great Britain; Opposition with a Capital ’O’", 
in Dahl 1966, op.cit., p.7.
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for the Opposition to attempt to overthrow the Government by undermining 
its support on the floor of the House through the adoption of what might 
be termed a critical or negative role of Opposition. This was most 
clearly stated by George Tierney, a leading Whig of the period, who
maintained that "the duty of an Opposition was very simple - it was to
2 5oppose everything and propose nothing". In addition, in the process 
of its emergence the Opposition acquired some of the roles that had 
previously been the prerogative of the House as a whole. Most notably 
it increasingly became the responsibility of the Opposition to act both
as a check upon the power of the administration and as a ventilator for
O ^
the escape of irrepressible discontent . These I shall term the 
constitutional and representative roles of Opposition.
1832-1867; The Consolidation of Opposition
After 1832 the continued development of constitutional Opposition 
in the United Kingdom was closely related to the gradual emergence of 
the political party system. Tentative indications of a nascent party 
system had already emerged during the early decades of the Nineteenth 
Century. Mitchell notes that in the 1820s an increasing proportion of
divisions in the House of Commons conformed to what he has described
2 7 » • .as "party questions"; while according to Beattie, from 1800 onwards
the Opposition was often collectively described by the use of one of the
28
two party labels ♦ These deveL 
over the next thirty-five years.
lopments were extended and consolidated
Throughout the period, however, the process whereby party emerged 
and became more closely associated with Opposition followed an intermittent 
rather than a persistent and cumulative pattern of development. On the 
one hand, the limited party cohesion of the 1820s intermittently declined 
during the 1830s and the 1840s and the period has been described by some.
2'5. Quoted in H.J. Hanham, "Opposition Techniques in British Politics:
1867-1914", Government and Opposition, Vol.2, No.l, October 1966-
January 1967, p.35.
26. Foord 1964, op.cit., pp.440-451
27. A. Mitchell, The Whigs in Opposition: 1815-1830, Oxford 1967, pp.5-8.
28. Beattie 1970, Vol.I, op.cit., p.37
16
29as the "golden age" of Parliament . On the other hand, both Front-Benches 
continuously attempted to counteract this tendency by making spirited 
efforts to reassert party unity. By 1841, for example. Peel had managed 
to build up a majority which was shattered some five years later following
the Repeal of the Corn Laws. In turn the remnants of this majority were
30carefully pieced together in the 1850s by Derby and Disraeli . Much 
the same situation faced the ’Liberal* groupings who, after leaving office
in 1841, underwent a period of internal dissension and intra-party
31'cohesion was not reasserted until the 1850s .
Despite these setbacks and false starts, however, X would agree
with Beattie when he states that by 1867 party was "widely accepted as
32
an established framework of action." Moreover, with the establishment
of a party system it began to be increasingly recognised that the
33phenomena of Opposition and party were closely related elements .
As a consequence of the growing linkage between party and Opposition 
important alterations took place in both the structure and the scope of 
the Opposition. Structurally the most important change was the gradual 
emergence of a clear and distinct Opposition leadership in the form of a 
"Shadow Cabinet" or "late Cabinet". According to Keith the earliest 
example of this new form of Opposition leadership was Feel’s attempt, in 
1836, to call his ex-Calxnet together; although Turner suggests 1860 as 
a more reliable date for the emergence of the "Shadow Cabinet".
Whatever the precise date, however, we may agree with Turner’s statement 
that by 1867 "a modified form of ’Shadow Cabinet’ was in existence".
29, Ronald Butt, The Power of Parliament, 2nd edn., London 1969, p.69.
;3.0, See Norman Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction in British Politics;
1832-1852, Onford 1964, pp.184-6,
31. See John Vincent, The Formation of the British Liberal Party; 
1857-1868, Middlesex 1972.
32. Beattie 1970, Vol.l, op.cit., p.87
33. For Sir Robert Feel’s progressive views on this issue see ibid., p.81.
34. On the question of the "Shadow Cabinet", see-= A.B. Keith, The British 
Cabinet System, London 1952, p.1457; D.R. Turner, The Shadow Cabinet 
in British Politics, London 1969, p.2; J.P. Mackintosh, The British 
CabinetTLondon 1962, p.447; and R.M, Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition,
_ W !■ I" "I* III. I ll^ l'WIIIBIIinilWIIWWiJlJwuWI—
London 19/3, pp.74-109,
35. Turner 1969, op.cit., p.10.
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To the extent that party and Opposition were increasingly related, 
the development of extra-parliamentary party organisations served to 
extend the scope of the Opposition beyond the bounds of the Parliamentary 
arena. This process began soon after the 1832 Reform Act when registration 
societies were established. Initially these tended to be on a local basis, 
but were later co-ordinated through informal contacts with the party
’headquarters* which operated from two political clubsî the Carlton for
36the Conservatives and the Reform for the liberals * The next significant 
development in extra-parliamentary party organisation took place in 1861 
when the liberals established a national Liberal Registration Association
in London and some two years later the Conservatives created a counterpart
37
entitled the Conservative Registration Association .
In conclusion; the most important development during the period 
spanning the first two Reform Acts was the gradual and tentative arrival 
of a coherent party system. This development effectively meant that 
the two concepts of party and Opposition became more and more closely 
associated. As a further consequence of the growth of party the nature, 
structure and scope of the Opposition were altered. It should be noted, 
however, that the emergence of party and the correlation between it and 
Opposition were developments which were latent rather than manifest and 
the full extent of their implications was not fully realised until the 
later years of the Nineteenth Century. For example, throughout the 
1832 to 186/ period, the desirability and validity of Opposition, still
38
remained open to question in some quarters at least ; while the linlc 
between Opposition and party, although increasingly close, was never 
absolute. Moreover, there were no significant additions to the roles of 
Opposition. The critical, conatLtutlonal and representative roles previously 
accredited were maintained but no new ones reached fruition. The period 
was thus mainly a transitional one in which certain trends, already 
developed during the previous century, were extended and consolidated 
while, at the same time, other newer trends emerged and crystallised.
3^ . See Ivor Bulmer-Thomas, The Party System in Great Britain, London 
1952, pp.12-17 and 213-4; Sir Ivor Jennings, Party Politics; Vol.2 
The Growth of Parties, Cambridge 1961, p.94 and p.98 ff.
37, BiiTmex^Thbmas, ibid., p. 18; R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties 
2nd (revised) edn., London 1964, p.262; and John Vincent 1972, op.cit. 
pp.120-125.
38. Barker (ed.) 1971, op.cit., pp.13-16.
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1867-1914: Party and Opposition
The period from 1867 to 1914 has been covered by Hanham in an
3qexcellent article on Opposition techniques , In his exposition Hanham 
adopts a framework focussing upon three aspects of the growth of party; 
the emergence of the party leader, the increase in party cohesion, and 
the development of party organisation. These, he claims, had a significant 
influence upon the development of Opposition. His schema is adopted in 
the following brief account.
According to Hanham the emergence of a single party leader and the 
consequent personalisation of politics during the Gladstone/Disraeli 
period gave a new impetus to the idea of a straight confrontation bettfcen 
Opposition and Government. The more significant contribution was made by 
Disraeli who was, says Hanham, "the first man to perfect the role of 
Opposition L e a d e r . H i s  contribution lay in organising the Conservative 
Party into an effective Opposition capable of maintaining a persistent 
criticism of the Government^^. Disraeli subscribed to the dictum that 
it was the first duty of an Opposition to oppose and he was, according to 
Blake, "perhaps the first statesman to systematically uphold the doctrine. 
Disraeli’s viewpoint brought a new degree of vigour and combat to the 
operation of the Opposition and heightened party feelings in the House and 
the country.
The development of a more vigorous style of Opposition politics 
was also assisted by the series of reforms in House of Commons’ procedure 
which took place from 1882 onwards. These reforms effectively allocated 
the great majority of parliamentary time to government business. As 
Hanham notes, the effect was a general increase in the number of party 
divisions since, once a clear choice was given, these were intensified'^^. 
This added momentum to the already developing process of party cohesion 
so that by 1914, on this dimension at least, the parties closely resembled
39. H. J. Hanham 1966/67, op.cit., pp.35-48
40. Ibid., p.37
41. See Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill,
London 1970, p.118.
42. Robert Blalce, Disraeli, London 1969, p.355.
43. Hanham 1966/67, op,cit., pp.41-2,
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their modern counterparts^^. The increase in party cohesion inevitably 
meant a tightening of the link between party and Opposition.
In addition to changes in party leadership and party cohesion, the 
extra-parliamentary party organisations were refined and extended during 
this period. Soon after the Reform Act of 1867 both Liberals and Conserva­
tives set out to establish a netifork of local party organisations. To 
co-ordinate and control these efforts national mass party organisations
were founded: the Conservative National Union in 1867 and the National
« * 5^
Liberal Federation in 1874 • At about the same time the parties’ central
bureaucracies were reorganised. In 1870 the Conservative Registration 
Association became Conservative Central Office and by 1874 the Liberal 
Registration Association had been renamed the Liberal Central Association^^, 
Developments in party organisation continued througiiout the period and, 
taken together, they provided Party Leaders with machinery through which 
appeals could be made directly to the electorate and through which support 
and assistance eould be recruited. The effect was to further extend the 
scope of the national political debate beyond Parliament and to produce 
a permanent Government versus Opposition situation in the localities.
In conclusion: the changes in the leadership, cohesion and extra-
parliamentary organisation of the parties during the period 1867-1914, 
represented a consolidation of the trends which had emerged during the 
1850s and early 1860s. The effect of these developments upon the nature 
of Opposition politics was twofold.’ First, the concepts of party and 
Opposition became inextricably bound together. Moreover, the right to 
oppose a government was, by 1914, overwhelmingly accepted and was regarded 
as mainly the responsibility of party rather than Parliament as a whole^^. 
Secondly, the scope of Opposition was further extended beyond Parliament 
and the dichotomy between Opposition party and Government party was brought
44. For the analysis and tabulation of the increasing party cohesion during 
the period sea Beer 1965, op.cit., p.257. See also Hugh Barrington, 
"Partisanship and Dissidence in the Nineteenth Century House of 
Commons", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.XXI,No.4,1968,pp.338-74
45* For details on the growth of the mass parties see H.J. Hanham, Elec­
tions and Party Management: Politics in the Time of Disraeli and 
Gladstone, London 1959.
46. Jennings 1961, op.cit., pp.131-32 and p.136.
47. See, for example, Sidney Low, The Governance of England, London 1904, 
p.123.
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into existence at the grass roots as well as at the centre. Both these 
developments brought about a significant alteration in the Opposition’s 
field of action. In particular the increasing cohesion of party voting 
limited an Opposition’s chance of defeating a government in Parliament.
Thus an Opposition’s prospects of returning to power became more dependent 
upon gaining support amongst the electorate at periodic General Elections. 
The consequences of this for the roles of Opposition, however, were not 
drawn out during this period. Despite the fact that some advances were 
made in party policy-making and propaganda^^, the idea of Opposition as 
an alternative government, offering the electorate a choice of men and 
measures, was not widely popularised. Instead the Disraelean conception 
that an Opposition’s role was to oppose remained the orthodox view.
1914-1970; Opposition and the Constitution
The inter-relationship beta^ een Opposition and party and the extension 
in the scope of Opposition beyond the Parliamentary arena formed the twin 
bases for the further development of the institution in the Twentieth 
Century. Most significantly W o  further concepts of the role of Opposition 
were formulated and popularised. These I will label the legislative and 
alternative government roles of Opposition, In addition the constitutional 
role was reassessed and extended.
In order to understand the nature and development of the legislative 
role of Opposition it will be necessary to outline the Parliamentary 
conventions and rules governing the operation of the Opposition in Britain. 
Following the procedural reforms of the 1880s, Parliamentary time was 
allocated between the two major parties, and gradually the practice grew 
whereby the Opposition was consulted as to the length of time required for 
the discussion of the various stages of government measures. By the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century it was generally accepted that the 
Opposition had the right to choose the subjects being debated on the days 
allotted to the consideration of the Estimates and the Bills by which 
they were finally authorised^^. This has meant that the Opposition was.
48. See Geoffrey D. M. Block, "Party Manifestoes", in the same author’s, 
A Source Book of Conservatism, CPC.305, London 1964, p.70.
49. Lord Campion (ed.), British Government Since 1918, London 1950,
pp.20-21.
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and still is, allotted a generous share of Parliamentary time; somewhere 
betïfeen 25 and 30 per cent of the total or about thirty-two days in each 
session^^. In addition the Government is morally bound to grant a day 
for the discussion of any vote of censure which the Opposition may wish 
to move. Opposition leaders also have the right to choose the subjects 
to be debated on certain items of business such as the address in reply
to the Queen’s speech, motions for the adjournment of the House, and certain
51
stages of the Budget .
As a consequence of the allocation of Parliamentary time and duties 
to the Opposition the non-governing party was afforded an opportunity to 
fulfill a more positive function than that outlined by Tierney and Disraeli. 
Specifically the Opposition could, through a judicious use of its time and 
Parliamentary rights, effect the nature and content of public legislation.
One of the earliest exponents of the legislative role of Opposition 
was Ramsay Macdonald. In an article published during Labour’s first term 
as the second largest party in the House of Commons, the Party Leader
argued that the Opposition had a legislative role and a duty to "examine
52and criticise" and not simply to oppose for the sake of it . More recently 
the theory of the legislative role of Opposition has been supported by 
Ronald Butt, and he has expanded Macdonald’s analysis by arguing that the 
modern Opposition’s influence on public policy is not limited solely to 
the Parliamentary context. In particular, he has noted that the Opposition, 
in addition to amending legislation, can influence government policy in 
three ways: first, it can help to condition the contemporary climate of
opinion through which the Government itself is influenced; secondly, in 
formulating policy the Government will take into account their opponents’ 
case if only to limit the Opposition’s freedom of attack^^; and finally.
50. Ronald Butt 1969, op.cit., p.324.
5l* Campion 1950, op.cit., p.21; see also Lord Campion (ed.). Parliaments
A Survey, London 1952, pp.29-31.
52, J. Ramsay MacDonald, "The Purpose of an Opposition" reproduced in, 
Beattie 1970, Vol.2,op.cit.» p.345. MacDonald later condemned the 
view that it was an Opposition’s duty to oppose as "a crime against 
the state". Minutes of Evidence, Select Committee on Procedure,
HC 161: 1931, extracts from evidence of J. Ramsay Macdonald, MP, the 
Prime Minister, Para,29.
53. Butt 1969, op.cit., pp.316-17.
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Opposition policy can reveal areas in which Government policy is lacking^^.
The generous allocation of Parliamentary time and duties to the 
Opposition indicates that by the early decades of the Twentieth Century 
the institution was accepted as an integral part of the British Constitu­
tion. In the Ministers of the Crown Act 1937, it was accorded statutory
S‘5
recognition for the first time . The legislation provided for the payment
of a salary from public funds to the Leader of the Opposition who, in
the provisions of the Act, was defined as:
that member of the House of Commons who is 
for the time being the Leader in that House 
of the party in opposition to his Majesty’s 
Government having the greatest numerical 
strength in that House.
The statutory recognition of the Opposition was complemented by the 
further development of the constitutional role of Opposition. Like earlier 
constitutional theories it was mainly concerned with the Opposition’s role 
as a check upon the Executive and was, in part, a restatement of ideas 
which had been prevalent since the Eighteenth Century. For example, in 
works published in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Campion, Jennings and
Araery maintained that the Opposition had become the major constraint on
57the power of the executive •
In addition to the legislative and constitutional roles, an 
alternative government role of Opposition also came into prominence during 
the Twentieth Century. Advocates of this view have held that it is the 
primary duty of an Opposition to prepare itself for future office. This 
may best be achieved, it has been argued, by the Opposition party present­
ing itself as a real, responsible and viable alternative to the existing 
administration, offering an alternative programme and an alternative team 
to the electorate.
54. Ibid., p.318
55. 1 Edw, 8 and 1 Geo. 6, C.38, Part I, Section 5.
56. Ibid., Part 3, 10(1).
57.. Campion (ed.) 1952, op.cit., pp.29-31; L.S. Araery, Thoughts on the
Constitution, Oxford 1947, pp.10-11 and p.31. Sir Ivor Jennings,
Cabinet Government, Cambridge, 2nd edn., 1951, p.439.
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The alternative government role of Opposition is of comparatively 
recent origin. Although indicated in the 1937 payment of the Leader of 
the Opposition, it did not become prominent until after the Second World 
War. One of its earliest exponents was R. A. Butler. Soon after his 
Party’s defeat in the 1945 Election he outlined the major task facing
the Conservative Opposition as the need to offer "a positive alternative
58to Socialism." The series of "Charters" and policy statements which 
were produced under his guidance in the immediate post-war years provide
convincing and practical evidence of his commitment to the alternative
. 59government thesis . In the 1950s and early 1960s, with the Labour Party 
in Opposition, the alternative government concept was endorsed by all 
three Labour Leaders: Attlee, Gaitskell and W i l s o n w h i l e  Anthony
Croaland, and others, argued in its f a v o u r ^ T h e  growing acceptance 
of the alternative government role has led Professor Crick to argue that 
it has in recent years come to replace the view that it is the Opposition's 
role to oppose as the orthodox view of the constitution^^.
The increasing acceptance of the alternative government role of 
Opposition in the post-war period may be regarded as a consequence of 
at least four developments in the nature of contemporary British politics.
58. See 11. A, Butler, The Art of the Possible, London 1971, p. 133.
See also Rt. Hon. Earl Winterton. Orders of the Day, London 1952,
pp.210-11.
59. J.D, Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition, 1945-1951,
London 1964, pp.207-220.
60. See D. E. Butler, The British General Election of 1955, London 1955, 
pp. 23-29; D.E. Butler and Richard Rose, %ie Ibfiti'sh General Election 
of 1959, London 1960, pp.17-34; D.E. Butler and Anthony King,
The British General Election of 1964» London 1965, pp.57-76;
Signposts for the Sixties, Labour Party statement of Policy accepted 
by the Annual Conference, London October 1961; Harold Wilson,
Purpose in Politics; Selected Speeches, London 1964. For a clear 
and interesting outline of the tasks facing an Opposition leader and 
the application of an alternative government role see: Sir Robert 
Menzies, The Measure of the Years, London 1970, pp.16-17.
61. See G.A.R, Crosland, Can Labour Win?, Fabian Tract Wo.324, 1960;
the same author’s The Future of Socialism, London 1964; and M. Abrams, 
Richard Rose and R. Hinden, Must Labour Lose?, London 1960. For a 
contrary point of view see: R.H.S. Grossman, Labour in the Affluent 
Society, Fabian Tract Wo.325, 1960,
62. Bernard Crick, "Two Theories of Opposition", New Statesman,
18 June I960.
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First, as mentioned in the previous section, the gradual development of 
a coherent two party system effectively limited an Opposition’s chances 
of defeating a government in Parliament, This, coupled with the growth 
of the franchise, resulted in the replacement of Parliament by the 
electorate as the major forum for the determination of the con^lexion 
of governments. Thus increasingly, as Jennings has noted, the real appeal 
of Opposition personnel was not to the members on the benches opposite 
but to public opinion outside^^.
As well as alterations in the party system, changes in the nature 
of the parties themselves influenced the growing acceptance of an 
alternative government role. In particular the emergence of the Labour 
Party which, after 1918^^ , offered to the electorate a distinctive 
alternative programme tended to persuade the other political parties of 
the need to distinguish not only between men but also measures. Thus the 
Labour Party’s example may have encouraged the practice by which parties 
in Opposition issued a set of alternative policies to the electorate in 
the form of a centrally printed manifesto; a practice taken up by the 
Liberals in 1923^^ and by the Conservatives in 1935^^. At much the same 
time machinery for the presentation and formulation of policy was estab­
lished by the Conservatives who, in 1929, founded the Conservative Research 
Department^^. Internal dissension and lack of finance precluded the 
Liberals from undertaking a similar venture until after 1946^^.
Thirdly, the development of an alternative government role and its 
increasing acceptance in recent years may be regarded as a consequence of 
the modern Opposition’s inability to fulfill effectively either a 
legislative or a constitutional role. This is a charge generally made by
63. Sir Ivor Jennings, "The Technique of Opposition", Political Quarterly, 
Vol.VI, No.2, April 1935, pp.211-212.
64. At the Labour Party Conference in 1918 a mildly socialist constitu­
tion was adopted. For the background to this see Beer 1965, op.cit., 
pp.126-152* See also F.W.S. Craig, British General Election Manifes­
toes; 1918-1966, Chichester 1970, p.xi and pp.5-6.
65. Craig 1970, op.cit., pp.24-27, in which the full text is reproduced.
66. Block 1964, op.cit., p.72
67. McKenzie 1964, op.cit., pp.284-286.
68. Jorgen Scott Rasmussen, The Liberal Party; a Study in Retrenchment
and Revival, London 1965, pp.35-58.
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those who believe that in recent decades the power of the executive has 
increased at the expense of other elements in the constitutional pattern, 
most notably Parliament. Grossman, for example, has argued that as long 
as a government maintains its majority in the House of Commons an Opposi­
tion cannot check the executive or influence the nature of public policy 
against the Government’s wishes^Others have suggested a decline in 
the status of Parliament as a. major forum for policy-making and its 
subordination in the legislative process to other, extra-parliamentary, 
channels, such as the interplay between the administration and organised 
interests . If the main points of this argument are accepted then one 
may conclude that, as Parliament provides the Opposition with its main 
opportunity to affect the nature of public policy, the decline in Parlia­
ment’s legislative status has led to a dilution in the Opposition’s 
opportunities to participate in the legislative process. Thus, to the 
extent that the Opposition’s ability to fulfill both legislative and 
constitutional roles has declined, the alternative government role has 
emerged to replace them.
Finally, the wide-scale development of mass communications media 
has had the effect of undermining the Opposition’s role as a primary 
source of criticism and has decreased its importance as a major channel 
for the expression of opinions and the ventilation of discontent. The 
competition of other arenas has thus tended to undermine the importance 
of the Opposition'a critical role . Conversely, the development of 
popular newspapers, mass literacy and, later, radio and television has 
tended to highlight the alternative government role of Opposition. For 
at least since the Second World War, the resources have been available
69. R. H. S. Grossman, "Introduction", to Walter Bagehot, The English 
Constitution, Fontana edn., London 1963, pp.42-3. See also,
Lord Morrison of Lambeth, Government and Parliament, Oxford 1954,
pp.96-8,
70. See Andrew Hill and Anthony Wichelow, What’s Wrong with Parliament?, 
Middlesex 1964. There are many books dealing with the decline of 
Parliament. For a general outline of the main points in the debate, 
see Bernard Crick, The Reform of Parliament, London,second edition, 
1968, pp. 1-16 o     ' ^
71. A point made by lonescu and Madariaga. 1968,op,cit., pp.102-121.
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by which an Opposition may make a direct appeal to the national electorate
In conclusion; during the period from 1914 to the present day the 
Opposition has been granted statutory recognition and accorded significant 
legislative rights and duties. These developments have resulted in the 
formulation and general acceptance of both a legislative role and a 
constitutional role of Opposition. These roles have more recently been 
further extended to include an alternative government concept which has 
become increasingly prominent in the post Second World War period. This 
new development is in part a result of four important changes in the 
nature of British politics; the final evolution of a two-party system, 
the emergence of the Labour Party, the "decline" in the status of Parlia­
ment, and the development of mass communications media. In general, 
throughout the period, the idea of the Opposition as a legitimate and 
important part of the constitution and British system of government has 
been increasingly acknowledged and the word and the concept of Opposition 
have become a part of the vocabulary of everyday political life.
Conclusion
As Potter has noted, the course of Opposition history since the 
Eighteenth Century may be viewed as the transition from an institutional
70
(i.e. parliamentary) to a party view of Opposition . During the same 
period ideas about the role of Opposition have developed from an opposition 
to particular men or measures conducted by Parliament as a whole to an 
opposition in the form of an organised group offering an alternative 
government. During the course of its evolution other theories have 
emerged and, in the contemporary British context, the political party as 
Opposition may be expected to fulfill any, or all, of the following 
five roles;
72, No comprehensive account of the role of the mass media in politics
has yet been published. A seminal work is J. T. Klapper, The Effects 
of l^Iass Communications a New York, I960. For the British context see 
J. Trenaman and D. McQuail, Television and the Political Image,
(a study of two Leeds constituencies during the 1959 Election 
campaign) 5 London 1961; R. Rose, Influencing Voters, London 1967; 
Lord Windelshara, Gomiunication and Political Pov7er, London 1966.
'73, See Potter, in Dahl (ed.), op.cit., 1966, p.6.
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1, A constitutional role: whereby the Opposition acts as a
check upon executive power and "provides against corruption 
and defective administration"*^^
2. A representative role: whereby the Opposition may serve
as a channel for the expression of minority opinions and 
for the ventilation of grievances*
3* A legislative role: whereby the Opposition may affect the
nature and content of public policy.
4. A critical role: whereby the Opposition’s primary duty is
simply to oppose.
5. An alternative government role: whereby the Opposition
coAduets its activities in a responsible and constructive 
manner witli the aim of presenting itself as a real and 
viable alternative to the existing administration.
The first three roles mainly relate to the Opposition in Parliament, 
while the last ttw have a wider application: A political party during
a terra in Opposition may fulfill all these roles or only some of them.
An initial concern in this study is to determine which role or roles 
were adopted by the Conservatives during their period in Opposition from 
1964 to 1970. Thus in the next chapter an outline of the conduct of 
that Opposition is provided, and an attempt is made to answer two question^; 
First, which role, or combination of roles» was given primacy; and 
secondly, what was the nature, of the goals pursued by the 1964 to 1970 
Conservative Opposition?
74 . Jennings 1931, op.cit., p.463.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLES AND GOALS OF OPPOSITION: THE CONSERVATIVES AS OPPOSITION
1964 TO 1970
R. T, McKenzie has argued that one of the most striking features
of the Conservative Party is "the enormous power which appears to be
concentrated in the hands of the Leader." If one accepts 24cKenzie’s
analysis then it is clear that the selection of the role, or roles,
adopted by the Conservative Party as Opposition will greatly depend
upon the Party Leader’s preferences and attitudes. He performs the
function of the grand strategist, although, as McKenzie adds; "The vast
powers of the Leader..• are exercised only with the consent of his 
2
followers." Thus in practice the Party Leader is, at the very least, 
dependent upon the support of his closest colleagues and must consider 
their advice. Moreover, he cannot persistently ignore the feelings of 
those within the Parliamentary and Mass sections of the Party.
McKenzie’s analysis would seem to imply that any study of roles 
addptëd and goals pursued by a Conservative Opposition should contain 
a consideration and assessment of the views of the Party Leader. In 
addition, the opinions of actors at other levels within the Party should 
be taken into account. However, to the extent that the opinions of 
those actors may differ amongst themselves and with those of their 
Leader, the actual roles adopted and goals pursued may not conform 
absolutely to any stated vievqmint. Thus an a'nalysis of the actors’ 
opinions may usefully be complemented by an analysis of the Opposition’s 
behaviour. Taken together, these two dimensions - opinions and behaviour 
appear to offer the best prospect of worthwhile conclusions.
In the light of the considerations outlined above the remainder of 
this chapter is divided into four sections. The first contains an 
analysis of the views about the roles and goals of Opposition held by
1. R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties, Second edn., London 1964 ,
p . 21.
2. Ibid., p.67.
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the two men who led the Conservative Party during the years from 1964 to 
1970: Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Edward Heath. Their opinions are then
compared and contrasted with those held by their immediate colleagues 
within the Party Leadership, which, for the purposes of this study, 
comprised the members of the Leader’s Consultative Committee or, as it 
was more popularly termed, the Shadow Cabinet. In the third section an 
outline is given of the Conservative Opposition’s behaviour and account 
is taken of back-bench and mass party influence in shaping this. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with an assessment of the preceding outlines of 
attitudes and behaviour in terms of what they reveal about the roles 
fulfilled and the goals pursued by the Conservative Party as Opposition 
from 1964 to 1970.
The Party Leaders
Following their election defeat in October 1964 the Conservative 
Party formed the Opposition for the first time in thirteen years.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home has since recalled that the Party was totally
* • o . 3
unaccustomed to its new situation and quite unprepared for its new task ,
However, many Conservatives, including Sir Alec, had experienced Opposition
during the 1945-1951 period, and this experience provided.them with some
precedents on which to base their actions.
The experiences gained during the 19.45 to 1951 period offered at 
least two possible guidelines. First, there was the view generally 
associated with Churchill who, like Disraeli, maintained that an Opposi­
tion should mainly fulfill a critical role, opposing for opposition’s 
sake^. Moreover, Churchill thought it unnecessary and dangerous to run 
a system of sharply defined "shadow ministries", preferring instead to
command a Front-Bench with loosely defined or even undefined responsi- 
5bilities . The second model was most strongly supported by R. A. Butler 
who, as we have seen, favoured a strategy based mainly upon the alterna- 
tive government role of Opposition involving the formulation of a
3. Kenneth Young, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, London 1970, p.222
4. J. D. Hoffman, The ConservaH/^ Party in Opposition 1945-1951, London
1964, pp.135-36.
5. Lord Kilmuir, Politleal Adventure, London 1962, pp.148-9.
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’positive policy’ which offered a distinct alternative to the Labour 
Government^.
As Opposition Leader in 1964 Sir Alec showed a marked preference
for Butler’s view point. He considered that an Opposition’s success
was in part a result of a Government’s failures, and in part the product
of "the general impact of an Opposition in suggesting itself as a
7competent alternative." Consequently Sir Alec rejected opposition for
opposition’s sake, doubting whether the country really wanted "ding-
8dong parliamentary battles." At a meeting of Conservative backbenchers, 
held shortly after the 1964 Election, Sir Alec outlined his concept 
of a "constructive" and "responsible" Opposition:
I want to make it clear that it is not our intention 
so to exploit the Parliamentary situation that good
government is made difficult... That is not the function
of an Opposition* We shall judge each proposal as it 
comes... and the test we shall apply.in every case is 
whether or not the matter proposed is in the best interests 
of the nation .g
Later, in his July 1965 resignation speech to the 1922 Committee, Sir 
Alec emphasised that the object of all his work as Opposition Leader had 
been to turn public opinion back to the Conservatives so that they would 
be in a position to win a General Election ' .
As well as showing a marked preference for the alternative government
approach. Sir Alec was concerned that such an objective should be pursued
in an "effective" manner. To be "effective", he believed that the
Opposition had to remain united since nothing would harm a party’s support
11more than disunity . Consequently one of Sir Alec’s major concerns as 
Opposition Leader was to develop a closer degree of co-ordination between 
the Front and back benches of the Parliamentary Party and between them
6. Lord Butler, The Art of the Possible, London 1971, p.133 and p.135.
7. Young 1970, op.cit., p.234.
8. Ibid.g p.239.
9. The Times, 28 October 1964,
10. The Times, 23 July 1965; and Interview 9.
11. Robert Rhodes James, Ambitions and Realities, London 1972, p.116.
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12and Conservative Central Office (CCO) . Moreover, his emphasis upon
party cohesion and co-ordination was reflected in his attitude towards
the appointment and responsibilities of Opposition personnel. Soon after
entering Opposition, for example, he appointed a sixty strong team of
Front-Benchers, including a "Shadow Cabinet" of nineteen members, tt/elve
other Front-Bench spokesmen and twenty nine junior spokesmen. Each
member of this large team was given a specific brief and a specific area 
13of responsibility .
In general, Sir Alec’s attitude towards Opposition conformed closely
to the alternative government concept. In both organisational and
tactical terras he did not follow Churchill’s example. Yet, in addition
to purely tactical considerations. Sir Alec’s approach was shaped by more
personal desires and inclinations. As his biographer has noted. Sir Alec
was politically too detached to get fully involved in the business of
Oppositions "he disliked personalising issues and shied away from the
competitive cut and thrust which appealed to politicians such as Macleod
and W i l s o n . R a t h e r  he felt that Opposition behaviour should conform
to certain standards and rules which demarcated what was and what was not
acceptable: "like fighting in a cricket match to score more runs than 
15the other team," For such a man the critical role of Opposition was 
not appealing.
Sir Alec’s successor as Party Leader, Edward Heath, continued his 
predecessor’s emphasis upon the alternative government role. According 
to Rhodes Jamas, Heath regarded it as hia main task "to build up an 
alternative government which was a credible alternative."^^ Furthèr 
evidence for this conclusion is to be found in the statement made by 
Mr. Quintin Hogg, following the Leadership Election in July 1965, in 
which he claimed that Heath's function was to "raise the status of the
12. See article by The Times 'political correspondent' , "Tory Tactics 
will be to Flay it Cool", 26 October 1964; and Rhodes James 1972, 
op.cit., p.126.
13. In February 1965 the team of Opposition spokesmen was increased to
66. For details of changes in front bench personnel, see
R.M. Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition, London 1973, Appendix D.
14. Young 1970, op.cit., p.232.
15. Ibid., p.232,
16. Rhodes James 1972, op.cit.» p.140
32
17
Opposition to that of an alternative government". Moreover as 
Conservative policy chief during Sir Alec’s tenure as Leader, Heath had 
already demonstrated his commitment to the re- assessment of party policy 
involving the formulation of a distinctive alternative programme^
Heath did not, however, share his predecessor’s personal reservations 
about the cut and thrust of Opposition and was more willing to accept such 
tactics as a necessary part of the situation in which the Party found 
itself. For instance, prior to his election as Leader, Heath, in his 
management of the highly successful Conservative attack upon the Labour 
Government’s 1965 Finance Bill, demonstrated that he saw some merit in 
adopting both the critical and the legislative roles of Opposition^*^.
At the 1966 Conservative Party Conference he made it clear that, although 
his main aim was "to show the country that we are the alternative govern­
ment ready to take over", this did not rule out the need for an Opposi-
. 20tion which, though acting responsibly, would "oppose vigorously." " The 
strategy by which Heath hoped to return his party to power thus contained 
two dimensions: first and most importantly, the formulation and presen­
tation of a credible alternative aimed at increasing Conservative support; 
secondly, responsible yet vigorous opposition aimed at exploiting the 
Governmentweaknesses and undermining its support. The real problem 
with such a strategy lay in its balance and timing; in deciding just 
when to attack, just when to publicise the Party’s alternative, and what 
degree of emphasis should be placed on each aspect at any given time.
The manner in which Heath fulfilled his task as Opposition Leader 
provided an indication of his awareness of the problems of balance and 
timing involved in the adoption of a tv7o dimensional strategy. His 
approach to Opposition Leadership may be divided into two periods; from 
July 1965 to the General Election in March 1966 and from then until June 
1970. In the first period the Conservative Party most closely resembled
17. Sunday E^ q^ ress article quoted in, George Hutchinson, Edward Heath: 
a Personal and Political Biography, London 1970, p.172,
18. See Chapter Six below.
19. For details of this campaign see; Margaret Laing; Edward Heath; 
Prime Minister, London 1972, p.165,
20. NÜCUA 84th Annual Conference Report, 1966, WUCUA London, 1966, 
pp.34-36.
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a "government in exile" rather than a party in Opposition • Faced by 
a Labour Government with a majority of six it was a reasonable expectation 
that a General Election might take place at any moment. In this situation
it appears that Heath’s major concern was to project his party as a viable
22and credible alternative government Thus he emphasised the reformulation 
of party policy which was taking place at the time and a great deal of
publicity and attention was given to the major policy statement published
23
in October 1965“ .
After March 1966 the emphasis changed. The Labour Government had
returned to power with a majority of 110, thus making it virtually certain
that the Conservatives faced a long period in Opposition. In this new
situation Heath, in consultation with his closest colleagues in the
"Shadow Cabinet" and leading members of Party Organisation decided that,
over the next two years, resources would be mainly concentrated on
revitalising the party machine and holding the party together^^.
This was to be a period of low key Opposition but thereafter, from late
1968, the Opposition would prepare itself for the polls by publicising
its alternative policies and alternative team, and by concentrating upon
25attacking its opponents .
Like his predecessor. Heath placed strong emphasis upon the need
for a united Opposition since, as he saw it, the public had little time
26for an Opposition divided within itself . A divided Opposition could 
neither attack the Government vigorously nor present itself as a viable 
and credible alternative. To do both these things effectively the 
Opposition needed to act as a united team, supporting a consistent and 
well articulated programme.
Heath’s concern with unity was reflected both in the organisation
21. Interview 16,
22. Interview 9.
23. Putting Britain Right Ahead, CCO, London, October 1965.
24. Interview 5,
25. See speech be Edward Heath to the 1968 Party Conference, MUGUA 86th 
Annual Conference Report, NUGUA, London, October 1968, pp.125-126. 
This was also confirmed by Interviews 9, 5 and 6*
26. Ian Trethowan, "Tory Leadership Face a Long Term Trial", The Times, 
25 April 1968.
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of the Opposition and in his attitude to more independently minded colleagues.
Organisationally Heath followed Sir Alec's example. He rejected Macmillan's
27advice to "do what Winston did" and preserve flexibility , and instead 
appointed a team of seventy m o  Opposition spokesmen each with clearly 
defined responsibilities and duties. The only exceptions were Maudling
28as Deputy Leader and Hogg who was "without departmental responsibilities," 
Moreover, Heath divided his spokesmen into specialist groups on each of 
the major subjects, such as Overseas Mfairs with nine spokesmen under 
Sir Alec, Defence with five spokesmen under Powell, and Treasury, Economi.c 
Affairs and Trade with six spokesmen under Macleod, “ Following the 1966 
General Election the idea of specialist subject teams was dropped and the
number of Opposition spokesmen was cut dom to 37, although all remained
< • . 30responsible for a specific policy area" .
Heath's approach to the organisation of his'Front-Bench may have
resulted in at least two members - Maude and Poxfell - feeling circumscribed
3J
by the lack of flexibility allowed them \ Both attempted to take an 
independent line and were sharply rebulted by their Party Leader for attempting 
to do so.
On 14 January 1966, the Front-Bench spokesman on Commonwealth 
Affairs, Angus Maude, published an article in The Spectator in which he 
argued that the Conservative Party had become a "meaningless irrelevance" 
and had "completely lost the political initiative.Heath reacted by 
ajjplying the doctrine of collective responsibility to his Shadow Cabinet, 
insisting that members should not engage in public feuding on party and 
policy issues. The Times commented that this reflected the Opposition 
Leader's belief that disagreement within the Leadership would undermine
27. Hutchinson 1970, op.cit., pp.172-173.
28. See Punnett 1973, op.cit., Appendix D and p.164,
29. These figures include the Party Whips of which there were ten
in 1965.
30. Including ten party Miips. The figure of 37 Front-benchers remained 
constant until the latter part of 1967 when a gradual recruitment 
began in preparation for the General Election, so that by late 1969 
Heath commanded a team of 54 subject spokesmen* For further details 
see Punnett 1973, op.cit.
31. For views on Heath's organisation of his Front-Bench team see
Hutchinson 1970, op.cit., p.172 and 174; Punnett 1973, ^.cit., 
pp.168, 336.
32. Angus Maude, "Winter of Tory Discontent", The Spectator, 14 January
1966.
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Conservative support, a particularly disturbing possibility in what seemed
33likely to be an election year . After a meeting with the Party Leader, 
some four days later, Maude resigned from the Opposition Front-Bench,
In response Heath made clear his determination to prevent the Conservative 
Party from tearing itself apart in public and he recalled the consequences 
of the ideological divisions which had wracked the Labour Party in the 
late 1950s34,
In comparison to Claude, Powell was a more persistent offender.
He frequently spoke in public on topics outside the scope of his Defence
brief, and very often without prior consultation with the relevant Front-
35Bench spokesman or the Party Leader * in April 1966, following a speech
by Powell on Opposition strategy. Heath reminded him that members of the
Shadow Cabinet must follow a common line and present agreed policies in
36
the House and in the country . At the time Powell accepted the Party
Leader's doctrine and thus remained a member of the Front-Bench team, but
he continued to maintain an independent position. After his Birmingham
speech, in April 1968, Heath demanded his resignation and Powell left the
37Opposition Front-Bench .
In sum. Heath's concept of Opposition was a combination of the 
alternatIve government and critical roles, with a slight preference for 
the former* Throughout his period as Opposition leader. Heath never publicly 
advocated the adoption of an opposition for opposition's sake posture,
preferring instead vigorous opposition conducted in a constructive and
38 i 1responsible manner * The goal of the Opposition was to win back power
and this mainly depended upon the gradual accumulation of support among 
the electorate. Thus the fixed point in the strategy was the next General 
Election* During the period of Opposition the Party's primary tasks were
33. Tlie Times, 15 January 1966. On 'collective responsibility'
in Opposition, see Punnett 1973, op.cit., pp.288-301.
34. T.V. interview with Heath quoted in The Times, 19 January 1966.
35. Andrew Roth, Enoch Powell: Tory Tribune, London 1970, p.332.
36. The Times, 18 April 1966.
37. For background sees Andrew Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, London
1972, p.204.
38. Report of a speech by Heath at Keith, Banffshire, in The Times,
11 September 1968.
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to influence public opinion by attacking the Government's weaknesses in a 
responsible manner and by presenting themselves as a viable and credible 
alternative with a distinctive programme and a well publicised team ready 
to take office. Central to his thesis was the idea that neither of these 
tasks could be fulfilled unless party cohesion was maintained and disunity 
avoided' .
The Party Leadership
As previously noted, among Heath’s senior colleagues in the 
Shadow Cabinet the main publicly expressed disagreements with his viewpoint 
were articulated by Maude and Powell. The letter’s views were particularly 
noteworthy because he was one of the few Conservative politicians to outline 
a clear and concise concept of Opposition Xfhich differed substantially 
from the view held by the Party Leader.
There were three main points of disagreement between Heath and 
Powell* In the first place, as Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky note, Powell’s 
concept of Opposition conformed more closely to the Nineteenth Century idea 
of "men in opposition" allowing for a high degree of flexibility and a free 
play of ideas'^. This was totally contrary to the Party Leader’s view that 
an Opposition should be united behind a clear set of policies capable of 
serving as an election j)rogramme. Secondly, Powell rejected Heath’s notion 
of responsible Opposition and advocated a more negative style "designed 
to demolish, to shake confidence, to hold up to ridicule".Finally,
Powell proposed that the Opposition should offer a radical alternative, 
unhindered by the need to hold the middle ground of electoral support: in 
the interests of electoral prudence^
With the exceptions of Powell and Maude, all metbers of the
39» Interviews 1, 2, and 6 . See also D. E. Butler and Michael Pinto- 
Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970, London 1971, p.92; 
and Riiodes James 1972, op.cit*, p. 116.
40. Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971, op.cit., p.77.
41. The Times, 14 April 1966.
42. The Times g Leader, 15 January 1966. See also the speech delivered
by Powell on 6 A%)ril 1966» The Times, 14 April 1966.
37
Shadow Cabinet who made public their views on Opposition supported the 
Party Leader, and often defended his tactics against demands articulated 
by members of the Parliamentary and iaass sections of the Party for a 
rougher and tougher style of Opposition. Maudling, Douglas-Home, Barber, 
Hogg and Seiwyn Lloyd served at various times throughout the Opposition 
period as defenders and supporters of the Leader's approach^^.
Other prominent Conservatives appeared to prefer a marginally 
different emphasis. Macleod, for example, at one point came close to 
the Churchillian concept when he described his notion of Opposition as 
"guerilla raids" including concentrated assaults on weak ministers and
occasional carefully planned set piece attacks on the Labour Party in 
general and Wilson in particular^^. In contrast Boyle preferred what 
The Times called a "consensus view" of Opposition, placing greater 
emphasis upon the Conservative alternative rather than partisan attack^^. 
These variations were marginal, however, and the strategy articulated by 
Heath appeared to enjoy the support of the overwhelming majority of his 
closest colleagues.
The Behaviour of the Conservatives in Opposition
As previously noted, the roles adopted by the Conservative Party 
in Opposition, although strongly influenced by the attitudes of the Party 
Leaders cannot be said to have depended solely upon them. The part played 
by other sections of the Party in determining which roles were pursued 
must also be considered. In attempting to do this the following analysis 
takes the form of an outline of the operation of the Opposition in three
43, See speeches by Maudling and Barber to the 1966 Party Conference,
in MUCUA 84th Annual Conference Report, NUCHA, London 1966, p.126 
and p. 27, respectively; Seiwyn Lloyd, NUCUA 86th Annual Conference 
Report, NUCUA, London 1968, p.20; Douglas-Home and Hogg, The Times, 
5 October 1968 and 7 October 1968.
44, Iain Macleod, "In Opposition", Crossbow, January to March 1965;
although contrast this with his speech to the 1966 Party Conference 
in which he outlined a concept in line with Heath's strategic 
preferences; NUCUA 1966, op.cit., pp.96-8. For further discussion 
of Macleod*s views see Nigel Fisher, Iain Macleod, London 1973,
p.284"85.
45, The Times, Leader, 15 January 1966.
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chronological sections s from October 1964 to the 1966 General Election, 
from March 1966 to June 1968, and from then until June 1970, Particular 
attention is given throughout to the influence upon the application of 
the Leadership’s approach of opinions within the Parliamentary and Mass 
sections of the party.
The first phase began with what may he termed a honeymoon period, 
during which the Labour Government was allowed to settle into office and 
the Conservatives adapted to their new role as Opposition. The low-key 
approach that this entailed soon aroused demnds from sections within 
both the Parliamentary Party and amongst the rank and file for a more 
militant style of Opposition^^. Party Leaders responded in March 1965 
by launching a renewed and "earnest" Parliamentary struggle against the 
Labour Government and by calling upon the constituency associations to 
move on to the offensive^^* This move, and the èVer present prospect of 
a snap General Election apparently sufficed to placate the critics and to 
keep the Party united.
By November 1965, however, opinion polls were showing a Labour 
lead of between five and eighteen per cent and in the new year signs of 
growing disunity within the Party began to emerge* Powell and Maudling 
conducted a public argument about Conservatism and incomes policy^^, Maude
made his views on the conduct of the Opposition known, and other sections 
of the Party echoed his opinion^^* Faced with the threat of a sharp 
decline in party discipline Heath and Macleod launched attacks upon the
46. See "Tories in a New World", The Times, 12 November 1964;
ibid. g 28 Decemfaer 1964; and motions numbers 30, 32, 33 in,
WUCÏÏA Central Council: Agenda and Handbook, March 1965, NUCUA,
London.
47* See. announcement by Whitelaw to the 1922 Committee as reported in
The Times, 5 March 1965; speech by Douglas-Home, ibid., 18 March 
1965; announcement by du Gann, ib^., 5 March 1965.
48. See NOP Bulletin, December 1965, p.3; Gallup Political Index, No.69
January 1966, p.4,
49. For details, see pp. 155 below.
50. See. speech by Paul Williams, Chairman of the Monday Club, and
speeches by Macleod and Edward Taylor, M.P. supporting Heath,
The Times, 15 January 1966. See also, editorial by Michael Wolff,
"A Party Trying to find its Voice", in Crossbow, January to March 
1966 edition.
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51Labour Government’s price control policy . These attacks marked the 
beginning of a more militant phase in the conduct of the Opposition which 
was sustained up until the 1966 General Election.
In the second phase, from March 1966 to June 1968, intra-party
attacks upon the Opposition’s performance began early in the new session ,
while the Parliamentary Party became deeply divided over the Labour
53Government’s prices and incomes policy '. By October 1966 criticisms of
Heath in particular and the Opposition’s performance in general were being
54 . . 4widely articulated . Against this background of growing intra-party
dissent, in January 1967, The Times reported that, as a result of a top
level decision, there was to be a shift in Opposition tactics away from
the responsible approach previously pursued. The new departure was to be
launched by Heath and was to take the form of "a long-term strategy of
. 4  « . . 53attrition" with Wilson as its principal target • In response to back-bench
56criticism this campaign was later shelved , although intra-party complaints
about the Opposition’s performance persisted and the Party Leader’s popu-
57larity continued to decline
31. The Times, 31 January 1966, and 17 January 1966*
52. See article by the ’Political Correspondent’ in The Times, 1 July 1966|
editorial in Crossbow, July to September 1966 edition; both of which 
articulated the dewiands for a more aggressive and effective Opposition. 
See also, Roth 1972, op*cit., p.201.
33. For details, see pp. 158-59 below.
54. In the debate on "Conservative Policy in Opposition" at the 1966
Party Conference, six of the eleven speakers from the floor were 
critical of the Opposition’s lack of vigowr; NUCUA 1966 Conference 
Report, op.cit., pp.27-34. These critics reflected the views of a 
large minority amongst the ranlc and file as indicated in the motions 
submitted for the debate. Out of 50 motions submitted on "Conservative 
Policy in Opposition", 16 demanded a more militant Opposition pursuing 
more negative tactics while 16 called for a clearer statement of the 
Conservative alternative; the remaining 14 were more general in nature, 
NUCUA Conference Handbook and Programme of Proceedings 1966, NUCUA, 
London, motions nmiibers 85-135, pp.15-22.
55. The Times, 16 January 1967. The first indications of this new campaign
were contained in The Newsletter, 14 January 1967, GCO, London.
56. The Times, 20 January 1967.
57. In January 1967 the Gallup Poll revealed that Heath’s popularity
rating had dropped to 29 per cent. Gallup Political Index, Report No, 
81, p.6. See also the motions submitted for the Central Council 
Meeting in March 1967, NUCUA Central Council, Handbook and Agenda, 
March 1967, NUCUA, L o n d o n , n u % 5 e ^  3-9.
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In the Autumn of 1967 doubts about Heath’s future as Party Leader 
were being publicly expressed. Sir Gerald Habarro in his self-appointed
capacity as what The Times called the Party Leader’s "candid friend",
58questioned Heath’s success as Party Leader . Other Conservatives
were critical of the Party's lack of impact and tended to blame either
the Party Leader, the Party’s publicity machine or the nature of
59
Conservative policies’ * At the 1967 Party Conference the platform 
attempted to silence these critics, and Barber, Maudling and Selwyn 
Lloyd urged the party faithful to guard against the danger of stampeding 
their leaders into adopting opposition for opposition’s aMke tactics^^.
The situation failed to improve, however, and by the late Spring of 1968 
the decline in unanimity reached a new peak as the Party split over 
defence, Rhodesia, immigration, and prices and incomes policy^^. It was 
at this point that Powell delivered his Birmingham speech on imiiigration, 
and, as a consequence, the Party Leader demanded, and received, his 
resignation from the Front-Bench^^. This incident represented a watershed 
in the life of the Opposition, Heath’s assertion of authority over the 
Powell affair was to mark the beginning of sl gradual process of party 
re-unification.
Overall, the second, mid-term phase proved the most difficult for 
the Party Leaders. Faced with the prospect of up to five years in Opposi*' 
tlon, the probability of a sharp decrease in party discipline and party
58* The Times, 25 September 1907; and ibid., 20 October 1967;
SÏr^Gerald Nabarro, HAB 1; Portrait of a Politician, Oxford 1969, 
p.63 and p.71.
59. See The Times, 16 October 1967; article by Ian Trethowan, The Times,
12 October 1967.
60. NUCUA 85th Annual Conference Report, 1967, NUCUA London, p.27 and
pp.121-127,
61. On the state of opinion within the Conservative Party in the 
early part of 1968 see: David Wood, "Tories Pressing for All-Out 
Attack", The Times, 5 February 1968; and Ian Trethowan, "Tories 
Planning New Policy Moves", The Times, 22 February 1968.
62. Sees Roth 1970, op,cit., pp.339-361. For full text of Powell’s 
speech, see Enoch Powell, Freedom and Reality, London 1969,
pp.213-219.
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morale was heightened^^. Moreover, the Party Leader’s popularity unden^rent
a progressive decline during the wo  year period and as a consequence his
authority weakened and his hold upon the Party loosened. Throughout this
phase. Party Leaders were under continual pressure from sections of the
Parliamentary Party and the ranlc and file to adopt more militant Opposition
tactics. In the face of this pressure the Leadership pursued a strategy
which mainly emphasised the critical role of Opposition, as indicated in
the Opposition’s attack upon the Labour Government’s prices and incomes 
64legislation , the adoption of a campaign of attrition in January 1967, 
Heath’s critique of the Labour Government’s Industrial restructuring
65programme, and the adoption of a general charge of "interventionism."
In the final phase, from June 1968 to June 1970, the Opposition’s
actions conformed more closely to the Party Leader’s blueprint. In June
and July 1968 rfeath delivered four speeches in which, for the first time,
he placed emphasis upon the economic situation which would be facing a
future Conservative Ctovernment and attacked both Wilson and the Labour
66Government’s record . In October, a "mid-term" manifesto containing
the Party’s alternative policies was published^^, and in the same month .
at the Party Conference Heath announced that the final stage in the Party’s
preparation for the next General Election was to begin^^. The Times
commented that at this Conference the Conservative Leaders had, for the
69first time, attempted to present themselves as the next Government , and 
from there on, the final phase in the two-fold plan outlined by the Party 
Leader following the 1966 Election was sustained until June 1970. Moreover, 
criticisms of the Party Leadership and the Opposition’s performance declined 
tlirougliout the latter part of 1968 and the early part of 1969. No motion 
critical of the Opposition’s lack of vigour, for example, was submitted
63. On party discipline in Opposition see U.K. Alderman, "Parliamentary 
party discipline in Opposition: the Parliamentary Labour Party 
1951-1964", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.21, No.2, Spring 1968,
pp.124-136,
64. See below, pp.159-61.
65. See below, pp.263-64 and 277-78,
66. See The Times, 26 June 1968, 27 June 1968, 5 July 1968,
17 Jïïîy 1968."
67. ]Méike Life Better, GCO, London, October 1968.
68. NUCUA 1968 Conference Report, op.cit., pp.125-126.
69. The Times, 9 October 1968.
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for either the 1968 or 1969 Party Conferences* and the latter was the first
since 1963 at which the issues of party purpose and party strategy were not 
70debated .
The Roles Adopted by the Conservative Opposition
In sura, the roles adopted by the Conservative Party In Opposition,
although strongly influenced, by the attitudes and preferences of the Party
Leaders, did not solely depend upon them. In practice Party Lenders were
forced to reconcile their preferences with, first* pressures from their
followers for more militant and vigorous tactics and, secondly,' their own
desire to maintain party unity. The outcome, particularly during the second
phase of opposition, was that more emphasis than the Leadership had originally
allowed for was placed upon the critical role of Opposition. Tlius in practice
the Conservative Opposition mainly adopted and pursued a combination of the
73alternative government and the critical roles in about equal proportion *.
The conclusion outlined in the preceding paragraph should not be taken 
to mean that the Party did not fulfill other roles of Opposition, There is 
ample evidence that it did. In opposing the manner in which Section IV of the
1966 Prices and Incomes Bill was introduced, for example, the Opposition
• 4 72fulfilled a constitutional role . Equally, in their approach to the Companies
Bill, particularly during the Committee stage, the Conservatives fulfilled
73a representative role . %ile, finally, through the Party’s handling 
of the 1965 Finance Bill (to which they tabled 680 amendments, defeated the 
Government in three out of 108 divisions, and thereby achieved the first 
government defeat on a Finance Bill since 1924) the Opposition fulfilled a 
legislative role^^. None of these roles, however, was fulfilled with the 
same persistence and consistency as were their critical and alternative. 
governiaent coun terp ar ts.
70. See NUCUA Conference Handbook and Programme of 
NUCUA, London 1968; and ibid., 1969.
71. For a diecuæion and assessment of the relative merits of these roles,
see Punnett 1973, op.cit., pp.196-205,
72. See below, pp. 1 6 0 ^ —
73. See speech by Michael Shaw H.C. Debs., Vol.759, ColG.%27r29 , 19 July
1967; another example might be the 1968 Transport Bill, H.C.Debs., 
Vol.765, Cols. 2069-74, 30 May 1965,
74. See speech by Heath, H.C. Debs., Vol.716, Cols. 805-12, 15 July 1965*
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The Dominant and Persistent Goal of the Conservative Opposition
Towcirds what end did the Conservatives adopt the two roles outlined
above? Punnett has argued that a central characteristic of the Opposition
in the United Kingdom is that it is "office-seeking" and, because of the
fairly regular alternation of parties in govermmifc, it is "office- 
75 _ . . »expecting." ' Likewise, Richard Rose has noted that Opposition politicians
* 4 • . 76concentrate their efforts primarily upon eeuuring election • Other
observera of the Conservative Party* such as Samuel Beer and Nigel Harris,
have referred to what might be termed a "will to power" as one of the major
77determinants and most persuasive explanations of the Party’s behaviour 
The preceding analysis of the attitudes of the Conservative Leadership and 
the behaviour of the Conservative Opposition during the 1964 to 1970 period 
would seem to validate their conclusions. Many Conservatives, including 
the overwhelming majority of the Party Leadership* appear to have regarded 
the Party’s status as Opposition as a purely temporary phenomenon and to 
have believed that eVery effort should be made to secure a return to office 
at the earliest opportunity. It thus may be stated that, in pursuing the 
two roles outlined above, the primary goal of the Conservative Party was 
to regain the power, prestige and status of a governing party.
This does not mean that other goals were not pursued by the 
Conservative Opposition during the 1964 to 1970 period. As Dahl notes, 
political actors have "short-term" and "long-term" aims and their ostensible 
goals may not be their "real" goals. But, he continues, "certain goals,
whether long-run or short-run, public or private, are dominant and control-
78 . .ling," Thus, it m y  be said that, although the Conservatives during their
period in Opposition m y  have pursued other goals, these were transitory 
and secondary to their primary aim of regaining power.
75. Punnett, 1973, op.cit., p.13
76, Richard Rose, "The Variability of Party Government", Political
Studies, Vol. XVII, No.4, 1969, p.429,
77# 8. H. Beer, Modern British Politics, London .1965, p.299; Nigel
Harris, GorapeLi.tlon and the Corporate Society, London 1972, pp.254- 
262.
78. Pv, A. Dahl (ed.). Political Oppositions in Western Democracieg,
New Haven 1966, p.341*
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Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter I have attempted to outline the roles adopted and 
the goals pursued by the Conservative Party as Opposition during the period 
from 1964 to 1970. I have argued that the predominant and persistent goal 
of the majority of the members of the Conservative Opposition was to regain 
the power, prestige and status of a governing party* and that in pursuit of 
this goal they adopted and fulfilled a coinljination of the alternative 
government and critical roles of Opposition in about equal proportion.
This resulted in a concentration of party activities upon two fronts, 
first, upon attacking the Government and exploiting its weaknesses with 
the aims of undeniiini.ng its support and maintaining the unity of the 
Opposition; secondly* upon presenting the Opposition as a real, responsible 
and viable alternative to the existing administration, with the aim of 
strengthening Conservative support and morale.
Ill the eyes of most of the Party leaders and some of their followers, 
if these aims were to be ftuccessfully anhieved at least two conditions 
required to be met. First, in order that the Opposition might maximise 
its ability both to exploit the Government’s weaknesses and to appear as 
a viable alternative, party unity had to be maintained. Secondly, in 
order that the Opposition might pursue a persistent and consistent attack 
upon the Government and offer a real alternative, some form of party 
policy, either in detail or in general outline, had to be provided*
It is this latter aspect, the production of party policy in 
Opposition, which forms the central subject matter of this study.
However, before proceeding to consider the case studies of particular 
policy areas, the policy-making process of the Conservative Opposition 
may usefully be outlined.
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PART TWO
POLICY-miCXNG IM OPPOSITION: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY
The nature of the policy formulated by a political party during 
a period in Opposition will be influenced not only by factors peculiar 
to the Opposition situation but also by considerations relevant to the 
particular party under study. In the preceding chapters the Opposition 
situation has been outlined and in this section I consider the situation 
as it applies to a Conservative Opposition. This situation is affected, 
first* by the party’s structure and, second, by the party’s culture.^  
Broadly speaking, the former element covers the institutional and 
organisational aspect of Conservative policy-making and is dealt with 
in Chapter Four, while the latter element, outlined in Chapter Five, 
encompasses the shared Ideals and opinions of the actors who operate 
within the structural framework •
1, For a more detailed outline of the Conservative "policy process" 
see John D. Saloma, British Conservatism and the Welfare States 
An Analysis of the Policy Process Within the Conservative Party, 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Harvard University, October 1961, 
Chapter I.
2. The term "culture" is used here in the same sense as in the 
political culture literature, the implication being that a 
political culture may be defined in terras of the shared attitudes 
which the members of a given political group hold in common.
The term seems to have originated with Gabriel Almond, see 
Heina Eulau, S. J. Eldersveld and Morris Janowits (eds,). 
Political Behaviour, New York 1956,p.36. See also, S. H. Beer 
(et.al.)»Patterns of Government, Hew York 1958.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION’S POLICY-MKING PROCESSî THE STRUCTURAL
ELEMENT
Much has already been published on the Conservative Party’s policy- 
3
making structure ' * but until recently no study was available which
‘ 4 ,
dealt specifically with the Opposition context /. The publication, in 
the Autumn of 1973* of Punnett’s study of Front-Bench Opposition has to 
a large extent reiTjedied this omission ' . I have, therefore, attempted 
to minimise my own material and whenever possible have referred the 
reader to relevant sections of Punnett’s outline. However, certain 
aspects of the Party’s policy-making structure are not covered by Punnett 
(the Extra Parliamentary sections) and these I have included in my oim 
analysis.
The policy-making structure of a political party may be defined 
as the sum of the various policy channels which have access to the party’s 
key policy-making centre. A policy channel miy take the form either of 
an institution, such as a committee or other kind of organisation, or 
of an individual, A policy-making centre is taken to denote the locus 
of policy decision. In any policy producing organisation there will 
probably be many loci of policy decision, but usually these will exist 
within a hierarchical structure so that the final decision is centralised 
in a single agency, either an institution or an individual. It should 
be noted, however, that in the case of an institution the individual 
menibers of it may at times also serve as channels of policy in their 
own right,
3. R.T, McKenzie, British Political Parties, second edn,, London 1963, 
Part 1; Ivor Bulmer Thomas, The Growth of the British Party System, 
2 vols, London 1965; Geoffrey K. Roberts, Political Parties and 
Pressure Groups in Britain, London 1970, Ch.3; Nigel Birch,
The Conservative Party, London 1949, p.42 ff; John D. Lees and 
Richard Kimber (eds.). Political Parties in Modern Britain, London 
1972, Ch.l; The Party Organisation, Organisation Series No.l,
GCO, London, February 1970*
4o The one possible exception is Hoffman’s study. However, he does not
deal specifically with the structure of the Conservative Policy- 
Making process nor its relation to the Opposition context.
J.D. Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition 1945-51, London 
1964, pp.133-201.
5• R. M, Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition, London 1973.
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Clearly if a channel has access to a key policy-making centre 
then it follows that it has an opportunity to influence policy content. 
Opportunity to influence is, however, in no sense equivalent to actual 
influence , VJliether or not a channel is able to use its opportunities 
effectively will depend on a number of factors, including personalities, 
historical circumstances and types of issue, and even if these are 
allowed for a precise assessment remains problematic . Thus, X am 
solely concerned here with outlining the opportunities to influence 
policy content available to the various policy channels which had access 
to the Conservative Party’s key policy-making centre during the 1964 
to 1970 Opposition period.
The key unit of policy decision within the Conservative Party 
during the years from 1964 to 1970 is identified in this study as the
Party Leadership, variously termed the Leader’s Committee, Consultative
* 8 «Committee, or Shadow Cabinet . Constitutionally, throughout the period,
. * 9'the Party Leader was ultimately responsible for party policy î in,
practice* however, the Shadow Cabinet may be taken as the locus of 
decision in the policy-making structure. Generally speaking, policy 
could not become official or binding until after it had been considered 
by the Leaderships^' .
Thus the Conservative Party’s policy-making structure may be 
defined as the sum of the various policy channels which had access to
6. On the concept of "influence" and the problems relating to its 
usage see, R.A, Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, Second edn.,
New Jersey 1970, pp.14^34; W.J.M, Mackenzie, Politics and Social 
Science, Hamondsworth Middlesex 1967, pp.213-25 and 258-77.
7. For a discussion of the issues involved in assessing policy making
influences and the problems involved in their analysis see,
K.J. Cergen, "Assessing the Leverage Points in the Process of
Policy Formation", and, "Methodology in the Study of Policy
Formation", in XI. Bauer and IC.J. Gergen (eds.), The Study of Policy 
Formation, New York 1968, pp.181-200 and 205-231 respectively.
8. As Block notes, the phrase hshadow Cabinet" is a popular not an 
official term; "Concerning the Shadow Cabinet", in Geoffrey D.M. 
Block, À Source Book of Conservatism, CPC 305, London 1964,
pp.90-91. For an outline of the duties performed by the Shadow 
Cabinet in addition to policy making see, Punnett 1973, op,cit.,
pp.216-221.
9. McKenzie 1963, op.cit., p.21.
10, Interview 9; Punnett 1973, op,clt., pp.218-19 and 262-63,
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the Party’s key policy-making centre. In the remainder of this chapter 
the nature of this structure during the 1964 to 1970 Opposition period 
is outlined and analysed. The outline is divided into eight sections* 
each covering a particular institution or set of institutions, namely; 
the Party leadership, other Front-Bench spokesmen, the Parliamentary 
Party, the Party Bureaucracy, policy groups and policy projects, the 
Mass Party, the Advisory Committee on Policy, and extra-party policy 
channels. Under each heading the structure of the institution is 
indicated, its points of access to the Party Leadership and to other 
policy channels outlined, and its opportunities to influence policy 
content in Opposition contrasted with those available to it in Government.
The Party Leadership
The Party Leadership consists of the Party Leader and his immediate 
colleagues in the Shadow Cabinet. In the following account these two 
elements are considered separately.
The Party Leader has final control over party policy but his 
opportunities to influence the content of policy are liable to be limited 
by constraints of his omi time and energy. Therefore, to operate effec­
tively the Leader must delegate and each act of delegation implies a 
decrease in the number of opportunities available to him to influence 
the content of party policy. Moreover, the Party Leader cannot easily 
impose his policy preferences upon an unwilling party and he may be 
forced to compromise his ovni position in order to gain and maintain the 
support of his followers. In addition, the number of policy-making 
opportunities available to the Party Leader will also depend upon his 
conception of the value of policy-making in Opposition^}
As previously noted. Sir Alec Douglas-Home regarded the reformula­
tion of policy as one of the major tasks facing the Conservative Opposi­
tion, Immediately upon entering Opposition he delegated the responsibility 
for policy reformulation to Edward ïîeatÂ^, In turn Heath’s position as
11, For a full outline of the Conservative Leaders powers, see
il,T, McKenzie 1964, op.cit., pp. 21-57, For an analysis of the 
Leaders position in Opposition, see Punnett 1973, op.cit., pp. 
93-7 and 173-5.
12. The Times, 29 October 1964,
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Conservative policy chief was further consolidated when he became Party 
Leader in July 1965. Thus, although Sir Alec initiated the reformulation 
of party policy, the proposals which emerged owed more to the activities 
of his successor. In addition* as we shall see. Heath not only organised 
and supervised the general development of party policy, but also served 
as a major source of policy in his own right.
In fulfilling his task as Party Leader, Heath was able to call 
upon the assistance of his private office. This was established soon 
after he became Party Leader, and it was modelled on the Prime Minister’s 
private office, at No,10, The staffing and structure of Heath's private 
office altered during the Opposition period. From July 1965 to March 
1966 the office was headed by John MacGregor, on secondment from the 
Party’s Research Department, Also included in\the office were James
Prior îyjP, Heath’s Parliamentary Private Secretary, and one other person
•  ^ 13
mainly concerned with administration plus a number of secretaries ,
After the 1966 General Election the size of the office was expanded,
MacGregor remained head until late 1968 when he was succeeded by Douglas
Hurd, In addition to Hurd the office included three officials, assisted
by six secretariei^^. All of these were a charge on the Party. Also
included were Heath’s constituency secretary and his tc/o PPSs, Prior
and Anthony Kershaw, As well as this staff of thirteen Heath had first
call on personnel from both the Party's Central Office and Research
Department^.
The Party Leader’s non-secretarial staff fulfilled four functions: 
they deputised for the Leader on various committees and organisations; 
they briefed the Leader on current issues, policy group reports and 
policy proposals; they dealt with press and public relations activities; 
and they arranged the Leader’s schedules and campaigning tours^.
In their briefing capacity, the Leader's personal staff fulfilled 
a role equivalent to that of civil servants. They sifted and paraphrased
13. Ill ter vi ew 6.
14. Int crvi ew 6,
15. Interview 6. See also George Hutchinson, Edward Heaths A Personal
and Political Biography, London 1970, pp.170-171.
16. Interview 6.
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reports and outlined policy statements and speeches for the Leader’s
consideration. But they differed from the Civil Service in that their
briefings were more overtly party political in nature. In addition*
although in time the staff began to understand the kind of approach
17Heath wanted, they still had their own views to put over . Thus, the 
Leader’s private office was not only an administrative device, but also 
had access through the Party Leader to the Party's policy-making centre 
and other policy channels and served as an important channel of policy 
in its own right. Moreover, by delegating some of his responsibilities 
to a loyal and sympathetic staff, the Party Leader may have been able to 
maintain the scope of his involvement in policy-making to a greater 
extent than possibly any previous Conservative Opposition leader and thus 
his opportunities to influence the Party’s policy™)iiaking activities were 
enhanced.
The Party Leader’s actual influence upon policy-making will, 
however, depend in part upon his ability to gain and maintain the support 
of his colleagues in the Party Leadership or Shadow Cabinet. According 
to Turner there has never been any stipulated size for Conservative 
Shadow Cabinets. The numbers involved vary according to the wishes of 
the Party Leader, Members are not required to attend but' normally do 
so and other persons can be invited to attend for discussions on particu­
lar Subjects. Generally no formal vote is taken and the Chairman,, usually 
the Leader, sums up the consensus of opinion within the meetin^^.
Sir Alec’s first Shadow Cabinet, for instance, numbered nineteen, and 
Heath’s twenty-one (including the Party Leader and the Chief Idiip in 
both cases). Under Heath’s Leadership the members met twice a week 
during the Parliamentary session and the meetings were usually anchored 
to a specific agenda decided by the Party I.eader in consultation with 
the Chief Whip and the Secretary to the Shadow Cabinet^,
During the 1964 to 1970 period each member of the Shadow Cabinet 
was given responsibility for the development of policy in his subject
17. Interview 6.
18. D. R. Turner, The Shadow Cabinet in British Politics, London 1969,
p.87, For a more detailed account of the history and contemporary 
operation of the Conservative Shadow Cabinet, see Punnett 1973, 
op.cit.s pp.45-52 and 221-249.
19. Hutchinson 1970, op.cit.» p.171; Punnett 1973, op.cit., pp.231-32,
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area. They chaired or kept in close contact with relevant policy groups
t 2 0  a • •and committees . Their involvement in, and opportunities to influence,
policy-making varied widely. Some, such as Macleod, were sceptical about
21the need to develop policy at all, particularly in detail , Others, 
because of their involvement in other areas such as industry and the
22City, were not able to devote much time to the formulation of policy 
According to interviews, towards the end of the Opposition period the 
momentum of the policy exercise depended to a large extent upon the 
efforts of a few individuals, such as Heath, Sir Keith Joseph, and 
Robert Carr. These individuals, it was claimed, m£ide an important 
contribution to the development of the Conservative programme^’^.
In addition to Front-Bench spokesmen the Shadow Cabinet Included
the Chairman of the Party Organisation, the Leader and Deputy Leader of
the Conservative Peers and the Chief Vdiip who, although not a full member,
was a regular attender ’ ' . These individuals served as important channels
25
of communication bett^een the Leaders and their followers' , The Deputy
Chairman of the Party Organisation, Sir Michael Fraser, fulfilled the
role of secretary and, according to Punnett, "he represented the interests
and the attitudes of the Party-Organisation at Consultative Committee
m e e t i n g s . F i n a l l y ,  the Director of the Research Department, Brendon
Sewill (1965-1970), and Heath’s two PPSs, Prior and Kershaw, attended
27meetings as observers
Other Front-Bench Spokesmen, Miips and PPSs
During the 1964 to 1970 period not all Front-Bench spokesmen were
mendiers of the Shadow Cabinet. Those who were excluded included "senior",
28"junior" and "deputy" spokesmen . The precise nunhers of individuals
20, For a more detailed outline of the Parliamentary Committees and 
the policy groups, see below, pp. 52-54 and pp.60-63.
21, Interviews 5 and 6; Nigel Fisher, Iain Macleod, London 1973, 
pp.284-5,
22, Andrew Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, London 1972, p.193; Anthony 
Sampson, The New Anatomy of Britain; London 1971, p.92; Punnett 
1973, op.cit., p.185,
23, Interviews 5, 6 and 9,
24, In 1969 these were respectively; Anthony Barber, Lord Carrington,
Lord Jellicoe and William Whitelaw,
25, Punnett 1973, op.cit., pp.110 and 234-6,
26, Ibid., p.234.
27, Ibid., p.225.
28, For an outline of the nature of these various offices, see Punnett 
1973, op.cit., pp.74-7.
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involved varied during the period. For instance, in October 1964 there
were thirteen Front-Bench spokesmen outside the Shadow Cabinet. A year
later this number had grown to 41 but* following the 1966 Election* was
2 9
reduced to twelve and* by October 1969, had risen once more to 27
These Spokesmen, along with the Party Leadership, constituted what
30
Punnett has termed the "Shadow Government",
According to Punnett* Shadow Cabinet meetings are sometimes 
attended by spokesmen who are not members, but* during the 1964 to
1970 period, this was comparatively rare as almost all of the senior
• 31Conservative Spokesmen were meirhers of the Shadow Cabinet anyifay .
As will be shown in the case studies* however, spokesmen who were
outside the Shadoxf Cabinet were often deeply involved in, or even
3'2
responsible for, the formulation of policy in their own subject areas
Thus, at least in their subject areas, they had considerable opportunity
* 3 3to influence the final content of party policy ' .
Also outside the Shadow Cabinet were the Assistant Opposition 
Whips and the PPSs of some of the senior party figures. The Ifhips 
provided a major channel of communication between the Leaders and 
their followers in Parliament and were able to transmit both their 
own and others views on policy-making^'. PPSs also had some opportunity 
to influence policy content. As previously shown both of Heath’s PPSs 
sat in on Shadow Cabinet meetings, and other PPSs presumably gave some 
assistance to their spokesman in the relevant subject area.
The Parliamentary Party
The Conservative Parliamentary Party consists of all members of
.35both Houses of Parliament who take the Conservative whip"' . The
2 9. Ibid., Tables 48 and 49,
3:0. Ibid., p.76.
31, Ibid.g pp.225-6 and 287
32. See below. Chapters 9 and 10, pp. 228 and 279 respectively.
3,3, For more information on the policy-making role of Front-Bench
spokesmen, see Punnett 1973, op.cit., pp.261-265.
34. For an outline of the Whips' duties, see R, J- Jackson, Rebels and
Whips , London 1968, Chapter 2.
3 5. For the organisation of the Conservative Opposition in the House
of Lords, see Punnett 1973, op.cit., pp.420-30.
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Conservative Party in the House of Commons is organised into a number 
of back-bench committees covering both subject matters and regional 
areas0 Each subject committee deals with a major field of government 
activity* such as agriculture* finance, home affairs, transport and so 
forth. Attendance at these committees is open to any Conservative MP, 
and each committee has a chairman, one or txm vice-chairmen, one or
3 6ti'70 honorary secretaries and a secretary from the Research Department . 
When the Party is in Government all these officials, with the exception 
of the Research Department Officer, are elected by the back-benchers. 
During the 1964 to 1970 opposition period, although other offices 
remained elective, each subject committee was chaired, by the relevant 
Front-Bench spokesman who was appointed by the Party Leader.
In 1969 there were twenty-five subject committees including six
sub-committees, ranging from Agriculture under the chairmanship of
Joseph Godber, to Transport under Peter Walker. Xn addition, there
were area groups covering Scotland, Ulster and some of the English
regions, open to the MPs for the area. With the exception of the
Scottish Members’ Committee, none had direct links with a Front-Bench
spokesman and all their officials were elected* Overall, in 1969, over
3 7eighty back-benchers served as Committee officials " .
According to Punnett, the main function of the area groups was
38 ,
to "co-ordinate regional interests", while the subject groups provided
an opportunity for back-bench MPs to make k n o w  to the Spokesmen their
views on policy; but neither were policy committees in the sense that
39
they decided party policy . In contrast to a period in office, however, 
in Opposition attenders at back-bench committee, meetings had, through 
their chairmen, greater access to the Party’s policy-making centre.
In addition back-bench committee officials were often chosen to sit on
36. Interview 9.
37. R. Oakley and Peter Rose, The Political Year 1970, London 1970,
pp.176-7.
38. Punnett 1973, op.cit., p.305*
3,9. Ibid. 3 p.306. For an outline of the work and operation of the
committees, see Anthony .Barker and Michael Rush, The Meaher of 
Parliament and His Information, London 1970, pp.278-84.
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the Party’s special policy groui>s^^ and* at times during the Opposition
period, some served as temporary, "deputy", Front-Bench spokesmen in
4]
their specialist subject areas ", The opportunities available to these 
individuals to influence party policy-making were thus enhanced.
In the 1964 to 1970 period of Conservative Opposition, the personnel
of the various back-beuch committees and those spokesmen who were not in
the Shadow Cabinet were members of what was termed the "Business Conuaittee".
This met on Wednesdays following Shadow Cabinet meetings* and was attended
by the Chief Whip and the Leader or the Deputy Leader^^. It was mainly
concerned with the discussion of Parliamentary business and did not
43generally consider wider policy matters . However, it did serve as a 
useful channel of coimaunication between the Party Leadership, other 
Front-Bench spokesmen and the back-benchers.
A further link between spokesmen and their back-bench colleagues
was provided through the Conservative and Unionists Private Members’
4'! 4
Committee (1922 Committee) . Membership of the 1922 Committee was open
to all back-bench members of the Conservative. Par 1 iamentary Party in the
House of Cormaons. Members of the Shadow Cabinet, the IJliips and other
45
Front-Benchers attended only at the Committee’s invitation' . Committee 
meetings served as a sounding board for back-bench attitudes to party 
policy but were not used to hold great policy debates
40, See below, pp. 61-62.
41, Punnett 1973, op.cit., p.145-6.
42, Under Sir Alec the committee was generally chaired by Selxyyn Lloyd in
his capacity as "co-ordinator of The Opposition in the House of
Goimaons". However, Sir Alec was entitled to chair the Committee and 
in his absence so was Maudling. The Times, 29 October 1964.
43, Punnett 1973, op.cit., pp.302-3,
44, On the 1922 Committee, see Sir George Rentoui. Sometimes 1 Think,
London 1946, pp.231-9; Sir Ivor Jennings, Party Politics, Vol.2, 
Cambridge 1961, pp.347-8; "Origins of the 1922 Coimiitt^^, in 
Block 1964, op.cit., p.88; McKenzie 1963, op.cit., pp.37-62;
Philip Goodhart, The 1922, London 1973.
45, Interview, Sir Harry xTegge Bourke, BBC Radio 4, 21 October 1972.
46, Punnett 1973, op.cit., p.302,
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The existence of the Business Committea and the Front-Benchers’ 
chairmanship of the back-bench coiinaittees meant that in Opposition the 
contact between the Party Leadership and the parliamentary section of 
the Party was much more direct* and the degree of interlocking much 
closer* than when the Party was in power^ » In addition, by serving on 
policy groups and* at times, acting as temporary assistant spokesmen, 
back-bench committee officials were brought more closely within the 
ambit of the Party’s policy-making structure. On both these counts* 
in Opposition* back-benchers enjoyed greater access to, and more oppor­
tunities to influence, the process of policy-making than they had done 
in office.
The Party Bureaucracy
The Party Bureaucracy includes the Conservative and Unionist
Party Central Office (GCO) and the Conservative Research Department
(GRD^^, At its head is the Chairman of the Party Organisation who is
usually a senior member of the Parliamentary Party. He is assisted by
tlie Deputy Chairman, and both are. jointly responsible for overall 
49management . Both these office holders are direct appointees of the 
Party Leader, as are the three Vice-Chairmen and the two Party Treasurers
50
47. For an elaboration of this view, see The Times, editorial,
20 November 1964.
48. For a history end outline of the Party Organisation see McKenzie 
1963, op.cit., Chapter 5; Robert Blake, The Conservative Party:
From. Peel to Churchill, pp.78-81, 137-'59, Î88-95, 224”33 and 
259-627
49. Since 1972 the Party Chairman has been assisted by a second Deputy 
Chairman in the person of James Prior, !<P«
50. "The Party Organisation" 1970, op.cit., p.16, For a discussion of 
the Party Leader's relationship to GCO, see Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, 
"Central Office and ’Power’ in the Conservative Party", Political
Studies , Vol.XX, No.l, 1972, pp.1-16. For a detailed outline of 
the clianges in the Party Bureaucracy during the 1964-70 period, 
see D. L.Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of 
1966, London 1966, pp.53-9; D.E. Butler and Michhel Pinto- 
bus chins ky, The British General 32J, action 19 70, London 1971, 
pp.94-110; R. Rhiodes James, Ambitroiis and Realities, London 1972, 
pp.124-26 and 235-37; for changes in the Party Bureaucracy in the 
post-1970 period see, D. E. Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British 
General Election of February 1974, London 1974, pp.201 ff and 219, 
"(Tan Wiitelaw Lift theToriei^’, The Sunday Times, 22 September 1974.
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Within the Party Organisation two elements were of particular 
relevance to the formulation of Conservative policy during the 1964 
to 1970 period: the Research Department (CRB) and the Conservative
Political Centre (CPC). Their place in the Conservative Opposition’s 
Xjol icy “making structure is exami.ned below.
51The Research Department fulfills two major functions: a policy
52
making and a briefing function In the former case it is the Depart­
ment’s task to undertake policy research and analysis, to advise party
leaders on policy matters and to assist in the formulation of party 
53
policy 0 To a large extent the Department’s policy-making function 
is focussed upon the task of building up material for an election 
programme* by assembling policy proposals, rendering them viable and* 
very often, producing the first outline of a draft manifesto for submis­
sion to the Leadership ^ ‘^*0
The Department’s briefing function includes the provision of 
information and guidance on current political affairs to all members of 
the Party. Towards this end a comprehensive literature service has been 
developed^"'. Most of the GRD's time, however, is spent in briefing and 
servicing members of the Parliamentary Party^^. In Opposition the first 
priority is given to members of the Shadow Cabinet and other Front-Bench 
spokesmen* each of whom can call upon the assistance of a Research 
Department officer. After their demands are met priority can then be 
given to the demands of party groups in Parliament each of which is, as 
previously noted* serviced by a Departmental officer^^. Some of the
51. For a history of the Research Department* see McKenzie 1963*
op.cit.* pp.284-6; Francis Boyd* Richard Austen Butler* London 
1956* pp.92-105; J.D. Hoffnuin 1964* @ pp.207-20; Lord
Butler, The Art of the Possible* London 1971, pp.135-40.
52. For a full list of the Department’s functions see* "The Party
Organisation" 1970, ap*eit.* p.19.
53. Butler 1971* op.cit.* pp.138-9.
54. Interview 9. For further details on the Research Department’s
role in the relation to the manifesto* see Anthony King, "How the 
Conservatives Evolve Policies", New Society, 20 July 1972.
55. The Research Department publishes. Notes on Current Politics,
(fortnightly), Overseas Review (monthly), Campaign Guide, and 
Local Election Campaign Guides, and the Conservative and Unionist 
Pocket j3ook.
56. Butler and Finto-Duschinsky 1971, op.cit., p.89.
57. Barker and Rush 1970, op.cit., p.249.
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briefs produced by the Department are then made available to individual
58MPs through the Miip’s office . In order to fulfill both his briefing 
and his policy-making functions the Departmental Officer maintains 
informal contacts with a wide range of extra and intra party agencies* 
such as PEP, ÏEA, NIESR, the Bow Group* and Pressure for Economic and
59
Social Toryism.
During the 1964 to 1970 period the Department was divided into 
five subject sections: Economic, Home Affairs, External Affairs, Constitu­
tional and Library, and Research. Each section contained a number of 
Research Officers under the supervision of a section head. The Research 
Officers were each responsible for a specific policy area, such as 
industrial relations* transport or agriculture in the Economic Section, 
or education or housing in the Home Affairs Section. The day to day 
management of the Department was carried out by its Director, Brendon 
Sewill, who was assisted by a Deputy Director, and three Assistant 
Directors. Overall supervision was in the hands of the Deputy Chairman 
of the Party Organisation, Dir Michael Fraser^^*
Throughout the Opposition period the number of research staff 
employed by the Department remained fairly constant, rising from a 
minimum of 30 in 1964 to a maximum of 32 in 1968^^. Among this numJjer, 
however, turnover was fairly brisk and many officers transferred to 
other branches of the Party, such as the Leader’s private office or to 
special research p r o j e c t s T h e  Officers fulfilled the Department’s 
policy-making and policy-briefing functions. In the provision of informa­
tion the same Research Department officer served the relevant Front- 
Bencher, Parliamentary Committee and policy group. He thus acted as an 
important channel of communication between some of the agencies involved 
in the policy-making structure. The relations between a Shadow Minister
58. Ibid., p.252
59. Ibid., p.250-1; Interviews 8 and 9.
60. Interviews 5 and 9.
61. Interview 9, and unpublished Departmental memos on staffing and
organisation,
62. For the Party Leader’s Private Office, see above, pp. 49-50,
for research projects, see below, pp. See also,
Ronald Butt, "Tory Civil Service", The Times, 20 November 1969.
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and his Research Department counterpart were generally very close* and 
the latter was often allowed a wide degree of initiative in formulating
63
policy proposals , Thus the Department’s personnel had considerable 
opportunity to influence the content of policy.
It appears that when the Party is in Opposition the Research
Department’s points of access to the Party's policy-making centre are
greatly increased. In the 1964 to 1970 period* Front-Benchers were able
to rely, in lieu of the assistance of the permanent Civil Service, upon
departmental personnel for advice and information^^, and Shadow Ministers
and their Research Department counterparts often worked closely together,
sometimes on a day to day basis, in formulating policy p r o p o s a l s ^ X n
fulfilling both these functions CRD personnel sifted and transmitted to
the Leadership tiie views of a wide number of extra- and intra-party ■>
• 6 6
agencies , Moreover, members of the Party Leadership and the Research 
Department were brought into frequent contact through their joint partici­
pation in the business of other agencies in the Party’s policy-making 
67
structure . In Government, by contrast, the contact between the Leader­
ship and Research Department personnel tends to be less close. In the 
provision of advice and information and in the formulation of public 
policy. Research Department officers are supplanted by memliers of the 
permanent Civil Service, This leads to an alteration in the Research 
Department's role: its advisory functions are concentrated more upon the
needs of back-benchers^^, while, since the Front-Benchers no longer chair 
baclc-berich committees. Research Department officers take on the task of 
liaising between the committees and the relevant Minister. Even in this 
latter case the contacts bettreen the officer and his counterpart in the 
Party Leadership are not frequent, amounting to perhaps only one meeting 
per quarter
6 3, Interview 9; Punnett 1973, op,cit., p.274; Barker and Rush 1970,
op.cit., p.250,
6'4. Barker and Rush 1970, op.cit., p.250.
6 5. Interviews 5 and 9; see also, Punnett 1973, op.cit., p.273.
6b. Barker and Rush 1970, op,cit., pp.252-3.
6 7. Mainly the back-bench conmirttees, the policy groups and the
Advisory Committee on Policy.
68. Interview 5; Barker and Rush 1970, op.cit., p.250.
69. Interviews 5 and 9; Punnett 1973, op.cit., p.273.
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Thus, when the Party is in Opposition the opportunities available to 
Research Department personnel to influence the content of policy are 
extended. During the 1964 to 1970 period they were often close to the 
centre of the Party’s policy-making structure; formulating proposals, 
serving committees and working closely with Front-Benchers, As one senior 
official put it, in Opposition the Department fulfills a much more
'70
"important, interesting and exciting role than when in Government."
The second element within the Party Organisation which was of
particular relevance to the formulation of Conservative policy during
the Opposition period was the CPC. This organisation, established in 1945*
has been mainly concerned with political education, and for this purpose.
71
it publishes a wide range of pamphlets and sponsors study courses 
In addition it operates a policy discussion scheme extending right down 
to the constituency level.
In January 1947 CPC launched a "Two-way Movement of Ideas"
programme. The programme operated through a network of local discussion
groups, which periodically received from CFG national office briefs
containing questions on current political issues to which they were asked
to formulate a reply. The replies were then returned and analysed by CFG
national office and the results were circulated to the Research Department,
the Chairman of the Advisory Commiittee on Policy and the Chairman of the
Party, The prograimae continued throughout the Conservatives' period in
7 2
Government but tended to lose momentum in the early 1960s ,
Following the 1964 General Election, David Howell was appointed 
73
Director of the CPC • His appointment marked the beginning of a regenera­
tion and reorganisation of CPC activities. In March 1965 the Centre was
74
"brought fully into the Party Organisation", and within a year the
7p. Interview 5.
71. For an outline of CPC activities, see CFG in Action, CPC No.498,
second edition, London January 1972; McKenzie 1963, op.clt,,
p.283; Lord Butler 19 71, op.cit., pp.136-7.
72. Interview 10.
73, The Times, 31 October 1964.
74, Ma'tionai Union Central Council Minute Book, Minutes of Central 
Council meeting held on 5 and 6 March, 1965 in London, NUCUA, 
London.
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75number of CPC constituency coiranittees had increased by 35 per cent
In addition, Howell reorganised the "Two Way Movement of Ideas" programme
mp(
77
so as to include replies from Shadow Ministers^^. This reva ed* three
way, movement was renamed the "Political Contact Programme"
CPC's policy discussion scheme, although expanded and reorganised
during the Opposition period* had only a marginal opportunity to influence
the content of policy. This was because policy very often tended to be
discussed well after the final proposals had already been determined^^.
In addition* the. questions posed in the briefs tended to be general in
nature and thus difficult to apply to specific policy issues^^. The
scheme did* however, act as a channel of communication between Leaders
and led in which party opinion was expressed in the form of a series of
« 80
general propositions about policy . It provided Party Leaders with some 
indication of the general boundaries within which their specific policy 
proposals would have to be contained if they were to be acceptable to 
the Party in the country.
Policy Groups and Policy Projects
During the 1964 to 1970 period the Conservatives established a
series of policy groups and research projects which, both in terras of
their nature and their scale, were unique in the history of Opposition
politics in the United Kingdom. The policy groups were launched by Heath
81soon after his appointment as the Party's policy chief in October 1964 .
Their task was to formulate detailed policy proposals in certain specified
7 5. See speech by Edward du Gann in, NUCUA 84th Annual Conference Report
1966, NUCUA London, 1966, pp.11-13.
7 6. Interview 14; The Times, 12 October 1966,
77, "NUCUA 84th Annual Conference Report" op,cit. In March 1966, Howell
was elected as 1ÎP for Guildford and in September was replaced as 
the Director of CPC by Russel Lewis, For further details on the 
Political Contact Programme see Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971, 
op,cit.g Table 12, p.287.
7;8. Interview 9.
79, Interview 10,
8'0, Punnett 1973, op,cit,, p.275.
81. The Times, 1 January 1965,
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areas The policy groups had the advantage of drawing into the Party’s
policy-making structure outside specialists and experts and greatly
83
increased the resources available to Conservative policy-makers ,
I-lbst of the groups which were established in late 1964 and early
* 841965 had submitted their"interim proposals to heath by July 1965
After this date the work was continued. The less successful groups
were disbanded or reconstituted and new ones created, while some remained
in operation throughout the Opposition period. In sum, before the 1966
General Election, there were twenty-three policy groups with a combined
85membership of 181 kJPs and Peers, and 118 outsiders , Between 1966 
and 1970 twenty-nine groups were in operation at one time or another 
with a combined membership of 191 MPs and Peers and 190 outsiders^^.
The figures tend to overstate the total number of personnel involved 
as several participants served on more than one group.
Each policy group included the relevant Pront-Bench, or junior 
Front-Bench spokesman as Chairman; members of the Parliamentary Party 
chosen because of their interest in the subject or because they repres­
ented various shades of opinion within the Party; non-Parliamentary
8 7
specialists; and an officer from the Research Department as secretary
82. "Progress Report on Tory Policy Making", The Times, 1 February 1965,
83. Interview 11, In February 1966 the Conservatives launched an
operation to recruit into the services of the Party University 
teachers who were thought to have Conservative sympathies. This 
operation was the responsibility of a Research Department officer - 
Michael Spicer - until February 1968, and Sir Anthony Meyer there­
after, According to The Times, 30 March 1967, over 400 "sympathe­
tic" dons were recruited. See also. The Times, 28 February 1966, 
and 6 February 1968.
84. Interview 6; The Times, 29 July 1965,
85. Hutchinson 1970, op.cit., p.134; Butler and King 1966, op.cit.
p.60; speech by Heath to the Conservative Women'*s Conference,
26 May 1965, Notes on Current Politics, No.14, 12 July 1965, p,38i, 
published by Conservative Research Department, London. From hereon 
this publication will be cited as follows; NCR year, No, of Issue, 
date, page no; e,g, NCF 1965, No,14,12 July 1965, p.381.
86. For a full list of the groups involved in the exercise, see Butler 
and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971, op.cit,, f.n., p.67.
87. Interview 9.
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The size of the groups and the number of outsiders involved varied according 
to subject. In the period betvreen the 1964 and 1966 General Elections* for 
example, the largest was the group studying agriculture under the chairman­
ship of John Scott Hopkins, This involved nineteen outsiders who served
on seven sub-groups. Next came the Future Economie Policy Group* usually
88chaired by Heath* with fourteen outsiders , The whole policy group
exercise was wreathed in secrecy and the names of those involved were never
publicly released. The non-Parliamentary specialists, however, tended to 
be either academics or members of the professions with a sprinkling of 
prominent Conservative "sympathizers".
According to interviews, the success of the different policy groups 
varied widely. Substantial work was done in five areas: social services
review (mainly carried out under Sir Keith Joseph prior to the 1966
General Election); housing; industrial relations (under the guidance of
9o
Iain Macleod); and agriculture , Other groups were less successful.
For example, the Future Economic Policy Grouj), although successful in the
taxation field, was deeply divided over exchange rates and incomes policy,
and the Regional Development group had some difficulty in reaching agree- 
9i
ment , The momentum of the policy group exercise tended to decline 
during the Opposition period. Prior to the 1966 General Election Heath 
placed great emphasis upon the groups’ work and was himself the "driving
/ Q ^
force" behind the exercise , Following the Election, in the words of
93
one participant, the work tended to "sinlc into the sand," In those 
fields where the exercise was successful, however. Conservatives claimed 
that the quality and the scale of the work which x^ ras produced was greater 
than anything done before in Opposition^^,
88. Hutchinson 1970, op.clt,, p.134. For an outline of the composition
and operation of the Future Economic Policy Group, see Fisher 1973, 
op,cit,, pp.264, 269-71, 285 and 301,
Q 9, Intervi ew 16,
90. Interview 6. A detailed outline of the work of the Regional
Development Group is given in Chapter 9 below.
9.1. Interviews 5 and 6,
9 2, The Times, 29 July 1965 ,
9 3, Interview 16,
9-4, Interview 6,
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By bringing together Front-Benchers, Parliamentarians and outside
experts, the groups were able to draw into the policy-making structure
a wide range of opinions. Moreover, the more successful groups, in the
limited policy areas for which they were responsible, had considerable
opportunity to contribute to the content of Conservative proposals. The
impact of the exercise, however, was to some extent weakened by the
limited area of inquiry and freedom of manoeuvre allowed to each group.
The general framework and emphasis of Conservative policy were established
by the Party Leader and his closest aides, and it was the role of the
groups to fill in the details. Moreover, the Party Leader ultimately
controlled the exercise, as he had the final say in determining the
nature of the groups, their terms of reference, their personnel and
(with the rest of the Party Leadership) their exact contribution to the
95
Opposition's programme
Unlike the policy groups exercise, the policy projects were 
initiated at a comparatively late stage of the Conservatives' period in 
Opposition. The two agencies involved were the Conservative Public 
Sector Research Unit (CPSRU) and the Conservative Systems Research 
Centre (CSRC). The former was concerned with the application of manage­
ment techniques and modern technology to the work of the public sector.
The latter was concerned with the use of computer models and data proces­
sing techniques in the development of policy. The CPSRU was established 
in March 1967 under Ernest Marpies, and the CSRC a year later under 
Mervyn Pike^^. Both agencies used a project approach to policy research 
whereby specific projects were contracted out to various non-party 
consultants and organisations^^. Both claimed that their work was 
primarily "non-political"^^ and, although ultimately responsible to the 
Party Leader, they were separate from the Research Department and 
Conservative Central Office. Thus they were less subject to party ties 
and pressures than were other elements in the party's policy-making struc­
ture such as the policy groups. Moreover, through the work of these
95. Interviews 3 and 6.
9 6, In t e r v i ew 11.
97. Interview 9.
98. Interviews 13 and 14.
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agencies the Party was able to gain the assistance of outside experts 
and specialists. The CPSRU, in particular, established a team of specia­
lists which could be drafted into Government in the event of the Conserva-
q9tives returning to power^ .
The work of the CPSRU and the CSRC was encouraged and supported 
by the Party Leader and other leading Conservatives. Both agencies 
provided Party Leaders with information and advice on a series of matters, 
including the reform of Central Government^^^, alternative taxation
10 1 # 4systems , and certain aspects of economic management such as economic 
planning and public expenditure^^
The policy projects and, at least in terms of its scale, the policy
groups exercise were developments unique to the 1964 to 1970 period.
Never before had an Opposition developed such a comprehensive range of
policy committees and agencies. By providing information, advice and
policy proposals, the personnel involved served partly in lieu of the
permanent Civil Service and other sources available to the party as
Government. They also brought a wide range of resources within the ambit
of the Conservative policy-making structure. The role of the outside
expert, however, should not be exaggerated. For instance, the most
active members of the policy groups, particularly after the 1966 General
103Election, tended to be the MPs ; while the projects, although work was 
contracted out to non-party organisations, were managed by party officials 
and directed by appointees of the Party Leader.
The Mass Party
The Conservative mass party organisation is officially termed the 
National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations (NUCUA). It is 
to this organisation that the constituency organisations throughout
99. ilug'h Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public 
Money, London 1974, pp.267-276.
100. See David Howell, A New Style of Government, CPC No. 463, London
1970“ A Better Tomorrow, CGC 1970, pp.10-11.
101. Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971, op.cit., p.83.
102. See below. Chapter 7, pp.130-131.
103. Interviews 9 and 11.
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England and Wales are affiliated. Conservatives in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland have their own, separate associations^^'^.
The main governing body of the NUCUA is the Central Council which 
meets twice a year. In addition the national Union meets annually in Party 
Conference. Both of these bodies are large and, from a policy-making point 
of view, unwieldy with maximum possible memberships of approximately 
3,500 and 5,500 respectively . Because of the infrequency of its meetings 
and the size of its membership the Central Council delegates much of its 
policy-making and management responsibilities to an Executive Committee 
which meets about eight times a year. This committee has a total member­
ship of 194 including the Party Leader, the principal officers of the 
Party, and representatives of the eleven Provincial Areas into which the 
National Union is d i v i d e T h e  Executive Coiomitee in turn delegates much 
of its detailed administrative work to a General Purposes Committee of 
about 58 members. This meets five times a year, and leaves the Executive 
free to devote itself to broader issues of policy. In addition, the 
Executive Committee is advised by seven National Advisory Committees,
namely Women's, Toung Conservatives', Trade Unionists', Local Government,
107
CPC, Education and Federation of Conservative Students . The average 
membership of each of these committees is approximately fifty and consists 
mainly of representatives appointed at Provincial Area level^^^.
The National Union serves as a channel of communication between 
the Leaders and their followers. As McKenzie notes; "in ordinary circum­
stances the attempts of the mass organisation to influence or control the
104, For a history of the National Union, see McKenzie 1963, op.cit., 
pp.146-80: Jennings 1961, op.cit., pp.94-101, 200-16, 227-32,
308-26. For rules regarding affiliation see. Rules and Standing 
Orders of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associa-- 
tj.ons, (referred to as Rules and Standing Orders from hereon), 
NULUA, Lonaon 1971, Rule III.
105 . For details of the composition of the Central Council and the Party
Conference, see "Rules and Standing Orders", op.cit., Rules IX 
and XVIX respectively.
10 6. iM-d., Rule XII
10 7. Ibid., Rule XVI
10 8. McKenzie 1963, op.cit., p.208.
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actions of the Party in Parliament constitute no more than one of the
pressures (and usually not the most important) which the Party Leaders
109
must take into account". In the peculiar circumstance of Opposition,
however, the influence of the National Union may be increased as a result 
of at least two factors. First, in Opposition other non-party pressures 
which tend to focus upon the Party as Government arc. either absent or less 
important, so that Party Leaders are able to devote more time and attention 
to intra-party demnds and there are fewer countervailing pressures and 
influences. Secondly, in the absence of the important constraint of loyalty 
to "our Government", rank and file cohesion may weaken. In attempting to 
counteract any such tendency, Party Leaders may be forced to pay more heed 
to, and to act more closely in accordance with, the wishes of the rank and 
file.
During the 1964 to 1970 period, for example. Heath was an assiduous
attender at Party Conferences. These he generally attended in full from
beginning to end whereas previous Conservative Leaders had linn.ted themselves
to one appearance on the final day of the Conference, In addition, some
commentators detected a marked "swing to the right" amongst the party rank
110
and file from about 1966 onwards . The Times noted that at the 1967
Party Conference Party Leaders often found it necessary to address themselves
to this section of party opinion, although they were careful to avoid being
] 11
forced into too extreme a position '
The Advisory Committee on Policy
Officially the Advisory Committee on Policy (AGP) has the task of 
advising the Party Leader on policy matters. It consists of a Chairman 
and Deputy Chairman, both appointed by the Party Leader, and fifteen other 
members including seven drawn from both Houses of Parliament and eight 
members of the National Union. The Director of the Research Department 
serves as Secretary to the Committee and leading members of the Party
109 Ibid., p .23u.
110. The Times, Editorial, 17 October 1966; Rhodes James 1972, op.cit.
Part 3.; David Wood, "Wiy Mr Heath Earned his Standing Ovation", 
The Times, 14 October 1968; Dennis Barker, "Swelling Chorus for 
Powell", The Guardian, 7 November 1969.
111. David Wood, "Mr Heath Controls the Swing to the Right", The Times,
23 October 1967.
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112Organisation are generally co-opted . Between 1951 and 1964 the AGP 
ceased to he an influential body and, except when an election manifesto 
was being prepared, it met only quarterly. Following the 1964 Election,
113however, the members of the Committee met fortnightly and sometimes weekly ' ,
According to McKenzie, the AGP "is one of the most important
]1*4
committees in the entire party organisation". " This is misleading,
since as far as policy-making is concerned, the ACP has only a marginal
role to play. To the extent tiiat it is representative of opinion within
115
the Party, it acts as a useful "sounding board",' but it does not decide 
anything and its functions are purely advisory. Thus, by bringing together 
the elements involved in the policy-making structure, it serves as a focus 
for policy advice rather than a forum for policy decisions. Far more 
important than the Committee itself is its Chairman, who generally holds 
an influential position at the centre of the Party's policy-making 
structure. After the 1964 Election, for example, the post was given to 
Heath and it remained his responsibility until November 1968 when Handling 
took over
In sum, the ACP met more frequently in Opposition than it had done 
in Government, because of the more frequent contact with Party Leaders 
that; this implied, it is not unreasonable to assume that the opportunities 
available to ACP memliers to influence the content of party policy were 
extended. Its main function, however, was to bring together the various 
elements in the Party's policy-making structure and to provide a channel 
of communication between the Leaders and their followers,
Extra-Party Policy Channels
So far this account has concentrated upon elements within the 
Conservative Party, In the following section those policy channels which 
are located within the wider socio-political environment are outlined
112, See "The Party Organisation" 1970, op.cit., p.13.
113. "Progress Report on Tory policy making". The Times, 1 February 1965,
l^A. McKenzie 1963, op.cit., p.211
115. Interview 5,
116. Interviews 5 and 9.
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and analysed, A working distinction may be made between those bodies 
which are closely connected with or affiliated to the Conservative Party, 
such as the Bow Group, Monday Club and Pressure for Economic and Social 
Toryism (PEST), and those organisations which are not directly connected 
with the Party, such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (lEA), Aims of 
Industry, Political and Economic Planning, The Confederation of British 
Industry, the National Farmers’ Union, and so forth.
The Bow Group was founded in 1951 as a Conservative counterpart 
li7to the Fabian Society . In its early years its members concentrated
mainly upon African problems but they later developed interests in a
wide range of domestic and international affairs. The Group's main
concern has always been with research and the production of new policy
ideas^^^. The Modern Bow Group claims a Biembership of about 1,100^1^,
It is administered by a fifteen member council, all of whom are elected
annually. Its activities may be divided into three categories; the
publication of reports and policy studies, the holding of meetings,
3 20
and the publication of the quarterly magazine Crossbow '
The Group maintains no formal contact with the Conservative Party,
but there are informal links and an almost total overlap in membership.
321Thus, in practice, contact is often very close" , During .the 1964'to 
1970 period some members of the Group were involved at the centre of the 
Conservative policy-making structure, as members of the Research Depart­
ment, of the Parliamentary Party, or of the policy groups. In addition. 
Party managers attempted to use the group as a source for policy research 
and, although it preserved its independence, the Group did maintain
contacts with the Research Department in an attempt to prevent any overlap
122
in their research activities
ll'Vo For a detailed outline of the Bow Group's origins and development, 
see Richard Rose, "The Bow Group’s Role in British Politics", 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XIV, 1961, pp.865-78.
118. Interview 4.
119. This is the membership figure for 1972, c.f. Rose 1961, op.cit.
p.868.
120. Interview 4.
121. Interviews 4 and 9.
12 2. In terview 9.
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The Monday Club was founded in January 1963, by four younger
Conservatives who were dismayed by Macmillan's "wind of change" speech
12 3
and felt that the Party's "drift to the left" had gone far enough' ' .
In its early years the Club, like the Bow Group, was mainly concerned
with African affairs, but its members later developed interests in
economic, home and international problems. The Club's membership grew
slowly during the first half of the 1960s. A period of more rapid
expansion was not achieved until after the Labour Government's decision,
in November 1965, to impose sanctions upon Rhodesia. According to Club
officials, by late 1966 membership had increased by 100 per cent to a
total of 400. A similar recruitment took place following Enoch Powell's
Birmingham speech on immigration in April 1968; between then and April
1969 the Club's national membership increased by 90 per cent to a total
of 1,500^ . By 1971 the Club claimed 2,100 national members, another
5,000 members in its 30 regional branches, and 55 groups in universities
125and technical colleges' “ .
The declared aim of the Monday Club is "to lead the Party back to 
3 "26
true Conservatism", " This objective may be defined in terms of the
issues which the Club has dealt with, including law and liberty, arms
for South Africa, East of Suez policy, ending "state intervention",
"subversion", immigration, and so forth. The Club is governed by a
twenty-four member National Executive Council which includes a chairman,
four office holding members, fourteen other members (all elected by Club
127members), two branch representatives and two co-opted members ,
The Club's activities fall roughly into two categories. First, 
the formulation and dissendnation of standpoints and policy through
123. On the Monday Club, see Patrick Seyd, "Factionalism Within the
Conservative Party; The Monday Club", Government and Opposition, 
Vol.7, 1972, p,464-87.
124□ Intervi ew 12.
125. Campbell Page, "Bulldogs Every Monday", The Guardian, 21 January
1971; c.f. Seyd 1972, op.cit., p.471.
126. Robert Copping, The Story of the Monday Club, Current Affairs
Information Service, London 1972, p.26.
127. Intervi ew 12.
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128research, publications and the holding of meetings, rallies and functions
Secondly, with the rapid growth of local branches from 1967 onwards, the
Club developed a grass roots strategy. Members were encouraged to become
active within their local Conservative constituency associations and
to ensure that they had a substantial say in the selection of party
candidates. By these indirect means. Club strategists hoped that only
those Conservatives who were sympathetic to Monday Club aims would be
chosen to stand for public office, and thus, by changing party personnel,
129the return to "true conservatism" might be achieved
According to Seyd, during the Opposition period the influence of
the Monday Club on the Conservative Leadership "would appear to be 
130
negligible". Certainly its contacts with some of the Opposition's 
policy channels were never close. Its relations with the Party Organisa­
tion, in particular, were not amicable, while its more extreme members
l3.1
tended to cause party managers some embarrassment . However, the Club
was fairly well represented within the Parliamentary Party and prior to
* . 3 32
the 1970 General Election could count sixteen MFs as members ' , Of these,
133
moreover, one was a member of the. Shadow Cabinet " , one was a deputy 
Opposition whip, and five were officials of back-bench committees. Among 
the latter, three were officers on the Conservative Members’ Defence 
Committee^^^. Presumably, through the agency of these individuals, Monday 
Club viewpoints had an opportunity to be voiced within the Parliamentary 
Party and at the centre of Conservative policy-making, the Shadow Cabinet,
PEST occupies a position at the opposite end of the Conservative 
spectrum of opinionsyfrom that occupied by the Monday Club. It was founded 
in early 19o3 by four Cambridge undergraduates as a reaction against the
128. For further details, see.Copping 1972, Qp.cit,, p.9 and pp.14-15: 
Seyd 1972, op,cit., p.472 and Fn.38, p.479.
129. Julian Critchley, "The Monday Club’s Idea of True Conservatism", 
The Ji.''.mes, 23 November 1968; Seyd 1972, op.cit., pp.483-4.
130. Seyd 1972, op.cit., p.481.
131. Interview 12; see also Seyd 1972, op.£i.t., Fn, 44, p.481.
132. For a full list, see Copping 1972, op.cjTt., p.21,
133. Geoffrey Kippon.
134. For a comment, see Mark Arnold-Forster, "Heath’s Cape Helmsmen",
The Guardian, 23 October 1970.
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135
Monday Club and as a means of retaining the ideals of radical Toryism
The group remained relatively small until after the 1964 General Election
when, as a result of the growing unpopularity of Uouglas-Home as Party
Leader and the initiation of a campaign by FwST to maintain radicalism
within the Conservative Party^' it began an erratic period of growth.
13 7By January 1967 it claimed twenty branches, all in universities , and
I38
in early 1970 a membership of 600 all but forty of whom were undergraduates
PEST has consistently maintained a position to the left of the
substantial body of Conservative opinion. It has, for example, supported
13 Dpolicies such as national economic planning and comprehensive education 
It is governed by a co-ordinating committee of twenty members including
•j 4 0
national officers and branch representatives'''. Like the Bow Group and 
the Monday Club, PEbT publishes pamphlets, engages in research, and holds 
meetings and seminars. It has also established close links with the other 
radical, left of centre Conservative organisations, such as the East 
London Conservative Association and the Greater London Young Conservatives.
During the 1964 to 1970 period, PEST helped to promote and keep 
alive a left of centre Conservative alternative and it may have served 
to constrain the Party's movement to the right. Party Leaders were aware 
that if they gave in to right wing demands they would have to contend with 
the opposition of an articulate and well organised section of the Party^^^. 
Through an oveilap in personnel it maintained close contact with the 
Research Department, some of the policy groups and the policy projects, 
but its points of access to the Conservative policy-making structure do 
not appear to have been extensive.
In the. 1964 to 1970 period of Opposition, what opportunities to 
influence the content of Conservative policy were available to the second
135. Interview 11.
136. See Will The_lhjcie^J^ose_?_, PEST, London 1965.
137. The Times, 16 January 1967.
138. Article by Julian Critchley, The Times, 21 February 1970.
139. See, Call an End to Feeble Opposition, PEST, London 
Educating the Individual Child, PEST, London 1965.
1965;
140. Interview 11.
141. Interview 11.
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set of extra-party policy channels - those interest groups and organisations 
which were not directly connected with the Party^^^l In attempting to 
answer this question an initial distinction may usefully be made. On the 
one hand, relations between key sections of the Party and some extra­
party interest groups and organisations were kept at a distance for 
reasons of mutual convenience. Many groups preferred not to have connec­
tions with party labels, while leading Conservative personnel preferred not
14 3to have connections with certain groups , On the other hand, contacts
with other groups of an informal, unorganised and sporadic nature were
maintained and these focussed mainly upon three, elements within the Party's
policy-making structure. First, the Research Department which, in its
capacity as an information gathering agency, received the publications of
various organisations, such as the NIESR, PEP, the CBI and the
Department personnel also maintained connections with members of a large
number of organised interests "stretching right across the political 
l4 3
spectrum." " Secondly, contact was maintained on a sporadic and informal
basis, between organised interests and individual Shadow Ministers and
Front-Bench spokesmen^^^. Finally, there was some overlap in personnel
between various sections of the Party and organised interests. Members
of the Parliamentary Party, for example, were in many cases also members
of extra-party organisations, such as the British Institute of Management,
l4 7the National Farmers' Union, and numerous companies and corporations , 
Moreover, the policy group exercise and the policy projects brought a 
number of outsiders directly within the Conservative policy-making 
structure.
142, For an outline and classification of these groups and interests, 
see S, E. Finer, Anonyiiious Empire, second edition, London 1966; 
Allen Potter, Organised Groups in British National Politics, 
London 1961.
143. Interview 9.
14 4. Intervi ew 20.
145. Interview 9; Barker and Rush 1970, op.cit., pp.87, 94 and 250-3.
146. Hutchinson 1970, op.cit., p.173; Punnett Î973, op.cit., p.259-60.
147. For a detailed, but not always reliable, outline of MPs interests 
and connections see, Andrew Roth, The Business Background of klFs, 
Parliaiuentary Profiles, London 1967. For further comment see. 
Barker and Rush 1970, op.cit., pp.105-6, 369-78; Punnett 1973, 
op.cit., p.279.
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Thus, in Opposition certain extra-party interest groups and 
organisations maintained little, if any, contact with Party Leaders.
Other groups, however, maintained some degree of contact either directly 
or through the intermediary of other elements in the Conservative Opposi­
tion's policy-making structure. In contrast, when the Party is in Govern­
ment the range of interest groups seeking opportunities to influence 
policy-making is liable to be broader in scope and, perhaps, larger in 
number than was the case in O p p o s i t i o n ^ I n  addition, contacts with 
Party Leaders, as heads of government departments, are not usually made 
either directly or through intra-party agencies, but through the medium 
of the Civil Service. Consequently it may be suggested that in^Opposition 
certain groups may have opportunities to influence the content of Cohserva- 
tive policy, but the range of groups involved and the nature of their
contacts would appear to be different from those operating in the govern- 
14 d
mental context .
Finally, during an Opposition period, what formal contacts may
exist between Party Leaders and members of the Civil Service? According
to Punnett, the Civil Service "goes to great pains to avoid 'political'
contacts with the party in Opposition", while spokesmen themselves will
normally avoid contact with civil servants^^^. In general, this approach
151was followed throughout the 1964 to 1970 period , although prior to
the 1970 Election contacts were permitted in order to prepare for a possible
152
change in Government '""o Thus Conservative Leaders were not only deprived
of the assistance and advice of the Civil Service but also lacked access
to important sources of information such as the Bank of England and public 
153corporations
148. See, Potter 1961, op.cit.
149, See, Punnett 1973, op,cit., p.210
l5.0, Ibid. , p.281
151. iRd. , pp.281-4.
15 2, Ibid., p. 282
153. See quoted section from Peter Shore’s, Entitled to Know, in Punnett
1973, op.cit., p.231. For an interesting indication of the lack 
of contact between Conservative Leaders and the Bank of England 
during the 1964 to 1970 period see, Cecil King, The Cecil King 
Diary 19o5-1970, London 1972, pp.82 and 241.
74
Conclusion
The preceding discussion of the various policy channels which 
focussed upon the Leadership reveal two important aspects of the Conserva­
tive policy-making structure in Opposition. First, in contrast to periods 
when the Party was in Government, the degree of contact between Leaders 
and followers was much closer. In Opposition the organisation of the 
Parliamentary Party, for instance, limited the Leadership’s chances of 
losing touch with their parliamentary supporters. In addition, the overlap 
in personnel between the various sections of-the policy-making structure 
and the closer attention given by the Leadership to purely Party matters, 
tended to increase the frequency of contact between Leaders and led^^^. 
Secondly, following partly from the above, in Opposition the opportunities 
available to intra-party policy channels to influence the content of 
Conservative policy were extended, and, conversely, those available to 
extra-party channels declined. As Butt has noted; "any party in power is 
to a considerable extent fuelled by the fashionable views of the moment, 
by the opinion formers and especially by advise from Whitehall. There is
thus a tendency for Government decisions to be taken in the light of expert
l55
or neutral advice". An Opposition is, however. In a limited way, removed 
from the context of Government action and depends, for advice and information, 
on more overtly party political sources.
In this chapter the policy-making structure of the 1964 to 1970 
Conservative Opposition has been examined in terms of the opportunities 
to influence policy content which were available to party and extra­
party personnel. In Part Three, analysis will focus upon four specific 
aspects of the Conservative Opposition’s economic policy-making activities 
and more will be said about the actual use made of their opportunities 
by the various groups and individuals involved. Before, proceeding to 
consider specific aspects of policy formulation, however, the cultural 
dimension of the Conservative Opposition’s policy process requires 
examination.
154. For further comment see, Punnett 1973, op.cit., p.251.
155. Ronald Butt, The Power of Parliament, second edition, London 1969, 
p.316,
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION'S POLICY PROCESS - THE CULTURAL ELEMENT
It may be recalled that in Chapter One I postulated that, in 
Opposition, a party's policy content is liable to conform more closely 
to the party's ideology and the opinions of partisans than would be the 
case in Government. It is, therefore, necessary to enquire into both 
the nature of Conservative ideology and the opinions of Conservative 
partisans. Before proceeding, however, it will be useful to outline 
the meanings which are given to the terms ideology and opinion in this 
study.
The term ideology refers to the world view or overall philosophical 
position commonly said to be held by members or supporters of a political 
party. This world view may be regarded as consisting of at least two 
interdependent elements; first, a set of beliefs about the organisation 
of society and the role of the state, and secondly, a set of beliefs about 
the nature of man^. In contrast, opinions are taken to relate to particu­
lar themes or issues, so that an actor may have a positive or negative 
opinion about, for example, the réintroduction of capital punishment or the 
establishment of comprehensive schools. These opinions may be the outcome
of a consciously held ideology, or they may reflect a particular personal
2interest, or may be merely a reflection of partisanship .
Po Conservatives share a single belief system? What consequences 
may Conservative ideology be said to have for party behaviour? What 
opinions and attitudes are held by contemporary Conservative partisans?
These questions are considered in the following pages and the discussion 
falls into three sections. In the first section some of the problems 
involved in analysing Conservative ideology, or Conservatism, are briefly 
outlined and examined. Recent studies of Conservative thinking are reviewed 
and two predominant strands, in the form of ideal types, are isolated.
1. See Patrick Corbett, Ideologies, London 1965, p.12.
2. D. E, Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain, 
Middlesex 1971, p.260.
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III the second section an attempt is made to further clarify and elucidate 
these ideal types in the light of data drawn from recent opinion surveys 
and other material. The views of Conservative partisans on particular 
themes and issues are examined, and, whenever possible, emphasis is given 
to data collected during the 1964 to 1970 period. The chapter ends with 
a summary of some of the main points which have emerged and a discussion 
of some of the problems involved in classifying opinion groupings within 
the Conservative Party. By way of illustration, some of the findings out­
lined in the following case studies are briefly anticipated.
Conservatism
The term Conservatism implies the existence of a single set of 
systematically related beliefs which are shared by all members of the Party. 
This is misleading. In the first place, beliefs on particular issues are 
likely to vary according to the particular values and interests of each 
actor involved. More importantly, as is witnessed by the different conclu­
sions reached by those who have written on the subject, Conservatism cannot
be located in any one source, or reduced to a single doctrine or philoso- 
. . .  3phical position . More fruitfully the student may consider Conservatism as 
the product of a varied and ongoing tradition: as an outcome of the accumu­
lation of experience consequent upon the Party's historical development.
The Conservative tradition may be located in at least three sources: 
the Party's historical activities; the thought of certain men, such as 
Bolingbroke, Burke and Disraeli; and certain concepts about the nature
See for example. Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism, London 1912;
Keith Felling,Hhat is Conservatism?, London 1930, pamphlet;
Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind, London 1954, especially 
Chapter I. Compare these with: Sir Reginald Northam, Conservatism;
The Only Way, London 1939; Sir Arthur Bryant, The Spirit oi 
Conservatism, London 1929.
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of man and society which are rooted in the Western intellectual tradition^*
These sources have bequeathed to Conservative politicians a wide and
diffuse set of political prindples which may be utilised as a means of
either justification or precedent. Moreover, as Harris notes, because
Conservatism is a product of the Party's history, many precepts have
remained the same while the actual practices attached to them have altered.
He goes on to say that historically, the Conservative tradition:
is more verbal than actual, certain words are 
maintained by Conservatives giving them an identity 
over time. But more important is the historical fact 
that the practices attached to these words, the 
importance attached to them and the meaning given 
to them shift decisively.^
Thus, because of the width and depth of the tradition out of which it 
arises and the varied manner in which it has been applied. Conservatism 
would appear to defy definition and, hence, effectively to impose little 
constraint upon political action. Viewed in these terms Conservatism 
appears capable of justifying almost any form of state activity or 
inactivity^.
Despite the considerable analytical problems involved, a number 
of outlines of Conservative beliefs have been published. Those published 
prior to the 1950s attempted to reduce Conservatism to a single philoso­
phical position. Consequently the exact nature of the conclusions
4. In particular the concept of Leadership: according to this view
in every society there must be those who rule and those who are 
ruled, and as the leaders have total responsibility it follows 
that any mistakes are purely characterological in nature. This 
stress on valuative and subjective factors rather than on environ­
mental and 'objective* factors relates to arguments which are far 
older than British Conservatism. Equally the notion that conscious­
ness influences being is constant among 'right wing' philosophies. 
The concept of leadership and hierarchy and its consequences for 
Conservative ideals has been developed in, S. H. Beer, Modern 
British Politics, London 1965, pp.3-8. For a more detailed outline 
of some of the main points discussed by Beer the reader may consult: 
E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture, Middlesex 1963; 
Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Bein^ (i&)ridge, Mass. 1936. 
See also Werner Stark, The Fundamental Forms of Social Thought, 
London 1962; David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution, London 
1967, pp.75-76.
5. Nigel Harris, Conservatism; State and Society, unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis. University of London 1963, p.14.
6. Ibid., p.57.
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reached varied according ta the author's preferences and the Party's 
contemporary situation^. In general, however, most of these early accounts 
of Conservatism concentrated upon one of two separate and ultimately 
incompatible models of society and political action. These I will term 
the tory model and the liberal model. More recently, other scholars have 
extended the debate by arguing that taken together these two models form 
the twin bases of contemporary Conservatism, Amongst this latter group 
the most notable contributions have been made by a small number of British 
and American scholars, including: Glickman, Saloma, Beer and, most
recently, Harris and Greenleaf^. I hhve attempted to draw together the 
themes developed by them in the following outline.
The tory model is based on an organic view of society. Accordingly 
society is regarded as a corporate entity characterised by an interdepen­
dence of functions. In such a society each element operates in order to 
preserve and maintain the whole. Thus concepts such as "Stability, unity, 
harmony, order, security and continuity"^ are central to the tory disposi­
tion. In addition the model of society advanced is an hierarchic one.
In the tory view there is a clear distinction between leaders and followers; 
between those capable of leading and those who are to be led^^. The 
concept of leadership, however, implies responsibilities. Those who are 
entrusted with the direction of the state have a moral duty to fulfill, 
for in the tory model the state is allowed a positive role in co-ordinating 
the various elements of the society,maintaining stability, and, in the
7. See footnote no.3 above; Viscount Hailsham, The Conservative Case, 
Middlesex 1939.
8. See Harvey Glickman, Tory Ethos and Conservative Policy, unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis. Harvard 1958, and by the same author, "The Toryness
of English Conservatism", Journal of British Studies, November 1961; 
John D. Saloma, British Conservatism and the Welfare State; An 
Analysis of the Policy Fi^esT^^ the ConservatiT^ Party, un­
published Ph.D. thesis. Harvard University, October 1961, especially 
Chapter 2; Beer 1963, op.cit., esp. part I; Harris 1963, op.cit.; 
Nigel Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society, London 1972, 
esp. the introduction and chapters 1 and 15; and the same authors. 
Beliefs in Society, Middlesex 1971, pp.97-129. For a more recent 
analysis see W.H. Greenleaf, "The Character of Modern British 
Conservatism", in R. Benewick (et.al.) Knowledge and Belief in 
Politics; The Problem of Ideology, London 1973, pp.177-212.
9. Saloma 1961, op.cit., p.66; Harris 1963, op.cit., p.12.
10. Beer 1965, op.cit., pp.2-9, 92-93, 245-6.
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11Dlsraelian conception, providing for the "welfare of the people".
According to Harris, contemporary proponents of the tory point of view
are more concerned with stability than with competition and employ a
vocabulaty which contains terms such as "co-operation", "partnership",
12"consultation" and "integration". In the economic field, those who 
adhere to a tory viewpoint are most litotly to favour policies which 
involve government and both sides of industry such as national economic 
planning and a voluntary national prices and incomes policy. Tories, 
moreover, would not necessarily be opposed to proposals which might 
involve an increase in government intervention in the day to day affairs 
of industry and an extension in the size of the public sector such as 
investment assistance to particular companies and special measures to 
help industry in the less prosperous regions.
In contrast the liberal model is based on a reductionist or
individualistic view of society. According to this view society possesses
no intrinsic value: it is merely an aggregate of individual wills and
preferences and if is from the collision of these that social change
emerges. Thus concepts such as conflict, change, expansion, competition
13are central to the liberal disposition . As in the tory case the hier­
archical nature of social organisation is assumed but more emphasis is 
placed on political and social mobility and the alternation and change of 
ruling groups^^. In the liberal model the state fulfills a negative role. 
Its functions are limited to 'holding the ring' or, in economic matters,
to providing a stimulus to free enterprise operating competitively
15according to the sanctions of an open market . In its contemporary form 
the liberal view is more concerned with competition than stability and 
proponents employ such terms as "responsibility", "realism", "initiative" 
and "incentive".In economic policy terms, liberals are most likely to
11. Ibid.. p.266-71
12. Harris 1963, op.cit., pp.144-145. For a recent outline of the Tory
case see: Hailsham 1959, op.cit.
13. Beer 1965, op.cit., pp.34-39; Harris 1963, op.cit., p.12.
14. Harris 1972, op.cit., p.79.
15. Ibid.9 pp.17-19.
16. For a recent outline of Conservatism which is based firmly upon the 
liberal mcdel, see Timothy Raison, Conflict and Conservatism, CPC 
313, London 1965; and in relation to economic affairs, see Enoch 
Powell, "The Limits of Laissez-Faire", Crossbow, Spring 1960.
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advocate measures designed to discourage monopolies and large scale 
organised interests (including employers' and workers* organisations), 
to decrease the size of the public sector through denationalisation, the 
divestment of government functions, and the cutting back of government 
expenditure, and to encourage individual initiative through reducing 
taxation.
Precedents and justifications for both these models can be found
within the Conservative tradition. The tory model can be supported by
reference to the works of Bolingbroke, Burke and Disraeli, all of whom
emphasised the integrated and organic nature of society and advocated a
17positive role for the state . Thus R. A. Butler was in no sense deviating 
from Conservative principles when he said that his Party was not "frightened 
at the use of the state, A good Tory has never been in history afraid of 
the use of the s t a t e " . T h e  liberal model derives its credibility, not 
so much from the work of theorists, but from concepts introduced into the 
party as a consequence of the recruitment of business support from 1867 
onwards. During the remainder of the Nineteenth Century and early part 
of the Twentieth Century, financial, commercial and industrial wealth 
greatly increased its representation within the Conservative Party. In 
the House of Commons in 1865, for example, 199 Conservative MPs were land­
owners, while 112 were connected with finance, industry and commerce. By 
1892 the proportion had changed: 163 as opposed to 298 of the latter
category. Moreover, in 1865 the Liberal Party had included 344 MPs 
connected with finance, industry and commerce, by 1892 this figure had 
fallen to 297^^. These figures reflect the movement of finance, industry
and commerce from Liberalism to Conservatism especially after the Liberal 
20split in 1884 . The process continued throughout the early decades of 
the Twentieth Century and gained renewed momentum following the Lloyd
PI
George/Asquith split in 1915 * . As the Conservative Party increasingly
17. On Burke and Disraeli, see Harris 1972, op.cit., Appendix; on 
Bolingbroke, Burke and Disraeli, see Sir Geoffrey Butler, The Tory 
Tradition, CPC 175, London 1957. See also, Kirk 1954, op.cit., 
chapter 2; Cecil 1912, op.cit.» pp.45-72; Beer 1965, op.cit.,
pp.266-271.
18. H.C. Debs., Vol. 434, Col.1247, 10 March 1947.
19. Sir Ivor Jennings, Parliament, Cambridge 1939, Table XI, p.38
20. Harris 1972, op.cit., pp.24-6.
21. Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party, London 1966,
esp. chapters 3, 4, and 5.
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won the support of businessmen they had, according to two modern
Conservatives, "a profound effect on the party, purging it of most of its
Tory philosophy and indietrinating it with that peculiar blend of whiggery
and laissez-faire Liberalism which still colours the speeches of some of 
22
its leaders."
In sum, at least tifo contradictory elements exist within modern 
Conservatism; an individualistic liberal tendency and a collectivist tory 
tendency. Because Conservatism cannot be reduced to a single doctrine or 
philosophical position, any attempt to measure the precise influence of 
Conservative ideology upon the formulation of Conservative policy is 
liable to prove difficult. Moreover it is possible that the vast majority 
of Conservatives, both voters and activists, may be totally unaware of 
the nature and complexity of the models outlined above. Even when dealing 
with those who might be considered to possess an awareness of party 
ideology, the student cannot know whether, or to what extent, these actors 
are motivated by principle or by other self interested or tactical consid­
erations .
The above considerations should not be taken to mean that Conserva­
tive ideology has no relevance to the Conservative policy process. It may 
be assumed, for instance, that those politicians who are Ideologically 
aware are liable to act with principles in mind either on the basis of
conviction or because they wish to render their actions consistent with,
23or make them acceptable to, a given body of opinion . Thus, to the 
extent that any corpus of shared principles imposes limi.ta upon the actions 
of those who adhere to them, it may be said that there are certain bound­
aries, if only of a very general nature, beyond which Conservative policy­
makers may not trespass. For this reaaon Conservative principles are 
relevant to the Party's policy process and it may be postulated that 
policy content must not contradict or undermine them. Because of the 
width of the Conservative tradition, however, its precepts cannot easily 
be utilised as a means of assessing or predicting Conservative behaviour.
22. Roy Lewis and Angus Maude, The English Middle Classes, London 1947, 
p.74, quoted in Beer 1965, op.cit., p.273.
23. The author owes this point to a paper given by Quentin Skinner, 
"Political Action: the Namierite Fallacy", at the University of 
Glasgow on 13 November 1972.
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More usefully the two models may be regarded as ideal types forming the 
poles of a continuum, and as such they can offer a potentially fruitful 
means of distinguishing the various opinion groupings which may be found 
to exist within the Party. Moreover, although all Conservatives cannot 
be said consciously to subscribe to a particular Ideology, most may be 
expected to express opinions which can be placed at some point along a 
tory/liberal axis.
The Opinionsof Conservative Partisans
No comprehensive survey of the opinions of party supporters in the 
United Kingdom has so far been undertaken. It is possible, nevertheless, 
to reach certain tentative conclusions on the basis of material drawn 
from a number of sources, including opinion polls and other surveys. In 
order to handle the evidence adequately a distinction must be made between 
Conservative voters generally and activists in particular. There is some 
comparable information about both voters' and activists' opinions. Amongst 
voters, additional material is available on the working class Conservative 
voter, while, amongst activists further evidence is available on two sub­
groups; parliamentary candidates and MPs. In the following pages each of 
these categories and sub-categories is treated separately. The relevant 
evidence which is available is reviewed and, whenever possible, the 
opinions of Conservative partisans are contrasted with those of their 
Labour counterparts and, in addition, areas of opinion conflict amongst 
Conservatives are highlighted. In the main the material has been drawn 
from sources relevant to the 1964 to 1970 period and to the issues which 
are considered in the following case studies.
1. Conservative Voters
In their study of political change in Britain, Butler and Stokes 
conclude that the majority of the public have little understanding of 
policy issues and few preferences^^. This conclusion is largely supported
24, D. E. Butler and Donald Stokes 1971, op.cit., pp.218-220.
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25by the evidence presented in opinion polls . According to data collected
by National Opinion Polls (NOP) during the 1964 to 1970 period, however,
there were at least three issues, relevant to the policy areas chosen for
analysis in this study, on which the preferences of Conservative voters
differed markedly from those of their Labour counterparts, namely steel
nationalisation, proposals for a wealth tax and the power of the Trade
Unions^^. On each of these three issues the majority of Conservative
27voters endorsed a view in opposition to the majority of Labour voters * 
(see Table 5.1, below).
Table 5.1 Issues on which the majority of Conservative voters
endorsed a view in opposition to the majority of Labour 
voters.
Should the Government nationalise the Steel Industry?
All % Con % Lab % Lib % Source
Should 19 4 36 
Should not 57 86 29 
Don’t know 24 10 35
9
74
17
NOP/May 1965/p.7
Would you approve of a wealth tax?
Approve 40 30 52 
Disapprove 53 66 41 
Dnn’t know 7 4 7
NOP/March 1968/p.9
Do you think the Unions now have too much power?
Too much 62 72 46 
Too little 6 4 9 
Right 22 16 34 
Don* t know 10 7 10
69
3
19
8
NOP/March 1969/p.6
In addition. Conservative voters were less likely than Labour voters to 
accept that government control of prices and incomes was necessary and 
were less sympathetic towards the Labour Government’s 1965 National Plan
25. National Opinion Polls, Political Bulletin, 1965-1970; Gallup Poll, 
Political Index 1965-1970. The data used in the remainder of this 
section are Itaken solely from National Opinion Polls. This is because 
Gallup does not generally distinguish responses to attitude questions 
on the basis of party affiliation.
26. Hereafter, references to National Opinion Polls, Political Bulletin, 
will be abbreviated as follows: NOP/month and year/page reference.
27. Richard Rose, Politics in England Today, London 1974, p.284.
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(see table 5.2). On the other hand Conservative voters were more sympa­
thetic than Labour voters towards issues such as the denationalisation 
of the Railways, Coal, Gas and Electricity industries and preferred the 
use of competition as opposed to controls as a means of keeping prices 
down (see table 5.3).
Qn the issues of the necessity of government control of prices 
and incomes, the Labour Government’s National Plan, and the denationalisa­
tion of existing public sector industries, substantial numbers (over 30%) 
of Conservative respondents took up a position contrary to that of the 
majority of Conservative voters. For example, on the question of the 
denationalisation of the Coal industry Conservative opinion appears to 
have been split into two equal factions, while, in the case of the Gas 
industry, only a small majority (2%) favoured its return to the private 
sector (table 5.3).
Table 5.2 Breakdown of opinions according to party affiliation on the 
issues of the Labour Government’s National Plan and the 
necessity of government control over prices and incomes.
Attitudes to the National Plan
All % Con % Lab % Lib 55 Source
A very good idea 8 3 14 7
A good idea 33 22 42 43
A bad idea 15 27 6 15 NOP/September 1965/p.9
A very bad idea 3 7 A 2
Don’t know 41 41 38 33
Do you think that a prices and incomes policy is necessary or unnecessary?
Necessary 56 49 65
Unnecessary 27 36 18 NOP / SeptenÈier 1968/p. 9
Don’t know 17 15 17
Is Government control of prices and incomes necessary or unnecessary?
Necessary 66(56) 61(52) 75(69) 71 NOP/October 1969/p.13
Unnecessary 22(30) 30(35) 13(18) 18 Figures in brackets
Don’t know 12(14) 9(13) 12(13) 11 for February 1969.
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On the issue of prices and incomes, a majority of Conservative voters 
consistently accepted the necessity of controls (table 5.2), although 
79% had previously stated that competition and not controls was the 
best way of keeping prices down (table 5.3). Finally, on the issue of 
the Labour Government's National Plan, 25% of Conservative voters were 
favourable as opposed to 34% who were not (table 5.2).
Table 5.3 Breakdown of opinions according to party affiliation on the 
issues of the denationalisation of existing public sector 
industries and the use of competition as opposed to controls 
as a means of keeping prices down.
Should the following industries remain nationalised?
Steel Railways Coal
All% Con% Lab% All% Con% Lab% All% Con% Lab%
Remain nationalised 42 24 64 48 39 61 53 43 69
Denationalise 41 61 18 38 48 24 32 43 17
Don’t know 17 15 18 14 13 15 15 14 14
Electric Gas
Remain nationalised S3 41 70 53 42 66 Source :
Denationalise 32 45 15 31 44 15 NOP/September
Don’t know 15 14 15 16 14 17 1968/p.8
Which is the best way of keeping prices down: competition or nrore
g o v e r n m e n t  control over prices?
Competition 
Contro1 
Don’t know
All % Con % Lab % Lib %
62 79 49 74
32 17 46 21
6 4 5 5
Source
NOP/March 
1967/p.6
Thus, on each of the issues outlined in tables 5.2 and 5.3, Conservative 
voters appear to have been divided amongst themselves. However, with 
the possible exception of the issue of Government control of prices and 
incomes, the available evidence suggests that during the 1964 to 1970 
period the balance of opinions amongst Conservative voters was tilted 
towards the liberal tendency. This impression is further strengthened 
when the three issues on which Conservative voters differed markedly 
from their Labour counterparts (see table 5.1) are taken into account.
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Studies of the working class Conservative voter carried out by 
Nordlinger and by McKenzie and Silver, although based on surveys adminis­
tered during the first half of the 1960s, both offer some confirmation
28for the generalisations developed in the preceding paragraph
Nordlinger, for instance, found that what working class Conservatives
disliked most about the Labour Party was its advocacy of nationalisation
and planning (38%), while they praised the Conservative Party for its
perceived tendency to "do what is best for the country" (17%), for its
support for free enterprise (15%) and for its possession of "business 
29virtues" (10%) . Likewise, McKenzie and Silver found that working
class Conservatives condemned Labour for its support of nationalisation,
its wastefulness and its hindering of initiative and enterprise, while
almost all "indicated a preference for individual over collective action
30for personal betterment" . In addition, 84% of working class Conservative
voters were found to agree with the statement that "the Trade Unions have
31too much power in this country"
2. Conservative Activists
The opinions of party activists have not been extensively analysed. 
For instance, no comprehensive national survey has been undertaken of 
the viewpoints of Conservative or Labour Party workers at either consti­
tuency, regional or central level. Some indications of possible opinion 
groupings amongst certain sections of party activists, however, can be 
drawn from research carried out by Richard Rose, Robertson and Kornberg 
and Erasure.
Richard Rose has undertaken an analysis of the resolutions submitted
to each of the Conservative’s Annual Party Conferences during the 1955
32 . .to 1960 period . He divides the resolutions into one of four categories: 
Partisan, Non-partisan, Right-wing Conservative and Left-wing Conservative.
28, Eric A. Nordlinger, The Working-Class
McKenzie and Allan Silver, Angels in Marble; Working Glass Conserva-
Tories, London 1967; Robert
tives in Urban England, London 1968,
29. Nordlinger 1967, op.cit., p.155
30. McKenzie and Silver 1968, op.cit., p.110 and p.218
31, Ibid., Chart 4.9, p.134.
32, Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party Activists",
in Richard Rose (ed.). Studies in British Politics, Second edition, 
London 1969, pp.368-390.
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The former refers to those resolutions which contain references to agreed 
party policy which is opposed to that of the Labour Party, while Non- 
partisan refers to those resolutions which are not subject to controversy 
along party lines. Rose’s definition of Right-wing Conservative, as it 
applies to economic issues, broadly conforms to my liberal model and 
covers those resolutions which refer to matters such as denationalisation, 
the reduction of government spending and services and the reduction of 
redistributive taxes. Finally, Left-wing Conservative refers to those 
resolutions which are in harmony with the policies of the Labour Party^^.
Rose found that amongst resolutions dealing with economic affairs 
and taxes 177 reflected a Right-wing viewpoint, while 159 could be 
classified as Partisan, 28 as Left-wing and 93 as Non-partisan^^. As 
Rose does not analyse Opinion groupings in detail and as his findings are 
based on evidence drami from the latter part of the 1950s, his conclusions 
are of limited relevance to the subject matter of the present study. 
Nevertheless9 Rose’s analysis suggests that at the very least a good 
many party activists may hold opinions which are close to the liberal 
strand of Conservatism,
Robertson’s findings deal with the opinions of those Conservatives
35who stood aa Parliamentary candidates in the 1970 General Election “ .
His analysis, covering the election addresses of 95% of Conservative 
candidates, reveals that in the majority of cases themes reflecting a 
strong bias towards the liberal tendency were emphasised. For example, 
72% of Conservative Election Addresses referred to trade union reform,
64% proposed cuts in taxation, 63% mentioned the abolition of Selective 
Employment Tax, 53% called for the removal of economic controls and the 
introduction of measures to increase competition, and 50% demanded a 
reduction in public expenditure^^.
33. Ibid.9 pp.372-376
34. Ibid., Table 5a, p.381
35. David Robertson, "The Content of Election Addresses and Leaders’ 
Speeches", in D. E,. Butler and M. Pinto-Duschinsky, The British 
General Election of 1970, London 1971, Appendix IV, pp.437-445.
36. Ibid., Table 1, pp.438-39.
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The research carried out by Kornberg and Erasure is confined to
37the policy orientations of Conservative MPs . Their survey, administered 
in 1969, involved 126 Conservative Parliamentarians each of whom was 
asked to respond to a series of six statements on policy issues. The
researchers assumed that positions on substantive policy issues reflected
38more general ideological positions . Two of the statements utilised 
have particular relevance to the themes developed in the present study. 
First, Conservative tIFs were asked to state whether they agreed or disagreed 
with the contention that "a legally enforced prices and incomes policy 
should be a continuing part of British economic planning in the future 
regardless of which party holds office". Eight per cent expressed agree­
ment, while ninety per cent disagreed with the statement. Secondly, 
respondents were asked to state their reaction to the statement that 
"the trade union system must be reformed or economic health may be
unobtainable". Ninety-seven per cent agreed with this statement, while
39three per cent disagreed
The findings reported by Rose, Robertson and Kornberg and Erasure 
suggest that a sizeable proportion of party activists, constituency 
members, candidates and MPs may hold opinions which in the field of 
economic affairs are close to the liberal strand of Conservatism.
Moreover, the analyses carried out by Robertson and Kornberg and Erasure 
suggest that during the latter part of the 1964 to 1970 period there was 
a marked tendency towards liberal solutions on the part of candidates and 
MPs with emphasis being placed upon policies designed to cut back the 
scope of the public sector, to curtail government involvement in the 
affairs of industry and to increase competition. It may be noted that 
these conclusions are broadly in line with those previously drawn from 
the evidence relating to Conservative voters.
Conclusion
In the preceding pages the nature of Conservative ideology and the opinions 
of Conservative partisans have been outlined and examined* Two ideological
37. Allan Kornberg and Robert C. Erasure, "Policy Differences in British
Parliamentary Parties", American Political Science Review, Vol.LXV, 
September 1971, pp.694-703.
38. Ibid., p.696
39. Ibid.. Table 1, p.698
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tendencies have been extracted: a tory tendency and a liberal tendency.
These, it has been suggested, offer a useful means of distinguishing the 
various strands of opinion which may be discerned within the Party.
Partly in order to elucidate this proposition, published material dealing 
with the opinions of Conservative partisans has been examined and the 
conclusion has been drawn that, during the 1964 to 1970 period in particu­
lar, the balance of opinions amongst Conservative voters and activists 
was biased towards the liberal tendency.
Although the general tendency of partisan opinions remains clear, 
in terms of both quantity and quality the available evidence remains 
too limited to allow of any precise classification of opinion groupings 
amongst Conservatives. In addition, as the evidence presented in this 
chapter reveals, on a number of issues the breakdown of Conservative 
opinions was neither clear-cut nor predictable. On some issues opinions 
were fairly evenly divided, on others the majority trend was closer to 
the tory than the liberal tendency, while there were certain issues which 
did not appear to be a matter of controversy either within the Party or 
between Conservatives and their Labour counterparts. Moreover, the data 
on prices and incomes policy in particular appear to support the proposi­
tion outlined by Butler and Stokes that the policy preferences held by 
partisans are ephemeral and change over time^^. The above considerations 
would imply that the precise nature and disposition of opinion groupings 
within the Party, and the extent to which the tory or liberal element is 
emphasised, is liable to vary across issue and across time. In order to 
illustrate this point some of the findings which are presented in the 
following sections of this study may be briefly anticipated.
In relation to national economic planning, for example, it is 
possible to discern at least three broad opinion groupings within the 
Party prior to the 1964 Æeneraîl Election. First, there was a predominant 
view which, with its stress upon the desirability of the co-operation 
and partnership of government and both sides of industry, emphasised 
themes central to the tory tendency. Secondly, there was a less popular
40* Butler and Stokes 1971, op.cit., pp.220-221
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middle view which, while not opposed to national planning in the form of 
an exchange of information between government and industry, argued that 
the first priority was the creation of a competitive environment in which 
industry might prosper. Finally, a more extreme liberal viewpoint, which 
was opposed to national economic planning in general on the grounds that 
it was liable to prove a wasteful activity and was incapable of functioning 
adequately in the context of a free enterprise economy^Later, as the 
politicians’ perceptions of planning changed so the nature and disposition 
of opinion groupings within the Party altered. Support for the more tory 
view declined, the middle view became predominant and the liberal view 
gained adherents. At the same time, however, the content of each viewpoint 
was refined and developed in the light of experience and in response to 
the emergence of new ideas about the role and function of planning^^.
Likewise, in the case of incomes policy five broad opinion groupings 
can be discerned within the Party prior to the 1964 General Election.
Each of these can be placed at some point along a tory/liberal continuum: 
bounded at one extreme by those who were opposed to a national incomes 
policy because it involved government intervention in the workings of 
the market, and at the other by those who advocated an extension of 
government intervention in order to affect the levels of prices, profits 
and w a g e s I n  later years, as in the case of economic planning, the 
arguments put fortrard by, and the pattern of support for, these groupings 
were altered and transformed^^.
The above Q3camples could be supported by others drmni from the cases
of both structure of industry and regional policy, but the main point is
evident: the precise structure and balance of opinion groupings within the
Party is liable to alter in accordance with changes in both the nature of
the issue being discussed and with the Party’s circumstances and historical 
43situation . Thus any further analysis of the relationship between Conser­
vative ideology and the opinions of Conservative partisans must await the 
detailed case studies of specific policy issues which follow.
41. See below, Chapter Seven, pp. 107-113.
42. See below, Chapter Seven, pp. 119-120,
43. See below, Chapter Eight, pp. 144-147.
44. See below. Chapter Eight, pp. 148-166.
43. For others views on this point in relation to the Conservative Party 
see: Julian Critchley, "The Case for aWhig Revival in the Tory Party", 
The Times, 15 February 1969; and Harris 1972, op.cit., p.79.
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PART THREE
FOUR CASE STUDIES OP CONSERVATIVE POLICY-MAKING
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CHAPTER SIX
INTRODUCTION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION’S PARTY
PROGRAMME
In Parts One and Tt-jo I have attempted to outline the context of 
Conservative Party action during the 1964 to 1970 period. In the First 
Part, I outlined five roles which have traditionally been pursued by 
Oppositions in the United Kingdom, and suggested that two of these, a 
critical role and an alternative government role, were given primary 
emphasis by the 1964 to 1970 Conservative Opposition. I further argued 
that in pursuing these roles the predominant and persistent aim of the 
Conservative Party was to regain the power, prestige and status of a 
governing party. In Part Two I examined the Conservative Opposition’s 
policy-making process in terms both of its structure and its culture.
I noted that when the Party is in Opposition the opportunities available 
to intra-party policy channel» to influence the content of policy are 
greater than when the Party is in Government. Finally, in dealing with 
the cultural element I have extracted tCTO broad philosophical tendencies, 
a tory conception and a liberal conception, which may be said to co-exist 
within modern Conservatism. The purpose of these earlier sections is to 
provide a background to, and a context for, the analysis of the case 
studies which form the core of this thesis.
There are four case studies each dealing with a particular policy 
area, namely national economic planning and the National Plans, prices and 
incomes policy, regional policy, and policy in relation to the structure 
of industry. As previously indicated, these have been chosen because they 
all appear to be areas in which (a) the 1959 to 1964 Conservative Government 
introduced important policy innovations which were to some extent contro­
versial in terms of certain strands of Conservative ideology, and (b) there 
was some continuity of policy development and debate in the following years 
of Labour Government. For these reasons they appear to offer interesting 
and promising test cases for the hypotheses outlined in Chapter One,
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During the Opposition period the development of policy within
each of the four policy areas took place within a wider policy framework, 
namely the evolution of the overall party programme. This programme was 
revealed in four major policy statements published during the 1964 to 
1970 period and, as will be shown, these and the circumstances surround­
ing their formulation had consequences for each of the policy issues 
considered in the case studies. In order to avoid tiresome repetition 
at a later stage, a brief outline of the development of the party programme 
will be given in the remainder of this chapter.
The case studies are related in Chapters Seven, Eight, Nine and 
Ten below. They cover the period from around 1960 to June 1970 and they 
all follow a broadly similar format. With the exception of Chapter Eight 
all begin with a delineation of the scope of the relevant policy area, 
and where appropriate, the nature of policy developed prior to 1960,
Next, the evolution of Conservative policy between i960 and 1964 is 
considered. Attention is paid both to party opinion and the activities 
of the Government, and an assessment of the Conservative position on the 
eve of the 1964 General Election is prov2.ded. This is followed by an 
examination of the development of party attitudes and proposals during 
the 1964 to 1970 Opposition period. The activities of the Labour 
Government and the Conservative Opposition’s responses to them are 
described, and the attempts to develop a Conservative alternative 
position are analysed. Each chapter concludes with a brief review of 
some of the main points which have arisen and a tentative appraisal of 
their relevance to the hypotheses outlined in Chapter One. Finally, in 
Chapter Eleven, the development of policy during the 1970 to 1974 period 
is examined and the measure of continuity between Opposition policy and 
Government actions is evaluated. The salient features of these five 
chapters are drawn together and discussed in Part Four, the concluding 
section of this study.
The Development of the Party Programme 1964-1970
As previously noted, following his appointment as the Party's 
"policy chief" in October 1964, Heath initiated a widescale review of 
party policy. The task of producing proposals in pre-determined policy 
areas was entrusted to the policy groups but the overall framework and 
general tendency of Conservative policy remained the responsibility of
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the Party Leader, his "policy chief", and their colleagues in the 
Shadow Cabinet .
The Initial draft of the basic outlines of Conservative policy
took the form of a series of proposals for a manifesto which could be
used in the event of a snap election. According to The Times the
proposals were based on Heath’s analysis of the reasons for his party’s
2defeat in the 1964 General Election . Later, at his request, they
were outlined in an 8,000 word skeleton manifesto by David Howell, the
3Director of the Conservative Political Centre . In January 1965, this 
document was submitted to Sir Alec^ and, after it had received his
approval, sections of the draft were sent to the various policy groups
5for further development .
The contents of this early manifesto were not revealed to the 
public, but some of the points contained within it were expounded in 
a number of speeches delivered by Heath and other Conservative Leaders.
In the debate on the 1965 budget, for instance. Heath outlined the 
Conservatives' solution to Britain’s economic problems. He began by 
emphasising the need to create more incentives and greater competition, 
and he proceeded by outlining proposals for reforms in the fields of
industrial relations, industrial structure, taxation and regional
6development . In conclusion he stated that the main aim of his proposals
was the creation of "a high efficiency econoiiy which pays high wages
7but, because of its high efficiency, achieves low costs". In addition 
to the proposals outlined by Heath, Sir Alec committed a future Conser­
vative Government to undertake far reaching fiscal reforms including 
the reduction of taxes'^ .
1. "Progress Report on Tory Policy Makers", The Times, 1 February 1965.
2. The Times, 1 January 1965. Surveys indicated that one of the reasons
for the Conservatives defeat was their failure to hold the support 
of the middle class omier occupiers, in the 30-40 age group. See 
The Times, 3 November 1964.
3. Interview 14.
4. The Times, 4 January 1965
5. Interview 14.
6. H.C. Debs. Vol.710, Cols,514-19, 7 April 1965. See also Heath’s 
speech to the Scottish Conservatives Conference at Ayr, The Times,
23 April 1965; speech by Sir Keith Joseph, H.C.Debs. Vol.712, Cols. 
387-9, 11 May 1965.
7. H.C.Debs., Vol.710, Cols.514; see also speech by Heath to City of 
Westminster Conservative Association, The Times, 19 May 1965.
8. T.V. broadcast, 26 April 1969, quoted in NCP 1965, No.'14, 12 July 
1965, p.386.
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In contrast to the Party’s previous period in Government, the
approach outlined by Heath represented a significant alteration in policy
emphasis. In the Conservatives’ 1964 General Election manifesto, for 
example, primary emphasis had been placed upon the themes of modernisation 
and economic growth which involved a strong commitment to such proposals 
as economic planning and prices and incomes policy. Although competition 
was mentioned, it was not treated as the central aspect of Conservative 
economic policy^.
It was originally intended that the proposals produced by the
policy groups should provide the basic material for a manifesto planned
for publication in the Autumn of 1965^^. In keeping with this schedule
most of the policy groups had submitted their interim reports to the
11Advisory Comnittee on Policy (AGP) by the end of July and these were
12considered by Heath, the new Party Leader , By early August the first
13draft of the new manifesto had been produced and, in September, the
document was submitted to the Shadow Cabinet for their approval
Finally, the policy statement was published under the title Putting
ter 
16
15Britain Right Ahead , and in Octobe 1965 received the overvdielming
endorsement of the Party Conference
Two themes were emphasised in Putting Britain Right Ahead; first,
the encouragement of individual initiative, individual enterprise, and
individual work; and secondly, the creation of "a new dynamic within
17industry" by measures of increased competition . These themes were
9. F.W.S. Craig (ed.), British General Election Manifestos 1918-1966, 
Chichester 1970, pp.216-219.
10. Interview 6; speech by Heath to Scottish Conservatives Conference, 
The Times, 23 April 1965.
11. The"“^ m es, 29 July 1965.
12. George Hutchinson, Edward Heath; A Personal and Political Biography,
London 1970, p.150,
13. Interview 14.
14. The Times, 21 September 1965.
15. CCO, London 1965.
16. See NUGUA 83rd Annual Conference Report 1965, NUCUA, London 1965, 
pp.19-20; also motions Nos. 1-25, Conference Handbook and Programme 
of Proceedings, 1965, NÜCUA, London 1965.
17. These themes were expounded by Heath during a speaking-tour of the 
Scottish Highlands in September 1965; see in particular his speech 
at Inverness, The Times, 20 September 1965,
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developed in relation to five elements of Conservative policy: greater
incentives, a competitive industrial structure, trade union reform, 
selectivity in the social services, and entry to Europe^^. The programme 
was later carried through into the Party's 1966 General Election manifesto 
and formed the basis of the Conservatives’ election campaign^^.
As explained in Chapter Three, following the 1966 Election Heath
and his closest aides formulated a plan for the conduct of the Opposition
20in the years ahead , They decided to leave all activity for about six
21
months until the Autumn of 1966 Prom thereon, policy formulation was
to continue but was not to be publicised or emphasised by the Party 
22Leaders ' . Some policy groups were to proceed with their work while new
ones were to be established. All groups were to submit their final
reports to the Leader and the AGP in the summer of 1968 and these reports
were to form the basis of a mid-term manifesto to be published in the
Autumn of the same year. In the period follwing the publication of this
document attention was to be focussed upon the formulation of policy in
detail and the clarification of certain key policy issues in preparation
23for the next General Election ,
Broadly speaking, during the remaining four years of Opposition
the Leadership's two phase programme was adhered to. A manifesto was
prepared for publication in the Autumn of 1968. The first: draft was
outlined by members of the Research Department in November 1967^^,
and was later considered by an "official" group of party officials.
The document was then discussed by the Party Leader's "Steering Committee"
25and, finally, by the full Shadow Cabinet and the AGP . The policy 
groups do not appear to have made a substantial contribution to this 
exercise. No reports had been submitted by them prior to the
18. Putting Britain Right Ahead, op.cit., pp.7-8, 11, 13 and 20.
19. Action Not Words, CCO, London March 1966.
20. See pp. 33 above,
21. Interview 5.
22. Interview 9.
23. Interviews 5 and 6.
24. Interviews 5 and 6.
25. Butler and Pinto-Duachinsky, The British General Election of 1970, 
London 1971, pp.80-81,
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preparation of the first draft and only thirteen groups had reported 
by July 1968 •
The document was published in time for the Party Conference in
27October 1968 under the title. Make Life Better . It outlined in
greater detail than ever before some of the main points of Conservative 
policy. Including fiscal reforms, the abolition of the Selective Employ­
ment Tax (SET), the reform of the machinery of Government, proposals for 
the reform of industrial relations, housing policy, education policy, 
reform of the social services, and so forth. The themes which were 
emphasised within the manifesto were substantially the same as those
outlined prior to the 1966 General Election, namely more incentives,
28more competition, more selectivity and entry to Europe
The publication of the mid-term manifesto marked the beginning of 
the final phase of the Conservative Party's policy reformulation: 
preparation fot the General Election, Thus, during the remaining 
eighteen months of Opposition, the emphasis turned increasingly to
. 2 9research projects designed to elucidate the specific aspects of policy
While these preparations were proceeding, at the end of January 1970,
the Shadow Cabinet met at the Selsdon Park Hotel, The object of this
meeting was twofold; first, to co-ordinate the various policies which
together would form the basis of an election manifesto; and secondly,
to settle the broad strategy for the approach to the next General
Election, But no important change was made during the meeting in any
30
established policy
Thus, the final, 1970 Election, manifesto reflected many of the 
themes first outlined in October 1965; greater incentives, more
26. Ian Trethowan, "Tories Planning New Policy Moves", The Times,
22 February 1966; The Times, 4 June 1968; The Times, 16 September 
1968.
27. CCO, London 1968.
28. Ibid,a p. 5ff.
29. For further details see Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971, op,cit., 
pp.81-83,
30. The Times, 2 February 1970; The Times, 9 February 1970; The Guardian, 
2 Februa:^ 1970; Peter Jenkins, "IUs Only Make Believe", The 
Guardian, 3 February 1970; David Watt, "A Plea for More than Law
and Order", The Financial Times, 6 February 1970; The Observer,
18 January 1970,
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competition, trade union reform, selectivity in the social services,
31and entry to Europe . In addition, three more recent themes were
outlined; the control of government expenditure, the encouragement of
savings, and the need to develop a "new style of government" through
the application of modern technology and business techniques to the
32decision-making process
In sum, during the Opposition period the overall party programme 
reflected a strong bias towards the liberal tendency. In economic 
affairs this took the form of what m y  be termed a "competition policy" 
with a stress upon the need for more incentives and a more competitive 
industrial structure. This development had been initiated soon after 
the 1964 General Election and was carried through into the Party's 
first policy statement published in October 1965. The Deputy Chairman 
of the Conservative Party Organisation, Sir Michael Fraser, later
maintained that all subsequent policy was "no more than a continuation
33
of what was done in 1965" . Likewise, in 1971, Heath claimed: "by
September 1965 all our present policy was already written down in detail
34in our policy statement". Certainly the general themes outlined and 
the overall tendency developed in 1965 remained central to the party 
programme throughout the Opposition period. The precise consequences 
which this was to have upon policy-making in narrower and more specific 
areas, however, must be considered in the following chapters.
31. À Better Tomorrow, CCO, London 1970, pp.6-7.
32. Ibid., pp.1-2 and 10-11,
33. Quoted in Robert Rhodes James, Ambitions and Realities, London 1972,
p.100.
34. Quoted in Anthony Sampson, The New Anatomy of Britain, London 1971,
pp.100-1.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING AND THE NATIONAL PLANS
I Introduction; Problems of Definition
The term economic planning has been used to describe at least two 
types of activities. First, planning in relation to the internal operation 
of the individual company or organisation; a process which has been called 
"corporate" or "business" planning^. Secondly, planning in relation to 
the economy of a whole society, involving action at government level in 
a process generally called "national economic planning". In this study 
I am concerned with economic planning mainly in this latter sense. Before 
considering the development of Conservative attitudes in this field, however, 
it will be useful to define some of the key terras involved. The following 
section attempts to do this. It begins by considering the nature of plans 
and the various types of planning, and concludes with a brief outline and 
assessment of the major planning documents produced by British Governments 
during the 1960s,
The process of national economic planning generally centres around 
a specific plan or series of plans. A plan, in the sense in which the term 
is being used here, may be regarded as performing five minimal functions. 
First, it must describe the present state of the economy and, as far as 
possible, measure and quantify the variables involved and analyse the 
relationships between them. Secondly, a plan should offer a forecast of 
the future movement of the economy. This would involve projecting those 
trends which can be estimated with reasonable confidence over the medium 
term, and predicting others where more guess work is involved. Thirdly, 
from describing the expected future any plan should go on to outline the 
elements of the desired future. Usually the desired future is expressed in 
terms of growth rate. This may be presented as one growth rate or several - 
the so-called "wedge" approach. Fourthly, the conditions for achieving
1. For a more detailed outline of this distinction see Neil W.
Chamberlain, Private and Public Planning, New York 1965, Chapters
1, 2 and 3; Wilhelm Keilhau, Principles of Public and Private 
i, London 1951.
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the desired future should then be stated: for example, it might be
claimed that growth in the economy depends, first, on achieving higher 
exports and lower imports, and second, on using national resources more 
fully and efficiently. Each of these may depend in turn upon other condi­
tions being satisfied, and so on. Finally, the plan may proceed to target 
setting. Thus a target rate of economic growth may be set and the condi­
tions for achieving this rate translated into target figures for exports, 
private investment, public expenditure, manpower supply, etc. .
A further series of questions is required if one wishes to classify 
the various types of plans and the planning processes from which they emerge, 
One may initially ask: who does the planning? For example, a plan might
be technocratic (relying heavily on the expertise of officials) or 
corporatist (with the emphasis upon consultation with economic interests) 
or popular (with full participation by Parliament, parties and people). 
Secondly, one may ask questions about the nature of a plan* For example, 
how comprehensive and specific is it? A plan may deal only with the public 
sector; or it may add to this a set of suggestions for remedial action 
to remove certain bottlenecks in the private sector; or it may go further 
and set out, in considerable detail, the physical inputs and outputs 
required from different industries or,even, particular firms. Finally, 
one may ask questions about the sanctions and incentives deployed. For 
instance, a plan may be seen as involving little more than the provision 
of information about the intentions of public and private agencies, in 
the hope that any adjustments needed in such intentions will be obvious 
and made quite voluntarily. This type of planning may be classified as 
purely "persuasive". Or the neutral exchange of information may be 
supplemented by broad Indications and exhortations from the Government 
about the adjustments required. These attempts may be supported by the 
deliberate use of broad controls (credit, taxation, etc.) in order to 
facilitate the achievement of the objectives outlined in the plan. This 
type of planning may be classified as "indicative". Finally, the more 
comprehensive and detailed types of plans may involve the imposition of 
specific quotas, targets and norms upon producing units, these being 
supported by detailed controls and specific penaltiei for failure.
2. Jeremy Bray describes the "logic of planning" as "description,
measurement, prediction, criteria, action". The New Economy, 
Fabian Tract, No,362, July 1965, pp.38-40.
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3This type of planning may be classified as "normative" or "imperative" .
The classifications I have outlined above should not be regarded 
as rigid and mutually exclusive. In practice, any particular plan or 
planning process may be expected to involve a number of the elements 
specified above, in a variety of combinations. The problem thus becomes 
one of assessing relative dominance. The following analysis of the three 
plans which were produced by successive British Governments during the 
1960s may help to illustrate this point.
The first plan was produced during a period of Conservative 
Government and was in the form of two documents published separately in 
February and April 1963. The first document. Growth of the United Kingdom 
Economy to 1966, studied the implications of an annual growth rate of four 
per cent^. The second. Conditions Favourable to Faster Growth, dealt
 .................   5
with the means by which a four per cent growth rate could be achieved .
Both documents were produced by the National Economic Development Council 
(NEDC), which, although established by the Conservative Government, was 
an independent agency involving representatives of government and both 
sides of industry. The NEDC documents did not incorporate a specific 
commitment to action on the part of the Government. Yet, as Barker and 
Lecomber point out, once the Conservative Government accepted the objective 
of a four per cent annual growth rate, "the projections were taken as 
targets and the assessment as a plan."^
3. The terminology outlined above is largely based on an unpublished 
paper by L.A. Gunn, Types of Plans, November 1970. Numerous other 
attempts to classify 'planning* and 'plans' have been made, of 
which the following may be noted: Firmin Gules, Economic Planning 
and Democracy, Middlesex 1966, pp.27-47; Jan Tinbergen, Central 
Planning, New Haven 1964, pp.9-32; Joan Mitchell, Groundwork to 
Economic Planning, London 1966, pp.13-27; an older but interesting 
analysis is, W. Arthur Lewis, The Principles of Economic Planning, 
Fourth impression, London 1954, pp.107-112; Pierre Bauchet, Economic 
Planning: The French Experience, London 1964, pp.21-6; Andrew 
Shonfield, Modern Capitalism, London 1965, pp.121-175.
4. NEDC, Growth of the United Kingdom Economy to 1966, HMSO, London 
1963.
5. NEDC, Conditions Favourable to Faster Growth, HMSO, London 1963.
6. T.S. Barker and J.C. Lecomber, Economic Planning for 1972: An 
Appraisal of the Task Ahead, PEP Broadsheet 515, 1969, p.710.
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Mien the Labour Government came to power in October 1964 the 
NEDC was retained in a purely consultative capacity, and a large part 
of its Secretariat (NEDO) and many of its planning functions were 
assimilated by the newly formed Department of Economic Affairs (DEA).
It was this Department which produced The National Plan published in 
September 1965 . This document dealt with the implications and means 
of achieving a üventy-five per cent growth rate over the six years from 
1964 to 1970, and it was heralded as "a statement of Government policy 
and a commitment to action by the Government".^
The final plan was published in February 1969 and entitled,
9
The Task Altead • As will be shown, representatives of both sides of 
industry were closely involved in its formulation. Its authors claimed 
that it was not a plan but a "planning document" which provided "a basis 
for a further stage in the continuing process of consultation between 
Government and both sides of industry".Instead of postulating a 
single growth target a range of possible growth rates was outlined.
Of the three plans, the first two were the most alike in purpose:
both were concerned with the feasibility of, and the means of achieving,
a desired growth rate, and their targets enjoyed the active support of
government. On the other hand, the 1969 plan did not indulge in target
setting to the same extent as its predecessors, nor did it gain the same
degree of government commitment. It was mainly concerned with initiating
and sustaining a process of consultation, involving the exchange of
information, between government and both sides of industry. Its primary
aim was to achieve, not faster economic growth, but the common objective
11of greater economy efficiency and stability . Thus the 1963 and 1965 
plans may be classified as being partially "indicative" and partially
7. Cmnd 2764, HMSO, London 1965.
8. See "Foreword" by George Brown, Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, ibid., p.iii.
9. Department of Economic Affairs, The Task Ahead: Economic Assessment 
to 1972, HMSO, London February 1969.
10. "The Task Ahead", op.cit.» Chapter l,para 1. The Task Ahead was 
'updated* in May 1970, Green Paper, Economic Prospects to 1972:
A Revised Assessment, HMSO, London 1970.
11. "The Task Ahead", op.cit., Chapter 1, para 15.
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"persuasive", while The Task Ahead was almost entirely of the latter 
12variety ' . The 1965 plan, however, differed from both of its counterparts 
in at least three respects. First, it was more technocratic in origin; 
secondly, its proposals for action were more comprehensive and more 
specific; and finally, it enjoyed a greater degree of government support.
Finally, it may be noted that all of the plans produced during the
1960s incorporated a very limited conception of the planning process. None,
for example,were imperative. Moreover, the forecasting and projection
techniques used, particularly in the first two plans, were crude and
unsophisticated, and, while considerable advances in the methods and the
13machinery of planning had taken place by 1969 , these were not fully
incorporated in The Task Ahead. None of the plans was particularly 
specific and all limited their prescriptions to the larger, 'macro* sectors 
of the economy without considering in detail the place of the individual 
firm or smaller industrial unit. However, although British planning in 
the 1960s was limited in approach, it was, at least for part of the decade, 
a matter of deep controversy within and between the two major parties.
The nature and outcome of this debate, particularly as they affected 
Conservative opinion, form the subject matter of the remainder of this 
chapter.
12. For other classifications of British planning during the 1960s 
see J. Mitchell, Groundwork to Economic Planning, London 1966, 
Chapter 1; John Pinder, '*A11 Planners Now*^ , in A Fresh Approach,
CPC 327, London January 1966, p.18; S, Brittan, "Inquest on 
Planning in Britain", PEP Planning, Vol.33, No.449, January 1967; 
Nigel Lawson, "The Economic Setting", in Conservatism Today, CPC 
350, London October 1965, p.53.
13. As a result of proposals contained in the Estimates Committee's 
report on Government Statistical Services published in 1966, 
improvements were made in the collection, storage and dissemination 
of statistical data, and four new units were established in the 
Central Statistical Office for this purpose. These units were 
concerned with computer utilisation, the classification of statis­
tical bases, the co-ordination of the "raw material" for statistics, 
and the planning of future statistical prograiiSQes, See DEA Progress 
Report, May 1968, p.2. For the formulation and application of 
theoretical models and their utilisation in economic planning, see 
Barker and Lecomber 1969, op.cit., p.717.
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II The Conservative Party and Economic Planning;
1961-1964
A system of nations economic planning was first introduced in
Britain during the war and in the immediate post-war period of Labour
Government^^. When the Conservatives were returned to office in 1951 it
had ceased to be a major tool of economic policy, and throughout the
15following decade no attempt was made to revive it • In the early 1960s, 
however, economic planning was rediscovered. Its re-adoption signified 
an important change in the Conservative Government's approach to economic 
management. This alteration in policy priorities and its consequences 
forms the subject matter of the following section. The analysis is 
divided into three parts: first, a britf outline of the origins and early
beginnings of economic planning in the early 1960s; secondly, an analysis 
of the influence of Conservative Party opinion upon the development of the 
policy; and finally, an assessment of the Conservative Party's position 
on economic planning at the time of the 1964 General Election.
1. The Origins and Beginnings of National Economic Planning
The origins of the Conservative Government's planning initiative 
have been well documented, and most accounts have emphasised one or all 
of four developments as particularly important^^. Most have agreed that
14. The Labour Government's economic planning is outlined in, Ben W.
Lewis, British Planning and Nationalisation, New York 1951, pp. 
3-41; A. A. Rogow, The Labour Government and British Industry: 
1945-51, Oxford 1955, especially chapter 2; and, Joan Mitchell, 
Groundwork to Economic Planning, London 1966, pp.55-120,
15. For a description and analysis of economic policy in the 1950s see
Samuel Brittan, The Treasury under the Tories: 1951-64, Middlesex 
1964, pp.135-203; G.D. Worswick and P. Ady (eds.). The British 
Economy in the Nineteen-Fifties, Oxford 1962,
16. The account of the origins of economic planning is taken from;
Mtchell 1966, op.cit., John Jewkes, The New Ordeal by Planning, 
London 1968; Samuel Brittan 1964, op.cit., Andrew Shonfield, 
Modern Capitalism, London 1965; James B. Christoph, "The Birth of 
Neddy**, in James B. Christoph (ed.). Gases in Comparative Politics, 
Boston 1965, pp.44-89; George Polanyi, Planning in Britain, lEA, 
Research Monograph 11, London 1967.
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disillusionment with the performance and operation of the British economy
during the late 1950s was a primary factor. Polanyi and Christoph have
suggested that Britain's low growth rate, especially in comparison to
17those of her West European competitors, was a matter of concern .
So also, according to Mitchell and Brittan, was the erratic manner in
which the British economy had been managed, the so called "stop-go" or
18"hiccough" economy . Moreover, the effectiveness of the Keynesian 
fiscal and monetary tools of economic management was, in Brittan's view, 
increasingly open to question and he charts the various proposals that 
were made for their replacement by more discriminatory forms of inter­
vention and management.
The adoption of economic planning warn, it has been claimed,
further facilitated by alterations in government personnel. According
to Mitchell, the retirement of some of the older members of the Civil
Service and the arrival of younger men removed one of the main obstacles
20to the adoption of planning policies . Christoph is more specific,
and notes in particular the appointment in 1961 of Alec Gairncross as
21Economic Advisor to the Government . As far as the Cabinet was
concerned, Christoph, Shonfield and Brittan agree that an important
role was played by the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, who had from
as early as 1938 been an advocate of economic planning, and the Chancellor
22of the Exchequer, Selwyn Lloyd •
The third factor which has often been mentioned, was the growing 
popularity of planning within industry. Some business firms were
17. Polanyi 1967, op.cit., Chapter 1; Christoph 1965, op.cit., p.56.
18. Mitchell 1966, op.cit., p.125; Brittan 1964, op.cit.» p.208.
19. Brittan 1964, op.cit., pp.204-210, A major role in the re-assessment 
of Keynesian techniques was played by the report of the Radcliffe 
Committee: Committee on the Working of the
Cmnd. 827, HMSO, London 1959.
20. Mitchell 1966, op.cit., pp.122-124.
21. Christoph 1965, op.cit., p.66.
22. Ibid., pp.66-7; Shonfield 1965, op.cit., pp.102-103; Brittan 1964,
op.cit.; cf. Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, London 1973, 
p.37. In 1938 Macmillan had advocated the establishment of a 
"National Economic Council" involving representatives from both 
sides of industry in the task of formulating a "comprehensive plan 
for general guidance", Harold Macmillan, The Middle Way, London 
1938.
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interested in introducing corporate planning techniques within their own 
organisations, while business groups were interested in promoting some 
form of economic planning at the national level. As far as the develop­
ment of national economic planning is concerned, most commentators have
emphasised the importance of a conference held by the Federation of
23British Industries in November 1960 , At this conference the nature
and erratic operation of the Government's economic policy was attacked 
and demands were made for the establishment of some kind of machinery 
through which government and both sides of industry could jointly 
produce long terra "assessments of possibilities and expectations".^^
Finally, Christoph and Jewkes, in particular, emphasise the
influence of the French example upon British attitudes towards economic
planning. They argue that, in British eyes, the attractions of French
planning were twofold,. First, it appeared to be successful; the
French record of economic growth in the 1950s was far in excess of
Britain's. Secondly, it appeared to be acceptable in that it did not
25
seem to involve the use of controls or detailed intervention
The four developments outlined above helped to create what might 
be termed the necessary conditions for the introduction of economic 
planning in Britain. The Government's decision to launch such a policy 
was, however, immediately prompted by the worsening economic situation 
facing the country.
On 25 July 1961, in response to a balance of payments crisis, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Selwyn Lloyd, announced new Government 
measures. These included proposals that were to mark the beginning of 
both the Conservative Government's national economic planning policy and 
its incomes policy. Thus, in addition to announcing a "pay pause", the 
Chancellor indicated his intention of discussing with both sides of 
industry their "various processes of consultation and forecasting with a
23. Brittan 1964, op.cit., pp.216-19; Jewkes 1968, op.cit., p.3;
Polanyi 1967, op.cit., Chapter 1; Christoph 1965, op.cit., 
pp.57-59.
24. Christoph 1965, op.cit., p.59.
25. Ibid., pp.62-65; Jewkes 1968, op.cit., pp.4-9. Jewkes makes the
point that the impression of French planning held by British 
policy-makers may have been mistaken.
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view to a better co-ordination of ideas and plans"^^. The outcome of 
the discussions between the Government and both sides of industry was 
the establishment, in January 1962, of the National Economic Development 
Council (NEDC), its Secretariat, the National Economic Development 
Office (NEDO) and subsequently its industrial offshoots the Economic 
Development Committtees (EDCS), The NEDC and the NEDO later produced 
the two documents which formed the first national plan of the 1960s.
In sum, disillusionment with the performance and operation of
the British economy, changes in the nature and opinions of government
personnel, the growing interest in planning within business and industrial
circles, and the French example, all helped to create the necessary
conditions for the introduction of economic planning. It may be noted
that the role of Conservative back-benchers and party members in this
process was limited. Although some expressed concern about existing
27
government policies , national economic planning was never strongly 
advocated as an alternative policy within the Conservative Party.
The decision to adopt such a policy was made on the initiative of the 
Party Leadership mainly in response to pressures from outside their own 
party.
2. Conservative Party Opinion and the Development of National 
Economic Planning
The concept of economic planning is at variance with some of the 
main tenets of liberal Conservatism, It implies a positive, interven­
tionist role for the state and, to the extent that it involves the joint
consultation of government and both sides of industry, a corporatist
28conception of economic and social processes . Thus, for the Conservative
26, B.C. Debs. Vol.645, Col.220, 25 July 1961.
27, See '*Macraillan Pink", The Economist, 16 April 1960; David Howell,
"Expanding Prosperity", in Principles in Practice, CPC 223, 
February 1961, pp.18-30; speech by Basil de Ferranti, H.C. Debs. 
Vol.648, Cols.905-9, 7 November 1961.
28, According to Macmillan the Cabinet discussion about the proposal
to establish the NEDC revealed "a rather interesting and quite 
deep divergence of view between Ministers, really corresponding 
to whether they had Old Ifhig, Liberal, laissez-faire traditions, 
or Tory opinions, paternalists and not afraid of a little 
dirigisme". Macmillan 1973, op.cit., p.37.
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Party, economic planning represented a potentially divisive issue.
According to one observer, it was for them "the most sensitive political
29question concerning the role of the state".
Within the Government, the introduction of economic planning was in
fact the responsibility of only a few individuals: most notably, Macmillan,
30Maudling, Lloyd and Sir Edward Boyle, Financial Secretary to the Treasury 
Moreover, according to Brittan, the NEDC concept when first proposed was 
strongly opposed by most of the Cabinet and no agreement was reached
"until the sterling crisis forced the issue", thereafter Lloyd went
31ahead, although "Cabinet rumblings continued".
Within the remainder of the Conservative Party, the introduction 
of economic planning initially produced little reaction, and those 
Conservatives who did respond were in general mildly favourable. Of the 
ten Conservative back-benchers who spoke in the debate following the 
Chancellor's announcement, two were strongly in favour, four were mildly
opposed, and the remaining four ma4a no mention of the proposals in their
32
speeches . Even those who expressed opposition accepted that planning
33might be necessary if only in a very limited way . Much the same opinions 
were reflected in the Debate on the Economic Situation in November 1961.
On this occasion, of the six Conservative back-benchers who addressed the
House, only two mentioned economic planning and both were strongly in
34
favour of the concept . Within the Mass Party, no protest was registered
35at the Party Conference or at the Central Council Meeting , and some 
members of the Bow Group, in particular, strongly supported the new policy
29. Nigel Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society, London 1972, 
p.133.
30. Boyle was a strong supporter of the French "style" of planning. See
H.C.Debs. Vol.645, Cols.628-44, 27 July 1961; Christoph 1965,
op.cit., pp.65-66.
31. Brittan 1964, op.cit., pp.220-2; cf. Macmillan 1973* op.cit.
32. H.C.Debs., Vol7645, Cols. 433-734, 26-27 July 1961.
33. See speech by Sir John Barlow, ibid., Cols, 673-4; and article by
Nigel Birch, The Sunday Times, 22 October 1961.
34. H.C.Debs., Vol.648, Cols. 805-937, 7 November 1961. See in particu­
lar speech by Basil de Ferranti, Cols. 905-909.
35. See the amendment to the debated resolution, KUCUA 80th Annual 
Conference Report, NUCUA, London 1961, p.90; NÜCUA, Central Council 
Minute Book, London March 1961.
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36measures •
The initial absence of any critical reaction from within the 
Party to the introduction of economic planning was in part a product 
ot the nature of the policy proposals themselves. These remained, at 
least until the first meeting of the NEDC in March 1962, loosely and 
ambiguously defined. For example, when Selwyn Lloyd first outlined 
the Government proposals in July 1961 he indicated that the kind of 
planning he envisaged was to involve government and both sides of 
industry "in a joint examination of the economic prospects of the 
country stretching five or more years into the future" primarily
concerned with establishing what were "the essential conditions for
37realising potential growth". Such general aims could not fail to 
gain the tacit support of most Conservatives, and the failure of 
Government spokesmen to outline in detail the exact nature and powers
of the proposed machinery left potential opponents without a target
38for their criticism .
In addition to the non-explicit nature of their proposals the 
Government may also have managed to reassure Conservatives by adopting 
two strategies. The first lay in stressing the paternalist tory 
element in the Conservative tradition in an attempt to persuade 
Conservatives that planning was consistent with Party principles 
and that, far from being innovatory, it represented a logical develop­
ment of existing policies. Thus Maudling emphasised the continuity 
of government policy when he stated that planning in the form being 
proposed - "that of a mutual study between industry and government of 
prospects and estimates'* - was already taking place in relation to the
36. See Editorial, Crossbow, October-December 1961, in which the
editors argued that it was the "proper role of politicians to 
plan our strategy in grand terms, to determine the kind of 
society that we need... it is for the economic experts then to 
draft the course". They proceeded to advocate the establishment 
in Britain of a body similar to the French Commissariat du Plan. 
See also David Price, MP, "A Conservative Looks at Growth and 
Planning", The Statist, 1 June 1962.
37. See H.C.Deba., Vol.645, Col.220, 25 July 1961; and ibid.. Vol.439,
26 July 1961.
38. See Timothy Raison, "Tories to your Oim Selves be True", The
Statist, 16 February 1962,
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nationalised industries, iron and steel, machine tools, ship building 
39and motor cars . Butler too, was able to contend that, ever since the
days of Bolingbroke, Conservatives had been willing to use the power of 
40
the state
The second strategy emphasised the difference between Conservative 
and Labour planning, and suggested that the former represented a sensible 
middle way between the two extremes of state control and laissez-faire. 
Speaking at the Party Conference in October 1961 Macmillan indicated that 
"between socialism and laissez-faire liberalism there is indeed a middle 
way. That is our way".^^ Sir Edward Boyle maintained that tory planning 
did not mean more controls or more nationalisation and he referred to the 
example of French planning, which, he contended, did not depend either 
"on an extension of public ownership or on the application of physical 
controls".In this manner the Conservative policy of "planning by 
consent" was contrasted with the Labour alternative of "planning by 
compulsion"^^, and the inference drawn that Conservative planning was 
not only distinctive but also pragmatic and in accordance with the 
Party's principles and practice.
As far as may be judged these tactics enjoyed some success and 
the absence of any consistent and widespread intra-party opposition to 
economic planning continued throughout 1962. In the Debate on the 
Economic Situation in November 1962 only two of the six Conservative 
back-benchers who participated mentioned economic planning and then only 
briefly^^. However, two events which took place during 1962 reflected 
the first indications of a breakdown in consensus. First, in jMarch, a 
reduction in the Bank Rate from six to five per cent marked the beginning 
of a series of expansionist policies, and the promotion of economic
45growth to the position of primary objective of British economic policy .
39. H.C.Debs., Vol.644, Col.1093, 18 July 1961.
40. NCP 1963, No.21,28 October 1963, p.4.
41. NCP 1961, No.21,30 October 1961, p.5.
42. H.C.Debs., Vol.645, Cols. 640-643, 26 July 1961.
43. NCP 1962, No.14, 9 July 1962, pp.21-22.
44. H.C.Debs*, Vol.666, Cols. 604-738, 5 November 1962.
45. John and Anne-Marie Hackett, The British Economy; Problems and
Prospects, London 1967, p.122.
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The expansionist policies were continued by Maudling, who succeeded
Selwyn Lloyd as Chancellor of the Exchequer in July 1962, and in his
1963 Budget Maudling committed the Government to achieving the NEDC
46target of a four per cent annual growth rate , According to Hackett, 
the outcome of this expansionist policy was that total demand was given 
too violent a boost. This resulted in a Balance of Payments crisis 
which effectively undermined the targets of the NEDC plans, thus reducing 
the credibility of planning^^^.
The second event was the Cabinet changes which, while bringing 
Maudling to the Treasury, also brought Enoch Powell into the Cabinet for 
the first time. As Minister of Health, Powell was responsible for two 
major planning initiatives within his own departments the "Hospital Plan" 
of 1962 and the "Health and Welfare Plan" of 1963* However, these 
departmental plans should not be taken to mean that Powell was sympathetic 
to national economic planning. In May 1963 he launched the first coherent 
attack by a Conservative politician upon the assumptions underlying the 
Government's planning initiative. In his speech he carefully avoided 
making any specific criticisms of the NEDC and Government policy and 
concentrated instead upon denouncing long range planning in general. 
According to Powell, such a policy was bogus because any predictions made
about the future upon the basis of assumptions manufactured in the present
48were bound to be hopelessly out . In July 1963 Powell announced that 
the Conservative Party should remain true to its capitalist roots and 
primarily concern itself with upholding the "free economy".However, 
the key personnel in the Government, particularly the Prime Minister, 
remained strongly committed to planning and growth.
Polloifing the resignation of Macmillan in October 1963 there were 
indications of a decline in support for economic planning within both the 
Government and the Conservative Party. First, the new Prime Minister,
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, had never been closely connected with the planning
46. H.C.Debs., Vol.675, Cols. 475-6, 3 April 1963.
47. Hackett 1967, op.cit., pp.122-6.
48. Speech at Bournemouth, 25 May 1963, reproduced in John Wood (ed.),
A Nation Not Afraid, London 1965, p.13,
49. Ibid.r pp.28-9, speech at Bromsgrove, 6 July 1973.
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initiatives of the previous administration and whilst there is no
evidence that he was actually hostile to them, he was not as strongly
50
Goromtted as his predecessor . Secondly, among those who were members
of the new Cabinet, the appointment of Edward Heath as Secretary of
State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development and President of the
Board of Trade marked a change in the emphasis of Government policy.
Speaking to the Houae in November 1963, Heath advocated a role for the
State which was qualitatively different from that underlying the policies
of the lyiacraillan period. He supported the idea of a partnership between
Government and Industry in economic affairs but was careful to stress
that it should not be a partnership in which government took the lead.
Instead industry should provide its own initiative whilst the Government
pursued economic policies designed through the pressure of competition
to encourage "the innovators" on which the future prosperity of the 
51country depended . In Heath's opinion, the modernisation of industry
depended ultimately upon industry itself and those managing it and was
5?not something which "could be Imposed from the outside". " He envisaged
that in such a process the most useful form of planning was planning
within the firm which government should endeavour to assist by providing
. . 53information on which industry could base its choices' *
Finally, the refusal of Enoch Powell to serve in the new Cabinet 
under Sir Alec Douglas-Home meant that he was able to enjoy a greater 
freedom in criticising government policy from the baclc-benches. After 
leaving the Government Powell delivered a series of speeches in which 
he emphasised the need to foster free enterprise through the encouragement 
of market forces. His campaign implied a rejection of the basic assump­
tions upon which the administration's planning initiative was based^^.
50. See Kenneth Young, Sir Alcc-Douglas-Home, London 1970, p.85 ff.
51. H.C.Debs., Vol.684, Cols. 323-349, 14 November 1963.
52. Ibid.. Col.326.
53. Ibid,, Col.324.
54. See Andrew Roth, Enoch Powell, Tory Tribune, London 1970, pp.304- 
306; D. E. Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election 
of 1964, London 1965, p.22; Enoch Powell, "Is it Politically 
Practicable", in A. Seldon (et.al.) Rebirth of Britain, London 
1964, pp.237-267.
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3. Conclusionî the Conservatives and National Economic
Plannings October 1964
The introduction and development of a policy of national economic
planning appears to have been primarily the responsibility of certain
Conservative Ministers and was not substantially sha%)ed or modified by
opinions within the larger Conservative Party. Party Leaders appeared
to recognise that the policy was a potentially divisive one, and took
pains to present it in a form acceptable to their followers. Following
the resignation of Macmillan, support for the policy appears to have
declined among certain sections of the Government and the Party.
Moreover, the views expressed by both Enoch Powell and Heath indicated
that an alternative to a policy of national economic planning was
available (i.e. competition) and was a matter of debate within both the
Government and the Party. Inevitably, however, any re-assessment of the
55Party purpose had to be curtailed as the General Election approached .
In their 1964 General Election I#nifesto the Conservative Leaders 
restated their commitment to economic planning as a moans to achieving 
a higher rate of economic growth. The authors were at pains to distin­
guish between Conservative and Labour planning. Thus the NEDC was said 
to represent "the democratic concept of planning by partnership" in 
contrast to the Labour Party’s policy of "centralised control".
The Leadership’s careful commitment to économe planning appeared to 
enjoy at least the tacit support of most Conservatives. It remained 
to be seen whether, in the less disciplined atmosphere of Opposition, 
a potentially divisive debate would emerge.
55. Butler and King 1965, op.cit., p.85.
56. "Prosperity with a Purpose", in F.W.S. Craig (ed.), British
General Election Manifestos: 1918-1966» Chichester 1970, p.217.
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III The Conservatives in Opposition 1964-1970
1. The First Phase in Opposition; October 1964-March 1966
As has been mentioned earlier, soon after their defeat in the
1964 Election, the Conservative Leadership adopted a competition approach
57to economic affairs • This policy implied a critique of what The Times 
called "the conventional wisdom of the age", consisting of the belief that
economic planning on French lines held out the greatest hope of improve-
58ment in the rate of economic growth , although this was a belief that the 
Conservatives had themselves played a significant part in fostering.
Although the adoption of a competition policy implied at least a
modification of the Conservative commitment to economic planning, this was
not a development which the Leadership appeared either to welcome or
encourage. The spectacle of a Party Leadership denouncing policies which
only a few months previously it had defended in an election campaign
would have appeared neither credible nor convincing. Furthermore, there
was the problem of personalities: many ex-Ministers remained closely
59wedded to the policies they had administered while in office • This
was particularly the case with Reginald Maudling and Sir Edward Boyle,
while Heath still recognised in the NEDC a useful forum in which govern-
60ment and industry could discuss problems of mutual interest • Finally, 
the Party Leadership had to balance the process of policy re-assessment 
with other considerations vuch as the maintenance of party unity. In 
particular, the Party's policy chiefs were concerned to avoid a situation 
in which ideological disputes undermined the Opposition’s electoral 
credibility^^, and, as I have already noted, economic planning touched on 
the fundamentals of party belief and was therefore a potentially 
divisive issue. Significantly
57. The nature of this alteration in policy emphasis is considered in 
Chapter 6.
58. See "Tories in a New World", The Times, 24 December 1964.
59. See D. E. Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of 
1966, London 1966, p.62.
60. Interview 16. See also William Rees-Mogg, "The Radical Centre", 
The Sunday Times, 4 July 1965.
61. Heath, in particular, recalled the damaging effect of the Labour 
Opposition’s debates about Clause 4 and nuclear weapons. See 
Butler and King 1966, op.cit., p.59.
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economic planning was not the subject of detailed study in any of the
study groups established by Heath^^, nor was it considered in the official
63debates at the Party Conference in October 1965 . Ho mention was made
of the issue in the Party’s first major policy statement published after
El 
65
the 1964 ection^^ and it was also absent from the 1966 General Election
Manifesto
The Leadership's attempts to ignore the issue were frustrated by 
at least three developments. First, outside the Party the debate about 
economic planning continued, and the content of this debate reflected a 
more critical attitude towards the concept, methods and machinery of 
economic planning, A body of economists disillusioned with the experience 
of national economic planning had emerged and their views began to attract 
attention. Central to this group were a number of individuals connected 
with an independent research organisation! the Institute of Economic 
Affairs (ÏEA), Since its establishment in 1957 the Institute had generally 
maintained a free-market approach to economic questions and had never 
been sympathetic to the notion of national economic planning. In 1965 
the IEA published two pamphlets which are relevant to this study. One 
of them, by John Brunner, was a critical analysis of the Labour Government's 
proposed National Plan which he attacked as being primarily a "political 
plan" in that the forecasts of industry were being forced into a pre­
determined model of the economy produced by central planning^^. Brunner 
did recognise, however, that planning and plans had some value in providing 
industry with relevant information. This was followed by another pamphlet 
from the XEA in which it was argued that the techniques of forecasting 
were so unsophisticated that, until they were improved, the whole process 
would have to be curtailed^^. This growing body of dissent was 
reflected in certain business circles. An article appeared in the
62. Interviews 5 and 9.
63. See HUCUA 83rd Annual Conference Report, NUCUA, London October 1965. 
Although notë^ïeath’s comment on indicative planning, p.41.
64. Putting Britain Right Ahead, CCD, London October 1965.
65. "Action Hot "Words' in F.W,S, Craig (ed*), British General Election
Manifestos 1918-1966, Chichester 1970.
66. John Brunner, The National Plan, IE A, Eaton Paper, No.4, 1965.
67. Duncan Burn (et.al.). Lessons Form Central Forecasting, IE A,
Eaton Paper No.6, 1965.
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Journal of the Institute of. Directors which sharply criticised the methods 
and procedures by which the Department of Economic Affairs was collecting 
information on which to base its new plan^^. The questionnaire used for
this purpose antagonised raany of those in business who were originally
69favourable to the Government's planning efforts . In particular.
Hr Arthur Shenfield, economic adviser to the Federation of British
Industries, which had played an important role in the establishment of
70the NEDC, confessed that he was totally disillusioned with planning *
The second development took place within the Conservative Party
and was in part a reflection of the grm/ing disillusionment with planning
among some professional economists. The precise links between the
Conservative Party and the lEA,, and the latter's influence upon
Conservative opinion, are difficult to establish. However, at least
one HP was of the opinion that the lEA was influential and some HPs
subscribed to the organisation, while most received its publications
71and some read them . In addition there were those who, unlike some 
meijabers of the Party Leadership, did not desire to avoid discussion 
of party fundamentals. In particular, Powell did not share the reticence 
of some of his colleagues. In Hay 1965 he launched an attack upon the 
methods the Government were using to collect data for their National
Plan, He condemned the whole operation as "a piece of manifest futility
72 *on a colossal scale" , and added that the National Plan was "foredoomed
73to utter failure". Others within the Parliamentary Party shared
Powell’s opinions. John Biffen argued that the logic of the National 
Plan, of the NEDC and the EDCs would inevitably lead to planning by 
compulsion^^. The contribution of the Mass Party to the debate was 
marginal and in general the issue of economic planning aroused little
68. See "The Hanning Avalanche", Journal of the Institute of Directors, 
July 1965.
69. The Times, 5 July 1965.
70. "The Anti-Planners", The Economist, 17 July 1965.
71. Interviews 1 and 16.
72. Speech at: Nuneaton, Hay 1965, reprinted in Enoch Powell, Freedom 
and Reality, London 1969, pp.26-7.
73. Ibid., p.30.
74. H.C.Debs., Vol.710, Col.750, 8 April 1965. For a more lengthy
outline of Biffen’s views on planning see John Biffen, "tdiere the
Planning Has to Stop", Crossbow, April-June 1966.
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interest* The notable exception was the Greater London Young Conservatives,
who at their Annual Conference in April 1965, carried a motion urging their
75Party to reject outright "the myth of a planned economy".
The third development which made it inevitable that the whole
issue of economic planning would become a matter of public debate, and
that the Leadership would have to take a stand, was the publication in
September 1965 of The National Plan^^ > The initial response came from
Heath who, in a speech the day before the Plan was published, condemned
it outright as the Labour Government's "biggest publicity gimmick".
He went on to question its chances of success in the light of Callaghan's
July Budget and ridiculed the information on which the Plan's statistics 
77had been based . Heath's rejection of the Plan before it had even been 
published was considered ill advised, and The Times later commented that 
his handling of the issue had been "tactically foolish".
For a number of reasons a position of straight opposition to the 
Plan was not tenable. First, the National Plan had much in common with 
the earlier NEDC plans which were formulated under and accepted by the 
previous Conservative Government. As we have seen, both sets of plans 
were alike in postulating a desired growth rate and in outlining measures 
by which this objective could be achieved^^. They differed in their 
style, particular prescriptions for action, the degree of government 
commitment, and the sources from which they emerged* The Opposition 
could attack these latter aspects without totally rejecting their own 
record while in office, but they could not attack the general approach
of the National Plan. Secondly, there was the particular problem of
rejecting an obviously popular aim of a 25 per cent growth rate up to
1970, Finally, if the Opposition rejected the Plan, they might appear
to be discarding the concept of planning in general. As already noted, 
it was considered that any attempt to do this would probably dwaiage
75. The Times, 12 April 1965.
76. The National Plan, Cmnd. 2764, HMSO, London September 1965.
77. Speech at Renfrew, The Times, 16 September 1965.
78. The Times, Leader, 29 September 1965.
79. See article by John Finder, "All Planners Now", in A Fresh
Approach, CPC 327, January 1966, p.18.
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party unity* In addition, some form of planning still had supporters
in industrial circles and the Leadership could not risk alienating this 
80group , 
limited,
^^. For these reasons the Opposition’s freedom of manoeuvre was
The Party Leaders eventually agreed on an approach to the 
National Plan which consisted of welcoming the document in general while 
criticising four specific aspects of the Plan and the Labour Government’s 
planning machinery. First, the methodology of the Plan and the informa­
tion upon which it was based: Maudling argued that the Plan was a clear 
attempt to "try to fit the facts to the Plan rather than adapt the Plan 
to fit the facts"^^, while Macleod questioned the credibility of the 
25 per cent growth target '. Secondly, the Opposition were concerned 
about what they regarded as the "political" aspects of the Plan and,
in particular, the inclusion within the document of plans to nationalise
83the iron and steel industries : consequently it was variously labelled
as "political propaganda" or a "socialist manifesto".Thirdly, the
Opposition criticised the Plan for what it did not contain, specifically
measures which would help to "create a climate in which industrial
. 85 .enterprise might flourish". Finally, the Opposition attacked the
Labour Government’s planning machinery, specifically criticising the
integration of the NEDC into the government machine and the division of
86responsibilities between the DEA and the Treasury, .
The Party Leaders’ decision to oppose specific aspects of the Plan
while accepting the general principles underlying it proved problematic
when, in Novenber 1965, the National Plan came before the House. Macleod,
in a somewhat vague and ambiguous speech, was reduced to "welcoming the
87opportunity to find fault with the proposal". The Conservative Leaders
80. See speech by Sir Paul Chambers, The Times, 11 November 1965.
Report of the Conference between the BEG, FBI and NABM, Britain’s 
Economic Problems and Policies, Conference Report, 1965, pp.20-23,
81. Speech by Reginald Maudling in London, The Times, 30 September 1965.
82. See stattament by Iain Macleod, The Times, 17 September 1965.
83, Ibid.
84. Broadcast by Iain Macleod on TV, reported in The Times, 18 September
1965.
85, Statement by Iain Macleod, The Times, 17 September 1965.
86, Speech by Iain Macleod, H.C.Debs., Vol.718, Cols, 1075-76,
3 November 1965.
87, Ibid, Cols. 1067-1076; see also The Times, 4 November 1965.
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decided to recommend to their followers that they should not vote against
the Plan and no division was taken. Although this approach was supported
by a majority of the Party, a small section of Conservative back-benchers
would clearly have preferred a straight vote against the measure^^s
Peter Horden questioned the whole concept of planning'^^ and Ï.L. Iremonger
presented a critical amendment to the Government ’s motion welcoming the 
90
National Plan .
The three developments outlined above indicate that discussion of
economic planning within the Party continued despite the desire of certain
sections of the Leadership to limit this debate. The outcome was that,
by the end of the first phase of Opposition in March 1966, there were at
least three different attitudes towards national economic planning within
the Conservative Party. A small element, primarily located within the
Parliamentary Party, favoured the total rejection of national economic
planning. The views of this group had been cogently argued by Enoch
Powell and, though their support was limited, by early 1966 it was clearly
on the increase. Secondly, there were those who supported the previous
Conservative Administration's commitment to planning, and in some cases
favoured the extension of planning and of planning mechanisms. This
group was small in number, and was mainly contained within the Mass
Party and primarily involved the metbers of the radical Conservative
students organisation, PEST. The latter rejected competition and
conflict as a basis of economic policy and advocated instead the creation
91of a sem™planned economy . Between these two extremes there ejtisted 
a middle position which favoured a dilution and alteration in the Party's 
commitment to planning without necessitating a rejection of planning 
altogether. This approach was supported by the majority of informed 
and interested Conservatives and, although it did not represent an 
official standpoint, it was probably closest to the thinking of the
88. Interviews 16 and 2.
89. H.C.Debs., Vol.718, Col.113, 3 November 1965.
90. Ibid., Col.1041.
91. See Call an/End to Feeble Opposition, PEST, London 1965. See also
motion no's. 236 and 243, submitted for the 1965 Party Conference,
NUGUA Conference Handbook and Programme of Proceedings, 1965,
NUCUA, London 1965; Philip Ashworth, "Gan the Tories Afford to 
Relinquish Planning?", Crossbow, January-March 1966.
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majority of the Leadership, including Heath.
The third or middle view contained several distinct elements. First,
the word "planning" and its associated term.nology, with implications of
compulsion and control, had for long been a provocative word in Conservative
circles. Historically it belonged more naturally to the rhetoric of the
Labour Party and the Conservatives had traditionally employed the word
92in a pejorative fashion when attacking their political opponents 
One way of conducting the discussion on economic planning without endanger­
ing party unity was simply to alter the terminoloty of the debate.
Terence Higgins, for example, noted that the word "planning" was anathema 
to many of his colleagues and suggested that the word "programming" was
93 ,
more acceptable' . In a speech at Bristol, Heath revealed that he favoured
"surveys, forecasts and studies".
The alteration in termindogy could not disguise an alteration in
the substance of the Conservative atdtude towards economic planning.
For example, Higgins argued that the most important role of planning and
the planning institutions was not targeting but the co-ordination of the
Economic Development Committees; as these were in direct touch with
individual industries the process of planning would consequently prove a
95"useful source and channel of information". Likewise, Sir Edward Boyle
argued that the main purpose of "indicative planning" did not lie in
overall targets of the National Plan type, but in "co-ordinated and
coherent forx-rard forecasting affecting key sectors of industry". He
added that it should be the Conservatives' aim to "encourage key sectors
96of British industry to plan together and to plan for success". A
similar argument was adopted by Heath at the launching of the Party’s
1966 Election Manifesto, when he suggested that the NEDC and the EDCs had
97a useful role to play in the exaliange of Information between industries
92. See Harris 1972, op.cit., pp.239-241.
93. See Terence Higgins, The Second Managerial Revolution, CPC 317,
April 1965, p.20,
94. Quoted in H.C.Debs., Vol.718, Col.1042, 3 November 1963.
95. Terence Higgins 1963, op.cit., p.21-22.
96. Sir Edward Boyle, Conservatives and Economic Planning, CPC 335,
January 1966, pp.24-25; cf. Sir Edward Boyle7^*The Conservative 
Essence", New Society, 8 October 1964,
97. The Times, 7 March 1966; also Henry Bosch, "The Limits of Planning", 
CrosalTow, January-March 1966, pp.44-46.
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Thus, throughout the early stages of the Conservatives period in 
Opposition, discussion of the issue of economic planning was neither 
desired nor encouraged by the majority of the Party Leadership. Never­
theless the debate had proceeded and, although the Leadership had taken 
no official stance, by the time of the 1966 General Election attitudes 
towards economic planning within the Party had undergone a significant 
change In emphasis^Many influential Conservatives appeared to have 
rejected the idea of a centrally determined target as the essence of 
economic planning, and to have fallen back upon the limited application 
of planning in the sense of forecasting and the provision of information, 
with its implications of a less dirigiste role for the state. Thus, as 
will be shown, by March 1966 the outline of future Conservative policy 
was already discernible. The further clarification of this policy was 
to take place in relation to the abandonment of the Labour Government's 
National Plan. As Conservative policy took shape against the background 
of the Government's planning efforts I will now look at these in detail.
2, The Labour Government's Policy: The Collapse of the National
Plan and the Re-assessment of Planning
By late 1966 the Labour Government's National Plan had, in the words 
of Nigel Birch, "been vapourised^.^^ The abandonment of the Plan did not 
mark the end of the national economic planning in Britain. But it did 
signify the conclusion of the first phase in the process initiated by 
the Conservative Government in 1961. For out of the ruins of the 
National Plan a new and distinctive concept of national economic planning 
arose. This reformed approach constituted the basis of the next plan, 
which was published in February 1969 under the title of The Task Aliead; 
Economic Assesmment to 1972. These developments served to shape opinion 
within the Conservative Party and their exact nature is considered below.
The Goveriunent had originally provided for the NEDC to undertake 
an annual review of the National Plan, The purpose of this review was to
98. On the general developments within the Party during the 1964 to
1966 period, with particular reference to economic planning, see
A, King, "New Stirrings on the Right", New Society, 14 October 1965.
99. H.C.Debs., Vol.732, Col.1510, 26 July 1966.
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see how performances measured up to targets and, where they had not, how 
they could be improved. Only if it later became clear that the original
targets had been unrealistic was there to be any consideration of amending
Yet, even before the first review took place in the Autumn of
1966, the targets had already been invalidated. Faced with a major
balance of payments problem, the Labour administration introduced four
101deflationary budgets during 1966 • The last of these, introduced on
20 July, involved massive cuts in Government expenditure and increases
in indirect taxes, and effectively served finally to undermine the
targets of the Plan. A weak later George Brown announced to the House
that the National Plan was to be rewritten in the light of the economic
situation and that the rate of growth originally envisaged would need
102to be drastically altered . The attempt to salvage the Plan failed,
however, and in November 1966 Michael Stewart, who had succeeded George
Brovm as Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in August 1966, revealed
that there was to be no interim assessment. In addition, he announced
that, in the light of the July measures, he had already initiated a
103long term review of the Plan and future plans' . Consequently, by the 
end of 1966 the National Plan was, as one national newspaper put it,
"in a state of suspended animation".
The consequences of the National Plan eacperiment and its subsequent
abandonment were tiTOfold.i' First, the whole process drastically undermined
the credibility of government economists and brought into question the
105
whole concept of national economic planning , even among those who had
100, The Times, 7 July 1966.
Id. Specifically on 8 February, 1 March, 3 May and 20 July 1966. The
1 March, or pre-election "mini-budget" did not involve any new
measures: instead the Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan, 
announced his intention to introduce new gambling taxes. Samuel 
Brittan. Steering the Economy, Middlesex 1971, pp.323-340,
102. H.C.Debs.3 Vol.732, Cols. 1849-50, 27 July 1966,
103. Written Answer, H.C.Debs, Vol.735, Cols,341-2, 10 November 1966.
104. The Times, 5 December 1966.
105. The Times concluded that as a result: of the National Plan the 
economists were no longer "cult figures". The Times, 27 July 1966.
See also speech by Sir Cyril Osborne, H.C.Debs., Vol.737, Col.689,
1 December 1966. See also Leonard TiveyT^'The Political Consequences- 
of Economic Planning", Parliamentary Affairs, 20(4), Autumn 1967, 
pp.297-314.
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once been strong supporters of This development was reflected
within the Conservative Party and may have strengthened the influence of
those who had long been opposed to national economic planning. Following
the abandonment of the Plan, Enoch Powell suggested that "the whole
107planning mania... must be thrown out bag and baggage". Others felt 
likewise and David Howell suggested that national economic planning 
represented an "escape route from the realities of modern economic 
management". The majority of the Opposition Leaders, however, avoided 
committing themselves either for or against national planning and concen­
trated instead upon attacking the machinery of the Labour Government's 
planning experiment and the division of responsibilities between the 
DEA and the Treasury^^^. At the same time, they made it clear that,
although they remained convinced planners, they were not of the Labour 
1 iO
variety .
The second consequence of the abandonment of the National Plan was 
the promotion of a movement in favour, not of the rejection of national 
economic planning, but of the reform and alteration of the process as it 
had previously been practised. This movement found its roots primarily 
amongst the informed members of the business community, and their interest 
was inspired by two factors. First, businessmen had become increasingly 
planning-conscious in relation to their own affairs, in particular the 
spread of corporate, planning techniques had done much to convince them
106. See contributions by Sir Paul Chambers and Lord Robbins,
Economics, Business and Government, XEA, Occasional Paper, No.8,
1966.
107. Speech at Chapel-en-le-Frith, 3 September 1966, reproduced in Enoch 
Powell, Freedom and Reality, London 1969, pp.39-41.
108. H.C.Debs., Vol.732, Cols. 1821-22, 6 July 1966. See also speech 
by Sir Douglas Glover, H.C. Debs., Vol.720, Cols.1193-4,
17 November 1965; and John Biffen, "Where the Planning Has to 
Stop", Crossbow, April-June 1966, pp.7-8.
109. See speeches by Heath, H.C.Debs., Vol.732, Col.1463, 6 July 1966. 
See also contribution by Selvjyn Lloyd, ibid., Col. 1787, and 
Nigel Birch, ij^ id.. Col,1510.
110. See David Wood, ^Planning is Outmoded; Tories Find a Cry",
The Times, 20 March 1967. See also Powell's reply to this article. 
The Times, 2 March 1967.
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111of the value of such processes . Secondly, industrialists had become 
increasingly aware that their success depended upon the Government's 
management of the economy, and they recognised that in order for the 
Government to fulfill its functions adequately the information available 
to it would require to be supplemented. This consideration led indust­
rialists to propose a new doctrine of economic planning; the primary
purpose of which was to provide for a process of consultation and a means
112of exchanging information between government and industry . Thus, 
according to The Times Industrial Correspondent, in place of the rigid 
and inflexible National Plan there was to be "a living, changing, contin­
uous operation" which would give industry realistic guidance on its 
113future prospects . Within this process a plan would be limited to 
forecasts for the next laio years and beyond that would concern itself 
with discussing possible trends on the basis of a series of growth 
rates^ ^
The representatives of industry used their position on the NEDC 
to bring their new concept of planning to the attention of the Government. 
Their case was greatly strengthened by the support it received from 
Fred Catherwood, who in April 1966 had succeeded Sir Robert Shone as 
the Director of the NEDO, Soon after his appointment Catherwood made 
it clear that the NEDC would only support another planning exercise if
115it entailed a more flexible approach than had previously been the case 
In February 1967 the GBÏ representatives on the NEDC requested that a 
new plan should be formulated which would be capable of adapting to all
111. In The Times it was reported that business planning was being 
taken up with enthusiasm; inore than three hundred attended the 
Inaugural meeting of the Society of Long Range Planners, The Times, 
7 March 1967, See also Michael Shanks, "National Plan: Off with 
the Old on With the New", The Times, 11 September 1967; XEA Sympos­
ium, Growth Through Industry, lEA, Readings in Political Economy 
1967; Kirby E. Warren, Long Range Planning: The Executive View­
point, New York 1966,
112. See Fred Catherwood, "Could this be the End of the Beginning?",
The Times, 24 February 1969. For a fuller version of Catherwood's
views see "The Planning Prologue", National Westminster Banl; Review, 
May 1969, pp.2-9.
113. The Times, 18 March 1966.
114. The Times, 2 March 1967.
115. Speech in London, The Times, 1 December 1966.
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possible developmentsand a month later the Government acceded to
• • 117this request by placing a paper on planning before the Council
This document contained new proposals based on the idea of planning as
consultation and providing for the postulation of a number of possible 
118growth targets . The document was intended to form the basis of a new 
plan to be published in the Autumn of 1967. But the Government's applica­
tion to join the EEC invalidated this exercise and the publication of
119the document was deferred until January 1968 ' , However, the devalua­
tion of Sterling in November resulted in the final abandonment of the 
planning blueprint which had been in circulation since March 1967.
The abandonment of the first prototype of the new plan renewed
the debate about the worth and purposes of national economic planning.
Those who were totally opposed to the idea reiterated their arguments.
In February 1968, Professor John Jewkes argued in a new book that planning
was doing positive harm to the economy by serving as an inflationary
120pressure and that no more plans should be attempted , Professor Jewkes
121gained the support of Mr MacFadaean of Shell ' and other industrialists,
while his thesis was attacked by those who remained strong supporters of 
. 1 2 2planning . Yet despite these misgivings, the CBI continued to urge the 
Government to inaugurate a new planning initiative* Consequently in 
April 1968 the second prototype of the new plan was launched when
116. The Times, 2 February 1967.
117. The Times, 2 March 1967.
118. A fairly full version of this document was published in April 1967, 
See "Future Work on Planning", DEA Progress Report (Economic),
No.28, April 1967, DEA, London, pp.3-4. See also "Twilight of 
Planning", The Times, 6 April 1967; cf. Professor T. Wilson,
"The Future of Economic Planning", The Times, 8 and 9 March 1967.
119. The Times, 9 October 1967; and 2 November 1967,
120. John Jewkes, New Ordeal by Planning, London 1968, See also by the
same author, "The Cost of This Network of Planners", The Times,
7 February 1968.
121. See letters page. The Times, 12 February 1968, See also F. S. 
MacFadaean, "Economic Planning and the Large Corporation", Economic 
Age, February 1970, pp.22-29,
122. See Peter Jay, "Planning Must Not Become a Dirty Word", The Times,
8 February 1968; Michael Shanlcs, "After the National Plan; The 
Case for Continued Planning", The Times, 8 February 1968; Fred 
Catherwood, "Planning the Only RealTstrc Way to Economic Progress", 
The Times, 14 February 1968; and the same author's "Economic 
Planning and the Market Economy", Economic Age, February 1970,
pp.32-36.
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Peter Shore (the new Secretary of State for Economic Affairs) announced
that a planning document would be published in the Autumn, which would be
"exploratory" rather than "indicative" and designed to investigate a
, . 123range of assumptions
The publication of this second document was also delayed. In the
first place the Cabinet itself was not agreed upon the advisability of
publishing a further plan. The Times reported that the Treasury was
124particularly hostile to the proposal , but after long argument it gave
way and a finalised draft was circulated to NEDC members in the latter
125part of November 1968 . Secondly, the CBI had certain misgivings
126about the content of the document . To gain the support of the CBI 
the Government agreed to cut out about a third of the draft originally 
presented to the NEDC in November. These cuts included two industrial 
chapters which dealt with the role of the IRC and the Industrial Expan­
sion Act, and details of past statistics which some members described
as "Government propaganda". In addition, the CBI succeeded in getting
1 27
the Government, not the NEDC, to publish the Plan' . Finally, there
was the problem of the form in which the plan should be presented to
the public. In December 1968 Neil Marten and a group of Conservatives
back-benchers tabled a motion urging tht Government to publish the
document so that the public and the MPs might participate in "this
128aspect of national decision making". ' The Government accepted this 
proposal and The Task Ahead was finally published as a Green Paper in 
February 1969.
The Task Ahead was a much more modest document than its predecessor. 
Nor was it as widely acclaimed or publicised by the Government. It was 
not discussed at great length in any Parliamentary debate, so that the 
opportunities for members of the Opposition to voice their opinions on 
the matter were limited. All those Conservative 13Ps who did make their
123. Oral Answer by Mr Peter Shore, H.C.Debs., Vol.762, Cols.581-4,
4 April 1968. See also The Times, 5 April 1968.
124. The Times, 7 November 1968.
125. H.C.Debs., Vol.775, Col.1535, 19 December 1968,
126. For further details see Michael Shanks, "Wanted a Plan for the
Economy^which is Genuinely National", The Times, 13 January 1969
127. The Times, 6 February 1969.
128. H.C.Debs? Vol.775, Cols. 1634-41, 19 December 1968.
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views known, however, concentrated upon questioning the nature of the
specific assumptions on which the plan was based, rather than its
forec 
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129validity as a planning exercise . Mo over, the Party Leadership
made no detailed comment on the matter
In conclusion, the abandonment' of the National Plan had resulted 
in both a questioning of the validity of target planning and an altera­
tion in the Government's approach. The new style of planning which 
was embodied In The Task Ahead was thus distinctly different from that 
which had formed the basis of the 1963 and 1965 %)lans. These earlier 
exercise* had been characterised by a dominant role for the central 
government planners (i.e. they were technocratic) and by a single target 
growth rate: the approach in the 1969 plan placed much more emphasis
upon the consultative function of planning and upon contingency planning - 
that is a series of hypotheses built upon differing assumptions as to 
feasible growth rates (the wedge approach). Industry had been the prime 
mover behind this alteration in planning style and, in contrast to the 
1965 National Plan, the NEDC had been closely involved in the formulation 
of The Task Ahead. As already shown, the approach embodied In the latter 
document had been advocated by some Conservatives during the first phase 
of Opposition. In the years between 1966 and 1969 the pressures shaping 
the Labour Government's planning exercise also served to clarify and 
shape thinlclng within the Conservative Party.
3. The Conservative Alternative
The disillusionment which followed the abandonment of the 1965 
National Plan effectively removed the issue of national economic planning 
from the centre of the party political debate. Nevertheless the Labour 
Government's renewed planning initiative in 1968 and 1969 meant that the 
question remained, if only intermittently, a matter of political contro­
versy. The consequences of this for the Opposition were twofold: first
129. H.C.Debs., Vol.778, Cols. 1727-34, 26 February 1969; Vol.783, 
Cols. 641-4, 8 May 1969; Vol.785, Cols. 1684-5, 26 June 1969.
130. On the day of its publication Macleod questioned the targets, but 
not the purpose of The Task Ahead, H.C.Debs., Vol.778, Col,1729, 
26 February 1969.
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the threat to party cohesion remained, and secondly, the Party Leadership 
could not wholly avoid formulating and outlining its ox-m approach to 
national economic planning.
The Party's inability to agree on the merits or otherwise of
national economic planning xfas indicated by the reactions of certain
members of the Opposition back-benches to the Government's 1965 planning
proposals and subsequent developments in 1966 and 1967. Neil Marten
suggested that the whole exercise of national economic planning should be 
131abandoned ', while others preferred to label the Labour Government's
132experiment as "interference" rather than planning , and Duncan Sandys
suggested that what was needed x^ras not more planning but "better leader-
133ship and a united national effort". From 1968 the Labour Government
came under increasing pressure from a number of Conservative back-benchers
to abandon its whole planning exercise: these included A.P. Costain,
John Biffen, Nicholas Ridley, Sir John Eden, John Bruce-Gardyne, Julian
Eidsdale, and John Peyton^^^. In addition, demands were made from within
the Mass Party for the rejection of all interventionist agencies,
including the NEDC and the EDCs, At the 1968 Party Conference a call
135x\ras made for the abolition of "those little Neddies", Amongst the
motions submitted for debate at the same Conference, two advocated the
abolition of the NEDC and one called for the rejection of all planning 
136machinery . Coupled with these developments there xfas a reaction, on
the part of some Conservatives, against the policies and practices of
137the Macmillan period
131. H.C.Debs., Vol.734, Cols. 1293-5, 27 October 1966,
132. Speech by John Biffen, H.C.Debs., Vol.753, Col.928, 7 November 1967.
133. H.C.Debs., Vol.754, Col“.1204, 21 November 1967.
134. Biffen, H.C.Debs., Vol.773, Cols, 584-5, 14 November 1968; Costain, 
H.C.Debs, Vol.762, Col.582, 4 April 1968; Peyton, H.C.Debs., Vol.778, 
Col.739, 20 February 1969; Ridley and Gardyne, H.C.Debs., Vol.773, 
Cols, 584-5, 14 November 1968; Julian Eidsdale, H.C.Debs,, Vol.785, 
Cols. 1684-5, 26 June 1969.
135. Speech by Joan Hall, NUCUA 36th Annual Conference Report, NUCUA 
London October 1968, p.9.
136. Motions no's. 683, 693 and 360 reproduced in NUCUA Conference Hand­
book and Programme of Proceedings 1968, NUGUA, London October 1968,
137. See Julian Critchley7~^ ^*^ o"nservative Critics of the Old Macmillanism", 
The Times, 19 August 1968; The Swinton Journal, Summer 1968,
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The reaction against planning and the policies of the previous
government connected with it, promoted a further reaction in its
defence, Julian Gritchley attacked the growth of dogmiatism within
the Party and suggested that the pragmatic approach adopted by Macmillan
138xfas absolutely in line with Conservative principles * Maudling 
warned Conservatives that it was no good trying to pretend that "problems
with which we grappled as Government no longer existed when we became
139the Opposition". On another occasion, he defended the NEDC as a 
"great concept of co-operation between Government, management and the 
Unions".
Although the doctrinal debate x-zithin the Party continued, the 
majority of the Party Leaders made few public pronouncements on the 
issue of economic plannlng^^^. The matters was debated at the 1966 
Party Conference and Iain Macleod replied on behalf of the platform.
He confessed that he found the whole argument about planning "quite 
unreal", and he went on to state that: "everyone plans. Governments 
plan, businesses plan, individuals plan. You cannot conceivably avoid 
that". By exploiting the ambiguous nature of the terminology involved 
he effectively obscured the content of the argument and avoided making 
any precise commitment either for or against national economic planning^^^. 
After 1966, in line with the decline in the general interest in economic 
planning the mention of the term in official Party literature and in 
the speeches of Party Leaders became progressively less frequent.
Heath in his first major statement on economic policy since the 1966 
Election omitted any reference to the matter^^^. The annual "Economic 
Briefings" issued by the Conservative Research Department in 1967 and 
1968 contained no mention of economic p l a n n i n g ^ T h e  1967, 1968, and
138. Critchley, op.cit.
139. R. Maudling, "Letter to the Electors of Barnett", The Times,
16 February 1967.
140. NUCUA 85th Annual Conference Report, NUCUA, London October 1967, 
p.34.
141. See Ian Trethowan, "A Hard Choice for the Tories", The Times,
10 October 1968.
142. NUCUA 84th Annual Conference Report, NUCUA, London October 1966, 
p. 97,
143. Speech at Carshalton, NCP 1967, No,14, 24 July 1967, pp.312-3,
144. See NCR 1967, No.6, 23 Fiarch 1967, p.126-156; NCP 1968, No,4,
28 February 1968, p.50-64,
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1969 Parliamentary debates on the '’Economic Situation" contained hardly
any references to the issue by Labour and Conservative politicians
145alike' . instead the Balance of Payments problem aid the question of 
devaluation tended to dominate, and the major theme pursued by Conserva­
tive speakers x-zas the need to cut Government oxpenditure^^^.
Despite the Conservative Leadership’s silence on the issue of 
economic planning, work on an alternative policy tras taking place behind 
the scenes. The sources from which this new policy emerged were txfofold. 
First, Conservative thinking on economic planning was influenced by some 
of the same pressures and ideas which had served to shape the Labour 
Government’s planning policy after 1966. The general decline in support 
for the concept of central, "target" planning and its replacement by 
a process designed to maximise the consultative functions of national 
planning xzas also reflected in the Conservative Party, Secondly, from 
within the Conservative Party, the attempt to define a middle vzay between 
the txzo extremes of Party opinion continued and developed after the 1966 
Election. A notexforthy contribution was made by the Public Sector Research 
Unit (CPSRÜ) established in 1967 under the general guidance of Ernest 
Marples. The Unit, by the nature of its work and the manner of its 
operation, came into close and continual contact with progressive thinking 
in industry  ^ . Charged with the task of looking into the application of 
management techniques and modern technology to the x-zork of the Public 
Sector, the unit engaged the services of at least four firms of manage­
ment consultants, and could also call upon the assistance of various 
specialist advisers^^^. The Unit produced detailed policies for the 
reform and rationalisation of procedures an the public sector, including
143. H.CJ)ebs., Vol.753, Cols. 845-98, 7 November 1967? Vol.754, Cols.
1Ï40-T271 and 1314-1448, a  November 1967; Vol.774, Cols. 33-164,
25 November 1968; Vol.790, Cols, 658-786, 3 November 1969.
146. See speech by David Hoxfell, H.C.Debs., Vol.774, Cols.105-111,
25 November 1968? and Heath, ibid., Vol.754, Cols. 1140-1171,
21 November 1967,
147. On the CPSRU see D.E, Butler and M. Pinto™Duschinsky, The British 
General Election of 1970, London 1971, pp.85-86; George Hutchinson, 
Edward Heath: A Personal and Political Biography, London 1970,
pp.179-182; Hugh Heclo and Aaron WiMavsky, The Private Government 
of Public Money, London 1974, pp.267-276. See also Ernest Marples, 
Innovation axid Revival, CPC 383, London 1967; David Hoxzell, Uliose 
Government Works, CPC 407, London 1968; and the same author’s 
A New Style of Government, CPC 463, London 1970,
148. Interview 15.
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proposals for planning, programming, budgeting systems and the establish­
ment of a central capability unit to disseminate and supervise the 
application of these techniques.
Equally important in this contest was the work of the Conservative 
Systems Research Centre (GSRC), established in 1968 by Heath under the 
supervision of Mervyn Pike, MP and Michael Spicer^^^. The Centre teas 
particularly concerned with the utilisation of "programming" and fore­
casting techniques in the formulation of party policy. In particular, 
two theoretical models of the economy were developed: one on taxation,
the other on public spending. Conservative "planners" claimed that the 
application of this "information system" was capable of preventing 
inconsistencies between policies, of indicating the range of conditions 
under which spending policies might be feasible, and of showing the 
range of choice open to the Party. The models formulated were based 
on much the same principles as those utilised by corporate planners in 
industry and the Conservatives were able to claim that the "flexibility 
and dynamism" of their system 'Vas in sharp contrast to Labour’s National
Plan",
Both these sources, from within and from outside the Party,
contributed to the development of an approach to economic planning
distinctly different from that pursued by the Conservatives xzhen last
in office. This nexz approach was first revealed to the public in the
Party’s raid-term manifesto published in October 1968, Following a
fierce repudiation of "a grandiose National Plan" the document contained
a brief outline of the Opposition’s policy for "sensible planning"
consisting of businesslike public sector planning by the Government
151"co-ordinated with forecasts for private industry". An extended 
and more fulsome account of these proposals was published in February
149, On the GSRC see Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971, op.clt,, Michael 
Spicer, "Toxfards a Policy Information and Control System", Public 
Adminjstration, Vol.48, No,4, Winter 1970, pp.443-447.
150, See David Jones, "Computer Aids Tory Planning", The Times,
25 May 1970.
151, See "Make Life Better", CCD, London October 1968, p.12. See also 
"The Tories Turn", The Times, 7 October 1968; Peter Jay, "In 
Search of Conservative Economic Policy", The Times, 1 November 
1968.
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1970, in the last, and indeed only, detailed statement on economic
planning to appear during the Opposition period. This document stated 
that!
Conservatives start from the obvious fact that a 
Government must plan ahead for its own activities.#»
Yet because of the impact of Government spending on 
the rest of the economy and the implications for taxa­
tion, such planning cannot sensibly be done in isolation 
from what is likely to happen in the rest of the economy.
And in the same x^ ay, industry can only make its own for­
ward plans»,, on the basis of some viexv about xdiat 
Government policies are likely to be,.. Thus Conserva­
tives have long recognised the value both of improving 
the Government’s oxfn ’planning’ and forecasting tech­
niques, and of exposing as fully as possible the 
Government’s intentions and expectations for discussion 
by industry and a wider public»». Planning in this 
sense is... designed... to help everyone to make their 
ox-m decisions more sensible and realistic by improving 
some of the relevant background information to which 
they must be related. At the same time it can spotlight 
current or future problems which may need action.».And... 
it can strengthen the effectiveness of democratic political 
choice by exposing to public discussion the likely increase 
in the country’s wealth... The essence of such an approach 
is that it should be flexible, tentative, and relatively 
informal so that decisions can be modified if they turn 
out to have been a mistake, or when unforeseen events
occur.^^2
The concept of Conservative planning outlined above shows that 
Party policy makers had kept pace with events. They had also broken 
with the past, for by adopting the techniques of corporate planning in 
the public sector and hy stressing the consultative aspects of planning, 
they had implicitly dropped the emphasis upon central, "target" planning 
which had characterised the Macmillan era. This alteration in planning 
priorities xzas not, however, emphasised. Some atteüipts were even made 
to reX'zrite the history of earlier Conservative planning. For example, 
the authors of the policy statement suggested that the only purpose 
behind the establishment of the NEDC had been to provide machinery 
through which the Government’s intentions would be open to public 
debate^**. In addition, the Conservative approach to economic planning
152. The Campaign Guides 1970, CCO, London February 1970, p.59,
153. Ibid., p.59»
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did not appear substantially different from that pursued by the Labour
Government after the abandonment of the National Flan, This was not 
perhaps surprising considering that policy-makers in both parties appear 
to have, been influenced by the same general pressures. Nevertheless, 
certain differences remained and theee related to both the scope and the 
machinery of planning. The Conservative Party, through the activities 
of the CPSRU had been deeply concerned with the nature and the application 
of planning techniques in the public sector. In general the emphasis 
of their policy was more closely related to decision-making in the public 
sector than that of the Government and had been more closely influenced 
by current thinking in management circles. Furthermore, the Conservatives 
maintained that the NEDC should remain one of the main elements in the 
machinery of planning, and that it should be totally independent of 
the government machine. In addition they proposed a reduction in the 
number of EDCs, especially where they duplicated the work of existing 
bodies, such as the Trade Associations^*^. This marked a concession to 
the anti-interventionist viewpoint within the Party, but it was a compro­
mise with the extreme demand for the abolition of all the little 
Neddies . Finally, in keeping with their emphasis both on independent 
machinery and a flexible and open approach to planning, the Conservatives
welcomed the existence of private forecasting bodies as "a valuable
136alternative source of analysis and judgement". These differences in 
the scope and machinery of economic planning were of a marginal nature 
and the approach of both Government and Opposition tox^ ards the issue was 
substantially the same.
However, despite the similarity in substance, in presenting their 
policy the Conservatives attempted tO" portray it as distinctive. Conse­
quently, as on previous occasions, "the socialist concept of planning"
was outlined as a "rigid official blueprint for economic development"
Ü 57 .imposed by "controls and restrictions". ’ This xzas contrasted xzith the
154. See speech by Sir Keith Joseph, to the AGM of the Young Conservative 
Advisory Coimmittee, 7 March 1970, CCO News Service ref.167/70,
p. 20.
155. See The Times, 10 February 1969.
156. Campaign Guide 1970, op.cit,, p.59.
157. Ibid., p.59-
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158Conservative concept of planning based upon "co-operation and conaent".
Even The Task Ahead did not weaken the argument for, although it was
welcomed as "a more sensible approach", it xzas criticised for not being
accompanied by a comparable change in the "Government's interventionist
159and restrictive industrial policy".
The Opposition's alternative policy xzas never widely publicised 
or debated. Such debate would probably, as on previous occasions, have 
undermined party cohesion. Moreover, by 1970, national economic planning 
had ceased to be a central issue of party or, indeed, public controversy: 
simply stated, it aroused little interest. For both these reasons there 
was little to be gained electorally by exploiting the issue. Consequently, 
no mention of natonal economic planning xzas contained in the Party's 
1970 Election Man 
Election Campaign,
IV Conclusion
ifesto^ , nor was it a matter of concern during the
In sum, during their period in Opposition, the Conservative 
Leaders xzithdrexz from the conimitment to a system of centralised national 
economic planning xzhich had been outlined in their Party's 1964 Election 
manifesto. This alteration in policy approach appears to have taken 
place in relation to both situational and ideological factors. On the 
one hand, the experiences gained from the planning initiatives of the 
1960s helped to bring about a reassessment and redefinition of the 
purposes and procedures of economic planning. This development was 
reflected both within the Conservative Party and within Labour Government 
circles. On the other hand, the Opposition's reassessment preceded that 
of the Government, for the adoption of a more liberal policy stance by 
the Conservative Leaders in 1965 implied at least a modification in their 
approach to economic planning. Thus, xzhile the Labour Government 
continued to pxirsue a policy of national economic planning much along 
the lines originally established by the previous Conservative Government,
158. Ibid., p.64.
159. Ibid., p.62
160. Proposals for the introduction of management techniques into the
public sector were outlined in the manifesto. See A Better 
Tomorrow, CCO, London May 1970, pp.10-11.
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the Conservative Opposition had by October 1965 dropped the item from
its programme0
The case study provides some evidence to support the contention 
that in Opposition party political pressures shape the content of policy 
formulation to a greater extent than in Government. It may be recalled 
that prior to the 1964 General Election the Party’s position on economic 
planning had mainly been developed by certain senior ministers in 
co-operation with both sides of industry and vzith the assistance of 
government officials. Other Conservatives, ME's, party officials and 
ordinary party members, did not play a substantial part in this process. 
In contrast, in Opposition, Party Leaders, in formulating standpoints 
and policy positions, relied more heavily upon intra-party resources 
such as individual specialists, the Research Department and policy 
projects. Moreover, Party Leaders appear to have been more responsive 
to the state of opinion within the Party, and in the early years of 
Opposition cautiously avoided dealing with the controversial issue of 
economic planning. Thus, to some extent, considerations relating to 
party strategy appear to have been given priority over the actual 
development of policy. Discussion of the issue was avoided xzhenever 
possible and precise commitments to future action were not in evidence.
The Conservative Party’s early break xzith its previous position 
and its criticism of the 1965 National Plan meant that the Conservative 
Opposition’s approach appeared to be different from that of the Labour 
Government, while the development of a more liberal policy emphasis 
assisted this process of differentiation. The Leadership, however, 
avoided making any commitment to the outright abolition of economic 
planning. After 1966, when national economic planning had ceased to be 
a major issue of inter-party controversy and the approaches of both 
Government and Opposition appeared to be substantially the same, the 
distinctions were brought out in terms of presentation and language. 
Thus, in this later period also, the Conservative Opposition attempted 
to ensure that their policy xzas perceived as a distinctive and real 
alternative.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
PRICES AND INCOMES POLICY
1 The Conservative Party and Incomes Policy: 1961-1964
1. The Government's Policy
On 25 July 1961, Selwyn Lloyd, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
announced that there would be a "pay pause" until productivity had caught 
up and there was room for further advances. The Government proposed to 
take no new powers but, in those areas where it had direct responsibility, 
it would act in accordance with this policy. At the same time the 
Government requested that their policy should be followed elsewhere both 
in the private sector and in those parts of the public sector outside 
their control. In outlining the "pay pause", Selwyn Lloyd made it 
clear that it was intended as the first stage of "a new long term policy" 
to relate wage increases to productivity^. This statement marked the 
beginning of the Conservative Government's incomes policy. In the 
following section the background to and the consequences of this statement 
are outlined.
Selwyn Lloyd's announcement of the Government's commitment to the 
idea of an incomes policy had its origin in two sources. First, within
Government circles incomes policy had been gaining support over a period
2of years . Yet, although incomes policy had its supporters within 
government, the Government was reluctant to act in the field of incomes
1. H.C.Debs., Vol.645, Col.223, 25 July 1961. On the operation of the 
"pay pause" see Allan Pels, The British Prices and Incomes Board, 
Cambridge 1972, pp.11-12.
2. See Samuel Brittan, The Treasury Under the Tories: 1951-1964, 
Middlesex 1964, pp.187-8, 206 and 211; John and Marie Hackett,
The British Economy: Problems and Prospects, London 1967, p.165.
For earlier attempts at incomes policy in Britain see Andrew 
Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and 
Private Power, London 1965, pp.154-155; J. Dow, The Management of 
the British Econony: 1945-60, Cambridge 1972, pp.5-15; Campbell 
Balfour, Incomes Policy and the Public Sector, London 1972, pp.1-7; 
K.G.J.C. Knowles, "Wages and Productivity*', in G.D.N. Worswick and 
P.H. Ady (eds.), The British Econony in the 1950s, Oxford 1962.
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simply because such action was considered desirable. By its nature an
incomes policy was innovatory and bound to arouse opposition, hence any
decision to introduce such a policy would need to be carefully weighed.
It was the worsening situation following the 1959 Election and the
failure of the Government's deflationary measures to have any effect on
what Selwyn Lloyd called "cost push inflation" which finally forced the 
3Government to act .
The Government's decision to launch an incomes policy was not
made in response to any prompting from its own Party. Conservative
back-benchers were concerned about the worsening economic situation
but^>apart from a rejection of incomes policy by the Conservative
5Research Department there is little evidence of much concern about 
the issue within the Party prior to July 1961.
There is some evidence that behind the facade of collective 
responsibility the Government was divided^ both on the need for an 
incomes policy and on the nature of the incomes policy to follow the 
pause . Thus, both during and after the "pay pause" the Government was 
faced with two tasks: first, it had to heal the division within its own
ranks and agree on a long term policy; and second, once agreed, this 
policy had to be made acceptable to employers, trade unions and the 
Government's own supporters^.
Although divided about the exact nature of a long term incomes 
policy, the Government appeared to be in agreement on two points. First, 
that any form of incomes policy could only serve as a secondary tool of
3. In the financial year 1960-1961 incomes rose by £1,620 million
while national output rose only by £630 million. Source:
NCP 1962, No.5, 5 May 1962, p.5. See also Harold Macmillan,
At the End of the Day, London 1973, pp.35-36 and 48-49.
4. H.C.Debs., Vol.634, Cols. 270-290, 7 February 1961.
5. The Research Department objected to incomes policy on the grounds 
that it would be unacceptable and uttzorkable in Britain, and 
suggested that government should continue to rely on controlling 
the level of demand. NCP 1961, No.12, 19 June 1961, p.10.
6. Brittan 1964, op.cit., p.239; Macmillan 1973, op.cit., p.37.
7. Brittan 1964, op.cit., p.239; Macmillan 1973, op.cit., pp.52 and
68-69.
8. See Macmillan 1973, op.cit., pp.49 and 60.
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economic management» a useful supplement to the Government’s policies 
for controlling demand . Secondly, that if there was to be an incomes 
policy it had to be voluntary in nature and based upon the consent and 
collaboration of both sides of industry. With this latter point in mind 
the Cabinet initially decided that the main instrument of incomes policy 
should be the proposed National Economic Development Council. Because 
this body was separate from the Government and the Treasury it was felt 
that it was more likely to enjoy trade union support .
By December 1961, Selwyn Lloyd was able to indicate the role the
Council would play in relation to incomes. He stressed that the Government
would maintain the main responsibility for checking inflation by using its
powers to control demand, but the NEDC would supplement this by using its
status to educate the public about the dangers of inflation and thus to
make those who determine wages and incomes aware of the "national 
11interest". By December the Government had also agreed upon the general
development of an incomes policy in three phases. Phase one, would be a
temporary "pause"; phase two would be a period of "continued restraint",
laying the foundations for phase three during which the Government, trade
unions and employers would "combine to plan for increased growth from
12which larger incomes can be afforded". Thus by the close of 1961 the 
Cabinet had reached general agreement about the outline of a long term 
policy. However, the Government’s attempt to translate this policy into 
action was frustrated by the TUC’s refusal to co-operate.
The TUC’s opposition to the Government’s plans was based on the 
view that no attempt should be made to restrain wages without the comple­
mentary restraint of profits, dividends and prices. The Government 
refused to concede this point since they saw the problem facing the
9. See speech by Selwyn Lloyd, H.C.Debs.,Vol.651, Cols.983-4,
18 December 1961; cf. Macmillan 1973, op.cit.
10. Nigel Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society; British Conser­
vatives, the State and Industry; 1945-64, London 1972, p.165. The 
decision that the NEDC should be used as the main instrument of 
incomes policy had been agreed by October 1961 when Macmillan refer­
red to it as the proper machinery for incomes policy. See his speech 
to the Party Conference, October 1961, NCP 1961, 30 October 1961,p.5.
11. H.C.Debs., Vol.651, Col.983, 18 December 1961,
12. Speech by John Hare, Minister of Labour, H.C.Debs., Vol.651, Col.
1066, 18 December 1961.
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country as wage and not price inflation. Moreover, any attempt to inter-
13fere with profits and dividends might alienate the employers . They
thus insisted that only if it was established that "aggregate profits
were increasing disproportionately as compared with wages and salaries"
would the Government take corrective action in "the fiscal or other
fields".These verbal concessions failed to satisfy the objections of
the unions and when the TUG decided, on 24 January 1962, to participate
in NEDC it did so with the proviso that such a course did "not imply
acceptance of the Chancellor’s view that the solution to Britain’s
15economic difficulties is to be found in wage restraint".
The failure to gain Trade Union support represented a considerable 
setback for the Government. It effectively meant that the Government’s 
incomes policy was reduced to the hope that at some time in the future it 
migilt be possible to canvass the idea of an incomes policy by approaching 
the unions through the NEDC. Nevertheless the Government proceeded to 
phase two of its policy, with the announcement that the "pay pause" would 
end on the 31st of March 1962. This was followed by a statement in 
February 1962^^ which set forth a "guiding light", stating that money 
incomes should not rise by an average of more than two and a half per cent 
per person, per year and that restraint should be shown in profits and 
dividends
It was at this point that the Prime Minister, Macmillan, took 
the initiative. Faced by criticism from his back-benchers about the 
operation of the "pay pause", its unfairness to employees in the public 
sector and the lack of any recognisable long term policy, Macmillan
13. The Government argued that inflation within the UK was mainly 
caused by powerful unions winning wage claims which were then 
passed on to the consumer. See NCP 1961, No.23, 27 November 
1961, p.20.
14. NCP 1962, No,2, 22 January 1962, p.17.
15. NCP 1962, No.5, 5 March 1962, p.8.
16. Incomes Policy; The Next Step, Grand. 1626, HMSO, London
February 1962.
17. Ibid., paras 5 and 14.
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decided to act^^. Following the dismissal of Selwyn Lloyd, on 26 July
the Prime Minister announced that a National Incomes Commission (NIC)
. 19 .was to be established to pronounce on wage claims . This represented an
alteration in the Conservative Government’s approach to incomes policy.
Previously the paramount aim had been to create an incomes policy based
on consent in which government was an equal partner with both sides of
industry. Following the Prime Minister’s statement it was announced that
"it is clearly the duty of the Government to give a lead and focus public 
20opinion". This view suggested that government would be at least 
primus inter pares in the operation of an incomes policy.
In November 1962 a White Paper was published outlining the nature
21 . 22 of the NIC . It was to be an "impartial" body with the following
terms of reference: first, NIC could enquire into any pay claim referred 
to it by the parties affected; secondly, it could review certain pay 
matters where the cost was wholly or partly met from the Exchequer, if 
the Government referred them to it; and thirdly, it could examine retros­
pectively any particular pay settlement which the Government referred to 
23it . The Commission was not a success. In January 1963 the TUG decided
to boycott it^^, and subsequently the Government made little use of the
agency. For instance, from the date of its establishment in November 1962
25until its demise in 1965 the NIC received only four references
18. On 4 July 1962 Dame Irene Ward introduced a motion for debate which 
called for a clearer statement of the Government’s incomes policy.
Dame Irene also regretted that the application of the policy had
not been uniform throughout the public and private sectors and that, 
because of its stress upon the public sector, the Government’s
policy had been unfair and discriminatory. H.C.Debs., Vol.662,
Cols. 590-652, 4 July 1962; Macmillan 1973, op.cit., pp.68-69.
19. Macmillan 1973, op.cit., pp.104-107.
20. NCP 1963, No.18, 23 September 1963, p.7.
21. National Incomes Commission, Cmnd. 1844, HMSO, London November 1962.
22. Ibid., para.l.
23. Ibid., paras. 4-7.
24. In January 1963 the TUC advised the building unions to boycott the
NIC and notified all trade unions of this advice. NCP 1963,
No.18, 23 September 1963, p.7.
25. Allan Fels 1972, op.cit., p.17. For an analysis of the work of
the NIC see Fels, Chapter 2, pp.16-22.
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Following the failure of the NEDC and NIC initiatives the
Government embarked upon a programme of economic expansion designed, in
part to facilitate the achievement of a voluntary incomes policy. The
new programme was outlined by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald
Maudlins, in his 1963 Budget Statement. The Chancellor stated that a
more rapid rate of growth could not be achieved without an incomes policy.
But, he went on, "we are faced with a problem; without expansion we cannot
have an incomes policy, without an incomes policy we cannot have expansion.
We must now break out of this situation". The Government proposed to do
so by "launching deliberately on a policy of expansion" and he invited
those with responsibility in management and unions to join with him in
this policy^^. As Heath later noted, one of the main aims of the Budget
27was to obtain trade union support for an incomes policy . Towards this
end the Chancellor gave away an extra £250 million in reliefs, which for
28many workers was equivalent to a wage increase of two per cent . The 
Budget Statement meant that the achievement of a voluntary national 
incomes policy had become the main priority of the Conservative Government’s 
economic programme.
The Chancellor’s measures, although praised by the TUC’s Economic
29Committee, failed to secure trade union co-operation . In October 1963,
Maudlins tried once more. He announced that the Government’s objective
30was "fairness to all" and in pursuit of this goal he encouraged the 
employers’ side to take the next initiative. This they did in early 
1964, when through the NEDC they proposed the establishment of a price 
review body. This proposal was rejected by the TUC after some discussion
26. H.C.Debs., Vol.675, Cols.475-6, 3 April 1963.
27. Heath later spoke of the 1963 Budget as a deliberate attempt to
get an incomes policy, and added that "it deserved one". 
H.C.Debs., Vol.693, Cols.466-7, 15 April 1964.
28. Samuel Brittan, Steering the Economy, Middlesex 1971, p.280.
29. In July 1963 Union representatives on NEDC agreed to the prepara­
tion of a paper for discussion on the issues involved in formula­
ting an incomes policy. But, in September at the Trade Unions 
Annual Congress, the Executive was instructed not to agree to any 
policy which did not include the control of profits and capital 
gains. The motion proposing this was passed by a "substantial 
majority", and by a small majority a motion was adopted declaring 
complete opposition to any form of wage restraint. NCP 1963,
No.18, 23 September 1963, p.8.
30. Speech at Party Conference, October 1963, NCP 1963, No.21,
28 October 1963, p.13.
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and was consequently dropped by the employers . Following the failure
of the unions and the employers to agree upon machinery to vet prices,
Maudling continued to try to secure a joint statement urging responsibility
on all sides. In his 1964 Budget speech the Chancellor conceded that the
32Government should act to "influence" the level of prices and profits .
But with an election approaching, time was running short and the Union
33Leaders refused to co-operate with the Chancellor .
By the time of the General Election in October 1964, after nearly
three years of effort, the Conservative Leaders had failed to establish a
permanent, national incomes policy. They remained, however, strongly
committed to securing one. In the Party’s General Election Manifesto,
it was stated that, if returned to office, the Conservative Government
would give "first priority" to their policy for economic growth^^. The
authors of the document went on to state that, "an effective and fair
incomes policy" was "crucial to the achievement of sustained growth
without inflation" and they committed a future Conservative Administration
to taking a "further initiative to secure wider acceptance and impleraenta-
35tion of such a policy". During the Election Campaign, Maudling reiterated 
this pledge and emphasised the "fundamental" importance of an incomes 
policy, the achievement of which he regarded as "the biggest problem we 
have to face in keeping our costs and prices competitive".^^
In sum, in July 1961, mainly in response to the worsening economic 
situation, the Conservative Government introduced a "pay pause". This
31. H.C.Debs., Vol.701, Col.241, 3 November 1964. The éraployers'
proposals were as follows: first, management should accept responsi­
bility for doing everything possible to keep prices stable or to 
reduce them; second, a price review body should be established to 
examine particular prices and report on them publicly; third, if 
over a period profits should rise more than incomes, the balance
should be redressed by taxation policy. John Wood (ed.) A Nation Not
Afraid; the Thinking of Enoch Powell, London 1965, p.105.
32. H.C.Debs., Vol.693, Cols.263-65, 15 April 1964; NCP 1964, No.9,
4 May 1964, p.9.
33. Throughout 1964 the Union Leaders were accused of refusing to co­
operate with the Government for political reasons. See for example,
H.C.Debs., Vol.701, Col.241, 3 November 1964,
34. ^'P'rosp^ity with a Purpose", in F.W.S. Craig (ed.), British General
Election Manifestos; 1918-1966, Chichester 1970, p.216.
35. Ibid., p..217..
36. Press Conference at CCO, The Times, 30 September 1964. See also
speech by Quintin Hogg in Birmingham, The Times, 17 September 1964.
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action marked the beginnings of an atfcenpt to secure a "long term" policy 
on incomes. After agreeing upon the general outlines of this policy the 
Government made a series of unsuccessful attempts to gain the co-operation 
of both sides of industry. Initially, it was hoped that the HEDC might 
serve as the main instrument of the Government’s policy, but this hope was 
frustrated. Next, the Government, on its own initiative, e«tablished the 
NIC but, after the TUC decided to boycott it, this venture had little 
impact. Finally the Government embarked upon a policy of expansion 
specifically designed to facilitate the achievement of a voluntary policy. 
This also proved unsuccessful, and no further progress had been made by 
the time the Conservative Government left office in October 1964.
Two features of the Conservative Government's actions during the 
1961-1964 period may be noted. First, there was an important change in 
the status of incomes policy within the framework of the Conservative 
economic programme. In 1961 it had been regarded as a secondary tool of 
economic policy. During and after 1963, however, its implementation 
became the Government’s first priority in the economic field and Conserva-
37tive spokesmen referred to it as "crucial" and of "fundamental importance". 
Secondly, there was an important change in the nature of the Government’s 
proposals. In the early stages the Government had maintained that most of 
the restraint should be on the incomes side. This analysis was hotly 
contested by the unions. By October 1964 the Government had made a series 
of concessions to the TUC’s viewpoint including a promise to act to 
"influence" the level of prices and profits.
The alterations in the status and nature of the Conservative 
Government’s incomes policy were significant. But, the freedom of 
manoeuvre available to government personnel and the nature and the 
quantity of the concessions they were able to make, were limited by a 
number of factors, not least the state of opinion within the Conservative 
Party.
37. Cf. Macmillan 1973, op.cit., p.108.
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2, Opinion Within the Conservative Party; 1961-1964
As already indicated, the Government's decision to introduce a
"pay pause" and to attempt to formulate a permanent policy was not made in
response to any persistent pressure from within the Conservative Party.
Thus one of the Government's first tasks was to persuade its own supporters
to accept the policy and to maintain that support whilst a permanent policy
was developed. On the need for a "pay pause", the Party appeared united
38since all accepted the proposal on grounds of necessity . But the party, 
at all levels, was split on the need for a permanent national incomes 
policy into those for and against such a policy* In turn both these broad 
groups contained a wide variety of tendencies and shades of opinion.
Amongst the supporters of incomes policy it is possible to ascertain
three tendencies. First, a group of lukewarm supporters, who were willing
to accept a limited incomes policy that would not involve any attempt to
influence prices, profits and dividends and that would play a purely secon-
39dary role in economic management • Secondly, a group of loyalist supporters 
who broadly supported the Government's line^^. This included the large , 
number of MPs who were not interested in the details of economic policy.
This is the kind of group on which every Party leadership depends for 
support and the complexion of such a group varies from issue to issue. 
Thirdly, a group of extreme supporters who were willing to go further than 
the Leadership in advocating measures to affect prices and profits and were 
even willing to consider the use of statutory controls. This group was and 
remained small in number^^.
38. See H.C.Debs., Vol.645, Cols.433-674, 25-26 Duly 1961.
39. See speeches by Sir John Barlow, H.C.Debs., Vol.645, Col.674,
26 July 1961. Sir Spencer Summers, H.C.Debs., Vol.651, Col.994,
18 December 1961; A.E. Cooper, H.C.Debs., Vol.693, Col.309, 15 April
1964.
40. See Debate on Incomes Policy, H.C.Debs., Vol.662, Cols.590-652*
4 July 1962; for loyal MPs, see speeches by Sir Arthur Vere-Harvey, 
Ibid., Vol.648, Coli842, 7 November 1961; Nicholas Ridley, ibid.. 
Vol.684, Col.392, 13 November 1963.
41. See speeches by Robert Carr, H.C.Debs., Vol.645, Cols.471-479,
25 July 1961. Carr advocated the use of regulators including "forced 
saving" to keep incomes in line with production, but his main answer 
to inflation throughout was a wholesale reform of industrial rela­
tions, Sir Cyril Osborne, H.C.Debs., Vol.684, Col.235, 13 November 
1963. Osborne advocated "statutory limitations" on wages, salaries, 
dividends and personal incomes, and firm rent control. His arguments 
were not wholly economic in nature; he regarded incomes policy as 
a way of creating discipline in national life.
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Amongst the opponents of Incomes policy it is possible to ascer­
tain at least tifo tendencies. First, a group of traditionalist opponents 
who supported what might be termed the traditional Treasury view of 
economic management. They were opposed to incomes policy because they 
argued it was unworkable and irrelevant. The charge of irrelevance rested 
on a belief that wages rose as a result of the pressure of demand and 
consequently the answer to inflation was demand management for which 
incomes policy could not be a substituted^. Secondly, a group of opponents 
who supported a liberal or neo-liberal view of economic affairs. These 
differed from the former group in that their case against incomes policy 
was based more on principle than expediency. To this group an incomes 
policy was an interference with market forces, and the best way to tackle
inflation was to encourage the operation of these forces within a free 
43market .
Initially, the failure of the Leadership to outline their view of 
a permanent policy meant that the opponents^of incomes policy had little 
of a concrete nature to attack, and much of the early debate was concen­
trated on the demand for the Government to reach agreement and clarify its 
policy. Once this agreement was reached, and as it became clear that the 
achievement of an incomes policy was being regarded by the Government as 
a primary objective which might entail some form of restraint on prices 
and profits, the Government found itself under increasing criticism from 
its own back-benchers. The lukewarm supporters of the policy began to 
move into outright opposition, but the bulk of the Party remained firmly 
behind the Government,
As in the case of economic planning, a crucial development came 
with the resignation of Macmillan as Prime Minister in October 1963.
With his departure the Cabinet lost one of its most persistent and powerful 
advocates of incomes policy. Secondly, his successor. Lord Home (later 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home), as a consequence partly of personality and partly 
of the manner in which he emerged as leader, was not able to comraand as
42. See speech by Nigel Birch, H.C.Debs., Vol.645, Col.462, 26 July
1961,
43. See speeches by Peter Walker, H.C,Deb a, Vol,645, Cols,521-2, 27 
July 1961; Sir James Pitman, ibid,, Col,497. See also Timothy 
Raison, "Tories to Your Own Self be True", The Statist, 16 February
1962.
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united a Cabinet or as united a party as his predecessor^^. Thirdly, 
the decision of Enoch Powell not to serve under Lord Home meant that 
the opponents of incomes policy gained an influential spokesman in the 
public debate.
Powell’s role appears to have been significant. After leaving
45the Government he wasted no time in launching his attack • Incomes 
policy was to him an example of unwarranted and unnecessary intervention, 
and in January 1964 Powell outlined what was to become his standard 
critique of incomes policy. He maintained that w^es, profits and prices 
were determined by supply and demand working through l:he market and that 
the only way to influence these market forces was to control the supply 
of money, for inflation was produced by an excess of money and incomes 
policy was irrelevant to this process^^.
Powell’s influence upon Conservative opinion is difficult to 
estimate: however, there is some evidence to suggest that the views
expressed by him aroused a response within certain sections of the 
Party^^. More importantly, while Powell attacked incomes policy on 
grounds of principle, other Conservatives were concerned about the 
consequences that the maintenance of such a policy might have upon the 
electoral performance of the party. Both incomes policy and economic 
planning were not only contrary to the free market opinions of a section 
of Conservatives but also appeared to blur the distinction between the 
parties^^. During 1964, in what was certain to be an election year, 
these strategic matters of policy presentation appear to have been issues 
of some concern within the Leadership^^. Moreover, as interviews have
44. On Macmillan.'a resignation and Home's emergence as leader see 
Randolph Churchill, The Fight for the Tory Leadership, London 1964; 
and comment by Iain llacleod, The Spectator, 10 January 1964.
45. For Powell's speeches prior to 1965, see John Wood (ed.) 1965, 
op.cit.
46. Ibid,, pp.104-111.
47. See "The Field Where the Biggest Failures Lie", by 'A Conservative',
The Times, 3 April 1964; Ian Gilmour, "Enoch Powell'a Pipe Dream",
The Spectator, 10 April 1964; Andrew Roth, Enoch Powell: Tory 
Tribune, London 1970, p.306. The Article in The Times of 3 April 
1964 may well have been written by Powell.
48. Interviews 10 and 16.
49. See D.E. Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of
1964, London 1965, pp.83-92.
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revealed, not all leading Conservatives were as strongly committed to
the establishment of a permanent national incomes policy as were, for
. 5 0example, Quintin Hogg and Reginald Maudling .
In sum, during the years from 1961 to 1964, the relative influence 
of the opponents and supporters of incomes policy within the Party
altered. Broadly speaking, throughout the period the supporters of incomes
. . .  51policy remained dominant , but the number and commitment of the Govern­
ment's supporters were reduced as the consequence of a number of develop­
ments. The Government's decision to rai&e incomes policy to the level of 
a primary objective of economic policy and the subsequent concessions 
on prices and profits tended to alienate its lukewarm supporters. In 
addition, the nature of Macmillan's resignation and the political circum­
stances surrounding the formation of Lord Home's administration, weakened 
the Government's authority and credibility. In this more flexible 
situation Powell launched an attack on the Government's incomes policy. 
Wliile, at much the same time, there were indications that the Government 
was not unanimous in its resolve to achieve a permanent national incomes 
policy.
3. Conclusion
When the Conservatives entered Opposition in October 1964 the 
Party's position on incomes policy was as follows. According to the 
official or Leadership view the implementation of a permanent national 
incomes policy was the primary aim of the Conservative economic programme. 
Its achievement was of "fundamental" importance and "crucial" to the 
realisation of the Conservatives' first priority: a policy for economic
growth. The policy visualised by the Party Leaders was to be voluntary 
in nature, based on the consent and collaboration of both sides of 
industry, and it was to cover not only incomes, but also prices and profits. 
The official view appeared to be supported, at least tacitly, by a majority 
of Conservatives. It was opposed, however, by a growing and increasingly 
voluble minority within the Party who advocated a liberal free-market
50. Interviews 5, 9 and 10.
51. After all this group contained the majority of MPs who were 
disinterested in the issue and loyally supported the Government 
line.
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approach. Between and around the official and dissenting views there was, 
as we have seen, a variety of tendencies and shades of opinion. Moreover, 
the differences of opinion were reflected mt all levels within the Party 
hierarchy and were not confined to only one section. The split was there­
fore a vertical one and represented a very real danger to party unity.
II The Conservative Party in Opposition; 1964-1970
Soon after entering Opposition the Party Leaders began to retreat 
from the firm stand on incomes policy maintained both before and during 
the 1964 Election. This gradual process of retreat characterised the 
development of the Conservative Party's incomes policy during the Opposition 
period and may be divided into four phases. First, from October 1964 to 
January 1966, when incomes policy was demoted from the position of the 
primary aim of Conservative economic policy to the position of a secondary 
objective. Secondly, from January 1966 to July 1967, when incomes policy, 
having been demoted in status, was next limited in scope; its relevance 
to price control was rejected and its applicability to the private sector 
was questioned. Thirdly, from July 1967 to January 1969, when an unsucces­
sful attempt was made to formulate a Conservative incomes policy. Fourthly, 
from January 1969 to June 1970, when the attempt to formulate a policy was 
shelved as the Party united to prepare for the forthcoming general election. 
These four phases are analysed in detail in the rest of this chapter.
1. Phase I; The Demotion of Prices and Incomes Policy:
October 1964 to January 1966
The withdrawal from the strong eoraraitmient to incomes policy made 
before and during the 1964 Election did not begin to take place iamiediately 
after the Conservatives entered Opposition. Towards the end of the year, 
however, indications of an alteration in Conservative priorities emerged, 
and these marked the commencement of the Party Leaders' retreat from their 
electoral position. This retreat was to evolve in response to tv7o develop­
ments: on the one hand, the development of the Labour Government's policy
and, on the other, the development of new Conservative policies which 
contained an emphasis distinctly different from the policies pursued by 
the previous Conservative Government.
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The Labour Government's plans tor incomes policy were first outlined
in the Queen's Speech in November 1964. The Government made it clear that
their aim was to achieve a voluntary policy and that their first objective
would he to bring government and both sides of industry together to discuss 
52the matter .
In December 1964 a "Joint Statement of Intent on Productivity,
Prices and Incomes" was signed by the Government, TUC and employers' 
organisations. The three parties recognised the need to "keep increases 
in total money incomes in line with increases in real national output and 
to maintain a stable general price l e v e l " . I n  addition, the representa­
tives of both aides of industry undertook to co-operate in giving effective
shape to machinery which the Government intended to set up including an
54agency to examine particular pay and price increases . Consequently, in
February 1965 the Government proposed the formation of the National Board
for Prices and Incomes (NBPI) and published an outline of its proposed
55constitution and terms of reference •
The NBPI was established in April'*^ , and in the same month the
Government, with the agreement of both sides of industry, laià down an
incomes "norm" of 3-3& per cent to guide the work of the Board. On the
prices side, no "norm" was laid down, but criteria were prescribed and
manufacturers were urged, whenever possible, to attempt to offset proposed
. . 57rises by increases in productivity
In the Autumn of 1965 the Government proposed the establishment of 
an "early warning system" under which it was to be notified in advance of 
nearly all important wage and price increases. This was to give it adequate 
time to consider decisions regarding pay and prices before they were put
52. Speech by George Brown, H.C.Debs., Vol.701, Col.221, 3 November 1964,
53. The Times, 17 December 1964.
54. H.C.Debs., Vol.704, Cols.385-388, 16 Decenher 1964.
55. Machinery of Prices and Incomes Policy, Cmnd. 2577, HMSO, London 
February 1965.
56. It was established by Statute until August 1966 when the Prices
and Incomes Act 1966 was passed.
57. Prices and Incomes Policy, Cmnd, 2639, London, Ht4S0, April 1965.
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58into effect . The Government had earlier announced that it would seek 
statutory powers to enforce the early warning system and a compulsory 
standstill period during which the HBPI could investigate and report.
In the event, however, the TUC and CBI co-operated voluntarily.
The Government's proposals on incomes policy, contained in the
Queen's speech and the subsequent Statement of Intent, were both welcomed
by Conservative spokesmen. In addition to the considerations already
outlined, there were at least two reasons for this state of harmony between
Government and Opposition. First, the Government's proposals, as Maudling
recognised, were much the same as those of his own party and thus, there
, 5 9was little in them against which the Opposition could take exception . 
Secondly, the Conservatives could not risk alienating the wide spectrum 
of informed and influential opinion which supported the Government's 
attempt to formulate a voluntary national incomes policy. This body of 
opinion included certain sections of the serious press, a wide range of 
academic opinion, and the employers* and workers* organisations^^.
Unable or unwilling to attack the substance of the Labour 
Government's policy, the Opposition Leadership concentrated instead upon 
questioning whether, in the light of the Government's economic actions, 
the policy could succeed. Throughout October and November 1964 the
58. Prices and Incomes Policy: An Early Warning System, Cmnd. 2808,
HMSO, London November 1965. Most of the proposals contained in 
this Uhife Paper were carried through into the Government's Prices 
and Incomes Bill introduced in February 1966.
59. Reginald Maudling, speaking in the Debate on the Queen's Speech,
noted that the Government's proposals appeared to be a continuation 
of the previous Government-s policy. H.C.Debs., Vol.701, Cols.240- 
241, 3 November 1964. See also, NCP 1964, No.21, 23 November 1964,
pp.18-19, which commends the proposals contained in the Queen's
Speech for the establishment of a Price Review Body, and noted that 
it was to be much the same as the Conservatives' NIC. On the State­
ment of Intent see speeches by Sir Alec Douglas Home, H.C.Debs., 
Vol.705, Col.906, 2 February 1965; Maudling, H.C.Debs., Vol.704,
Col.383, 16 December 1964 and Sir Cyril Osborne, ibid,, CoIs,383-4.
60. See The Times, Editorial, 18 September 1964. See also OECD, Policy
for Prrces, Profits and Non-Wage Incomes, 1964; Business Economists 
Group, Incomes Policy, Report of 1963 Oxèord Conference, obtainable 
from 21 Godleman Street, EC4; and the Fabian Group, A Plan for 
Incomes, Fabian Research Series No.247. For employerT^organisations 
see The Bulletin, October 1964, published by the British Employers 
ConfederationJTwhich stated that, whatever its political complexion, 
the first priority of a new Government must be an incomes policy; 
for a similar view from the Federation of British Industries, see 
The Times, 16 October 1964,
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Government had introduced measures to deal with a balance of payments
deficit, estimated at £800 million. These measures included a fifteen
per cent import surcharge; a budget containing increases in direct and
indirect taxation, increases in pensions and a proposal to introduce a
corporation tax; and in Novenher the Bank Rate was increased to seven 
61per cent . Conservative Leaders argued that these measures were
inflationary in effect and would make the achievement of a workable
incomes policy difficult. This v i w  was first expressed by Sir Alec
Douglas Home even before the Statement of Intent was published on
16 December 1964, On this occasion the Opposition Leader argued that
the Government's restrictive measures had made the prospect of a "workable
62Incomes policy" even imre distant .
Sir Alec's speech characterised the response of the Conservative 
spokesmen to each new initiative carried out in the incomes policy field 
by the Government during the first half of 1965. Thus by February the 
Statement of Intent was criticised by the Conservative Research Depart­
ment as unlikely to succeed in the "inflationary" environment created
63by the Government's policies . The Department responded in the same
manner to both the Government's I#iite Paper outlining the constitution
of the National Board for Prices and Incomes and the publication of an
64agreed norm by which to assess wage increases . The same sceptical 
view was expressed in a number of speeches by Party Leaders* including 
Barber, Rippon, Macleod and Selwyn Lloyd^^. In this manner the Leadership 
avoided committing themselves either for or against the principle of an
61. Samuel Brittan, Steering the Economy, Middlesex 1971, p.174; 
aiid Brian Lapping, The Labour Government 1964-1970, Middlesex 
1970, p.32.
62. Speech at London University, The Times, I December 1964.
63. NCP 1965, No.2, 1 February 1965, p.31.
64. For Research Department criticisms see NCP 1965, No.8, 26 April
1965, p.204.
65* Mr Barber spoke in favour of an incomes policy but argued that the
Labour Government's policy would not work because they could not 
"keep their own house in order". The Times, 22 April 1965. Mr Rippon 
did not support an incomes policy with the same force as Mr Barber, 
but concentrated his criticisms not on the principle, but upon its 
practicability, The Times, 12 April 1965; see also Iain Macleod's 
speech to Enfield Conservatives, The Times, 9 January 1965; Mr 
Selwyn Lloyd, whilst still supporting the idea of a national incomes 
policy, felt that the Government's performance had been "farcical". 
The Times, 24 May 1965.
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incomes policy, whilst at the same time criticising the Government's
policy. This in itself represented a significant retreat from the 
strong commitment maintained before and throughout the 1964 Election.
At the same time there was a gradual decline in support for the Government's 
policy amongst employers' and workers' organisations. The employers did 
not like certain aspects of the Government's proposals on prices and felt 
that George Brown, in attempting to launch his policy, was spending too 
much energy on achieving a speedy solution rather than concentrating on 
the details^^. Amongst the Unions, the Transport and General Workers Union 
expressed particularly strong opposition to the Government's proposals 
and, in April 1965, at a special TUC conference on incomes policy, they 
voted against Mr Brown's policy^^.
Although Conservative Leaders, in their public pronouncements, 
avoided any reference to the principles of an incomes policy, throughout 
the early stages of Opposition, those Conservatives who were opposed to 
the concept made their views known. As before, the arguments were ably 
expounded by Enoch Powell, who in a series of speeches and articles 
attacked not only the Labour Government's policy but also the idea of a 
national incomes policy^^. Powell's views on incomes policy were widely 
canvassed by some of the younger Conservative back-benchers^^. There
66. See British Industry, published jointly by the FBI and the BEG,
January and February 1965 editions.
67. NCP 1965, No,10, 17 May 1965, pp.268-269.
68. See Enoch Powell: "In Pursuit of a Mirage; I. The Reality of an
Incomes Policy", and "II: What Substitute for an Incomes Policy",
The Times, 17 and 18 December 1964. These articles were largely
a restatement of the argument he had been using prior to the 1964
Election, but in the post-election period Powell sharpened his
criticisms and extended them to apply specifically to the develop­
ment of the Labour Government's policy. In a speech at Edinburgh 
he attacked the attempt by George Brown to "hold down" prices by 
"cajoling" industry. The Times, 16 January 1965. See also speech at 
Nevrport, The Times, 25 September 1965, and speech at Westbury-on- 
Trim, 26 February 1965, reproduced in John Wood (ed.) 1965, op.cit., 
pp.115-118.
69. Including John Biffen, H.C.Debs.y Vol.710, Cols.746-750, 7 April
1965; Terence Higgins, H.C.Debs., Vol.725, Col.1182, 1 Plarch 1966;
Cranley Onslow and Ian Lloyd, H.C.Debs., Vol.720, Col.1206, 9 
November 1965; Nicholas Ridley, H.C.Debs., Vol.725, Col.1197,
1 March 1966. See also "Tories at Sixes and Sisvens on Incomes Policy", 
The Times, 31 March 1965.
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was, however, no organised "Powellite" group. îîhat Powell did was to
provide a well informed and tightly argued critique of the basic assum%)-
tions underlying British economic policy. In doing this he not only made
conversions* but appeared to esspress the views of a section of Conservative
opinion. As one tIP said in retrospect, "he provided the bullets for us to 
70fire" , but the desire to attack seemed, in many cases, already to exist.
The decision by the Party Leader in the Autumn of 1964 to review
and re-formulate party policy on a wide- ranging basis also had important
consequences for the Party's approach to incomes policy. As previously
noted, this review resulted in the adoption of what may be termed a
. . 71 .competition approach to economic affairs , which contained a policy
emphasis distinctly different from that pursued by the previous Conservative
administration. Significantly, Heath, when he outlined the components of
the new competition policy in the 1965 Budget Debate, made no mention of 
72incomes policy . This omission may be contrasted with Maudling's
announcement, in November 1964, that incomes policy was "by far the most
73important economic problem we have".
The adoption of a competition policy, with its stress upon conflict 
and individualism, seemed incompatible with the notion of a national incomes 
policy based on the concepts of harmony and consensus. This was underlined 
by a series of pamphlets commissioned from younger Conservatives by the 
Director of the CPC, David H o w e l l T i m o t h y  Raison, in his contribution 
to the series, advocated the formulation of policies which would introduce 
more "tension" into the social system: thus incomes policy with its stress
on harmony should be rejected and reliance should be placed upon competi­
tion and an increase in efficiency generally as the means by which incomes
75could be related more closely to "what we have earned". This line of 
argument was extended in Howell's and Higgins' contributions to the series
70. Interview 16.
71. See above, Chapter Six.
72. H.C.Debs., Vol.710, Cols.514-519, 7 April 1963.
73. H.C.Debs., Vol.701, Col.240, 3 November 1964.
74. This series was entitled "New Tasks" and involved contributors whose
views were in accordance with the new direction of Conservative 
policy. Interview 14.
75. Timothy Raison, Conflict and Conservatism, CPC 313, March 1965, 
p.6 and pp.11-12.
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both rejected the idea of a natonal incomes policy and suggested that the 
answer lay in plant level bargaining . The idea of plant level bargain­
ing was also stressed in a Bow Group pamphlet which commented that a
77national incomes policy was "unworkable" and "undesirable".
The contributions of the authors of the CPC pamphlets did not
represent official party policy, and throughout 1965 the Leadership
avoided making any specific statement about the Conservative approach to
78incomes policy. This silence may have been deliberate . Incomes policy
touched on the fundamentals of Conservative belief and, according to
Butler and King, Heath in particular recalled the damaging electoral effects
of the ideological schism which had bedevilled the Labour Party during
79its period in Opposition . Laing goes further by claiming that it was 
Heath who decided to reverse the Party's commitment to incomes policy under 
the "outvjrard cover of almost ignoring the question" and without even 
consulting or notifying his "shadow" Chancellor Macleod^^. Certainly, 
as Laing notes, the issue of incomes policy was a "delicate" one for the 
Conservative Leadars^^ and every attempt was made to avoid the question.
It was, for example, left out of the policy reforsiulation initiated by 
Heath, no policy group was established to consider the question and there
were no references to it in any of the detailed official policy proposals
82published in 1965 Even at the Party Conference the issue remained
dormant, and The Economist commented that incomes policy had apparently
83dropped from sight altogether
Despite the attempt by the Leadership to ignore the issue, a 
distinct shift of opinion took place throughout 1965 within the Conserva-
76. David Howell, Efficiency and Beyond, CPC 308, March 1965, pp.14-15. 
Terence Higgins, The Managerial Revolution, CPC 317, April 1965
pp ■ 8"“ 12.
77. Henry Bosch (ed.). The Confidence Trick, Bow Group, May 1965.
78. Interview 9.
79. D.E.Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of 1966, 
London 1966, p.50.
80. Margaret Laing, Edward Heath: Prime Minister, London 1972, p.177.
81. Ibid.
82. A preliminary statement on policy was published in July 1965. See
NCP 1965, No.14, 12 July 1965. See also Putting Britain Right Ahead, 
CCO, London October 1965; and NCP 1965, No.21, 22 November 1965.
83. "The Shake Out", 23 October 1965. For Conference see NÜCUA 83rd
Annual Conference Report, NUCUA, London 1965; and NCP 1965, No.20 
1 November 19*65.
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tive Party. On the one hand the opponents of a national incomes policy
had been gaining ground while, on the other, those who supported incomes 
policy, particularly Maudling and Boyle, appeared to do so with less 
fervour than on previous o c c a s i o n s T h i s  decline in support for an 
incomes policy had taken place in response to Government actions and as 
a result of the formulation of new Conservative policies. By the Autumn 
of 1965 these txro developments converged and added momentum to the demands 
upon the Leadership for a clear statement on prices and Incomes.
In September 1965, the Government indicated for the first time
that they were considering the use of statutory powers so as to require
the advance notification of price and pay increases and to enforce a
85compulsory standstill period . Although these powers were not immediately 
taken up, the fact that the Labour Government was considering their use 
marked a significant movement away from the voluntary approach previously 
pursued by the Labour Government and its Conservative predecessor. This 
new development made it all the more pressing upon the Conttervative Leader­
ship to state their own position on incomes policy. In addition the 
Government's new proposals re-awakened the debate over incomes policy 
within the Conservative Party and the subsequent disagreement revealed 
that the Party Leadership remained divided over the issue. Powell resumed 
his attack upon the concept of an incomes policy, whilst Maudling entered 
the lists in its defence^^. In a speech at Wellingborough in January 1966, 
Maudling conceded that incomes policy should be only one part of a general 
package of policies, but he rejected Powell's thesis by stressing that
"there remained the need by effort, leadership and example to achieve
87
restraint upon the growth of incomes as a whole", Powell reacted by
84. In November 1965, Maudling took a more cautious approach to incomes 
policy than he had in the previous year, H.C.Debs., Vol.720, Col. 
1267, 9 November 1965. See also Sir Edward Boyle, Conservatives 
and Economic Planning, CPC No.335, January 1966, pp.26-27, Copy
of a speech given in October 1965 in which Sir Edward conceded 
that incomes policy was "no panacea for our economic difficulties", 
but added that it had a part to play,
85. NCP 1965, No.17, 20 September 1965, p.482.
86. Speech"by Powell at Leicester, The Times, 13 October 1965. Speech
by Maudling at the Conservative Party Conference, The Timfes,
16 October 1965. See also speech by Reginald Bevins, urging the
Conservatives "to go for an incomes policy", The Times, 26 November
1965.
87. The Times, 5 January 1966,
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rejecting Maudling's views and attacked the concept of an Incomes policy
. 88
as administratively and theoretically "impossible".
Faced with the challenge of the Government's new proposals and a
public debate between two of his leading Front-Benchers, Heath attempted
to outline the Party's position on incomes policy. In a speech on
15 January 1966 to the Bolton Conservatives, he suggested that the Labour
Government's attempt to formulate an incomes policy had failed. Hence
there was a real need to break with the past and formulate "a new and
more coherent approach". This new approach should acknowledge that
"an incomes policy is not enough on its om, it can only be one part of
a general prices policy". Heath proceeded by outlining a "prices policy"
which included action to "increase competition* efficiency and incentives,
to produce better managrnment and promote trade union reform" * and which
would be primarily concerned with "the firm and skilled management of our
finances and the level of demand".This speech marked the first official
acceptance of the demotion of incomes policy from the position of the
primary aim of Conservative economic policy to the position of a secondary
objective. Maudling had already conceded this point in his Wellingborough
speech and Heath merely recognised the process which had been taking place
90within the Conservative Party over the previous twelve months
2, Phase II: The Limitation in the Scope of Incomes Policy:
January 1966 to Ju^ 1967
Heath's Bolton speech revealed the problem that an incomes policy 
posed for Conservative policy makers. His failure to define in detail 
Conservative Incomes Policy left an important gap in the Opposition's 
economic proposals. The "prices policy" outlined by the Leader contained 
measures which were basically long-term in nature: there still remained
88. Speech in l^ lanchester* The Times, 13 January 1966.
89. NCP 1966, No.2, 31 January 1966, p.30.
90. This new approach was also reflected in a television broadcast by
Macleod some four days later: "We regard an incomes policy not as
standing on its own but as one small part of our whole policy for 
keeping prices down", ibid., p.31, The same point was reiterated 
by both Heath and Macleod when speaking in the Commons in March, 
H.C.Debs., Vol.725, Cols.1141, 1143 and 1224* 1 March 1966.
157
the need to formulate a short term policy to deal with the immediate
* 91problems posed by inflation . Heath suggested that this could be achieved 
by the management of demand; but such a policy offered an awkward political 
choice. For instance* as Nigel Birch noted, in combating inflation, one
alternative to an incomes policy was deflation and the consequent creation
9? . . .of unemployment \ Politically this was not acceptable, nor did it square
with the proposed aim of Conservative economic policy which was the 
achievement of faster growth. Thus the Leadership was caught in a dilemma 
over incomes policy. On the one hand, outright rejection of an incomes 
policy might leave the Opposition open to the accusation of seeking delib­
erately to create unemployment, and would also tie the hands of a future 
Conservative administration in tackling inflation. On the other, the 
retention of incomes policy appeared to be at variance with the new 
Conservative policies developed under the guidance of the Party Leader. 
Furthermore, a decision either way could effectively split the Party, 
Significantly, in Bolton the Party Leader avoided committing himelf and 
kept the options open.
Although the Leadership did not reject incomes policy In total, the 
retreat from the 1964 coranitment continued. This process was shaped mainly 
by two developments: first, by the development of the Government's policy;
and second, in response to pressures from within the Conservative Party.
In 1966 the Labour Government introduced prices and incomes legisla­
tion. The Bill first appeared in February, but lapsed as a consequence of 
the advent of the General Election, and was re-introduced with some 
additions in the new session^^* It contained two elements; the first 
dealt with the Constitution of the NBPI and proposed the granting of 
statutory powers to that body, enabling it to call witnesses and gather
91. Commenting on the Conservative's 1966 Election Manifesto, "Action
Not Words", The Times' Leader noted that the Conservatives made no 
mention of any policy to combat inflation, and commented that this 
was a grave error for it should be the most important issue in the 
election, 7 March 1966.
92. Nigel Birch, H.C.Debs., Vol.725, Col.1169, 1 March 1966.
93. The General Election provided the Conservative Leadership with a
welcome reprieve, throughout January the "Shadow Cabinet" had tried
to reach agreement over the Opposition attitude to the legislation 
and had failed to do so. See "Maudling v. Powell", The Spectator,
4 February 1966.
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information; the second dealt with provisions for establishing an 
"early warning" system for price, wage and dividend increases, and 
Included proposals for a "standstill" period of up to three months on 
references placed before the Board. The powers to enforce the early 
warning system and the three month standstill period were to be held in 
reserve by the Government for a period of ti-7elve months and were capable 
of being renewed for further twelve months periods thereafter. The 
introduction of a statutory element* albeit in the form of reserve 
powers, marked a distinct break with the voluntary nature of the policies 
pursued by previous British Governments. The Bill did, however, oblige 
the Secretary of State to consult both the CBI and the TUC in relation
to each particular reference before reverting to the use of statutory 
94controls . Thus the Go 
element in their policy.
vernment attempted to preserve a strong voluntary
In response to the Labour Government's proposals the Conservative
Leaders considered their position. By early July they had agreed upon
tabling a "reasoned amendment" declining to give a Second Reading to
the Bill. The amendment began by suggesting that "price stability can
only be achieved by a comprehensive economic policy" and went on to
accept that a "Productivity, Prices and Incomes Board" had a useful
function in such a policy. The Bill was opposed, however, because it made
no contribution "to the solution of the serious problems facing the
95nation" and because it introduced an element of compulsion *
The amendment did not satisfy a substantial section of the Parlia­
mentary Party. The Times reported that up to a score of Conservative 
back-benchers would have preferred a direct vote against Second Reading^^.
One back-bencher, Geoffrey Hirst, attempted to kill the Bill by tabling a
97motion that the Bill "be read a second time upon this day six months". 
Three days later Hirst resigned from the Parliamentary Conservative Party 
over the issue of incomes policy and, although his influence within the
94. Prices and Incomes Act 1966, C.33, Part II, section 6(1).
95. H.C.Debs., Vol.731, Cols, 1760-1761, 14 July 1966.
96. The Times, 8 July 1966. My own assessment is that the number was
much higher than this, but it must be remembered that not all 
back-benchers were interested in the issue.
97. The procedural device for killing a Bill.
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Party was limited, his action reflected the strength of feeling among some 
98back-benchers , One long serving Conservative MP later indicated that at 
this time he came as close as he had ever been to resigning from the 
Party^‘\ In the debate on the Second Reading of the Bill the Leadership's 
tactics were strongly criticised by back-bench speakers and only one 
Conservative Member, Sir Cyril Osborne, spoke in support of the Leadership's 
position^^^. All other Conservative speakers were against the motion^^^.
Mr X. L. Iremonger submitted an amendment which rejected the Bill and all
its provisions, and called for a policy based on the "laws of supply and
102 . . .  , * demand". These indications of back-bench opinion illustrate that
by mid-July 1966 the Party faced a long and electorally damaging internal
debate. Fortunately, for the Conservative Party, this prospect was
curtailed when they united in opposition to new and unexpected Government
proposals.
On 20 July 1966 the Government announced a freeze on all price
and income increases for a period of up to six months, followed by a six
103
month period of "severe restraint". The Government proposed to seek 
statutory powers in order to enforce their policy; these were to be 
temporary and were to be held in reserve for a period of tifelve months 
after the passage of the necessary legislation^^^. The Government's 
proposals were embodied in what was to become Part IV of the 1966 Prices 
and Incomes Act.
The "Freese" proposals were roundly condemned by the Opposition, 
and the intra-party debate about the relevance of incomes policy was 
temporarily shelved as the Conservatives united in opposing the Government's 
measures. The Opposition concentrated its attack upon two aspects of the
98. See The Times, 11 July 1966. Hirst was W  for Shipley and although
he received support for his action from his constituency associa­
tion, he did not stand for re-election in 1970.
99. Interview 2.
100. H.C.Debs., Vol.731, Cols.1783-1784, 14 July 1966.
101. See in particular speeches by John Peyton, Ibid.,Col.1800; Ray lîawby, 
ibid.9 Col.1816; Norman St. John Stevas, ibid., Col.1832; Peter 
Hordern, ibid., Col.1837.
102. Ibid., Col.1742.
103. H.C.Debs., Vol.732, Col.636, 20 July 1966.
104. Prices and Incomes Standstill, Cmnd. 3073, HMSO, London July 1966,
paras. 1-2, 39-44.
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policy» First, they attacked its compulsory nature* condemning it as
105"antilibertarian" and leading to "the complete control of the economy"*
Heath announced that Britain had "reached a point of fundamental choice"
which reflected "a great divide in which Conservatives are utterly
opposed to Labour's path of compulsion and c o n t r o l " . Maudling referred
to the measure as the "first step down a slippery slope to complete
107Government control of the economy".’ Some support for these views 
came from the CBI and the TUC who initially found the compulsory nature 
of the policy unpalatable,After a council meeting attended by 300, 
however* the CBI decided with "reluctance" to collaborate with the 
GovernmentSecondly, the Opposition concentrated their attack upon 
the manner in which the legislation was introduced and carried through 
Parliament. Because Part IV was added to the Bill when it was already 
being debated in Standing Committee, and because amendments were intro­
duced in the Upper House before the Bill had even passed the Commons, 
the Opposition accused the Government of treating the Lower House with
110 àcontempt • Further, the Conservatives claimed that the Government 
had Infringed the "customary rights" of the Opposition and the back­
benchers by using the guillotine in an attempt to "bulldoze" the Bill
111through Parliament \ The Shadow Cabinet arranged for a Parliamentary
\
Debate to discuss these points and called for the Bill to be removed from
11?Standing Committee B and placed before a Committee of the Whole House ",
Despite these criticisms the Conservative Leaders did not attempt
to delay the Bill, They accepted that as a "result of the Labour
Government's Policy" a measure of restraint was necessary in the national 
113interest' . In the words of one commentator, "Part IV was an Aunt Sally 
against which the Conservatives could unite"^^^, and party spokesmen
105. H.C.Debs., Vol.733, Cols.492-528, 3 August 1966.
106. NCP 1966, No,14, 22 August 1966, p.377
107. In a speech at Finchley, Macleod made much the same point. The
Times, 1 August 1966,
108. When the White Paper was published the CBI threatened to mfuse
their support and the TUC was "intransigent". The Times, 29 July
1966.
109. The Times, 4 August 1966.
110. H.”C.Debs., Vol.733, Col.403, 3 August 1966.
111. Ibid,* Col.492. See also The Times, Editorial, 1 August 1966,
112. The Times, 2 August 1966.
113. H.C.Debs., Vol.733, Col.493, 3 August 1966.
114. See Ian Trethowan, "Opposition in Search of an Incomes Policy",
The Timas, 2 March 1967,
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limited the debate specifically to the details and effects of the Labour
Government's legislation. Thus, when in October 1966, as a result of a
legal challenge to the pay standstill, the Government requested that
Part IV should be activated, Macleod committed the Conservatives to
115oppose this development and all the orders resulting from it . He
116added that the Opposition would demand a debate on each order ' and,
117from November 1966, when the first "freeze" order was introduced' , 
until the end of July 1967 when Part IV expired, the Conservatives 
opposed all fifteen orders tabled by the Governmenè^^.
Part IV provided only a temporary diversion, and the basic point 
of contention remained whether or not the Conservatives should accept or 
reject the notion of a national incomes policy. As indicated above, many 
members of the Leadership preferred to avoid making a decision on this 
issue, but by the Autumn of 1966 pressures to reject incomes policy were 
exerted upon them from both the Mass Party and the Parliamentary Party.
As Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, Macleod was to play a leading part
in the Debate and his political skill was invaluable in helping to
119maintain party unity • Macleod*s position on the issue of incomes policy 
seemed straightforward. He was neither for it nor against it. In many 
ways he regarded the whole issue as purely rhetorical and if it was liable
• 4 120to split the party it was not really worth discussing
After a Summer of comparative calm the issue of incomes policy 
re-emerged at the Party Conference in October 1966. In the Debate on
Economic Policy a number of speakers from the floor argued that an incomes
121
policy had no part to play in Conservative economic policy “ and one
115. S.I. 1966, No.1262, 6 October 1966,
116. H.C.Debs., Vol.734, Cols,863 and 954, 25 October 1966.
117. S.I. 1966, No.1444, introduced 18 November 1966; H.C.Debs., Vol.
740, Cols.389-412, 31 January 1967,
118. H.C.Debs., Vol.748, Cols,395-398, 13 June 1967.
119. For an assessment of Macleod's appointment, see Robert Rhodes James, 
Ambitions and Realities; British Politics, 1964-1970, London 1972, 
p.137.
120. This is an outline of his views on the issue which I have construc­
ted from his speeches and a number of interviews. See also Nigel 
Fisher, lain Macleod, London 1973, p.62 and pp.268-69.
121. See contributions to the Debate on Economic Policy by J.Beliak 
(Ripon) and David Clarke (Watford), NUCUA 84th Annual Conference 
Report 1966, NUCUA, London 1966, pp.91-92.
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spealcer suggested that the Government must concentrate on setting an
122
example in the public sector “ . In reply, Macleod dealt skilfully 
with these criticisms; first, by suggesting that it was too early for 
the Opposition to make detailed commitments for the future; and secondly, 
by outlining a view of incomes policy which diluted the Leadership's
commitment to a minimum by stating that "there is a useful but a minor
3 23or, anyway, a marginal part to be played in this field"" . Macleod was
also willing to make concessions, and in October 1966 removed prices from
the scope of Conservative incomes policy, because, he maintained, prices
124 »were beyond control ' . Despite the Shadow Chancellor's tactics, 
further indications of dissent within the Mass Party emerged over the 
next few months. In February 1967, the Young Conservatives at their
125
annual conference carried a motion opposing any sort of incomes policy • 
At the Party ' s Central Council meeting a month later a motion was submitted
■ . . . . 4 4 126
calling for a complete rejection of a prices and incomes policy «
This movement against incomes policy was reflected in the
Parliamentary Party. As on previous occasions, Enoch Powell set the
context for the debate and precipitated a division within the Party by
launching an attack on employers' and workers' organisations. After some
months of comparative silence Powell had resumed his attack upon Incomes
policy in a series of speeches delivered between October 1966 and March
:he 
.128
1 27
1967 . t'îlien, in early 1967, John Davies, Director General of th CBI,
suggested an incomes and prices initiative by the TUC and the CBI'
Powell responded by criticising the increasing delegation of authority 
to bodies like the TUC and the CBI. He suggested that steps should be 
taken to limit and disperse their powers, and proposed that wage bargaining
122. Speech by Nigel Vinson (Guildford), ibid., p.89.
123. Ibid., pp.96-97.
124. H.C.Debs,, Vol.734, Col.869, 25 October 1966.
125. See The Times, 6 February 1967.
126. Motion No.19, Agenda and Handbook, National Union Central Council 
Meeting, 3-4 March 1967, NUCUA, London 1967.
127. See Enoch Powell, Freedom and Reality, London 1969,pp.101-126.
128. The Times, 25 February 1967.
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129should be devolved to the local level . According to one commentator
Powell*s speech was discussed three days later in the Shadow Cabinet.
A sharp conflict developed but no decision was taken* The following day
the Conservative Parliamentary Groups on Labour and Finance discussed the
* ♦ * 130topic andj with only one dissenting voices endorsed the Powell line •
Faced with a rebellion on the back'-benches the Leadership was in an awkward
position. A commitment to the devolution of wage bargaining would require
an attack upon employers^ and workers’ organisations^ and risk alienating
these bodies. Both the CBI and the City, although critical, continued
to support the Government’s attempts to formulate a national incomes 
131policy . Furthermore, some firms indicated that they would drop
financial support from a party dedicated to dismantling centraliaed 
132
controls
Given the climate of opinion within the Mass and:,Parliamentary
sections of the Party, the Leadership could not for long maintain an
ambiguous position on the issue of incomes policy and, in anticipation of
new Government measures, the Leadership had already begun to reconsider
its position. According to Trethowan, by early March 1967, the Leadership,
with the exception of Powell, had agreed that the Conservatives could not
opt out of incomes policy altogether. Having reached this conclusion the
133
problem remained as to how it might "be sold to the Party". Clearly 
the Leadership could afford to make concessions so long as they did not 
entail the rejection of incomes policy. But primarily the need was to 
arrive at a form of words which would placate the divisions within the 
Party whilst at the same tiim maintaining the Leadership’s flexibility.
The need for such a statement was further underlined by Government 
actions.
129, Powell 1969, op,cit., pp.l22™l25, Powell’s speech followed an 
exchange of views between Maurice î'îacmillan, MP, and Aubrey Jones, 
Chairman of the WBPI, in which the former accused the latter of 
leading the country towards a state of "co-operative fascism",
130, The Observer, 19 March 1967,
131, In his February speech John Davies referred to the popularity of the
incomes policy abroad; he claimed that Britain was being applauded 
for what had been achieved by incomes policy during the "freeze".
The Times, 25 February 1967,
132, The Observer, op.cit.
133, Trethowan, The Times, 2 March 1967, op.cit.
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Following the periods of "freeze" and "severe restraint", the
Government proposed new legislation which would extend the possible
standstill period under Part II of the 1966 Act by a further three
months ' ', These proposals were contained in the 1967 Prices and Incomes
Bill. The Conservative Leadership agreed to oppose this measure and
recommended that the Party vote against it. As before, the Conservatives
were opposed to its compulsory nature but Carr, speaking from the
Opposition Front-Bench, conceded that a policy based on the co-operation
of both sides of industry might be unworkable because the TUG and the
135CBI did not have enough power to control their menhers . Carr’s 
speech indicated that on grounds of workability the Conservative Leader­
ship were willing to concede the idea of a national incomes policy 
covering all sections of the community.
This was a significant concession and it gained authoritative 
expression in a speech by Heath at Carshalton in July 1967. It is 
important to note that as far as the sections of his speech which were 
relevant to incomes policy ware concerned, the Party Leader did not go 
into detail but simply stated certain general principles on which all 
members of the Party could agree. Thus he suggested that an incomes 
policy in the form of "a general educational programme demonstrating the 
relationship between incomes, productivity and prices" could be supported 
by all Conservativeso Equally all Conservatives could agree on opposing 
an incomes policy which meant "Government control over all incomes and 
prices", but quite what should come in the middle Heath did not divulge.
He proceeded to concede that an incomes policy was "workable and 
desirable" if it meant tliat the Government pursued "a policy of relating 
prices and incomes to productivity in those spheres where it has direct 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " . T h i s was the first official statement accepting that 
an incomes policy might only be operable if limited in scope to the public
134. Indications that the Government were working on a variant of Part
II of the 1966 Act to replace Part IV appeared in March with the 
publication of a White Paper, The Prices and Incomes Policy After 
30th June, Cmnd. 3235, HMSO, London March 1967. This document 
laid domi no norm; all increases were to be justified against 
Cmnd. 2639, April 1965, criteria.
135. H.C.Debs., Vol.748, Col.349, 13 June 1967.
136. HCP 1.967, No.14, 24 July 1967, pp.312-313. The Carshalton speech
was delivered on 8 July 1967.
165
sector* In a sense this represented a concession to the critics of 
incomes policy, in that it implicitly questioned the worth of a policy 
which covered the whole of the econony through the co-operation of 
employers and employees organisations* But Heath was careful to limit 
his discussion to the minimum scope of incomes policy* By avoiding the 
question of maximum scope the Party Leader had kept the options open and 
maintained a flexible position* It remained to be seen whether he had 
maintained party unity*
As a result of the Bolton and Carshalton speeches and the events 
surrounding them, the official Conservative position on incomes policy 
had altered significantly since the 1964 Election* By mid 1967 incomes 
policy had been reduced from the status of the primary short term objective 
of Conservative economic policy to a secondary one, prices had been 
removed from its ambit, and its scope had been limited, at least, to the 
public sector* Two developments had largely shaped this retreat from 
the Leaderships 1964 commitment! first, the actions of the Labour 
Government, and secondly, alterations of opinion within the Conservative 
Party*
Throughout the first two and a half years of Opposition the 
Conservative Leadership had been under persistent and growing pressure 
from certain members of the Party to reject incomes policy altogether. 
However, the majority of the Party Leaders, including Heath, had whenever 
possible avoided making any pronouncements about the validity and accepta­
bility of incomes policy. Experience had ahotm that discussion of the 
matter was liable to raise deep and damaging disagreement at all levels 
within the Party, The Party Leader’s Bolton and Carshalton speeches may 
have, served to preserve the Leadership’s flexibility but they left 
Conservative incomes policy undefined except in terms of its boundaries 
and minimal scope* To some members of the Party this uncommitted stand 
was "unconvincing"^‘^^* More importantly, the Opposition still lacked a 
short term policy to deal with an immediate inflationary situation.
137* Interview 1.
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3. Phase III; The Attempt to Formulate an Alternative Incomes
Policy: July 196? to January 1969’
In the months following Heath’s Carshalton speech two developments 
relevant to incomes policy took place within the Conservative'Leadership. 
First, some members tried to close the gap.in their Party’s proposals by 
attempting to formulate a short-term policy, and secondly, Maudling 
attempted to re-assert the case for an incomes policy. Both these 
developments took place concurrently and their nature and consequences 
form the subject matter of Phase III.
The attempt to formulate a short-term policy was mainly concentrated 
on the machinery of incomes policy, and in particular upon the role of the 
NB'PI under a future Conservative Administration. Since the Board’s 
inception in 1964, the Party’s attitude to it had varied but on the whole 
had been favourable. Heeth had praised it in 1966 for its useful work
"in dealing with restrictive practices and limitations on growth" and
138
added that there was "every reason why it should go on". Both Seltzyn 
Lloyd and Maudling had argued that the NBPI was a continuation of the 
previous Conservative Administration’s National Incomes Commission^^^.
It may be recalled that the only part of the 1966 Prices and Incomes Bill 
which the Shadow Cabinet found acceptable was Part I, dealing with the 
establishment of the Board. Within the Parliamentary Party, even opponents 
of incomes policy such as David Howell accepted that the Board "had been
useful in promoting greater efficiency, competitiveness and new wage
„ 140 
structures .
In September 1967, the Party Leader attempted to salvage the 
acceptable features of the Board and provided some guidelines for a short­
term policy. Heath outlined the role to be played by the Board under 
a future Conservative Government, and he suggested that it should be 
reconstituted as a Productivity Board with powers to investigate employment 
practices or methods of working^
138. H.C.Debs., Vol.725, Col.1142, 1 March 1966.
139. H.clPebs., Vol.732, Col.1786, 27 July 1966; and Vol.701, Col.241,
4 November 1964.
140. H.C.Debs., Vol.748, Col.383, 13 June 1967.
141. Speech in Newcastle, The Times, 15 September 1967.
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Nine months later, in May 1968, Carr outlined the policy in
greater detail. He re-affirmed the Party Leadership’s support for a
3 42
voluntary national incomes policy" He maintained, however, that
under a future Conservative Government such a policy "would have a
143minor but nonetheless significant role, to play" ' and he went on to
consider how the policy would be operated. Central to its operation 
the
was/NBPI which would be "reconstituted as a Productivity Board". As 
such it was to be used in a sparing and selective manner and would 
operate entirely by "a process of enquiry and report". It would seek 
to influence the parties before they reached their settlements and to 
provide them with information, thus helping to mobilise and educate 
opinion. Above all, in its educative and informative capacity it was 
to become "an increasingly important agency for encouraging the develop­
ment of productivity bargaining and efficient systems of payment by 
results"^^^ Carr emphasised, however, that more important than the
productivity board was the need for the Government to "set an example
145in relation to their own employees".
Carr’s outline provided a credible short-term policy: the
Government would give a lead and set an example within its own sector, 
whilst the Board would attempt to influence the private sector by 
persuasion and exhortation, a concept not unlike the earlier NIC,
Equally important, the policy might serve to unite both factions within 
the Party: under the proposals outlined by Carr an incomes policy was
to be operated at the national level but it was to be mainly concerned 
with achieving wage structures related to productivity, a process which 
would be best carried out on the shop floor. Thus, although a national 
policy, it contained a strong bias towards the decentralisation of wage 
bargaining.
Parallel with the discussion about the role of the NBFÏ, there 
developed an attempt by Maudling to re-assert the case for an incomes 
policy. In part, this may have been a product of the Leadership’s 
review of incomes policy, but the immediate stimulus was provided by the
142. H.C.Debs,, Vol.765, Col.315, 21 May 1968.
143. XHd., 4)1.323.
144. Ibid., Col.324.MP-mu
145. Ibid.
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Government’s decision, in November 1967, to devalue sterling by 14.3 per
cent. This development underlined Handling’s belief that some form of
wage restraint was imperative. Throughout the early part of 1968,
Handling used his influence in the Shadow Cabinet in the argument over
incomes policy^^^. In March, in response to the US dollar crisis, he
outlined a "solemn proposal" that the Conservatives should support the
Government an immediate measures to exploit devaluation on the condition
that an early election was promised^^^. He added that the Chancellor
"must take firm measures to prevent incomes from galloping ahead in advance
of anything justified by increased p r o d u c t i v i t y " . O n  the same day
Heath had delivered a speech on the same topic and had taken up a contrary
position. Far from offering support to the Government, Heath attacked
them and placed most of the blame for the US dollar crisis upon the
British Government’s decision to devalue^ Maudling continued his
campaign into the Summer. He argued in favour of a "managed" incomes
policy working through the NEDG, and backed his arguments with the claim
150that this concept enjoyed widespread public support . His efforts,
however, aroused as much opposition as support and served, once more, to
153reveal the deep divisions within the Party ’«
Maudling’s campaign and the attempt to salvage the more acceptable 
features of the NBPI and to mould them into the framework of a short-term 
policy, seemed to indicate a renewed concern about incomes policy on the 
part of some leading Conservatives. Moreover, their influence within 
the Party Leadership may have been strengthened by the dismissal of 
Enoch Powell from the Shadow Cabinet in April 1968, The interest in
146. See "Top Tories Split Over Incomes", The Times, 18 March 1968,
147. Speech to Conservative Central Council Meeting at Bath, The Times,
16 March 1968.
148. The Times, ibid.
149. Party Officials argued that the disparity between the two speakers
was due to a lack of consultation. See The Times, 18 March 1968,
150. See speech at St. Anne’s-on-Sea. The Times, 26 September 1968. Also
interview in The Banker, June 1968, pp.486-492. Handling’s claim 
was to some extent substantiated by the results of a poll carried 
out by Conrad Jameson and Associates, see The Times, 13 August 
1968. " *
151. See Statement issued by Duncan Sandys in response to Maudling’s
"solemn proposal". The Times, 18 March 1968, See also speeches by 
John Biff en, h, GJDeW., Vol. 765, Col. 354, 21 May 1968; and Terence 
Higgins, Col.769, Col.157, 22 July 1968.
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incomes policy within the Party Leadership was, however, shortlived.
After his speech at St, Anne’s on 25 September 1968, Maudling was not to
make another major pronouncement on the issue of incomes policy» Nearly
two weeks later, on 6 October 1968, the Conservatives published a major
152policy statement entitled Make Life Better ", In this document it
was stated that "Conservatives reject compulsory Government control of
wages" but it was accepted that "in key wage, negotiations a Government
] 53
may need to exert its influence on the side of lower costs"» 
Significantly, no mention was made of either the proposals outlined by 
Carr or the NBPI,
A few days after the publication of Make Life Better, on 9 October
1968, the Conservatives met in annual conference at Blackppol. In their
third session delegates debated a motion which held that: "This Conference
states that attempts to control prices and incomes by statute are at
complete variance with the basic Conservative principle of free enterpriûe"»^^
The proposer of the motion argued in favour of the repeal of the "Whole
155
Prices and Incomes Act" and the abolition of the NBPI . Some felt that the
motion did not go far enough and an amendment was proposed from the floor
which, if it had been accepted, would have meant the rejection of any form
156of incomes policy, even a voluntary one » Another speaker favoured the
original motion and even suggested that a degree of statutory control over
157incomes was desirable .
In his reply from the platform, Macleod argued that there was no 
real disagreement within the Party; or, if there was, it was "largely an 
argument about words, a debate on semantics". Nobody, he claimed, could 
deny "the facts of life", that the Government was the largest employer, 
customer and consumer, and it was "not conceivable" that it could avoid 
some concern about wages. Therefore, some form of wages policy had to
152, CGO, London 1968.
153. Ibid., p.6 ff,
154» NUCHA 86th Annual Conference Report 1968, NUGUA, London 1968, p.6
and p.53.
155» See speech by Councillor David Samuel, ibid., p»54»
156. Ibid., p.6 and p.54. See speeches by Mr J» Addington (South East),
the proposer of the amendment, ibid,, and Nicholas Ridley, MP, 
ibid., p.56.
157. See speech by Mr Hugh Byson-Laurie (Woking), ibid., p.56,
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play a part in any economic policy and certainly had a part to play in
158Conservative economic policy , Macleod, however, skirted around the 
question of what form this policy should take and he did not indicate 
the role that the WBPI or any si.ioi.lar agency might fulfil under a future 
Conservative Government, The motion was carried and the amendment was 
rejected by "overwhelining’’ majorities^^^.
Finally, in January 1969, Macleod announced that the NBPI in its 
existing form would be abolished a future Conservative administration. 
His exact words were: "I cannot forecast a happy or indeed a long life 
for the Prices and Incomes Board under a future Conservative Government", 
and he went on to describe its work as "ill-informed"
In sum, in a period of seven months, between May 1968 and January 
1969, three significant developments relating to incomes policy seem to 
have taken place within the Conservative Leadership. First, from being 
sympathetic to certain aspects of the WBPI the Leadership had become 
almost wholly opposed to the agency. Secondly, the detailed proposals 
outlined by Carr in May 1968 were not reiterated or alluded to by any 
member of the Leadership thereafter. They were not contained in the 
Party’s comprehensive mid-term policy statement, nor were they mentioned 
by the Shadow Chancellor when speaking on incomes policy at the 1968 
Party Conference, Finally, the campaign conducted by Maudling to re­
assert the validity of Incomes policy appears to have been suddenly 
curtailed in late September 1968. It is difficult to ascertain why these 
developments took place but a number of factors appear to have been 
relevant.
As far as the WBPI was concerned, at least three developments 
may have influenced the Conservative Leaders’ position. First, the 
Board’s increasing powers and rather independent manner had aroused the 
criticism of the TUG and the CBI in particular. In the 1968 Prices and 
Incomes Act, for instance, the Government had taken powers to defer or
158, Ibid., p.62.
159, Ibid., p.6.
160, Speech in London, The Times, 29 January 1969, See also the article
by David Wood, The Times, 10 February 1969.
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suspend increases in wages, salaries or prices for up to twelve months on
references to the These new measures greatly enhanced the powers
of the Board. Furthermore, in its Annual Reports, the Board had increas­
ingly assumed the role of advising the Government on the formulation of 
162policy , The TUG and the CBI issued a joint statement complaining that 
the Board had no right to lay down policy^^^. The growing hostility 
towards the Board’s powers and its manner of operation voiced by the TUG 
and the. CBI may have been reflected within the Conservative Leadership.
Secondly, the Conservative Leaders’ attitudes towards the NBPI may 
have been formed in response to alterations in the Labour Government’s 
position. In the Autumn of 1968, for instance, the first indications of 
the Government’s plans to integrate the NBPI and the Monopolies Gotindssion 
were revealed^^^. If accepted these were liable to involve significant 
alterations in the role and constitution of the Board- Clearly the .
Opposition Leaders would have been ill-advised to outline detailed 
proposals for an agency which was liable, within a few months, to be 
radically altered.
Thirdly, the Conservative Leaders’ attitudes may have been influenced 
by the fact that a policy involving the retention of the Board could not 
be easily sold to the Party* Within the Conservative Party there were 
expressions of concern about what may be termed "interventionism in 
economic affairs" and throughout 1968 a movement of opinion developed 
favouring the rejection of all "interventionist" agencies including the 
NBPI and the NEDC^^^. Furthermore, in the eyes of many Conservatives the
161. The Government also took powers to cover rent and dividend increases. 
See Productivity, Prices and Incomes Policy in 1968 and 1969, Grand. 
3590, HMSO, London April 1968, p^^ll-12.
162. The Board’s second Annual Report contained a bid for enlarged responsi- 
bility, National Board for Prices and Incomes, Second General Report, 
July 1966 to August 1967, HMSO, London 1967, paras. 72-80. In 1968, 
in its third Annual Report, the Board criticised the Government’s 
policy and in particular its strategy for referring prices increases. 
National Board for Prices and Incomes, Third General Report, August
1967-July 1968, Cmnd. 37l5, HMSO, London 1968, paras 18-30 and 80.
163. The fîmes, 19 September 1968.
164. The Times, 5 November 1968 and 30 December 1968; for the background to
this development, see below. Chapter Ten, pp. 271-273,
165. See The Times, 26 September 1968; and 16 September 1968,
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NBPI was part and parcel of the Goveriment's statutory incomes policy 
and could not be divorced from it* For instance, the Party’s 1970 
Campaign Guide later claimed that the Board had been destroyed "by being
harnessed to the absurdities of the Labour Government’s policies"
Both these instances suggest that Conservative Leaders would have met some 
opposition from amongst their oï*m supporters if they had continued to 
press their proposals for the NBPI.
As for the short-term policy outlined by Carr in May 1968, this
also involved the NBPI and thus the three considerations outlined above
must have made his outline less appealing to the Party Leadership, In
addidong some Party Leaders were not as strongly coimoitted as Carr seems
to have been* Maudling, who had never been a strong supporter of the
NIC concept, still believed in a voluntary incomes policy involving both
167
sides of industry through the agency of the NEDC' . Sir Keith Joseph 
had little sympathy with the concept of an, incomes policy in general^^^, 
and neither Barber nor Macleod appeared particularly interested in the 
idea^^^. Finally, as previously shown^^^, following the 1966 Election, 
Heath and his closest aides outlined a long-term plan for the conduct 
of the Opposition in the years ahead. It may be recalled that they 
envisaged that in the Autumn of 1968 the Party would begin its prepara­
tion for the next General Election. As Heath noted at the 1968 Party 
Conference the publication of Make Life Better marked the beginning of
171this final phase « Handling's campaign and the debate on economic
166. The Campaign Guide: 1970, CCO, February 1970, p.55.
167. See interview in The Banker, June 1968, pp.488-489.
168. See Sir Keith Joseph, "Towards a High Earnings Economy", The Guardian, 
9 October 1968. Also Sir Keith’s speech to the Party Conference in 
October 1968 in which he proclaimed that "competition not incomes 
policy offers the best hope of economic advance", HCP 1968, No.17,
28 October 1968,, p.314.
169. Barber in summing up from the Opposition Front-Bench in the Second 
Reading Debate on the 1968 Prices and Incomes Bill made no mention of 
Carr’s proposals and spoke of income control "as a function of the 
overall management of the economy", H.C.Debs., Vol.765, Cols.403-4,
21 May 1968. In the same debate John Biffen stated that Macleod had 
maintained "a stout and welcome scepticism about the whole concept
of productivity and productivity bargaining", Col.352. This remark 
was confirmed by interviews 5 and 16, and is supported by Macleod’s 
biographer Nigel Fisher 1973, op.cit., p.269.
170. See above. Chapter Three, p.33.
171. NUCIJA 86th Annual Conference Report 1968, NUGUA, London 1968, p.125.
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policy at the 1968 Party Conference revealed that incomes policy still 
remained a deeply divisive issue within the Party. Such divisions within 
the Leadership and other sections of the Party might seriously detract 
the Opposition from the primary task of regaining power. Hence the 
attempt to formulate a short-term policy may perhaps have been dropped 
in order to ensure the preservation of party unity during the critical 
months ahead.
In sum, during the third phase in the development of the Conserva­
tive Opposition’s attitude towards incomes policy attempts were made from, 
within the Leadership to formulate a short-term policy and to re-assert 
the case for an incomes policy. Both these efforts proved unsuccessful 
and by January 1969 the Opposition Leaders had agreed to the abolition 
of the NBPI in its existing form. These events seemed to indicate a 
change in the Conservative Leaders’ approach to incomes policy. This 
change, it has been suggested, x^ras brought about as a result of a number 
of factors including the operation of the NBPI, alterations in the Labour 
Government’s policy, shifts of opinion within the Conservative Party 
generally and the Leadership in particular, and considerations related to 
the Opposition Leaders’ long-term strategic plans.
In the course of the developments summarised above the Conserva­
tive Leaders had managed to indicate what they were against, most notably 
a statutory policy. In addition, despite earlier sympathy, they had 
moved strongly against the NBPI. Party Leaders had not, however, 
indicated what they xfere for. The defeat of the amendment to the official 
motion at the 1968 Party Conference meant that the retention of a volun­
tary incomes policy xfas possible, but no positive commitment was made to 
this effect. So it could be said that by the beginning of 1969 there 
was no clear Conservative Incomes policy. As on previous occasions the 
Party Leaders had left the options open and maintained flexibility.
4. Phase IV: Preparation for the 1970 General Election:
January 1969 to June 19/0
As indicated in the previous sections of this chapter, the Conserva­
tive Opposition was not able to agree upon a detailed incomes policy. 
During their final eighteen months in Opposition, the Party Leaders, 
instead of attempting to refine the Conservative position, concentrated
174
their efforts; first, upon attacking the nature and the consequences 
of the Labour Government's incomes policy, and secondly, upon outlining 
their own long-term policy of economic management.
The Conservatives* attack upon the Government’s incomes policy
had two main targets. The first was inflation. This had been gathering
172momentum since late 1965 and continued up to, and beyond, the 1970
General Election. Between October 1964 and October 1969, for example,
the Retail Price Index rose from 107.9 to 133.2, which represented an
173increase of 23.4 per cent or 4s.8d. in the £ . During the same
period, the average annual increase in hourly wage earnings was 7.1 per 
cent. In 1965, at the time of the Labour Government’s voluntary incomes 
policy, it reached a record 10.1 per cent, tailed off to 6.2 and 5.3 
per cent during the 1966/67 period of "freeze" and "severe restraint", 
and increased once more to 7.2 and 7.1 per cent during 1968 and 1969^^^. 
The Conservatives argued that continued inflation was evidence of the 
failure of the Government’s attempts to hold down wages and prices by the
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use of statutory powers , and that, although the period of freeze and 
severe restraint had had some effect, they only served as a postponement 
after which the rate of inflation accelerated^^^.
The second focus of the Opposition’s attack was industrial
relations. The Conservatives’ Leaders argued that the Government’s
incomes policy had not only failed to hold back inflation, but had
further created "grave injustices" between individuals and groups,
thereby encouraging militancy and producing a spate of industrial 
177disputes • This contention was supported with reference to statistics 
which showed that in 1968 the number of days lost by industrial disputes 
was 4.3 million, compared with 2.8 million in 1967 and 2.4 million in
172. In November 1965 the Retail Price Index jumped half a point and in 
the following month the Federation of Wholesale Grocers reported 
that their index of wholesale prices had jumped two points in a 
month, this was the beginning of what has been termed the "price 
explosion".
173. The Retail Price Index is reproduced in The Department of Employment
and Productivity Gazette (prior to 1968 entitled The Ministry of
Labour Gazette, Vol.77, November 1969, pp.1086-7.
174. Department of Employment and Productivity Gazette, Vol.77, May 
1969, p.490.
175. See speech by Heath, H.C.Debs., Vol.793, Col.1393, 17 December 1969.
176. The Campaign Guide 1970, op.cit., p.56.
177. H.C. Debs., op.cit.,Col.1388.
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1966^^^. Furthermore, this gave the Opposition an opportunity to public­
ise their own proposals for the reform of industrial relations. Those 
had been outlined under the guidance of Robert Carr and by mid-1969 were
in the process of being transformed into legislative form by a committee
179of lawyers under Geoffrey Howe ' . Later these were to form a major plank
in the Conservative programme and sometimes appeared to be used in lieu
_ ,, 180 of an incomes policy •
To some extent the Conservatives' concentration upon inflation 
and industrial relations reflected changes in the Government's own 
position. The acceleration in wage increases following the periods of 
"freeze" and "severe restraint" represented a set-back for the Adminis­
tration's policy, while the 3| per cent ceiling on wage increases laid
down in 1968, was, in the following twelve months, consistently 
181exceeded • As previously noted, by late 1968 Government personnel 
were considering reforms involving the re-constitution of the NBPI and 
the re-allocation of its functions. Parallel with these developments 
in the prices and incomes policy field, the Government published a 
White Paper entitled In Place of Strife which contained proposals for 
widescale reforms in industrial relations *
These two developments were drawn together by the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins, who in April 1969 announced that compulsory
powers to freeze wage increases under the Prices and Incomes Acts were
to be abandoned, and that legislation was to be introduced to implement
183
some of the provisions incorporated in In Place of Strife . The
178. NCP 1969, No.8, 12 May 1969, p.152,
179. See Fair Deal at Work, CPC,March 1968. These reforms were first
suggested in the 1965 policy statement Putting Britain Right 
Ahead, CCO, London 1965; and re-affirmed in the 1966 Election 
Manifesto, Action Not Words, CCO, London 1966.
180. NCP 1968, No.15, September, p.266; speech by Carr, H.C.Debs.,
Vol.786, Cols.62-75, 3 March 1969; speech by Heath, The Times,
3p October 1969; for similar criticisms from two academic observers 
see R.G. Lipsey,and J.M. Parkin, "Incomes Policy : A Reappraisal", 
Economica, May 1970.
181. Productivity, Prices and Incomes Policy in 1968 and 1969, Cmnd.
3590, mso, London ÀpriTlig^
182. Cmnd. 3888, ®iS0, London January 1969
183. H.C.Debs., Vol.781, Cols.1004-6, 15 April 1969.
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nature of the proposed legislation aroused strong opposition from both 
the TUC and certain members of the Labour Party, and the measure was 
eventually dropped by the Government
Thus, by late 1968, it appears that the Labour Cabinet had lost 
some of its earlier faith in incomes policy as the sole means of containing 
wage inflation* That is to say that the Government no longer placed 
singular emphasis upon a policy designed to deal with the symptoms of 
wage inflation through attempting to control the outcome of the collective 
bargaining process. Instead, like the Conservatives, they showed a 
growing concern with the reform of industrial relations. That is, with 
policies designed to deal with the causes of wage inflation through 
attempting to control the process of collective bargaining itself. Hence 
the Opposition's concentration upon the issues of inflation and industrial 
relations paralleled and, perhaps, reflected the alteration which took 
place in the Government's policy.
The Government’s retreat over its proposed industrial relations
bill had two consequences of particular significance to the subject of
this study. First, their action undermined the last vestiges of support
for an incomes policy on the Conservative back-benches. Kenneth Lewis,
for example, who had been one of the staunchest and most consistent
Conservative supporters of the concept of a voluntary incomes policy,
announced in December 1969 that he had come to the conclusion that a
185
voluntary policy could not be achieved and that, although it might be
possible to try again in the future, "the monopoly power of the unions"
would need to be looked into first^^^. Lewis also stated that for
"almost the first time" on prices and Incomes he would vote with the 
187Opposition .
Secondly, the Government's retreat on industrial relations left it 
once more dependent upon prices and incomes policy as the main means of
184. For a detailed outline of the events surrounding the development
and abandonment of the Labour Government's Industrial relations
policy, see Peter Jenkins, The Battle of Downing Street, London 
1970.
185. H.C.Debs., Vol.793, Col,1441, 17 December 1969.
186. Ibid., Cols.1444-5.
187. Ibid., Col.1442.
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dealing with inflation. As previously shown, existing policy in this 
field had proved inadequate and the Government was considering important 
adjustments in the machinery of incomes policy. In September 1969 the 
Government announced that as a "bridging measure" between the lapse of 
the existing prices and incomes legislation in December and the introduc­
tion of new measures, it would be necessary to re-activate Part II of the
1966 Prices and Incomes Act for a period of three months. This announce­
ment was followed in October by a statement indicating that the Government
had decided to merge the NBPI with the Monopolies Commission in a new 
Commission for Industry and Manpower . The Conservatives opposed both 
these proposals and, when in April 1970 a Bill was introduced outlining 
the nature and functions of the CIM, the Party Leadership attacked the 
new body as just "another instalment in the Government's ineffective 
and damaging incomes polipy'*'.^ ^^  It was regarded by the Conservatives 
as being primarily concerned with price restraint^^^, and they objected
in particular to Part II of the Bill which dealt with the compulsory
191
notification of increases in prices, charges, incomes and dividends
Despite these criticisms the Opposition seemed willing to accept some
of the provisions of the Bill, and indicated that, if established, the
CIM would be reformed rather than abolished by a future Conservative 
192administration
However, the Conservative Leaders did not specify in any detail 
whatever plans they might have had for the CIM and, throughout the final 
eighteen months of Opposition, they consistently avoided making any 
precise statement about the machinery and operation of the Conservative 
alternative to the Government's prices and incomes policy. Instead, 
Opposition spokesmen Confined themselves to two types of pronouncements. 
On the one hand, they made general statements of a rather ambiguous 
nature such as, for example, Macleod's contention that nobody could be 
an "Economic Minister in this country and not have a sort of incomes 
p o l i c y " . O n  the other hand, they concentrated upon outlining more
188. Department of Employment and Productivity, Commission for Industry 
and Manpower, HMSO, London January 1970,
189. Speech by Robert Carr, H.C.Debs.» Vol.799, Col.575 , 8 April 1970,
190. Ibid., Cols. 666-667.
191. Ibid., Col.590.
192. Ibid., Col.283.
193. BBC Radio 4 Broadcast, 16 April 1969; NCP 1969, No.8, 12 May 1969, 
pp.152-3.
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long-term policies involving proposals for the management of demand
and the provision of incentives. Heath, for example, outlined three
actions that could be taken by the Government to deal with price inflation:
the encouragement of savings by providing incentives to save, the
introduction of cuts in state spending, and the reduction of taxes so
as to provide greater incentives to productivity"*"^ .^ At a later date,
it was suggested that the answer to inflation was to be found in a
"return to a 'virtuous circle' through reducing direct taxation, leading
195to more savings, higher investment and cost reductions".
By the time of the 1970 Election, the emphasis upon long-term
solutions had become paramount in Conservative policy statements. In
their election manifesto the Conservatives rejected the Labour Government's
prices and incomes policy because of its statutory nature and offered
instead a "competition policy" to curb inflation. This policy included
the reduction of taxes, the reform of industrial relations, and the
improvement of efficiency in Government and indust r y I n  addition,
the Conservatives pledged that they would "subject all proposed price
197rises in the public sector to the most searching scrutiny". But this 
did not signify the total rejection of a more widely based policy. In a 
more comprehensive review of the Party's proposals released in preparation 
for the election, emphasis was placed both upon the decision in January 
1966 that incomes policy had "a useful but marginal role to play", and 
upon the Leader's Carshalton speech in which he dealt with the scope of 
the policy"*"^ .^
During the final phase in the development of the Conservative 
Opposition's approach to incomes policy the Party Leaders concentrated 
upon attacking the Labour Government's policy. They emphasised what they 
considered to be its inflationary effects and its consequences for human 
relations in industry. At the same time Government personnel attempted 
to supplement their anti-inflationary efforts in the prices and incomes
194. Speech to NUCIJA Central Council, Scarborough, 22 March 1969, 
NCP 1969, No.7, 7 April 1969, pp.110-11.
195. NCP 1970, No.9, 28 May 1970, p.219.
196. A Better Tomorrow, CCO, London May 1970, p.11.
197. Ibid., p.12.
198. The Campaign Guide 1970, op.cit., pp.51-52,
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field with legislation designed to deal with industrial relations.
Throughout the period Opposition Leaders avoided outlining in any detail 
the Conservative approach to incomes policy, and instead, in addition to 
attacking the Government's policy, concentrated upon outlining their own 
long-term proposals. So that, in June 1970, the Conservatives fought a 
General Election in which inflation was a major issue, without having 
formulated a short-term policy to deal with it^^^. The Leadership had, 
however, managed to maintain a flexible position, and had at no stage 
rejected an incomes policy altogether. Their avoidance of the issue, 
particularly prior to the Election, suggested that incomes policy had 
been excluded altogether. The door in fact remained open, even if the 
gap was only barely perceptible.
Ill Conclusion
The development of the Conservative Party's position on prices 
and incomes policy during its period in Opposition was characterised by 
at least one distinctive feature: namely that the Conservative Leaders
retreated from their pre-1964 commitment to the achievement of a permanent 
and voluntary national policy covering not only incomes, but also prices 
and profits. They failed, however, to formulate an alternative.
It may be recalled that upon entering Opposition the Conservatives 
were able to observe a Labour Government pursuing much the same policy 
guidelines as they had themselves supported in Government. Initially, 
the Conservative Leaders avoided criticising specific aspects of the 
Administration's approach and concentrated instead upon questioning its 
chances of success in the light of the Government's broader economic 
actions. However, the Conservative Leaders adoption of a more liberal 
policy stance and alterations of opinion within the Conservative Party 
more generally, implied at least a modification in the Party's Opposition 
standpoint, but the issue remained contentious and discussion was dis­
couraged. Yet, once it became clear that the Government was seriously 
considering the introduction of statutory measures, the alteration in the 
Opposition's position was officially acknowledged and the retreat began 
in earnest.
199. See Nigel Fisher 1973, op.cit., pp.302-3.
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Thus, by July 1967, the achievement of an incomes policy had 
ceased to be a primary objective of the Conservative economic programme, 
its relevance to price control had been rejected, and its applicability 
to the private sector had been questioned. In the remaining three years 
of Opposition, some leading Conservatives attempted to formulate an 
alternative policy but it roused deep divisions within the Party and in 
the long run proved unfruitful. After pledging to abolish the NBPI in 
its existing form, from January 1969 onwards the Party Leadership 
concentrated, not upon clarifying its own position, but upon attacking 
certain aspects of the Labour Government's programme and outlining long­
term proposals for the containment of inflation.
At least tï'70 factors seem to have contributed to the Conservative 
Leadership's failure to formulate a coherent alternative policy. First, 
some leading Conservatives did not regard the issue of incomes policy as 
a matter of great urgency or even importance. Macleod in particular, who 
as Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer was primarily responsible for the 
development of Conservative economic policy, appeared to be unconcerned 
about and somewhat disinterested in the matter and made no effort to 
encourage the development of a clear Conservative view on incomes policy^^^, 
Secondly, other leading Conservatives, most notably the Party Leader, 
seemed concerned to avoid, whenever possible, any discussion of incomes 
policy because of the effects that it was liable to have upon party 
unity. Thus the opportunities to develop an alternative policy were 
severely limited.
The latter point suggests that in the incomes policy field, as in 
the case of economic planning, the production of policy was very often 
subordinated to considerations of party performance. For instance, the 
debate which took place within the Conservative Opposition on the issue 
of prices and incomes was not only concerned with the detailed shape and 
content of the Conservatives' own approach, but also, and more fundamen­
tally, with the desiralility of any form of national incomes policy 
whatsoever. The Conservative Leaders, with the exceptions of Maudling 
and Powell, generally avoided making any clear pronouncement on the issue.
200. Ibid., p.269
181
To have done so might have proved damaging to the Party's prospects in 
at least three ways. First, any atteng)t by the Leadership to reject 
incomes policy altogether appeared liable to undermine party unity. 
Secondly, an outright rejection of incomes policy might have weakened 
the Opposition's credibility as a viable alternative administration. 
Finally, a clear cut decision either for or against, could have seriously 
limited the flexibility and freedom of manoeuvre of a future Conservative 
administration. In these circumstances, the strategy most likely to 
commend itself was the one which appears to have been pursued by the 
Conservative Leaders: namely, to avoid a decision, keep the party
united, and keep open as many options as possible.
Thus in the case of prices and incomes policy, as in the case of 
economic planning, the Conservative Leaders retreated from a policy 
position maintained by them when in Government which was controversial 
in terms of party beliefs and values and which was adopted and maintained 
by their successors in office. In doing so they were able to differentiate 
themselves from the approach pursued by the Labour Government. Also the 
production of policy proposals appears to have been subordinated to other 
considerations relating to party performance, namely the maintenance of 
party unity. The closer attention shown by the Leadership to opinions 
within the Party during the Opposition period may be contrasted with 
the position prior to 1964 when the Conservative policy on prices and 
incomes was mainly inspired and developed by a few senior ministers with 
the assistance of extra-party personnel. In contrast to economic planning, 
however, no alternative Conservative, policy was developed in the incomes 
policy field. For, while national economic planning ceased to be a major 
issue of public controversy, prices and incomes policy continued to be so, 
and Conservatives appeared unable to agree upon a specific course of 
action.
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CHAPTER. NINE 
REGIONAL POLICY 
I. Introduction
During the 1960s both Conservative and Labour spokesmen 
tended to accept that those areas of the UK which were characterised 
by above average unemployment, high net emigration, low activity 
rates and relatively low incomes, were deserving of special 
Government assistance* They disagreed, however, about the causes 
of regional decline and the desirability of the specific measures 
designed to mitigate the problem. Yet, even on these points the 
contrast between the parties' positions was never absolute and 
their differences were ones of emphasis rather than substance.
These variations in policy eraphasls are outlined in the detailed 
case study which follows. In order to place this In context two 
aspects of regional policy in Britain are considered in this 
section* In the first place some of the main issues of contention 
which surrounded the formulation of regional policy during the 
1960s are examined. This is followed by a brief outline of the 
development of regional measures prior to the decade under study,
1, Approaches to Regional Policy
According to McCrone there are at least two ways in which the 
problems of declining regions may be approached. The first stresses 
that a region's problems are a product of locational disadvantages 
such as its distance from cossmunication and growth centres or its 
peripheral situation in relation to the centre of the economy. If 
this analysis is accepted, policy will be aimed, not at the 
regeneration of the region, but upon facilitating the occupational 
and geographical mobility of labour, so as to move the workers to 
the work. In contrast the second approach emphasises that a 
region's probleias are a product of structural disadvantages such 
as declining industries, inadequate cotiMunications and restricted
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amenities. If this analysis is accepted, policy will be aimed at 
regenerating the region by developing its infrastructure or by 
providing inducements so as to attract new Industry to it and thus 
bringing the work to the workers^.
The high social and political costs of a predominantly 
locational solution have so far proved prohibitive in Britain. 
Although, as will be shown, the Conservatives have been more 
sympathetic than the Labour Party to locational arguments, they, 
like their opponents, have consistently given priority to 
structural reforms. Thus, regional policy has mainly consisted 
of measures to facilitate regional regeneration by the provision 
of inducements to attract new industry.
During the 1960s, however, attempts were made, particularly 
by Conservatives, to combine the locational and structural approaches 
in what was termed a growth points strategy. This phrase, as 
employed in political usage, involved an acceptance of the view 
that not all districts were viable. But regions would be viable 
if aid were to be focussed upon sub (intra) regional growth areas: 
i.e. areas of great potential economic growth. These areas, it 
was suggested, would be capable of acting as regenerating points 
for the region as a whole. Such an approach implied that other 
parts of the region should be allowed to decline, while the 
resulting unemployment would be mopped up by the adjacent, 
prospering growth areas. In sum, a growth points strategy 
involved a concentration of governmental resources in a selective 
and discriminatory manner. It placed emphasis upon economic 
(growth) criteria rather than social (unemployment) criteria, was 
long term rather than short term in nature, and involved planned 
intra regional mobility of labour as an alternative to unplanned 
inter regional drift of labour. Thus, the concept represented a 
combination of industrial mobility (i.e. wrk to the workers) and
1. Gavin McCrone, Regional Policy in Britain, London 1969, p. 169.
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aud labour mobility (i.e. workers to the work), and a unification 
of the structural and locational approaches.
As well as the approaches to the regional problem, the 
specific measures adopted to aid declining localities have also 
been the issue of heated political debate. In particular, the 
argument has centred around four issues. First, the criteria for 
scheduling and demarcating assisted areas, which has raised 
problems of definition and the drawing of boundaries. Secondly, 
the comprehensiveness and the use of controls such as Industrial 
Development and Office Development Certificates. Thirdly, the 
range and nature of incentives and inducements : whether these
should be mainly in the form of direct Assistance to industry in 
the shape of cash grants and/or tax allowances, or indirect 
assistance through measures of infrastructural reform designed 
to make the region a more attractive place for industry to go to. 
Closely related to this question is the fourth issue of how the 
inducements should be apportioned within an assisted area* whether, 
for example, aid should be equally available to all or preference 
should be given to certain types of industry and/or sub-locatlona 
within the larger area .
Moreover, as tie case study shows, decisions about the type 
and scale of British regional policy engendered a distinctive form 
of political controversy in which party political boundaries were, 
to some extent, obscured by local interests. The process of 
drawing boundaries was shown to involve a delicate balance between. 
national party purpose and local constituency demands.
2. See Harry W. Richardson, Elements of Regional Economics 
Middlesex 1969, pp. 120-8.
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2, The Development of British Regional Policy Prior io 19603
In Britain aid to depressed regions was started In 1934, 
but no clear strategy for the dispersal of industry emerged until 
the Report of the Barlow Commission in 1940^, Following the 
Commission's report, the war time Coalition Government made a
strong commitment to regional measuree in their 1944 White Paper
5on Employment Policy • Legislative effect was given to the 
proposals contained in the White Paper by the passage of the 
Distribution of Industry Act 1945. This Act established certain 
"Development Areas" in which the Board of Trade could provide 
special assistance in the form of factory building, public 
investment in the areas* public services, and loans and grants 
for industrial estate companies and specific undertakings^.
The vigour with which the 1945 législation was applied 
varied considerably over the next fifteen years, Initially the 
post war Labour Government gave a high priority to regional 
policy. Following balance of payments difficulties in 1947, 
however, the building of advance factories was stopped and at 
the aerne time the pressure upon busineasmcn to go to Development
7
Areas was relaxed • Despite the introduction of a system of
j Jiwuw’i^ .wwai
3. There are numerous surveys of regional policy in Britain, the
most comprehensive remains, McCrone 1969, op; cit,, pp. 91-119#
A less detailed but more up to date account may ¥e found in 
Coimnisaion of the European Comaunities, General Directorate 
for Regional Policy# Regional Economic Btructures and Policies
i^the United l a c ^ g o g T î W B T T ^ ---
EFTÀT "In«(u8tri^ ^^  ^Estates, March 1970, pp. 29-47; M.F.W.
Hemming^ Problem", Economic Review, No. 25,
August 1963, pp. 40-57; B.J, Loas¥y^*^TocaHmi of Industry* 
Thirty Years of 'Planning*", District Bank Review, No. 136, 
December 1965, pp. 29-52; L. Needleman & B. Bcofct, "Regional 
Problems and the Location of Industry Policy in Great■Britain", 
Urban Studies, Vol. 1, 1964, pp. 153-73.
4. ÏÏepwt of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the
Industrml Population, Cad 6153, HMSO, London 1940.
5. Employment Policy, Cad 6527, HMSO, London 1944, para. 29.
6. For a list of the areas dcmrcatcd under the 1945 Act, including
additions made after 1943 see McCrone 1969, op. cit#, p. 108.
7. Ibid., p. 113.
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Industrial Development Certificates (IDCs) tmder the Town am! 
Country PIaiming Act 1947, this trend continued into the 1950b . 
The relaxation was in part a consequence of the low level of 
post war unemployment which effectively removed one of the main
reasons for the 1945 Act. In addition, during the early 1950$
A
Che traditional Industries underwent a boom and as a result 
unemployment remained low and the regional economies buoyant.
By 1958 the boom in the traditional industries had collapsed
and unemployment increased once more^ « Between December 1937
and December 1958 it rose by almost one per cent to a total of
2o4, More importantly, the brunt of this rise was borne fey what
might be termed persistent problem areas such as the North West,
the North, Scotland and Wales, where the percentage rise in
10unemployment was 1*7% 1,4, 1,5 and 1,1 respectively , In an 
attempt to deal W.th these persistent pockets of unemployment the 
Government (fey the Distribution of Industry (Industrial Finance) 
Act 1958) tightened up their controls over XDGs and extended the
provisions of the 1943 Act to cover certain smaller "development
] 1
places" " , The problem of unemployment remained, however, and
in their 1959 General Election Manifesto the Conservative Leaders
promised early legislation to strengthen the Government's powers
12for dealing with unemployment « The need for an alteration in
policy was further underlined by the election results. Although 
the Conservatives were returned with an overall majority of 101, 
their performances in the North of England and industrial Wales
/^ere well below the national average, and in Scotland and North
13West England there was a marked swing against them .
«^ *»sW8?rf*'*Wï9tî?ÂfV'-»"ÏHürAa«4)ra4
8. J.R, Cable, "Industry and Commerce", in A.R. Prest (ed,),
A Manual of Applied Economics, London 1966, pp. 151-4,
9. HcCrone 1969, op. cit., p. 117,
10. Source: Ministry of Labour Gazette, Vols LSVI and LKVII,
1958 and 1969.
IX. Distribution of I n d u s (Industrial Finança) Act 1958, c. 41,
12, The Next Five tear8 ,% n  D,E, Btiter and E?,chard Hose, The
British General Election of 1959, London 1960, p. 258,
13. Ibid., p. 194 and pp. 20^=ni
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II. The Conservatives in Government! 1960-1964
In 1960, in keeping with their election pledge, the Conservative 
Government replaced existing legislation for the distribution of 
industry with a new Local Employment Act^^. This legislation 
provides a useful starting point for an analysis of the emergence 
of Conservative policy during the early 1960s. I have divided 
the period under four headings* First, the 1960 Act and its 
shortcomings are outlined. Secondly, the Government's reassessment 
of regional nmasures is considered. Thirdly, the nature and 
influence of Conservative Party opinion upon the development of 
Government policy is analysed. Finally, the content of the 
Conservative Party's regional policy at the time of the 1964 General 
Election is described and assessed.
The Local Employment Act 1960 and its Shortcomings
Under the 1960 Act any place In which high unemployment 
existed could be scheduled by administrative decision as a 
Development District and become eligible for a wide range of 
assistance. If unemployment fell, the area could be removed
15by administrative decision from the list of Development Districts 
In practice, 4,5 per cent was adopted as the unemployment rate 
at which a district was scheduled. The assistance available 
under the Act included the provision of factories for rent or 
purchase on mortgage, building grants for firms preferring to 
build their own factories, loans or grants for general purposes, 
and grants for special expenses incurred as a result of setting up 
in a Develo]pment District. The amount of assistance granted was 
related to the capacity of firms to provide new jobs^^. As under 
previous legislation, powers for the clearance of derelict land 
and the provision of basic services were continued. Also, the
14. Local Employment Act 1960, 8 and 9, Eliz. 2,■Ch. 18,
15. Ibid.i, Sect. 1(2).
16. Ibid., Sect. 1(3).
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Miniatry of Labour coutinued fco provide txo si stance towards the
3 7removal and resettlement of key workers' .
The 1960 Act rapreoented a culmination of the post 1945 
pollcyo For instance, it involved short term rescue operations 
based on social need father than economic potential, or even 
viability and, although it was to remlu the foundation, of 
regional policy, it was substantially strengthened and amended 
during the 1960s,
The revision of regional policy carried through by the 1960
Act did little to satisfy the critics of previous policy, They
pointed to at least three major shortcomings* First, smue
maintained that the criteria for scheduling under the Act were
too rigid, and the provisions for assistance too limited for the
legislation to be effective. In particular, they pointed out
the futility of mere rescue operations and urged the need for a
more comprehensive approach. This view was expressed on a number
18 19of occasions by the North East Development Council , PEP ,
?0The Economist newspaper' , and the Lancashire and Herseyaide
Industrial Development Association,* Members of the latter were
particularly concerned about what they termed the "fmidaraental
inflexibility** of the I960 Act which did not permit any concept
21of "grey or intermediate areas'* •
Other critics were concerned with the machinery of regional 
policy and the lack of coordination between the various goverruaent 
departments and agencies involved, Both The Economist and PEP
17, Ibid,, Sect. 6; KFÏA 1970, op, cit,, pp. 34-37,
10, The Guardian, 6 April 1963; ^^Eeport of the North East
Bev^opm^^ , The Statist, June 1962,
19$ Political and Economic"T'fonning fPEP), The Location of
Industry, London October 1962,
20, ^Developing Durham**, The Economist, 8 April 1961,
21. The Guardian, 25
w i  I lfc> «iWl »Ll ■  —
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criticised the functional specialisation in Whitehall which produced
a situation whereby regional problema were the concern of at
least five Ministries, each dealing with a different aspect of 
72policy" , For example^ IDGa wore the responsibility of the Board 
of Trade, comauni eat ions were partly the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Transport, the siting of new toxms was the concern of 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, industrial training 
was dealt with by the Ministry of Labour, and overall control of 
finance was held by the Treasury, Little regional machinery 
existed by which the responsibilities of these 'Ministries could 
be co-ordinated on an area basis.
Finally, as HcCrone notes, in the early 1960s the whole 
question of economic growth was receiving much greater emphasis 
than ever before ami attention was directed to the "contributions
which the regions might make to the achievement of a higher
23national rate of growth" • Under the I960.1 Act, however, the 
main criterion for scheduling Development Districts was not an 
area’s growth potential but its level of unemployment.
The criticisms of the scope, machinery and objectives of 
regional policy considered above were all outlined in the Toothill 
Report published In 1961 by the Scottish Council (Development
and Industry)^^# In addition to providing a well argued critique 
of existing regional measures, at least tm> of the Report * s
22. PEP October 1962, op. cit. "Checking the Drift", The
Economist, 11 November 1961; PEP Survey, Regional *
ment in the European Gommnity, London 1962, pp. 55-1
23. McGrone 1969, op. cit », p. 120.
24, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Scottish Economy,
Scottish Council (Development and Industry), Edinburgh 
November 1961, especially Chapters 2, 20 and 21. The 
Scottish Council is a private, voluntary organisation 
bringing together businessmen and a i m  trade unionists;
it maintains Infomml contacts with the Scottish Office,
and members of that Ministry acted as assessors to the 
Toothlll Committoe. For commont upon the Report see "The
Most Acute Case", The Economist, 25 November 1961.
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recomMondations served as pointers to a new policy* First, the 
authors reeoimended the establialiBient of a special section within
the Scottish Office responsible for the co-ordination of regional
23
measures , Secondly, the authors recommended that Government 
assistance should be coneentrat W  upon areas of potential growth, 
or growth points^^*
Additional support for those wlio criticised the adequacy 
of regional measures was provided by the general trend of 
unemployment. Between 1960 and 1963 unemployment in the United 
Kingdom rose by over one per cant and by January 1963, during 
one of the coldest and harshest winters on record, reached a 
total of 861,047* The depressed regions suffered the worst 
decline in employment, and in Scotland, the North Bast and Males
by January 1963 unemployment had reached 3*9, 6*3 and 3.7 per
27cent respectively . As Table 9:1 illustrates, this trend of 
rising unemployment became particularly pronounced after September 
1962 and continued throughout most of 1963.
The rise in unemployment coincided with a growing 
dissatisfaction on the part of some members of the Conservative 
Party with the Government’s regional policy. M  early indication 
of Party feeling was expressed during the debate on the Finance 
Bill in June 1962. On this occasion. Dama Irene Ward and Sir 
Fitsroy Maclean voted with the Labotn: Opposition in favour of a
clause, introduced by Sir Fitzroy, which advocated greater
28Incentives for the regional dispersai of industry' * In December 
1.962 a delegation of Conservative MFs representing constituencies 
in (die North East %?ut their case to the Prime Minister* They
25. "Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Scottish Economy**, 
op. cit,, Chapter 22.
2b. Ib^., p. 134.
27. MÎîSetry of Labour Gasette, Vol. 71, 1963, p. 67.
28. 952, l? December 1962; and
Vol."563r Cola 693-697, 19 July 1962.
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urged that a single Minister should be placed in charge of the
North East region and that the Government should launch a major
29planning policy to inject new life into the area" • In the
same month the Opposition tabled a censure motion on unemployment
and at least three Conservative all from the North East,
indicated their dissatisfaction with Government policy by
. . 30abstaining from voting in the division .
In addition to Conservative back-benchers, during December
1962, at least six organisations closely concerned with regional
matters petitioned the Government for a change in policy. These
31included the Scottish Council ', the Lancashire and Merseyside
32Industrial Development Association'", the North East Development
Council^^, the Town and Country Planning Association^^, the
35 36Federation of Industrial Development Associations and the TÜC
2, The Government’s Reassessment of Policy
In the face of niounting criticisms of existing policy and 
the rising level of unemployment the Government did not remain 
inactive. In the Autumn of 1962 a Cabinet Committee was 
established to consider reforms and adjustments in regional policy, 
and in November the Government announced that expenditure on
roads in the North East was to be doubled and that new advanced
37factories were to be built both there and in Scotland . Clear
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
29, The deputation included one Labour member, Edward Short 
(Newcastle upon Tyne, Central); H.G. Debs., Vol. 669,
Col, 926, 17 December 1962.
30. These were Dame Irene Ward (Tynemouth), CoiiMander J.S. Kerens 
(Hartlepools), and Fergus Montgomery (Newcastle upon Tyne,
East)0 For the debate see ibid «, Cols 902-1027•
The Times, 18 December 1962,
The Guardian, IS Deceaiber 1962,
Ibid.
The Guardian, 5 December 1962.
Ibid., 6 December 1962,
Ibid., 20 December 1962,
Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald Maudling, 
H.G, Debs., Vol. 666, Col, 634, 5 November 1962; Written Answer
by Mr Erroll, President of the Board of Trade, H.G. Debs., Vol. 
666, Col, 88, 8 November 1969; Speech by John Hare, Minister of 
Labour, H.C, Debs,, Vol. 671, Cols 60““64, 4 February 1963.
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Indications of a new approach did not, however, begin to emerge until
the early months of 1963 when the Government introduced a series
of measures of which two dealt with the problems of congestion in
the South East* The first was the establishment in April 1963
38of the Location of Offices Bureau • It was this organisation’s 
task to provide firms working in Central London, or those 
contemplating setting up office eni[>loyment there, with information 
and advice upon the advantages of decentralising their undertakings^ '^ , 
In addition, the Government began to decentralise its ovm offices 
and plans were drawn up to move, out some 50,000 of the 133,000 Civil 
Servants then working In Inner London^^*
As wall as dealing with the problems of the congested areas, 
the Government took initiatives in relation to the depressed 
regions. In January 1963, Lord Hailsham was appointed to lead 
an interministerial group with Special Responsibility for the 
North East, a reviex? of Central Scotland was set in hand under the 
auspices of the Scottish Office^^, and Merseyside was rescheduled 
as a Development District^^, In April, the Prime Miiiister 
announced that the Welsh Office x-?as to be strengthened and that 
work was i 
for Wales'
Moreover, the Government introduced two measures designed to
already taking place on a survey of l^ng term prospects 
43
38. This followed the publication of a Wltite Paper dealing with 
the problems of land use in the London area, which revaalsd 
that of the 40,000 jobs created annually in the London 
conurbation only 20 per cent were in manufacturing industry. 
London; Employment, Housing, Land, Gnmd 1952, HM80, London 
1963.
39. See speech by Sir Keith Joseph, H.G. Debs., Vol. 674, Cols 
1649^50, 28 March 1963. —
40. The Campaign Guides 1970, GGO, London 1970, p. 218,
41. Wmes'',''' lo" 'Jannory 1963; speech by Lord Dundee,
H.L . W h s ., Vo1. 246, Cols 43-46, 23 January 1963.
42* H.G* Debs., Vol. 671, Cols 59-61, 4 February 1963.
43. NCX> 1^ 63,' No. 18, 23 September 1963, p. 3.
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increase the assistance available to the depreseed regions. One
was in the form of a ’free depreciation’ section in the 1963
Finance Act, which enabled firms in Development Districts to offset
the full cost of investment in plant and machinery against profits
44
at any rate they chose • The other xm& the Local Employment 
Act 1963, This legislation left the general provisions of the 
1960 Act uncîianged, but made assistance both more generous and 
more predictable. In place of the. previous formula for building 
grants, the 1963 Act established a standard grant of 2$ per cent 
of the cost of building; and secondly, it provided for a standard
grant of 10 per cent of the cost of acquiring ax?d installing plant
45and machinery in industrial undertakings ,
The measures introduced during the early part of 1963 
indicated that the Government was according regional problems a 
high priority, but they did not form a comprehensive or co-ordinated 
approach. Strong support for a more coherent policy was contained 
in the second report o£ the NEDC published in April 1963, As in
the case of the Toothill Report, the members of the NEDG 
recommended that assistance should be concentrated on growth 
points within xzidely defined development areas^^.
In July 1963 the Prime Minister announced that the Government 
was evolving a new approach to regional policy based on the concept 
of growth points. He went on to reveal that two White Papers, on
44, Finance Act 1963, Gh, 25, Section 38,
45, Local Employment Act 1963* Ch. 19, Section 2(1) and Section 1; 
Speech by DaviZlFHceT'lïrG, Debs,, Vol. 676, Cols 1196-1198,
1 May 1963,
46, NEDG, Conditions Favourable to Faster Growth, MSO, London 
April was 
strongly supported by the federation of British Industries, 
see FBI, The Regional Froblew* A Study of the Areas of High
'lo3amnt, l*îay
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the North East and Central Scotland, wore due to be published shortly 
mid indicated that others were in the p i p e l i n e ^ T h e  task of 
completing the developiaent of the Government’a long term strategy, 
however, fell to Edward Heath as Secretary of State for Industry, 
Trade and Regional Development and President of the Board of 
Trade, in the Home administration.
Heath’s work in the regional development field was largely a 
continuation of the measures being developed under the previous 
Macmillan administration, although the new appointment did herald 
some important developments. In November 1963, Home announced 
changes in the machinery of Govemment^^. At the Board of Trade 
a Directorate for Regional Development and an inter-ministerial 
group was formed to consider future regional policies and plans. 
Moreover, adminsitration xms slightly decentralised with more 
extensive powers being given to the Ministry’s regional offices.
Further indications of the Government’s new approach were 
contained la the White Papers on the North East and Central Scotland 
published in November 1963. Both documents stated that public 
expenditure on regional infrastructure would b© increased in areas 
selected as "growth zones". In these areas, existing forms of 
assistance were to be guaranteed until there was evidence of general 
and sustained improvements in prospects over both regions as a 
whole^^. Both documents also proposed important reforms in the 
machinery of regional policy in the North East and Central Scotland. 
Existlag regional offices of Government Departmenta in the North 
East were to be strengthened and brought together in a single building
47, The Times, 3 July 1963* Sea also The Times, 2 August 1963 
and 21 October 1963.
48. The Times, 6 November 1963 and 13 November 1963*
49. Central Scotland: Aerogramme for Development and Growth,  ---------   ^ I r.1 , I I..I ■ I     ■■.im.iT.i»
C%md 2188, BblbO, Edihburgh 1963, esp. Ch. 8; The North 
East; A Programs for Development and Growth, Cmnd 2206, 
lMB07*LaHdon" 1963, paras 3é-4Ti
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50in Newcastle , while iu Scotland, the iater-departmental Scottish 
Development Group, which had been largely responsible for the 
production of the White Paper, was to coïitimne in being with the 
specific responsibility of co-ordinating the development of the 
policy^^.
Xn the Parliamentary Debate on the two White Papers, Heath
referred to them and the reiiorHis of regional planning machinery
as the beginning of a "comprehensive policy for reglonîs,!
52development" • He stressed the need for a small central
planning staff "with the powers necessary to ensure tliat the
piano of the local authorities, the Ministry of Transport, the
Ministry of Housing and Local Government and those of the Board
53of Trade" all fitted together *
The initiatives taken, in relation to the North East and 
Central Scotland x/ere later extended to other regions. In March
1964, a Government study group published a report on the South
54East of England mid, during the next few months, groups of
officials were formed to carry out similar studies for the North
West, West Midlands, the Scottish Highlands and Borders, and the
55East and West Ridings of Yorkshire' • 'Xlie Government also 
assisted and helped to finance local studies of the South West,
56Dorset, Devonshire, Cornwall, ami the Exeter and Plymouth areas ,
Most of these studies were not published, however, until after
57the Conservatives had left office •
50* The North East 1963, op * cit., paras 129-30.
51. Central Scotland 1963, op. cit *, para. 160.
52. H.C. Debs.. Vol. 685, Col. % 7, 3 December 1963.
53. IbiXTTol. 1002.
54. MiîîTstry of Housing and Local Government, The South East 
Study (1961-81), MSO, London March 1964; South East
m m ,  London March 1964:
55. NcFT9^4, No. 16, 17 August 1964, pp. 22-24.
56. fq* 1905. No. IS, 26 July 1965, p. 416.
57. For‘T"^mprohensiyo list of these studies see Harry W. Richardson 
1969, op. cit., -Footnote, p. 134.
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In sum, by early 1963, there were clear indications that the 
Government was making strenuous efforts to overcome the apparent 
shortcomings in the scope, machinery and objectives of existing 
regional policy. The publication In November 1963 of the two 
White Papers on the Worth East and Central Scotland, was the first 
clear outline of the Government’s new approach, although its 
origins may be traced to events which took place at least ten 
months previously. Central to this new approach was the concept 
of growth points, and these, in that they involved selective and 
discriminatory action, implied an increaee in state intervention 
and at least a modification in the liberal Conservative conception 
of the role of the state. Because the policy touched on the 
fundamentals of party belief, the state of Conservative opinion 
may be usefully, if briefly, considered.
3. %)inion Within the Conservative Party
As previously shown, Conservative MPs representing the problem
regions, particularly the North East, played some part in shaping
the developsicat of Goveriment policy. Moreover, in general there
is little evidence of widascale intra-party opposition to the
Governsienfe’s post 1963 reforms. However, there were critics. On
the one hand, some Conservative Members, although nocopposed to
regional measurea on principle, objected to the provision of
assistance which appeared unlikely to benefit their own localities.
This was the case with some Conservative who represented
conatituencios in the South West and North of England, and the
58
Highlands and Borders of Scotland « For example, objections 
were made to the concept of growth points because of the danger of 
producing a miniature, sub-regional version of the national pattern
58* See speeches by A. Bourne Arton (Darlington), h*C* Debs., 
Vol. 676, Col. 1219, 1 m y  1963; Dame Irene & d . "  iSIZT.. 
Cols 1225-6; Forbes Henry (Aberdeenshire W), ibid..
Col. 1246; Sir John Maoleod (Rosa and CromartyTZ*"
B.C. Debs, Gol. 685, Colo 1069-76, 3 December 1963.
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of congested and declining
The second group based their objections, not upon local 
interests, but on ideological grounds. Arguing from an almost 
lalssea-faire position they opposed the whole concept of measures 
to deal with the regional problem and maintained that the answer 
lay in the free operation of market forces^^. The laost voluble 
and articulate exponent of this viewpoint was Enoch Powell who, 
after his refusal to serve in the Home Government, launched a 
detailed attack upon the concept of regional pollcy^^, Powell 
viewed the regional problem as purely locational in nature and 
the Government’s role as being limited to removing restrictions 
upon the mobility of labour and industry^^’. He applied a similar 
analysis to the problems of congestion iu the South East by 
arguing that in time the econmiic costs of congestion would prove 
prohibitive and discourage further migration to the area. In 
the meantime the Goveruiïient * s role was to remove the means by 
which these costs were being kept at an "imrealistically low" 
level, by abolishing housing and travel subsidies and rent control ,
Although other Conservatives may have agreed with Powell, 
there is no evidence to suggest that the views expressed by him 
enjoyed widespread support within the Party, To repeat, throughout 
the period the overtyhelming majority of Conservatives seemed In 
agreement, either tacitly or overtly, upon the need for some form
59. See speeches by Patrick Wolrige-Gordon (Aberdeenshire East),
H.G. Debs., Vol. 685, Col. 1019, 3 December 1963; John Brawls 
(Galloway), H.C. Doha., Vol. 676, Col. 1216, I May 1963.
60. See speech by Viscount llinchlngbrookc (Dorset S), H.C. Debs., 
Vol. 613, Cola 95-102, 9 November 1959.
61. Speech at Glasgow, 3 April 1964, in John Wood (ed.),
A Nation Not Afraid, London 19Ô5, pp. 87-91.
62* Enoch Powell, "More Freedom to Move to a Job", Sunday 
Telegraph, 3 May 1964.- 
63. InoeirPwells "Fact and Fake in the South", Sunday Telot
 ^ IIMIIMI
22 March 1964.
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of GQverx?iüant assistance for the regions and supported, or at least 
did not openly oppose, the axjproach adopted by their Leaders.
4. The Conservative's Regional Policy at the Time of the 1964
tH n w w > iiiWiii>iatwMws'ita o
General Electron
Overall, during the 1961 to 1964 period Government policy for 
the regions underwent three major changes. First, the scale and
scope of assistance available for Development Districts were 
Increased. Second, considerations relating to questions of 
economic growth played a more central part In the foraiulatlon of 
regional policy. Third, machinery had begun to be established 
whereby regional measures could be more effectively co-ordinated. 
These three developments indicated that by 1964 the Government was 
placing a far higher priority on regional policy than ever before.
By tlic-i time of the 1964 General Election, the Conservative 
Government had assembled a coiiiprahonslvc range of measures to deal 
with the regional problem. In the first place, although the 
provisions for scheduling Developmxent Districts under the 1960 Act 
remained constant throughout the period, the Conservatives appeared 
to be moving towards a concept of x^ider and more permanent districts 
in which assistance would be cwallablG throughout the whole area, 
while public expenditure would be concentrated on particular growth 
zones. In addition, the range of incentives and inducements 
available in Development Districts had been extended and by 1964 
included the provision of factories, standard grants, and tax 
allowances. Xn attemxîtlug to îmve industry frox'i the congested 
to the depressed regions emphasis had been placed upon persuasion 
and inducement rather than the use of controls. Hence the provision 
of financial incentives and the establishment of the Location of 
Offices Bureau. The application of IDCs, however, continued to be 
tightened up during the period and remained a central part of the 
Conservative Government’s policy.
In their 1964 Election manifesto the Conservative Leaders
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reiterated their comnltment to the provision of special measures to
deal with the regional prohlem, and claimed that their programme 
combined
the provision of better commnlcatlona, up to date 
social services and Improved amenities with generous 
inducements to build new factories, install modern 
equipment and provide fresh jobs where they are most 
required. Its object is to Bmko each region a more 
efficient place to work in and a rxforc attractive 
place to live in,&4
Party Leaders made particular mention of their programmes for the
North East of England and Central Scotland, whlcli they claimed
to be "without precedent in conception and scale", and mention
was made of their plans for dealing with congestion in the South
65East , It was on the basis of this policy that, In October 1964, 
the Conservative Party entered Opposition,
III, The Conservative Party in Opposition; 1964-70
In the remainder of this chapter the development of the 
Conservative Party’s regional policy is handled mainly in a thematic 
manner. Three main themes arc emphasised: changes in the nature
of the regional problem, changes in the Government ’ s regional 
policy, and changes of opinion within the Conservative Party 
leading towards the formulation of an alternative policy. However, 
in order to explore these themes adequately, I have divided the 
material into two ohronological sections. In the first, from 
October 1964 to January 1966, no significant alteration was made, by 
either Oovernment or Opposition, to the regional policy guidelines 
established by the previous Conservative Administration, In the 
second, from January 1966 to June 1970, more intense activity took 
place and substantial alterations were made in the regional policy 
of both Government and Op%iosition.
64, "Prosperity With a Purpose", in F.W.S. Craig (ed.), British 
General Election Manifestos: 1918-1966, Chichester 197()Tlpr 219.
65. lEsi:
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1. Regional Policy: October 1964 to January 1966
Soon after entering Opposition, Heath, in Ixie capacity as 
Conservative policy chief, decided that a subatantlal review of 
his Party’s regional policy was not required. It was generally 
accepted within the Party that the corpus of policy which had
66accumulated during the Government period required little alteration . 
Moreover, the Opposition needed time to see what the Labour 
Government would do to assist tiie problem regions. Thus, regional 
policy was not; a central issue of lutra-party debate during this 
early period* There wera, however, some alterations in Conservative 
policy as a restait both of the LaVboiar Government’s activities and 
the Conservative Leadership’s adoption of a competition approach to 
economic affairs.
In November 1964, the I,abour Governmant announced proposals
both for the reform of regional planning machinery and for the
control of office development in congested areas* Under the
former proposals England was divided into eight planning regions,
making a UK total of eleven with the-addition of Scotland, Hales
and Nor them Ireland. Each region xme served by a Regional
Economic Planning Council, staffed by local politicians, academics,
fousincsswett and trade unioniste* These were appointed by the DEA
and each Council was aujxported by a Planning Board of Civil
Servants. The (îotmcils had no executive powers and were purely
advisory in nature* Their work was co-ordinated by the LEA
through a newly established regional planning unit and regional 
67directorate • In addition some of t;3ie functions which had previously 
been the responsibility of the Board of Trade were transferred to 
Che DBA, The vital executive functions were, however, still
66. NOP 1965, No. 15, 26 July 1965, p. 416.
67* See speeches by George 33rcnm, H.G, Deba., Vol. 701, Cols 228-9,
4 November 1964; H.C. Debs,, VoTTlW^ Colo 1829-31, ^ I l.,W.  ^ — *
10 December 1964.
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distributed among separate departments.
Conservative Leaders argued that the Labour Government ’a new 
regional planning machinery represented a continuation and 
rationalisation of the previous Government's approach. They
claimed, for example, that the desigimted regions were much the
68same as those on which the Conservatives had been working . 
Moreover, the Opposition maintained that the reforms represented 
an unnecessary extension in the scope of state bureaucracy and 
merely duplicated the work already being carried out by existing 
goverat&ental and voluntary b o d i e s ^ Later the Conservatives 
expressed concern about the accountability of the now Regional 
Councils, arguing that they should be subject to "proper" democratic 
coiitrol^^.
The second of the Labour Government's early initiatives was
the Control of Offices and Industrial Development Act 1965, Under
this legislation any new offices, in stated areas, required, in
addition to the normal planning permission, an office development
permit (ODP) from the Board of Trade, the only exemptions being
71buildings of less than 3,000 square feet . For the London 
Metropolitan Region (within forty miles of Charing Croso), the
first area to be designated, the Act had retrospective effect from
11midnight, 14 November 1964 . In relation to the rest of the
United KingiMia the Board of Trade was given powers to apply control
68. Michael Noble, H.C, Bobs,, Vol. 703, Col, 1836, 10 December 
1964,
69. Edward Heath, ibid.. Cols 1831-3; M Œ  1964, No. 21.
21 November 19ûX" -------
70. HC1> 1966, Ho. 2, 33. January 1966, p. 48; MCI' 1965, Mo. 21,
12 November 1965, p. 614.
71. Under the original Bill the exemption limit was set at 2,500 
square feet; however, this was amended to 3,000 square feet 
during the Committee stage. H.G, Debs., Vol. 705, Cols 733- 
822, X February 1965, see cspecIHly the speech by Douglas Jay, 
Cols 734~37,
72. Speech by George Brown, H.C* Debs., Vol. 701, Cols 230-32,^   ^ ™ mrimii i *  i i* -ymrt.n imi-iir 4T ^  ^
4 November 1964,
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by statutory instrument3 if the need arose. The Act also provided 
for a reduction In the lower ais© limit for which an Industrial
Development Certificate was required, from 5,000 to 1,000 square
73feet in the Midlands and South last . A year later, iu August 
1966, this was raised to 3,000 square feet,
74The Conservatives were opposed to tlie use of controls ,
Yet the alternative approach, the use of inducement and persuasion
as institutionalised in the Location of Offices Brueau, had only
had a limited effect. In the. first sixteen months of its
operation, for example, the Bureau was consulted by 784 firms
representing 82,000 office jobs, and of these only 116 firms,
75represGnting 12,100 jobs, moved outside London . Thus the
Opposition Front-'Beneh maintained an ambiguous position; they
welcomed the aims ot' the legislation but were undecided about the
means. John Hall wondered whether controls were necessary and
euggeotcd that the problem would in time solve itself according to
tlie dictates of the property market, but he did not specifically
rule out controls^^# Certain Conservative back-benchers were
more critical, however; they rejected the use of controls and
maintained that the approach embodied in the Location of Offices
77Bureau was the right one . Yet despite back-hencU concern, 
meiulmrs of tlî,e Conservative. Front**Bench accepted the provisions 
of the Act, although with reservations, and the Parliamentary Party 
did not vote against It.
A similar approach was maintained by the Leadership in relation 
to the application, of the Act. At first, no permits were granted
73. Control of Office ^md Industrial Development Act 3.965, Ch. 33, 
Sect. 19.
74. Peter Emery, £^ 1S.*» Vol. 710, Col. 1620, 14 April 1965,
75. John Hall, li.iT." ITab^ ., Vol. 705, Col, 746, 1 February 1965.
76. Ibido, Gals 753^4, See also speech by Peter
iCcT Debs., Vol. 710, Cols 1621-2, 14 April 1965.
77. See speeches by Â.F. Coatain, H.G. Debs», Vol. 705, Cols 767-
71, 1 February 1965; Captain UYilter Elliot, Col. 802;
A.E. Cooper, E.G. Debs., Vol. 701, Col* 297, 4 i^ veraber 1964.
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in the Greater Loadon Council Area except under very apecial 
circumeCancea, Later other areas were brought under control: 
Birmingham, in August 1965, and the whole of the South East, East
yg
Anglia and the West and East Midlands in July 1966 . In July
1967 the exemption limit was raised to 10,000 square feet outside 
the London Metropolitan Region, and in January 1969 to 10,000 
Square feet in the Outer Metropolitan Region, while East Anglia 
and rural parts of the Midlands were msemptud from control* The 
Conservatives criticised the extension of controls, without 
actually opposing them, and welcomed their relaxation as evidence 
that the Government "had at lust recognised" that control was
. 79
unneceasAry outside London .
Although neither of the measures introduced by the Labour 
Government during their early period in office aroused fierce 
party passions, the presentation and the emphasis of the Opposition’s 
proposals underwent alteration. The decision of the Party 
Leadership to adopt a competition approach to economic affairs 
in early 1965 meant that greater emphasis was placed on those 
aspects of existing Conservative regional policy which were in
keeping with the general aim of creating a more competitive
« 80
economic environment within the regions « Three elements of 
policy were singled out for attention; growth points, financial 
incentives and infrastructural reform. In January 1965, for 
exariiple, heath called for an amendment of the existing location 
of industry legislation so as to bring it up to date with the 
potentialities of growth points and growth areas both within and 
outside the actual Development Districts. He also suggested that 
any further financial inducements for firms should come in the
78. MeCmme 1969, op. cijk., p. 130.
79. Campaign Guide op. cit., n. 218
80. The background to this change in policy approach is discussed
in Chanter 8i% above. See also NCR 1965, No. 14, 12 July
1965, p. 382,
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form of discrimination in taxation, and added that measures were
also needed to spaed up the clearancQ of derelict eifces and to 
provide for the Improvement of amenlties^^, This triple change 
in policy emphasis was carried through into both the Party’s policy 
Btatement
Manifesto
s  published in October 196S and the 1966 Election 
02
In addition to the changes in the presentation and emphasis 
of Conservative regional policy there were also signs of new 
thinking within the Party. At the leadership level Heath 
outlined a series of new proposals. His suggestion that location 
of industry legislation should be emended to take account of 
possible growth pointa implied the creation of more extenaive 
Developmont Diatricta* He also auggeatod that the problem 
regions should be assisted by the discriminatory use of social 
service contributions and by the stipulation that a specified 
proportion of central and local government programmes should 
consist of goods produced in the Development Districts. Finally 
he argued that, for local Government to carry out its share of 
the regional programme, an extensive reform and rationalisation 
of its structure was required ,
Within the Parilamentarv Party the viewpoint articulated by
84
Powell was a matter of discussion . Many Conservatives ware not 
willing to go as far as Powell, however, and to reject regional 
policy outright.' For example, Terence Higgins argued that efforts 
should be made to attract not only labour"intensive but also
81. HOP 1965, ibid., pp. 391, 419-20,
82# Putting Britain Right Ahead, GGO, October 1965; "Action Not
%rd8'^'''"Irrp^ , British General Election
Hanifeart0_sg 1918-1966, Chichester 1970, pp. 256-265. 
WGP'^^5, aôT. 15j a^TJuly 1965, pp. 419-420.
84. Se@n%ry Soul Searching on What to Conserve", The Times.
15 March 1965; The Times, 31 March 1965,
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capital**.Intensive industry to tue Development Districts and that
within these areas a more flexible and discriminatory system of
investment incentives, assessed on an ’opportunity cost*„basl8,
85should be applied .
At the level of the Hass Party, and particularly amongst those 
Conservatives living in the depressed regions, pressure was applied 
for an extension in the scope and scale of regional measures.
At their Annual Conference in April 1965 the Scottish Conservatives
debated a motion urging the Party to explore additional methods
86
of selective financial arrangements for the regions . Amongst
the motions submitted for the Conservative Party Conference in
October 1963  ^ four urged an extension of previous policy and one
specifically requested un extension in the scope of Developmant 
87
Districts .
Although during the first fourteen months of Opposition new 
ideas on regional questions were emerging ifithin the Conservative 
Party, these ware tentative and, in general, regional policy was 
not a central issue of internal or cross party debate. Neither 
the Labour Government’s reform of regional planning machinery nor 
its measures to deal with office development in congested areas 
aroused deep inter-party debate, and with these two exceptions, 
from October 1964 to January 1966 both Government and Opposition 
more or less maintained existing policy intact.
2. The Labour Government’s Folicy: January 1966 - June 1970
During this period the Labour Government introduced measures
85. Ter&nee Higgiaa, The Second Managerial Revolution, CPC 317, 
April 1965, pp. 12-16 and 25®
Ihe Times, 23 April 1965.
87. tEtlonsrifoh 557-79 and 581* NUCWA 1965 Conference IWdbook 
and Programme of Proceeding, WcÙA, Lmî&n October 1%5*
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designed to alter the nature of the scUeduXed areas and tho 
astii-'tance available within them. These developments aigïiified 
a substantial change in the nature of British regional -policy 
and the Conservative Party’s reaction to these meaaux'ea nla-yed a 
large part in shaping the developmc-at of an alternative. Opposition 
policy. Thus, in this section an ou'izline is provided of the 
Labo-ar GDvernmcnfc’a measures and of the Conservative’s response 
to them.
Four aspects of the Labour (Government’a regional policy
particularly concerned the Opposition: Developatent Areas,
iuvcstment grmitSp employaient subsidies and int^mecliate areas.
Proposals relating to Cite first two were originally outlined in
a Ifnitc) Paper published iu January lyCbj and were given legislative
38
form in the Industrial Development Act of the same year . Under 
this Act tliQ Development Distaaicts weii'o replaced by wider 
DoveXopmant Areas covering almost, all of Scotland and Wales, 
the whole of tiio Northern Region, most of Cornwall ai:d Worth 
Devon and Merseyside ', Iu addition, the criteria for scheduling 
Devalopmfiut Areas wore v?ideued to include actual and prospective 
nnemploynient:9 population changes, migration, employaient growth
90
and the conséquences for regional baltmce over the whole country «
Tha Govcrra!i.e,nt claimed that the huit Davelopm<uit Areas swept 
away the "x:'ilr>gulded notion of small isolated development districts 
£ind substituted instead the principle of major continuous areas to 
be developed as a %diole"' « Within tlieso t/ide.r areas iimnufacturing 
firms qualified for investment graidwi on plant end machinery, at 
twice tho national rate of 20 per cent* This innovation replaced
80. laves tmnit Inceti t lyes g Cmnd 2874, DM80, London Jamtary 1966.
89. bee speecli by George Brown, , Vol. 724, Col. 1122,
15 February 1966*
90* Dpeech by Douglas Jay, j K ^ ^  Vol. 728, Col* 943,
16 May 1966. The cricorlon TincTer the 1960 Act: had bean 
unamployEiant only•
91. Ibid., Cels 941-2.
2Ü8
the 10 per cent standard grants which had been available in 
Development Districts since 1963, Other Local Employaient Act 
assistance was maintained, but free depreciation was discontinued.
As a result of the Act the procedure for obtaining grants was 
simplified in that they no longer depended upon the provision of 
extra employment; however, they were available only to manufacturing 
industry.
In November 1967 the provisions of the Act were extended to
cover "special" Development Areas, These were places already
contained within the scheduled regions which were considered to
require extra assistance as a result of colliery closures. In
these areas, manufacturing industries moving in were eligible for
building grants of up to 35 per cent; five years rent free tenure
92of a Board of Trade factory; and loans and operational grants *
In addition, as a special measure during 1967 and 1968, the rates
of investment grants were raisec
<
Areas and 25 per cent elsewhere"
d to 43 per cent in Development
93
The Conservatives voted against the Industrial Development
Act and tabled a critical amendment on Second Reading, Opposition
Leaders were mainly concerned With the new system of investment
grants, and the Development Areas received only mild criticism
from them. They argued that the wider areas would mean that
available assistance would be more thinly spread and, consequently,
less effective^^. They also lamented the "abandonment" of a
growth points strategy as a "retrograde step" and by doing so laid
93emphasis upon that aspect of their ovm policy * Michael Noble,
92, See speech by Peter Shore, H.C. Debs,, Vol. 753, Col* 300,
1 November 1967,
93, Campaign Guide 1970, op. cit., p. 214,
94. See NCP 1966, No, 2, 31 January 1966, p, 48; speeches by 
Anthony Barber and Iain Macleod, H.C. Debs., Vol. 724, Cols 
1144 and 1236 respectively, 15 February 1966.
95. See speeches by Barber, H.G. Debs., Vol. 728, Col. 969,
16 May 1966; Heath, quote<r*Kcî* 1966, Ho. 24, 29 December 
1966, pp. 674-98.
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however, on behalf of the Opposition Froîit-Bench, accepted that 
there were "new factors" which were becoming "more urgent" than
unemployment alone as a means of deterraining the scope of a 
96scheduled area , and, as previously noted, Heath had alreac 
suggested the creation of wider Development Districts.
The Leadership’s ambiguous and uncomiitted position appears
to have been supported by the substantial majority of their
Parliamentary followers* But some back-benchers, whose
constituencies were for the first time eligible for Government
97assistance, showed less caution and welcomed the changes # In
contrast, other back-benchers questioned the whole concept of
98scheduled areas and regional assistance •
The Opposition maintained a imre united position on investment 
grants* Broadly speaking the Party did not reject the concept 
of investment grants altogether, but were opposed to three aspects 
of the Labour Government’s scheme* First, Opposition spokesmen 
argued that it discriminated against transport, construction and 
service industries and, consequently, undermined attempts to create 
a viable and attractive infrastructure in the regions. Secondly, 
the grants were to be allocated regardless of profitability and 
thus might assist inefficient and unprofitable businesses. Finally, 
Party Leaders were concerned about the administration of the scheme*
Barber, for example, claimed that one thousand extra civil servants,
99at a cost of £2 million per year, would be needed »
96. H.C, Debs., Vol. 728, Col, 1038, 16 May 1366.
97. See speeches by N.H.K. Baker (Banff), H.C, Debs,, Vol. 728,
Col. 991, 16 May 1366; Sir Fitzroy Macïean’XB'ote and North
Ayrshire), H.C* Debs., Vol. 724, Cols 1199-1204, 13 February 
1966.
98. See speeches by John Biffen and Sir John Eden, H.C, Debs.,
Vol. 732, Col. 580, 19 July 1966; Geoffrey Hirst, HvC, Debs.. 
Vol. 724, Cols 1190-91, 13 February 1966.
99. H.C. Debs,, Vol. 724, Cols 1134-39, 15 February 1966;
skateme^ by lain I#cleod, MCF 1966, Ko, 2, 31 January 1966,«r r —... n,|„„ w^i* ■.*.■■ ■!
pp. 36-37*
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Xn contrast to the Government*© proposals the Opposition
emphasised their preference for tax allowances as the main means
of investment incentive^^^. This proposal was strongly supported
by Industry. For example, the National Chamber of Trade expressed
hostility to investment grants and the GBI carried out a survey
of its members which revealed a marked preference for free
101depreciation and investment allowances •
Investment grants remained an issue of party political debate
throughout the Labour Party’s term of office* In official
publications the Conservatives claimed that the system was open
to widespread abuse and that a situation had been created in which
firms already in Development Areas, or likely to move there in
102
any case, were receiving large sums of public money . They
also claimed that the scheme led to a concentration of "capital-
intensive industry in Development Areas, and labour-intensive
103Industry outside them" . Towards the end of their period in
Opposition there was a marked hardening of attitude amongst some
Conservative back-benchers on the issue of regional investment.
In the debate on Investment Grants in Fcbruiry 1969 two views were
expressed from the Conservative back-benches. On the one hand,
there were those who were opposed to any form of investment
incentive in the r e g i o n s O n  the other, there wore those who
were solely opposed to investment grants and urged that the existing
105system should be replaced by allowances . The Party Leadership,
100. H.C. Debs.. Vol. 724, Cols 1208 and 1140-42, 15 February 1966.
101. E.G. Debs.. Vol. 724, Cols 1235 and 1136, 15 February 1966.
102. HGF 1969, Mo, 20, 15 December 1969, p. 373.
103. The Campaign Guide 1970, op ,^ cit,, p. 214*
104. See speeches by Nicholas EÏdïûy and Kenneth Baker, H.C. Debs.,
Vol. 777, Cols 254 and 250-262, 4 Febru#Ky 1969.
103. See speeches by A.F. Costain, Sir Spencer Summers, D. Waddingtoa, 
Michael Shaw and Tom Boardman, ibid.. Cols 242-50, 267-70,
272-74, 274-77, and 280-82 rcmp^Hvely.
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however, did not comnit: their party to the abolition of all 
invoGtmtmt grants, and Sir Keith Joseph maintained a flexible 
position by claiming that it was "perfectly possible to reconsider 
investmrmt incentives in general while still giving special 
inveatJJiant advantage to the Development Areas"^^*#
The third aspect of the Labour Government’s regional policy
which particularly concerned the Opposition was the introduction
of a system of employment subsidies. In April 1967 the Government
published a Green Paper outlining proposals for a Regional
107Empl.o'yamnt Premium (ESP) , Three months later a finalised 
version of the proposal was issued in the form of a White Paper^^^, 
and this was later included in the 1967 Finance BilX^^^. Under 
this legislation a manufacturer in a Development Area received a 
premium at the rate of thirty shillings a week for men, fifteen 
shillings for women and boys and nine shillings and sixpence for 
girls. The scheme was extended in April 1968 x/hen manufacturers 
in Development Areas became eligible for a "selective employment 
tS3C premium" of seven shillings and sixpence for men, with lower 
rates for women and hoys. Thus, in mid 1968, the total benefit to 
a manufacturer in the Development Areas of these employment premia 
was thirty-aeven shillings and sixpence per week in respect of every 
man employed. Payments ware made through the Selective Employment 
Tax network, and were guaranteed for not less than seven years.
At first the Conservative Leadership reacted ca&tiously to
the proposal to establish a Regional Employment Preraium and did not
110commit their Party either for or against the measure • This
IMWWWH*e*WH»
106. Ibid., Col. 284.
107. The Development Areas: A Proposal for a Regional Employnie^
108. Tha Deve|qpyignt,toeggA..fe^^ u^ind 3310,
IMSO, London June 1967.
109. Written Ansxmr, H.G. Dobs., Vol. 748, Col* 113.
110. Speech by Iain Macleod, H.C. Debs.j Vol. 744, Col. 245,
5 April 1967. Speech by mbert Carr, H.G., Debs., Vol. 745, 
Cols 1180-81, 24 April 1967.
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cautioits approach reflected a division of opinion within the
Parliamentary Party; some with constituencies in the less
111prosperous regions found the proposal attractive , others
opposed the measure on economic grounds as liable to lead to an
112unprofitable use of labour .
During the three month sounding period, hoxmver, the CBI,
with the exception o.f its North Eastern area, came out solidly
against, the premium; so also did the Chambers of Commerce, and
in June the Conservative attitude hardened into outright 
113
opposition’ • At this later date Robert Carr, on behalf of the
Conservative Leadership, argued that the EEF was liable to ba an
extremely wasteful form of subsidy since assistance would be
provided regardless of need or the number of new jobs created.
He wont on to argue that the money would he better spent on 
* 114infrastructural reform , Later, the Party Leaders pledged to
remove the SEP ("taking proper account of the undertakings tliat
115had been given") when returned to office .
Despite the creation of Development Areas and the introduction 
of investment grants and the REP, national unemployment rose from 
an average of 1.6 per cent in 1966 to an average of 2.4 per cent in 
1969. As on previous occasions, the depressed regions were the 
most affected, but the percentage increase In unemployment was 
greatest in the North Western Region and the Yorkshire and 
Humberside area, neither of which were scheduled as Development 
Areas. between October 1966 and October 1969, for example, IHC 
imemployment increased by 31*1 per cent, while in the North Western 
Region the increase was 42*7 per cent and in the Yorkshire and
111. bee speech by H. Clark (Antriia il), ibid*, Col. 1198*
112. Sen speeches by J. Bruce Gardyno and R.W. Elliot, ibid*. 
Cole 1213 and 1252 respectively*
113. Bee speech by Michael Noble, H.C* Deb©., Vol. 747, Cols 
670-77, 5 June 1967.
114. Speech by Robert Carr, fibld*, Cole 733-43*
113. Campaign Guide 1970, op* cit., p. 213.
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Humbersj-do area it mis 79.2 per Gonsarvativa Leaders
claimed that: these disparities were a direct consequence of the
Government's policies. They argued that the high level of
assistance available in Development Areas had lured potential
investors away front neighbouring areas where equivalent assistance
was not available, and that the inflexibility of the Industrial
Developamit Act had prevented these areas from being scheduled as 
117
the need arose ’ •
Conservative iEs» particularly from the Morth West, had for
long been pressing upon the Government the claims of what came to
138be known as tho ”grey** areas ’ • In December 1966 regional
authorities in the Worth of England, Including Economic Planning
Councils for the three Wortheni Kegicme, local authorities and
industrial development associations, announced that they were to
make a joint approach to the Government asking for the designation
of "grey" areas covering most of the North of England outside the
scheduled aroas^^^. In addition, Planning Councils from East
Anglia and the South West pressed the claims of their oim areas
120for special treatment'" . In September 1967 the Government
appointed a Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Joseph Hunt
with the following terms of reference:
To examine in relation to the economic welfare of the 
country as a whole and the needs of the DoveXopEient 
Areas, the situation, in other areas where the rate 
of economic growth gives cause (or may give cause) for 
concern, and to suggest whether revised policies to 
influence economic growth in such areas are desirable 
and if so, what measures should be a d o p t e d . 121
116» Source: Department of Employment Gazette; see also NOP 1969,
No, 20, lb %mmber 1969^  pu 3/5.
117. Speech by Sir Keith Joseph, U.C. Debs., Vol. 790» Col* 1037,
5 November 1969.
118. See speeches by Charles Flotchor-Gooke.(Dar^mn) and Sir Frank 
Pearson (Clitheroe)» H.C. Debs., Vol. 743, Col. 1223, 24 April
'  ^ # iwrn--.., 1-N1 I-I.  ^ **
1967, and Vol. 747» Cols 680-83, 5 June 1967# respectively.
119. The Guardian, 23 December 1966,
fiwWw > %{it «> "#* .*### I*
120, See DEA Progress Reports Industrial and toiional, No. 37, 
1ebruary 1968#^p. 3.
121. Written Answers, H.C. Debs., Vol. 749, Col. 273.
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Hot, all Conservatives were content with the appointment of
the Hunt Committee: some t-rould have preferred wider terms of
reference covering the whole of the regional policy field, while
others urged immediate Government action to assist t!io “grey"
122areas In November 1967 Qelwyn Lloyd, chairman of the gr®up
of Conservative Members with constituencies in the North West,
123
raised once more the plight of his region" ' * A month later he
opened for the Opposition in a Debate on the economic problems of
the North West, and urged the creation of an intermediate range
of investment grants at the rate of 35 per cent^^^. All other
Conservative back-benchers who spoke in the Debate represented
constituencies in Che North West area, and each reiterated Sdlwyn
12 5
Lloyd's demand for immediate Government action .
The Government postponed taking any action, however, until 
after tho Hunt Committee had reported in April 1969. In their 
report the Committee recommended that in the North West and 
Yorkshire and Hunberside regions the Government should introduce 
new measures including building grants at. the rate of 25 per cent- 
not linked to the provision of new jobs, training and direct 
training assistance as in the Development Areas, Government 
industrial estates, factory building and supporting Investment, 
and 85 per cent grants for the clearance of derelict land# The 
Committee also recommended that the lower limit for ÎDC control 
should be raised to 10,000 square feet throughout tlie UK and that 
the Merseyside Development Area should be descheduled^^^.
The Government rejected the Committee'e recommendation on
122# Interviews 7 and 8.
123* B.C. Debs.. Vol. 753» Cola 209-11, 1 November 1967.
124. B.C. Dabo^, Vol. 756, Col# 434-44, 13 December 1967.
125. IbldTIlcSle 461-544. ^ 9
126. The Intermediate Areas: Report of a Committee Under the
' Hunt:, London
April 1969, paras 502-514.
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WQb and i:ha tiersaymSMe Development Area, and accepted in a modified 
form the proposals for t:lie North Western and Yorkshire and 
Humberside Areas, Instead of designating the tdiole of these
127
areasp tho Government created seven smaller intermediate areas ' •
Within these areas building grants wore made available at the rate
of 25 per cent but were linked to the provision of new employment,
Cover muent built factories and the full range of Development Area
training grants and training assistance xmre also made available.
In addition, local authorities in the areas were eligible for
128
75 per cent grants towards the clearance of derelict land ‘ , The 
coat of thesQ additional measures was estimated at about £20 million 
per aitmiim and this sum was to bo met b^ y the withdrawal of the 
selective employment tax premium. The now measures were later 
contained in the Employment Act 1970,
The Conservative Lcnderehip welcomed the législation but felt 
that it did not: go far enough, Sii? Keith Joseph questioned why 
certain areas had not been scheduled and specifically mentioned the 
V700X textile region* tho rest of the North West and East Anglia,
But Ua supported the Govarnment in rejecting the Hunt Committee's 
recommendations that buildings grants should not be tied to the 
provision of new Jobs and that the lower limit of ÏDGs should be 
raised to 10,000 square feet. Hir Keith emphasised that the 
Conservatives would have preferred a rmro wide ranging review of 
regional policy and he pointed out that, in the long run, the Act 
might multiply the problem by creating a series of "inter­
intermediate areas". Finally* he claimed that, if given the 
cViaucûp his Farty would divert resources away from employment
subsidies and investment grants towards infrastructural reform in
129
development and grey alike •
127* The full list covered 54 employment exchanges; see otatement 
hy Peter Shore, U,C, Debs,, Vol. 785, Col* 1506, 25 June 1969,
128, Ibid,, Cols 1506-08; speech by Feter Shore, H.C, Debs.,
VoIT 782, Cols 668-72, 24 April 1969,
129. H.C. Debs,* Vol. 790, Cols 1034-44, 5 November 1969; see
alsoT.T.* Debs., Vol. 782, Cols 672-73, 24 April 1969,■ —-------------------------- W V —
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Aîiioug Conservative back-benchers, two strands of opinion were
discernible: there were those who, like, the Leadership, supported
the legislation but felt that it did not go far enough, and there
were those who were opposed to the alias of the proposals• The
former opinion was expressed by two distinctive groups: first,
those representing constituencies in East Anglia, the North West,
Humberéide and the South West, who criticised the limited scope of
130
the areas scheduled under the Act * « Secondly, those representing
constituencies in the West Midlands were particularly concerned
about tho Government's rejection o.f the liunt; Committee's
131
racoMueudation on XhCa ‘ \ A small minority within the Party
were totally opposed to the legislation on grounds of principle,
Nicholas Ridley argued that the drawing of new boundaries would
only produce more problems for the future, and that at some stage
an end would have to foe brought to the process. As an alternative
132he advocated the devolution of: Government * ,
The above outline of the Opposition's response to the 
development of the Labour Government's regional policy hao 
indicated that four issues, were of particular concern to Conservative 
politicianss namely Development Areas, investment grants, employment 
subsidies and intermediate areas. In addition, during the early
130. Sea speeches by Eldon Griffiths (Bury St EdnK)nds), H.C. Debs,, 
Vol. 782, Col, 603, 26 April 1969; Keith Sfcaintoa (Sudbury 
and WoodbridgCi), ibid,, Vol. 785, Col. 1515, 25 June 1969; 
Charles Fletcher-cSolce (Dart^ en), ibid., Vol. 783, Col, 1510; 
Sir Frank Fearaon (Clitheroe), ibid., Vol. 790, Cola 1078-81,
5 November 1969; Patrick Wall (Hattemprica), ibid.. Vol.
782, Col, 673; Peter Emery (Honitoit), Vol. 782, Col.
681; Michael HeaalUine (Tavistock), ibid,," Vol. 785, Col. 
1315.
131. See speeches by Reginald Eyre (Birmingham Hall Green),
H.C. Debs., Vol. 782, Col. 682, 26 April 1969; G. Lloyd 
(Button Coldfield), jJxW., Vol. 782, Col. 674.
132. •, Vol. 790/ Cols 1117-27, 5 Movembor 1969; see also 
speech by E.F. V/ood, ibid.. Vol. 785, Col. 1512. 25 June 1969,
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period of Opposition, controls in the form of lOCs and OBPs formed 
a further iesue of party debate. These five elements served as 
the main foci for party controversy and were the key points around 
which an alternative policy was developed. Furthermore, the 
Conservative Leadership attempted to draw a distinction between 
the Labour Government's and their own approach, by emphasising 
three aspects of policy which differed from that of their 
opponents: growth points, infrastructural reform and investment
allowances. However, these did not represent a credible or 
comprehensive alternative policy. As will be shown in the 
following section, the nature of Conservative alternative was in 
fact far moro complex.
3» Development of an Alternative Policy
The preceding outline of the Labour Government's policy has 
indicated that 'critlilu the Conservative Party there were wide 
variations of opinion about both the need for and the content of 
regional measures. In an attemi>t to elucidate the variety of 
views muongst Conservatives, this account begins with an analysis 
of opinion at the various levels of the party hierarchy, from 
Leader to rank and file, and the role played by the various sections 
of the Party in the development of Conservative regional policy.
This is followed by an outline of tho Leadership's efforts to develop 
a coherent approach, and the section concludes \?ith an assessment 
of policy prior to the 1970 General Election.
I argued in an earlier chapter that, although in theory the 
Party Leader is ultimately responsible for policy, in practice
133
policy emerges from a much wider field of pressures and demands •
Nevertheless, because of his central role in the policy-making 
process, the influence of tho Party Leader upon the formulation of 
policy is substantial and therefore deserves consideration. As
133. For a more comprehensive outline of the Party Leader's policy­
making status see above. Chapter Four, pp. 46ff.
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previously noted, on entering Opposition Heath was a strong supporter 
of government assistance for the less prosperous regions. He 
maintained thia support throughout the period of Opposition and 
made it clear on a number of occasions that he had little time for 
the arguments of his more extreme free market followers. In 1969, 
for example, he stated that he would not be a party to a policy 
which eondmmed large parts of Britain "to slow decline ami decay,
to dorel&ction and persistent unemployment in pursuit of old
134fangled nineteenth century doctrines of laissem-faire" ,
During the period 1964 to 1970, hoxfever, the Party Leader
WAS not directly in charge of the formulation of his Party's
detailed regional policy. The overall responsibility for this
task was delegated to the four members of the Shadow Cabinet who
held briefs directly relevant to regional affairs, HaeXeod, as
Chief Opposition Spokesman on Treasury and Economic Affairs, was
particularly concerned with the scale of Government assistance to
the regions, Anthony Barber, as Spokesman on Trade, was also
involved in regional matters until February 1967, when he was
succeeded by Sir Keith Joseph, who in turn relinquished his post
13Sas Spokesman on Labour matters to Robert Carr , As will be 
shown, of these four. Sir Keith Joseph played the most important 
role in developing and extending Conservative regional policy.
Among other members of the Shadow Cabinet, with the notable 
exception of Powell^^^, the need for some form of regional policy 
was generally accepted. However, the extent to which each Shadow 
Minister was committed to tho idea of special measures for the 
regions varied widely. As far as can be ascertained from speeches 
and interviews. Sir Keith Joseph and Geoffrey Rippon, for example, 
were not as fervently pro-regional policy as Heath or Moulding,
134. Speech at Dundee, HGP 1969, No, 20, IS December 1969, p. 366, 
I'ha Timea, 23 February 19^7.
136, Powell resigned from the Shadow Cabinet in 1968.
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137while Haclood maintained acmore ambivalent position ,
Within the remainder of the Parliamentary Party there were 
two distinct strands of thinking on the issue of regional policy.
A small, but vocal, minority was critical of the concept of 
special measures for the regions on grounds of principle. This 
group tended to agree with the free market approach outlined by
Enoch Powell and included John Biffen, Nicholas Ridley, Sir John
138Eden mid Kenneth Baker . Although onmll in number, these 
Conservative MPo we?:e successful in holding up the development of 
policy; they ware also highly articulate and policy statements
139on regional affairs often began by refuting free market arguments , 
The substantial majority of Conservative WPs tmre, however, willing 
to accept the need for some form of regional policy, although 
opinions differed about its exact content.
Within the majority group of Conservative bIPs the argument 
frequently tended to be dictated by local pressures and 
constituency deimnds. One of the main channels through which 
these pressures and demnds were expressed were the Party's subject 
and area baek-bcnch commlttees^^^. Among the subject committees 
those most relevant to regional policy were the Trade and Industry 
Co-ordinating Committee, the Trade Committee and the Employiaant 
and Productivity Gosmittae^'^^. In cosmon with other back-bencii
137. Interviews 8, 2 and 16. For Nippon's views see H.C. Debs.» 
Vol«, 753, Cols 190-4, 1 November 1967,
138. See H.C. Debs.. Vol. 732, Col. 580, 19 July 1966; Vol. 777, 
Cols"''l54-W7''aufl Cols 258-62, 4 February 1969, respectively.
139. HCF 1969, No. 20, 15 December 1969, p. 376 m û  p. 366;
The Csæïpaign Gufde 1970, op. cit., o. 205.
140. For the distinction between subject and area comaittees, 
see above, Chapter Four, pp. 53-54.
141. These were the titles of the relevant coimaittees during the
last year and a half of Opposition: their titles changed
during the Opposition period in keeping with changes in tho 
Labour Government's departmental structure. Thus in 1965 
the relevant commttoes were Labour and Trade.
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subject committees, they were chaired by the relevant Froiifc-henoh
spokcunaau and served as a channel of communication between the
142Front and back-benchea of the Party • Members of the area 
committees tended to operate both within and independently of the 
subject committees, so that a spokesman for a given locality 
might utilize the subject committee as a means of publicising 
the interests of his region and of bringing pressure upon the 
Leadership while his owi area coimaittee provided a supplementary 
channel and source of pressure^^^.
According to those closely Involved In policy formulation
four regional groups of Conservative MFs were particularly
effective in pressing the demands of their areas and shaping the
development of policy^^^. X have already noted the part played
hy MPs from the North West in pursuing the claims of their region
for intermediate status* Their efforts were complemented by
those of their colleagues from the South West who, undex* the
chairmanship of Peter Emery, were also active in demanding
equivalent status for their locality* In addition, MPa from
the Midlands, particularly those representing constituencies in
the West Midlands, were mainly concerned with the operation of
Industrial Development Certificates and consistently argued in
favour of either their abolition or their relaxation* Finally,
Conservative Members from the South East concentrated upon the
problems of congestion and the limitations that these imposed upon
145developments in their area ' ,
Within the Party Organisation, two elements ware involved in 
the development of regional policy: the Research Department, and
the Party Area Organisations and regional associations. At least
142. See above. Chapter Four, p. 55.
143. Intm:view8, Ü, 7 and 22.
144. Interview 0.
145. The latter issue was of particular concern to the Greater 
London Members* Committee, chaired by John Boyd-Carpenter.
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tv7o uiüîiîbtirs of tlia Research Department were particularly concerned
with the devalopKieut of the Party's regional policy, and they also
briefed and gave secretarial assistance to the. relevant Shadow
Cabinet members and back-bench committee p e r s o n n e l I n
addition, they were responsible for producing public policy
statements and propaganda. Through their research and publications.
Department personnel showed themselves to be strong supporters
of regional policy and they consistently advocated a growq:h points 
147strategy
In contrast to the Research Department, the opportunities to 
influence policy content nvaiiXabla to the Party Area Organisations 
and regional associations were less substantial* although their 
role varied according to the siuature of the region they covered.
As noted in Chapter Four, the British Conservative Party is a 
coalition of three separate regional organisations: the National
Union of Conservative ami Unionist Associations covering England 
and Wales, the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association and 
the Ulster Unionist AsBociation^^^, During the Opposition period 
the English, and Welsh section was divided into eleven Area 
Organisations^^^. The Welsh Area Organisation, however, like 
the Scottish and Ulster Associations, possessed a larger bureaucracy 
than any of its English counterparts and also a research officer* 
Henèe an initial distinction must be made between the Welsh,
Scottish and Northern Ireland regional offices and the English 
Area Organisations: because of their extra resources all three
of the former were more capable of thinking about regional policy 
and of applying direct pressure on the centre. They were, thus, 
more able to fulfill policy-making as well as organisational
146, Interviews 7 and 0,
147, See MCP 1969, No, 20, 15 December 1969, p. 377,
148, See Robert îdcKensie, British Political Parties, second 
edition, London 1963, p* 187,
149* For a full list see, Rules and Standing Orders of the National 
Union of Conservative tmT^inlonist Àssociatloiis'T' "NUGUA,   .      . .
London 1970, Rule XXXV.
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fimcüioîis*. In contrast* the English Area Organisations were am inly
concerned with problems of party organisation and, according to
interviews, in England the Party bureaucracy's role in policymaking
was mainly confined to Headquartera in London, Consequently
Conservatives in the English regions covered by the English Party
Area Organisations tended to express their demands through their 
15Û
local MPa " *
Conservative Members of Parliament, particularly those 
representing English constituencies, thus served as a major channel 
for rank and fils opinion. As far as this section of the Party 
W&8 concerned. Conservative policymakers interviewed for this study 
were of the opinion that regional policy was too highly specialised 
to capture the interest of ordinary Party mambera, The few 
rank and file Conservatives who were concerned with the issue 
possesa&d either an "academic" interest in the subject or had 
direct experience of the matters involved through business or 
local government affairs. But, in general, the influence of the. 
rank and file was considered minimal and although motions ware
submitted for each Party Conference, they were few in number and
151only one, in 1969, was actually chosen for debate •
The debate over regional policy therefore mainly involved 
the Party Leadership, interested and informed Conservative back­
benchers , the Research Department and, in the case of Wales,
Scotland and Ulster, the Party Area Organisations and Regional 
Associations, A policy study group appointed by the Leader also 
played an important role, end I shall consider this in more detail
150, Interview
151. See iWUA 87th Annual Qonfereace Report 1969, NUCUÂ, London, 
pp. 98-105. More motions were submitted on Regional 
Development at this Conference than at any other during
the Opposition period. In total, 46 motions ware subBvitted 
on this topic out of a total of 1,250. See Conference 
Handbook and Programme of Proceedings » NUCUA, LoSon T969, 
Motions Nos 081-726^ PP# 161-68.
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later* iuao-agBt tuia aimll group of political actors X have been 
able to discern two strands oi: thinking# Some questioned the 
utility of regional policy on grounds of principle, while others 
accepted the need for a policy but differed about Its form and 
content, Ai'oougst some members of the latter group, the divisions 
of opinion tended to be influenced by local or constituency 
Interests, This mixture of political principle and local 
interest made regional affairs a potentially difficult area for 
the development of policy, Yet, despite these obstacles, the 
Party Leadership attempted to develop a coherent: Conservative 
programme, >k>w successful wore they? What form did the programme 
take?
In May 1966 Heath established a study group under the
chairmanship of Frederick Corfield, HP, to consider the development
152of Conservative regional policy % The exact composition oi; 
the group has never been publicly revealed. The basis of the 
group, however, consisted of at least seven Memberb of Parliament 
and throe non-ParIlamentery academic experts, although the
particular individuals involved altered during the group's life-
I 53span'"'". Ml officer of the Research Department served the
group mainly in the capacity of minutes secretary but also
154fulfilled information and research functions « Meetings of
the gîroup were usually held in a committee room at the House, of
155ComaoES and generally took place about eight times a year " ,
It was originally intended that the group should sumbit their 
recommcmdations to the Advisory Committee on Policy by wid-1968 at 
the latest. In the event this deadline proved unattainable.
After deliberating for four year& the group produced a final report 
which was scheduled for publication in August 1970 but, as a result
152, The Times, 9 Hay 1966,
153, Interview 25,
154, Interviews 25* 9 and 7 
155» Interview 25»
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of the General Election in the same year, publication m m  cancelled
and consequently the study group's final recomncmndations were
156never revealed to the public .
There vm*e at least three reasons why the policy group on
Regional Development proved so unproductive. First, the personnel
involved came from all parts of the United Kingdom and there was
some difficulty in getting all group members together in one place
at the sarae time# In addition, the nature of the regional policy
field was continually changing# This meant that the group had
continually to address itself to new problems and consequently
157progress was slowed dom • Finally, and most importantly, the
group liad difficulty in reaching agreement# The divisions within
the group followed much the same pattern as those within the Party#
Three members of the group, two !lFs and one academic, were strongly
against special governmental assistance for the regions on grounds
of principle. The remainder were strongly in favour of special
measures for the regions but differed amongst themselves aixjut the
form that the measures should take and the scope and scale of
158government assistance required • The persistence of those who
opposed regional policy meant that policy formulation was held up,
and this problem was finally overcome only by allowing a minority
159report to be attached to the main report «
As the study group's deliberations were never published it 
is difficult to assess the influence of its %mrk upon the content 
of Conservative policy# Interviewas with some of the participants 
involved have revealed that during its four year life-span the group 
was deeply concerned with at least three issues: the intermediate
areas, REP and investment incentives# In relation to REP, the
156. Interviews 5, 7 and 8.
157. Interviews 7 and 8.
158. Interviews 5, 8, 16 and 25.
159. Interviews 7 and 8.
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group recoftuïieïidoci Ulie. abolition oJ! the pretniitn and also considered
a number of possible aXtermitiveSs including a payroll tax* but
failed to reach any conclusion on this matter^^^# On the question
of Investment incentives the majority of participants were in
favour of the retention oi; cash grants but were concerned that
they should be applied more selectively* The focus of discussion
thus shifted to a consideration of the administrative machinery
required for the operation of a more "selective" system but, as
161
with REP, no conclusion was reached » Apart from considering
these iasues in their final report the majority of the group came
down strongly in favour of special measures for the regions and a
policy was outlined, ühlch provided for both investment incentives
5 62(including cash grants) and infrastructural reform" ■** In contrast
the authors of the minority report maintained a more laissez-faire
position» In their proposals, the three dissenting members of the
group gave a more central place to the operation of market forces
and recommended tnat government intervention should be mainly
163limited to infrastructural reformo' "* Despite its four years 
of existence. It may be concluded that, because the policy group 
on Regional Development was so late In submitting its final 
recomaeadations and mot such difficulty in reaching agreement, 
the effect of its deliberations upon the content of Conservative 
policy published prior to the 1970 General Election was not 
substantial.
The study group's failure to produce a comprehensive 
alternative policy by mid-1968 meant that the responsibility for 
this task fell back upon the Party Leadership# From 1966 to 
1966, while awaiting the policy group's report. Party Leaders 
continued to outline tho threefold progT'ariime which had been 
highlighted during the first period in Opposition# Speeches by
160« Interview 25»
161* Interview 16 and 25.
162. Interviews 5, 7* 8 and 25#
163# Interviews 7, 16 and 23#
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Heatli, Hacleod, Barber* Rlppon, Carr and Joseph revealed no
significant development in policy^^^, and the empbasia upon
growth points, infrastructural reform and investment allowances
was carried thrc 
1
in October 1968
ough into the Part;/'* s rald-fcerra manifesto published 
.165
By late 1968 Conservative regional policy bad In fact 
r^emained static for four years and existing policy no longer 
appeared adequate. First, it did not cover the now develoiments 
which had taken place under the Labour Government. For example, 
the Opposticm repeatedly emphasised that they preferred allmyances 
to grants., but tb.ey did not indicate in what proportion, nor how 
such a system would operate and to whom it would apply. They 
maintained an equally ambiguous position about the operation of 
controls and the scope and criteria for demarcating scheduled 
areas* Secondly, existing policy did not cover the changes which 
had taken place in the nature of the regional problem since 1964.
Most iBiporfcanfcly, the Party Leadership had made no detailed 
pronouncements about; the problems of the intermediate areas, 
although these were a matter of some concern within the Party.
At the National Union Central Council meeting in ï^ farch 1968, for 
example, a motion calling attention to the eeonomic plight of tho 
"grey areas’* was debated and carried by an "overwhelming laajority**^ ^^ . 
In addition the (piootion of the intermediate areas involved 
electoral considerations* in both the 1964 and 1966 General 
Elections, for example, Conservative candidates won the majority
164. For Heath see. HÜGUA 84th Animal Conference Report 1966, NUGUA, 
London 1966, pTTS9^I’Ecleodp'' H.cfr D e b s , ' Y 724, Col,
1236, 15 February 1966; Barber, Col, 1144; Rxppon,
H.C. Debo., Vol. 753, Col. 190, 1 November 1967; Carr,
H.C. Debs., Vol. 747, Cols 733-43, 5 June 1967; Joseph, 
fdJGUA 86th Annual Conference Report 1968, HUCUA, London 1968,
p. 100*
165. Make Life Better, CGO» London September 1968. See Also 
*^ *Xhe » The Tiiaes, 7 October 1968. ^ ¥nM-S,#»6XlW*¥*-Wll«*»eWWe
166. Central Council Minute Book, minutes of meeting 15-16 March
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of seato :tu North Lancashire* hacC Yorkshire and the Honth West,
Moreover, i?;lt!iin these areas there were a D.md>er of ïnarginally
held Labour seatg which would have to bo won by the Couservativas
if they seriously expected to be returned tu power in any
167subsequent election *
By lata 1968, however, Coaservativa regional policy appeared 
not only inadequate but also unacceptable. It iraplied a strong 
commitment to a growth points* otrategy and this was liable to 
involve high social and political costs which might prove damaging 
to party support in the country* For example, as some Conservatives 
had already recognised, a growth points strategy could result in 
the creation of n scries of regional variants of the national 
problems congested, areas surrounded by depressed localities#
Once again the situation waa further complicated by electoral 
factors. Host oi the Conservative-held seats Ixi the depressed 
regions were situated ii\ the non-urban areas which were the least 
likely choice, on, economic grounds, for the siting of new growth. 
30808^^^# Consequently, it is possible that a policy which Biaisily 
emphasised growth -points did not appeal either to those Conservative 
MPa wlio represented constltuenci.es in the depressed regions or to 
their constituants#
On grounds of both adequacy and acceptability, therefore, 
existing Consorvative regional policy appeared, by late 1968, to 
be in dire need of extension and amèncbuenl: # In addition, the 
failure of the policy study group to make any progress by this 
date Indicated that it could not bo relied upon as a major source 
of future policy, and consequently, the responsibility for this 
task reverted to the Shadow Minister in overall charge of policy-
167# D#E# Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election 
London 1965, Appendix I, pp# 308^14; the same 
aiithors. The British GeneralElection of 196^, London 1966,
pp. 302-08\
168. Butler and King 1966, op* citu
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making in the regional fields Sir Keith Joaeph^^^,
In formulating an alternative programme Sir Keith Joseph was 
able to call upon the assistance of members of the study group. 
Research Department personnel and colleagues in the Parliamentary 
Party, Amongst the latter those who were close to the Shadow 
Minister of Trade, Technology and Power included Frederick Gorfield, 
Nicholas Ridley who was Junior Front-Bench spokesman on Trade,
Alfred Hall-Davies who specialised in location of industry problems, 
and Charles Fletcher-Cooke and Michael Shaw who were Vice-Chairmen 
of the Conservative Back-Bench Committee on Trade.
In October 1969 Sir Keith was able to report to the Party 
Conference that a series of "firm decisions" had been taken about 
the nature of Conservative regional policy. His outline of these 
decisions and proposals was subsequently reiterated and elaborated 
in a number of speeches delivered by him during the early part of 
1970, Taken together these speeches represented the Opposition's 
final public pronouncements on regional policy prior to the General 
Election in June 1970.
In his speeches Sir Keith committed a future Conservative
Government to maintaining the Development Areas as they then were
and to making no alteration in boundaries until "a firm foundation
170for future prosperity had been established" . In making this 
statement he revealed for the first time that the Conservatives had 
accepted the criteria for scheduling assisted areas laid down in 
the Industrial Development Act 1966. Moreover, Sir Keith promised 
that the "grey are#s" would be "strengthened", although he failed 
to indicate what this term implied or how such a situation might be
169. See Ian Trehthowan, "Tories Planning New Policy Moves", 
The Times, 22 February 1968; The Times, 4 June 1968;
Adam Ferguson, "Tory A11ernat 1 ve'^ ," ffie^Times» 14 May 1969,
170. NUCUA 87th Annual Conference Report 1969, NUCHA, London 
October 1969, p. 104.
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171achieved • In addition, he made it clear that the Opposition 
did not propose any alteration in the size of the regional 
development budget. Instead he emphasised that a future 
Conservative Government, through savings achieved by abolishing 
the RfîP and instituting a more selective system of investment 
incentives, would attempt to channel a larger proportion of 
existing resources to infrastructural improvements, such as 
communications, housing, training and the clearance of derelict 
land^^^#
The more selective system of investment incentives envisaged
by Conservative policymakers was, hir Keith said, designed to
ensure that grants would no longer bo "automatically" available
to capital intensive industries or those that "would have gone
173to the area in any case" . But Sir Keith did not reveal what
proportion of these new "differential investment incentives" would
be in Che form of grants or allowances. Nor was he precise about
how the new system would be administered and merely suggested tliat
perhaps the Local Employment Acts might serve this purpose^^^.
He added that these Acta would, in any case, be amended by a
future Conservative administration so that their provisions would
175apply both within and outside Development Areas * Finally,
Sir Keith pledged that the IDC system would be preserved by the 
next Conservative Government, although its application would be 
more selective with greater regard being given to indî^ strial 
efficiency and the requirements of small firms^^^.
Sir Keith's speeches appeared to mark a significant change in
171. Ibid.
172. Debs.. Vol. 790, Col. 1044, 5 November 1969.
173. èTtîi Annual Conference Report 1969, op. cit.
174. H.C. Debs., Vol. 796, Col. 869, 23 February 1970.
175. WtlTlhmual Conference Report 1969, op. cit., p. 103.
176. Ibid. See also speech at Esher, 7 February 1970, CGQ News
Service, Ref: 87/70; speech to Greater London Area Trade 
Union Advisory Committee, 24 January 1970, CCO News Service, 
Reft 46/70.
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the emphasis of Conservative regional policy: moat importantly
leaa attention than previously was given to either tax allowances
or growth points, Speeches delivered by leading Conservatives
and policy statements published during the final nine months of
Opposition, hov/aver, reflected some confusion about the main aims
of the Party’s proposals for the depressed areas. Specifically
two objectives, neither of which v/as necessarily complementary to
the other, were outlined: these were long-term regional growth
and the alleviation of unemployment. In the Party’s Campaign
Guide, for example, it was stated that the basic aim of Conservative
regional policy was to foster soundly based long-term growth in
177the regions and nbt simply to deal with short-term problcîius ,
Another document went on to record that the "spearheads" of long-
178term growth were to be regional growth centres • In his speech 
to the Party Conference in 1969, Sir Keith Joseph also emphasised
that the heart of the Opposition’s policy was "the improvement of
4 179regional coimmnication and infrastructure" ' , Yet, in the same
speech. Sir Keith maintained that "everything will depend upon the
number of new jobs created" and he emphasised that the main
objective of Conservative %)olicy was "to encourage more new jobs
in Development Areas at less cost to the taxpayer"^^^.
The failure to specify the main goal of Conservative regional 
policy meant that the Party’s proposals remained, until the end 
of its term in Opposition, unclarified and ambiguous. However,
Sir Keith’s insistence that government measures should be closely 
tied to job provision did mark a significant retreat from his 
Party’s earlier cominitment to growth points, and, although Research 
Department officials continued to press the primacy of a growth
177. The Campaign Guide 1970, op. cit., p. 222,
178. NCP 1969, No. 20, 15 December 1969, p. 377.
179. 87th Annual Conference Report 1969, op. cit., p. 103, This
point had been made earlier by Heath in a speech at Dundee,
The Times, 10 September 1969.
180. 87th Annual Conference Report 1969, op. cit», p. 104.
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points strategy^^^, the absence of any mention of the proposal 
in the Party’s 1970 General Election Manifesto provides further 
evidence of the change in Conservative priorities
One Conservative closely involved in the formulation of 
regional policy later explained this change in policy priorities 
by suggesting that the Opposition had in fact developed a two­
fold strategy whereby capital expenditure was to be concentrated
on growth points, while financial incentives would be available 
183over a wider area • This would seem to be a reasonable 
assessment of the actual situation. It should be noted, however, 
that this tw-fold strategy merely represented a highly generalised 
and broad outline of the basic principles of Conservative policy.
At no point had Conservative policymakers indicated how this 
strategy might be fulfilled, nor had they given any precise 
outline of the special provisions which would, under a future 
Conservative Government, be available for the problem regions.
Thus, after nearly six years in Opposition, both the aims and the 
means of Conservative regional policy remained ill-defined and 
unclarified, and the Party entered Government without a body of 
agreed proposals capable of being iiiimediately put into operation.
XV. Conclusion
Like prices and incomes and economic planning, regional policy 
touched on the. fundamentals of party beliefs and was a matter of 
soma controversy within the Party. Some Conservatives questioned 
the need for any form of regional assistance whatsoever, while 
others disagreed about the form that assistance should take. In 
addition, certain aspects of the approach developed by the 
Conservative Government were adopted and extended by the Labour
181. The Campaign Guide 1970, op. cit.
182. A Better Tomorrow, CCO, London Hay 1970, p. 15.
183. TntervIeF 8.
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GovariiTaeiit: when they to power, ouch ao the notion of wider
development areas In whicli a variety of inducements, Including 
granto, would bo available. In Opposition the Conservatives 
retreated frota these positions while emphasising those aspects of 
their own policy which they felt were being neglected by their 
successors: liifraatructui:al refom, growth points and tax
allowances. When it came to formulating some form of Conservative 
alternative, however, the Party’s emphasis upon tax allowances 
and growth points was diluted.
In addition to emphasising grovrth points, infrastructural 
reform and tax allowances. Conservatives imdc other attempts to 
distinguish their own approach from that of the Government.
Thus, although Opposition personnel accepted that the. Labour 
Government’s reform of regional planning machinery was largely 
an extension of the previous Conservative Administration’s 
approach, they nevertheless criticised it as being both unnecessary 
and as representing an extension in the scope of state bureaucracy. 
Likewise, in the. case of ODPa and IDCs, Opposition spokesmen 
recognised some validity in the use of controls but, in response 
to the Government’s proposals, emphasised their hostility to 
them on grounds of principle.
Moreover, in Opposition Party Leaders appear to have been 
more attentive to party opinions than they had been in Government. 
Prior to the 1964 General Election, for instance. Conservative 
Mhî, particularly those from the problem regions, expressed concern 
about rising unemplo^mient and the Government’s failure to deal 
with it but, ifv developing a long-term strategy. Party Leaders 
adopted proposals akin to those originally suggested by extra­
party agenc5.es, such as the North East Development Council, the 
Scottish Council and the NEDC. In Opposition, however, in 
relation to the Imtermediate areas and IDGs, Party Leaders often 
appeared to make concessions after demnds had been articulated 
amongst their followers. In addition, policy statements often
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began by refuting the more extreme laisfjoz-faire arguments which 
were articulated by some Conservatives, while Conservative MBs, 
through the agency of the back-bench committees, were able to 
exert pressure directly upon key policymakers.
Finally, the case study illustrates the Conservatives* 
failure to formulate a detailed and consistent alternative 
policy. In part this may have reflected difficulties inherent 
in the field of regional policy, since decisions about the 
selective distribution of large sums of public money, in a 
policy field where there exist few guidelines and little 
consensus among informed opinion about the proper course of 
action, must inevitably prove problematic. In part also, 
however, the Party Leadership's flexibility in formulating policy 
was proscribed by the complex mixture of party purpose, political 
principles and constituency interests which operated in the 
regional policy field. The failure of the study group on 
regional development to reach agreement and the consequences 
of the wide variations of opinion within the Party, meant that 
the Conservatives* approach remained unclarified. As a result 
the Party fought the 1970 General Election on the basis of a 
series of general and somewhat contradictory proposals for 
regional development.
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CHAPTB& TEN
THE STRUGimm OF INDUSTRY
General Introduction and Background
The term structure of industry is ambiguous and may be taken to
have a variety of meanings* First, it may refer to the geographical
structure oj; location of Industry within a given spatial unlt^* 
Secondly* it may refer to the internal structure of the industrial 
unit, this involving problems of organisation, management and 
company law. Thirdly, it may refer to the external structure of
the industrial unit involving questions about the scale of British
industry and about public policy in the fields of monopolies and 
«mrgero* It la mainly in the third sense that the tuna structure 
of industry is used in this study* Before analysing the development 
of Conservative policy in this field, however, It will be necessary 
to provide some background to the discussion. Thus in the following 
section I have attempted to do three things: first, to define some
of the key terms involved; secondly, to outline briefly the nature 
of the relevant legislation and government machinery in the fields 
of monopolies and restrictive practices prior to 1960; and finally, 
to indicate some of the nmj or developments in the structure of British 
industry during the decade under study.
According to Schumpeter, the term "monopolist" refers to , • 
those single sellers whose markets are not open to the intrusion of 
would-be producers of the same coamiodity and of actual producers of 
similar ones"F. Defined in this manner, as Schumpeter notes, pure 
cases of long run monopoly are in fact liable to occur very rarely
1, Location of industry problems are dealt with in Chapter Nine 
above ("Regional Policy"),
2. J.A, Schumpeter, "The Dynamics of Competition and Monopoly",
in Alex Hunter (ad«). Monopoly and Competition, Middlesex 1969, 
p. SB.
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3 *indeed • Xn this study, however, I am not conoemad with the precise
nature of monopoly per m  but with how the concept has been used in
the formulation and application of public policy in the United
Kingdom. Under legislation passed in 1948, monopoly was defined
as a condition in which at least one third of the goods was supplied
by a single firm or by too or more firms with arrangements with one
another that had the effect of restricting competition^. In Britain
there has never been an automatic assumption that the existence of
a firm of monopoly aiae (as defined in accordance with the provision
of the 1948 Act) has been contrary to the public interest. Each
monopoly has been considered in its context and on its merits, in
terms of a vaguely defined "public interest" which includes such
factors as economies of scale, efficiency and innovativenesa, prices
and profits, tho "fullest use and best distribution of resources",
technical advances, opportunities for new entrants to the market,
5extent of foreign competition, etc. . It may be noted that although 
this approach has assured flexibility, it has also meant that public 
policy has often appeared ambiguous and, at times, contradictory,
A firm may reach a situation of monopoly through at least two
processes, First, through normal corniercial activities in competition
with rival firms, and secondly, through acquiring control of, or
integrating with, a rival firm, The activities involved in this
latter process are commonly referred to aa either a takeover or a
merger and those are distinguished by Vice as follows:
Both terms centra on the acquisition of voting capital, 
in the formal sense of more than 50 per cent, in a 
company. Merger generally refers to an agreed 
transaction between two units of broadly comparable 
siac, whereas takeover applies to a successful offer 
which was resisted by the ’victim’s* board of
3. Ibid# Robinson claims that "any simple definition of the
terms ’monopoly’ and ’monopolist’ is impossible": S.A.G.
Robinson, Monopoly, Cambridge (England), 1941, p. 6.
4. The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control)
Act 1948, IX & 12, Geo. 6, c. 66, Section 3 (1(a)) and 
3 (1(b)).
5. Ibid., Sec. 14.
a/fmivsteimeeifa
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directors, or more frequently, to the acquisition of 
a relatively small unit by a large one.G
Takeovers and mergers usually conform to three types: vertical,
horizontal and conglomerate. The distinction between these was
outlined in the Monopolies Commission's "General Observations on
Mergers" published in 1969, The Commissioners held that:
horizontal mergers are mergers between companies that 
sell the same products (or products that can be easily 
substituted for each other); vertical mergers are
mergers between companies of which one is an actual or
potential supplier of the other; conglomerate mergers 
are mergers between companies that do not produce 
similar products and where neither is an actual or 
potential supplier of the other.^
It should be clear that a merger or takeover may not necessarily
result in the creation of a monopoly. For example, of the three
types outlined above a conglomerate, is least likely to do so, but
it may, for instance, result in the creation of a grouping of very
large "absolute size" with consequent losses in efficiency. This
may be judged prejudicial to the "public interest" and consequently
be deemed a matter of public concern^.
The final terra requiring definition is restrictive practices. 
This, according to Guenault and Jackson, is the "measure" which the 
monopolist employs to exploit the market and to strengthen his 
control over it; "Generally they involve restraints or restrictions 
in connection vTxth the supiily of the coimuodity, or the conditions 
under which it is sold or marketed, or in relation to potential 
competition,"^ Public policy in relation to restrictive practices
6. Anthony Vice, The Strategy of Takeovers, Maidenhead, Berkshire 
1971, p. xi,
7. "General Observations on Mergers". Annex to Monopolies Commission
Report, Unilever Limited and Allied Breweries Limited, H.C.
Paper 297, Session 1968-69 (hereafter referred to as "The 
Monopolies Commission, 1969(a)"), para, 14, p. 35.
8. "General Observations on Mergers". Ibid., paras 25 and 26,
p. 38,
9. Paul II. Guénault and J.M. Jackson, The Control of Monopoly in
the United Kingdom, London 1960, p. 1.
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is not a major concern of this study, but it has been necessary to 
make some reference to this issue since, in the formulation of 
British public policy, restrictive practices and monopoly have often 
been closely related.
In the period prior to the 1960s public policy in the fields
of monopolies and restrictive practices was mainly governed by the
provisions of three Acts of Parliament. The earliest of these was
the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act,
1948, which established the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
Commission^This was followed in 1953 by the Monopolies and
Restrictive Practices CoBimission Act, which, by increasing the
number of Commissioners and by enabling them to sit in groups, was
designed to strengthen the Commission and permit its x-7otl<. to be 
11 , .speeded up , Finally, in 1956, the Restrictive Trade Practices
12Act reached the statute book , This provided for the registration
of a wide category of agreements relating to the production and
supply of goods and their judicial examination by a Restrictive
Practices Court. Under this Act the Monopolies and Restrictive
Practices Commission was renamed the Monopolies Commission, reduced
13in size and rendered less effective than previously ,
The provisions of these three Acts were later amended and 
extended in 1965 with the passage of the Monopolies and Mergers 
Act^^% As this forms a central part of the following case study
10. The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) 
Act, 1948, op. cit.
11. 1953, 1 & 2™ ELIZ 2, c. 51.
12. 1956, 4 & 5, ELIZ 2, c. 68.
13. For a detailed outline of the various provisions of the Acts
see: Michael Albery and C.F, Fletcher-Cooke, M.P., Monopolies
and Restrictive Trade Practices, London 1956* For the manner 
in which these provisions were applied see: Guénault and
Jackson 1960, op. cit.; D. Lee, "Monopoly Legislation", in
U, Lee (at al.TT^fonopoly, London 1968, pp. 23-60; G.G, Allen, 
Monopoly and Restrictive Practices, London 1968, pp. 61-101.
On the Monopolies Commission in particular, see Charles K. 
Rowley, The British Monopolies Commission, London 1966.
14. 1965, c. 50o
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it will be analysed In detail later. In the meantime, however, it 
will be useful to consider the context from which this latter piece 
of legislation emerged. Hence there follows a brief outline of
some of the major changes in the structure of British industry which 
took place during the 1960s.
The 1960s were characterised by an unprecedented growth of
acquisitions. As Davis ha.s noted, the period accounted "for nearly
1360 per cent of all mergers in post-war yars" " • Within the
decade, however, the nature and pace of merger activity varied
widely. In the first place, there was, particularly in 1967 and
1968, a sharp increase in the size of mergers, as measured in terms
of the values of the companies involved^^. Secondly, from 1965
onwards, there was a sharp decline in the actual numbers of mergers 
17taking place , Thus, especially during the latter half of the
decade, the tendency was for larger firms to merge with, or to
take over, other large concerns , As a result the concentration
of control in British industry was Increased and larger industrial
19units were created .
In addition to the changing scale of mergers during the 1960s 
there were important changes in their character. Most notably, 
especially in the latter years of the decade, there was a growing 
trend towards conglomerates. In 1969, for example, acquisitions 
in a different industry accounted for around 59 per cent of the
15. William Davis, Merger Mania, London 1970, p. 1,
16. This development reached a peak in 1968 and tailed off in 1969
when the takeover total was 61 per cent down in value, although 
the number of acquisitions and mergers was not materially 
changed. The Times, 25 February 1970,
17. These two developments are documented in Gerald D, Newbould,
Management and Merger Activity, Liverpool 1970, Tables 1.1a and 
1.1b, p, 19,
18. See The Economist, 1 February 1969,
19. These developments are documented in a survey made by the
Monopolies Commission of thaeffects of mergers upon UK 
manufacturing industry between 1961 and 1968; The Monopolies 
Commission, 1969(a), op, cit., p. 34, par&s 7 and 9,
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20total aa against about 33 per cent in 1968 ' . The growing popularity
of conglomerate groupings produced concern about merger policy both
21
in the United Kingdom and the United States • In the UK, the 
Monopolies Commission outlined three basic objections to 
conglomerates in its General Observations on Mergers, First, 
that because they might reach a very large "absolute size", 
difficulties in maintaining adequate managerial control might in 
some cases be encountered and possible losses in efficiency might 
result . Secondly, the Commission noted that "it may be worth a 
company's while to acquire another company for the sake of its 
current profits or its assets alone and without any particular
plan for improving the use of its resources. In such cases the
?3
effects of a conglomerate merger may well be to reduce efficiency"' , 
Finally, the Cqmmiaslon expressed concern about some methods of 
financing mergers, especially the increasing tendency to financing 
"by the issue of company paper
Hot surprisingly the increase in the scale,of mergers, the
change iu their character and the methods used to finance the
various deals, all led to growing concern about their consequences.
Towards the and of the decade the rationale behind the merger trend
began to be increasingly criticised. The idea that larger groupings
inevitably led to economies of scale and a more efficient use of
resources was queried. Critics pointed to the "diseconomies of
scale", such as problems of managerial control and communication,
and the social consequences of mergers, such as redundancies and
23
the possibility of an undue concentration of economic power “.
20# The Times, 25 February 1970,
21. 5 November 1969; The Economist, 1 November 1969|
Max^^SsV^A Guide to Board of Tva^S'l^&ùtTc&^ London 1969,
Annex 5 p^p'.''"37'-W6'.'' "
22# The Monopolies Commission, 1969(a), op* cit., pp. 36-38.
23. IMd., para. 22, p. 37.
24. Ibid., paras 29-30, pp. 39-40. For an outline of American
reaction to conglomerates, see J. Fred Watson, Sam Peltzman
(eds). Public Policy Towards Mergers, California 1969, pp. 179-226, 
25# See Edward Goodman, The Impact of Size* Acton Society Trust,
London 1970; Wi 11 i a i O T a v l S ^ W , especially pp. 86-93.
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Critics also suggested that5.while, international trading conditions
demanded the creation of industrial giants large enough to compete
with overseas rivals, the dangers of creating monopoly situations
at home were more important^^. In addition, the motives of
managements indulging in mergers were questioned# Newbould, who
undertook an intensive study of the 1967 to 1968 'merger boom',
concluded that many takeovers and mergers were made for the
security and convenience of the management of the bidding company
and that the average management's major motives in bidding were to
gain bigger shares of their markets, or protect themselves from
27other predatory firms »
In sum, during the 1960s, changes in the structure of British 
industry reflected a growing tendency towards concentration# The 
decade revealed a growth in the scale of mergers and acquisitions 
and a change in their character. The possible consequences of this 
trend raised concern about the application of public policy in the 
United Kingdom. These situational and ideological developments 
formed the background to the development of party policy, and they 
affected Labour and Conservative policy-makers alike.
II» The Conservatives in Governments 1961-1964
Conservatives have often referred to their Party as the Party 
of free enterprise. To some Conservatives this has meant no more 
than a commitment to the maintenance of the private sector, primarily 
by the prevention of further nationalisation. Others liave 
interpreted this phrase more radically to mean the application of 
policies to create and preserve a free market economy, involving
26, William Davis 1970, op. cit.. Chapter 1.
27. Gerald D. Newbould 1970, op. cit., p. 160 and pp. 200-206. 
These conclusions are supported by some American research; 
Stanley G. Vance, Managers in the Conglomerate Era, New York 
1971, pp. 50-59. See also The Economist, 28 June 1969, ^ ^4 -_-■ - -----------------— ..»
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measures to increase competition by removing the obstacles to the 
free play of market forces. To this group an effective policy 
for monopolies and restrictive practices was essential. But at 
the beginning of the nineteen sixties the influence of this view 
within the Party Leadership appeared to be slight. As previously 
noted, the Government pursued policies, such as economic planning 
and incomes policy, based on thci bringing together of economic 
units rather than those designed to keep them apart and little 
attempt was made to develop a consistent and comprehensive policy 
in the structure of industry field. Reliance was placed upon the 
somewhat limited provisions of the monopolies and restrictive 
practices legislation passed in 1948, 1953 and 1956, and in applying 
these provisions the Government appeared to be more concerned with
the restrictive practices than the anti-monopoly elenient of the
28policy . However, a spate of mergers took place at the beginning 
of the decade, and the Government's handling of both these and 
certain monopoly references suggested, even to its supporters, that 
existing policies were inadequate. This development is described 
below.
In the early 1960s the struggle for control of British 
Aluminium, Ford's bid for its British subsidiary, the Daily Mirror's 
grab for Odhams, a rush Of other less spectacular mergers, and 
the Government's handling of the Monopolies Commission's reports 
on such matters as British Oxygen, chemical fertilisers, and 
colour films, caused speculation amongst informed opinion about
the pace and purpose of mergers and the operation of Government
29policy . Some were favourable to mergers, arguing that in
the interests of efficiency British industry required a degree
30of rationalisation ; others expressed concern about the 
growth of monopoly power and the Government's apparent failure to
20, NCP 1961, No, 12, 19 June 1961, "Economic Grow“th".
29. The Times, 19 December 1961.
30. The Guardian, 11 September 1969. Suggested that British
industry suffered from "too many small, badly located and 
poorly equipped factories".
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. 33 .deal xd.th it Faced with those contradictory strands of opinion
the Government maintained a neutral position. This proved 
difficult and two developments, in particular, helped to further 
undermine the credibility of the Government's stance and indirectly 
led to a reappraisal of policy.
First, there was concern about the Government's handling of
32the Monopolies Commission's report on the Tobacco Industry
This report, published in July 1961s made special reference to
Imperial Tobacco's 37 per cent shareholding iu Gallabors. The
Commission considered that this shareholding served to preserve
Imps* "monopoly position" and thus operated against the public
interest^^. They therefore recommended that Imps should "divest
34itself" of its interest in its rival « In January 1962 the
President of the Board of Trade announced that the Imperial Tobacco
Company had given an assurance not to interfere in the management
of GalXahers. He had accepted this assurance and consequently
35MpB would not be required to dispose of its shareholding. He 
justified this decision on the grounds that he had been able to 
achieve the "object" of the recommendation without insisting upon 
"the disruption which would have been caused by the sale or disposal 
of Imperial's shareholding in Gallahero"^^.
The Government's handling of the Cornaission's Report on the 
Tobacco Industry was criticised on two grounds. The first was Its
31. The Kcpnopilst, 11 February 1961. Stated that the country 
needed some "general scrutiny of all mergers before they ware 
completed with power to prevent any thiat might appear 
contrary to the public interest.
32. The Monopolies Commission, Report on the Supply of Cigarettes 
and Tobacco and of Cigarette aiKf^Yobacco Tfachluery, H.C. Paper 
218, July l W T “"
33. Ibid., paras 590 and 591
34* Ibid., para. 611,
35. Board of Trade Statement, January 1962, NCP 1962, Wo. 5,
5 March 1962, pp. 22-24.
36. H.G. Debs., Vol. 653, Col. 1340, 14 February 1962. Speech
by Mr Erroll, Prasrdent of the ïX)A,
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37treatment of the Monopolies Commission • One Conservative bach-
38bencher accused the Government of snubbing the Commiesion and a
prominent city journal argued that, aftor the Government's decision,
39the Commission could never again be taken seriously by industry ‘, 
Secondly, the Government's lack of urgency in dealing with the issue 
was criticised. It was pointed out that the Report was dated 
6 January 1961g but had not been prasantod to Parliament until 
July 1961. I#y, it was asked, did it take the Board of Trade 
until 28 December 1961 to announce a decision? And why was this 
announcement made when Parliament was not sitting^^?
The second development which indirectly led to a reappraisal 
of public policy was the Government's handling of ICI's attempt to 
take over Courtaulds. ICI had made public their &180 million 
offer for Courtaulds on 19 December 1961. The Courtaulds board 
decided to fight this* offor and after a prolonged campaign, involving 
considerable share purchasing and repeated offers, they succeeded iu 
defeating the ICI bid^^. Despite its outcome, the matter raised 
important issues of public policy, for if the offer had succeeded 
It would have meant the creation of an f887 million combine, the 
largest single man-made fibres group to have been created.
During the period of negotiation between the two firms tlie
37. Of the 24 reports produced by the Commission between 1950 and 
1961, twenty-one recommended Government action in the public 
interest, but in only two of these cases was an order made.
The rest were either ignored or dealt with by consultation and 
agreement between the parties involved# Christopher Layton 
and Richard Lamb, The Morning After, Liberal Publications 
Department, 1965, p. 34. bee also, G.C. Allen, Monopolies 
and Restrictive Practices, London 1968, pp. 119-122.
38. 1370. Speech by Sir John Vaughan
Morgan.
39. 'Case for Enquiry*, T.uvestors Ghronido, 26 January 1962,
40. See- H.C* Debs., cpl cItTr"%T8"'r3fÈ-ï'327; for Hrroll's reply 
see, ibid., Col. 1343,
41. For atT outline of this campaign, see John Pearson and Grahata 
Turner, The Persuasion Industry, London 1965, pp. 249-256; 
William Davis ,19/u7 op. dlF., pp. 38-50,
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Government pursued what appeared to be mi Inconsistent and, to somOf 
an unsatisfactory policy^^. When the bid was first announced, 
î^îr Erroll, the President of the Board of Trade, stated that he 
had no power to refer proposals for a merger to the Mono%)olies 
Commission, Only if the merger took place and a monopoly situation 
resulted would he be able to refer the matter to the Commisslony^ 
and, presumably, ex post facto action might then be recommended and 
taken by the Government, including divestment. This ruling was 
at variance with his stated reasons for accepting Imperial 
Tobacco's assurance not to become involved in the management of 
Gallahers, The President had accepted this assurance so as to 
avoid disruption, yet in relation to the ICl/Courtaulds affair he 
suggested ex post facto action which if carried out would have been 
more disruptive than any attempt to force Xujps to sell Its 
shareholding in Gallahers. Regardless of this inconsistency,
Mr Erroll concluded chat: the Government could do nothing about the 
ICI/Gourtaulda bid and he suggested tliat the public interest would 
bo best served by Che parties involved continuing to sell their 
products as cheaply and efficiently as possible, as thie was the 
only way they could remain a profitable undertaking^^. Thus, 
according to Mr Erroll, the Government's position was that no action 
was possible ex ante, because the necessary powers were not 
available* Likewise, no action was possible ex post facto, 
because divestment would prove too disruptive*
Mr Erroll later appeared to change his mind. In January 1962,
45after consulting the parties involved * , he announced that ho had 
announced that he had not yet reached a final decision^^. But a
42. See Douglas Jay, H.C. Debs., Vol. 652, Cols 696-7, 30 January
1962, This was firmly denied by the Govermneut, see Erroll,
ibid.. Col. 096; H.C. Debs., Vol. 653, Col. 1355, 14 February 
1962.
43. Speech by Erroll, H.C. Dabs., Vol. 651, Col. 1546, 21 December
1961.
44. XMd., Col, 1548,
43. Se0*™Fearson and Turner, op, cit., p. 254% speech by Jeremy
Thorpe, H.C, Debs., Vol. 632, Col. 40, 22 January 1962.
46. H.C. Debs., Vol."65, Col. 38, 23 Jamsary 1962.
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later he returned to his original view that the Government
should take no action and that the merger could be judged only by
resulta^^* At this point it X'/aa not <it all clear what policy
guidelines the Board of Trade was following. Nor did the
CoverniMi'it appear to he in agreement on the issue» Lord Hailsham
and the Karl of Sx^ inUon stated, in contradiction to Mr Erroll,
that the Government did have powers which could be used against:
the proposed mergerg but had decided not to use them because of
the lack of information on the matter^^. Furthermore, there was
a lack of agreement about the objectives of the Government's
policy; Erroll emphasised the Government's belief in a "free
enterprise ©cortoay" controlled by the disciplines of a free market,
whilst Henry Brooke suggested that the Government should encourage
Aq
large groupings in the interests of promoting exports '.
As 3hivis has noted, the Goverwimnt'a rejection of the
Monopolies Commission's recommendations for the Tobacco Industry
and its hmidling of the IGI/Gourtaulcls bid revealed "how little
thinking the Government had done about the whole subject of
SOtakeovor bids and mergers" * the Conservative Party
soDie back-benchers were concerned that the Government should
51clarify and reassess its policy' . One Conservative MF, Sir
John Barlov?, threatened to vote against the Government on an
52Opposition motion on Private Hoîïopolies Another back-bencher,
Sir James Pitman, Introduced a "Monopolies Divestment Bill" under
47.
48.
Speech by Erroll, H.C* Debs., i^d.@ Col* 895, 30 January 1962. 
Sea spexïch by The Earl of Sx-finton, H.L» Debs., Vol. 236,
Col. 1163, X February 1962; and speech'Ty^ord Hailsham,
H.L. Debs., ibid., Col. 1198.
49, See speech by Erroll, H.C* Debs., Vol. 653, Col, 1338,
14 February 1962; and speech by Henry Brooke, Col. 1447*
50. William Davis 1970, op. cit., p. 49. See also **W Policy 
for Mergers'a The BconomisU, 3 February 1962.
51* Reports of a CoacîerVafcxv'e Party mecitlng held on 31 January
1962 suggested that nine out of ten of the Conservative Xff’s 
attending xmre critical of: the Government' a handling of both 
issues, H.L. Dabs., Vol. 236, Col. 1151, 1 February 1962.
Strong criticism also came from the City, see The Financxal 
Tim.es, 31 January 1962.
52, H,C. Debs,, Vol, 653, Col, 1413, 14 February 1962,
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the ten minute The Bill was "brought in", in addition to
Sir James, by leading members of the Conservative Members' Trade
and Industry Committee, namely Sir John Vaughan Morganp Robert Carr,
Geoffrey Hirst and Julian Ridsdale. The Bill was scheduled for
Second Reading on Friday, 23 March 1962 but, in the event, the
54
debate did not take place • From hereon the Conservative Members'
Trade and Industry Committee became the main focus of dissent and
in May 1962 tabled a motion appealing for "safeguards against 
55monopoly"
The President of the Board of Trade had already announced that
he would undertake a general review of policy in the light of the
experience gained since the passage of the 1956 Restrictive Trade 
56Practices Act » He later Implied that normal policies had proved
inadequate by suggesting that mergers and groupings were "perhaps
going too far" and invited interested parties to submit their views
57to the Board of Trade . Finally, in May 1962 the Government 
announced that the Board of Trade review would be "major" in nature 
and that consideration x-^ oulc
I
of Resale Price Maintenance"
j'ould also be given to the related problem
58
The first response from within the Conservative Party to the
Board of Trade’s invitation for the submission of views by
interested parties was made in February 1963 by a Committee of
the Bow Group. In general this committee proposed a return to
pre-1956 procedures, with an enlarged Monopolies Commission working
59
in groups but with ex ante powers . In March 1963 a report on
53" H.C. Debs., Vol. 655, Cols 1126-1129, 13 March 1962.
54. H.C, Debs., ibid.. Col* 1129,
55. The motion was sponsored by Robert Carr, Sir John Vaughan
Morgan, Geoffrey Hirst, Sir James Pitman, Peter Tapsell and 
Trevor Skeet, For full text see The Guardian, 31 May 1962,
36. Speech by Erroll, H»C. Debs,, Vol. 652, Col, 896, 30 January
1962.
57, H.C. Debs., Vol, 653, Cols 1354-5, 14 February 1962,
58, The Guardian, 31 May 1962,
59, Monopolies and Mergers, Bow Group, CPC 270, London 1963,
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Bîonoxîoly and mergers policy prepared by a Conservative committee
under the chairmanship of Lord Poole was published* This committeo,
60established in May 1962 , had a membership of nine, including the
Chairman, and back-bench opinion was xrell represented in the form
of seven biPs, most of whom had expressed concern about the
61Government's policy *
In their report the members of the Pool© Cornaittee argued
"that the existing machinery for the investigation and control of
62
monopoly is inadequate" * They rccomraended that a Registrar of
Monopolies should be established with the task of preparing
evidence and referring cases to the Commission* This, it: xms
argued, would relieve the Commission of much of its preparatory
work and enable it to achieve a heavier workload* More importantly
perhaps, in contrast to previous practice, it would also give the
crucial pox^ er of initiating investigations to some agency other
than the Minister. In relation to mergers the Committee proposed
that any proposal concerning a company with not assets exceeding
one million pounds or resulting In a combination of net assets
exceeding £1*5 million would have to be notified to the Registrar*
He would then determine xAiether the merger xms liable to result in
market dominance* If it was shown that it ïiiight do so, he would
then refer the matter to the Monopolies Coimission, and their
recommandât ions would be submitted to the Board of Trade.
Furthermore, any merger liable to result in market dominance would
be illegal until either the Registrar had notified the Company
that in his view market dominance would not result or the Monopolies
63
Commission had made its reconmiondations * To enable the Commission
INI >11 ■ii.iiiMiiriaiir» -Tiiinrrii-'r— ïiiir- inr—  -r-n r— r-n— t—rrv'- -n r— r 1----- - ---- i—  ------- --------- — — ............................. *
60. For full terms of reference, see Monopoly and the Public 
Interest, CPC 273, London 1963, p* 3*
61. The membership of the committee was as follows: Lord Poole,
Viscount Caldecote, Robert Carr MP, John Harvey W?, Sir
Lionel lleald MF, Bir James Pitman 1ÎP, John Rodgers MF,
William L. Hoots and Arthur Tileyy'MP; ibid., frontispiece.
62. Ibid., pp* 11 and 34.
63. Ibid., 'p. 24.
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to carry out this work the Committee proposed that it should be 
enlarged and enabled to operate in groups, and that the Ck>vernrfient 
should be given powers to require regular raturne, order 
divestment of assets, or impose restrictions on prices, as the 
Commission might recommend# Finally it was proposed that 
monopolies in commercial services should be subject to investigation 
and that the terms "monopoly" and "public interest" should be more 
closely defined by statute^^.
On 16 January 1964, nine months after the publication of the 
Poole Committee*# report, Edward heath, who was responsible for 
Board of Trade matters in the new administration under Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home, announced that the Government intended to introduce a
"comprehensive competition policy" covering ros'âie price maintenance,
65
monopoliae, mergers and restrictive practices # Resale Price 
Maintenance (ilPH) - the practice by which manufacturers obliged 
retailers to sell their branded goods at stipulated prices “ had 
been under consideration by successive governments since 1919^^#
In 1961 the President of the Board of Trade, Frederick Erroll, 
advocated the abolition of Wli to the Cabinet. The Cabinet rejected 
this proposé! because of the split it might provoke in the ranks 
of Coneervative MBs and their supporters in the constituencies^^.
The issue was left in abeyance until the Autumn of 1963 when John 
Stonehouse, a Labour MB, obtained first place in the Private Member's
64# Ibid#, pp. 34-36# In addition to these two Conservative
publications, a spate of other literature dealing with the 
issue of monopolies and mergers appeared throughout 1963.
These included Mergers P*dt and Present, and Mergers, the 
Effect on Managers, Acton Society Trust, 19u3; Douglas Jay, 
&:^r^ïI:S"ïü"the~New Society. Labour Party, 1963; Desmond 
Banks, Liberals and Economic Planning, Liberal Publications 
Department, 1§63; William MemieXl, Takeover, London 1963,
WCP 1964, No. 2, 27 January 1964, p/ZS. "
66# Ronald Butt, The Power of Parilament, second edition, London 
1969, p. 251. Mr Butt provides a well informed account of 
the RFM 'revolt' amongst Conservative back-benchers in Chapter 
9 of his book, "Resale Price Maintenance, A Study of Baek-Bench 
Influence", pp. 251-274. Much of the fallowing account of 
the abolition of HPMis drawn from Butt#
67. Ibid., p. 256.
WWHÉI-WbqlwWiM*
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68
Ballot and introduced ü Bill in December to end RPM . Clearly
Heath would have to make his omi position clear in the light of
this development, and with the support of the Cabinet he decided
to introduce legislation to abolish Id?M outright, x^ rith only one or
txw exceptions# In the division on the Second Reading of the Bill,
twenty-one Conservatives voted against the Government and about
twenty-five others deliberately abstained# This rebellion has been
well documented, but it should be pointed out tha,t It xras of such
a nature as to force both back-benchers and ministers to seek a 
69compromise « It was agreed that there should be two amendments to
70
the Bill# The flrht dealt with tho practice of "Loss Leaders" , 
and the second altered the provisions of the Bill so that, instead 
of being presvmied illegal but subject to appeal, all IiFM ;ir rang aments 
xvcre/'lo be. "registered" and the Board of Trade xxjuld have the function
of recommending cases to be broia^ ht forxmrd to the Restrictive 
71Practices Court ' , These concessions hel%)ad to end the back'' 
revolt and the legislation finally reached the statute' 'book.
The other elements in Heath's "eomprehensive competition
policy" proposals for monopolies, mergers and restrictive
practices were presented to Parliament in the form of a White
72Paper in March 1964 # The Government bad decided that because
of the complex nature of these Issues It would not he possible to
Introduce legislation to deal with then before the end of their 
73term in office « The White Paper thus represented the final 
detailed outline of the Government's proposals for reform published 
prior to the 1964 General Election.
68, Ibid,, p, 260,
69, Ibid,, pp. 264-274; Andrmf Roth„ Heath and the Heatlnuen» 
London 1972a pp. 176—8,
70, Log 8-leading is the practice of offering for sale, goods
belo'W cost x^rice in order to attract customers Ho other
goods in the shop.
71, Butt, op._ cit., PX3. 267-260p
72, Houopolies» Mergers and Restrictive Practices, Cmud 2299,
IR'iüO, Londoïi March 1964.
73, Ibid., para* 45*
250
On the issue of monopolies the Governsient reaffirmed their
view that It was wrong to introduce into law the idea that a
monopoly was in itself undesirable^^# Nevertheless, the
Monopolies Commioaioii was to bo strengthened and the existing
legislation was to be extended# First, by the appointment of a
Registrar of Monopolies with the task of selecting cases for
reference to the Commission (subject to Board of Trade approval),
investigating the facts of each case, and providing the Coamission
75with full Information # Secondly, the Govermnetit was to take
effective powers to ensure tiiat, If negotiations failed, the
Commission's recommendations would bo enforced, including powers
to enforce divestment of interests subject to the approval of
Parliament iu each particular case^^# Thirdly, the Commission
was to be enlarged from ten to twenty-five members and was to be
given the right to work simultaneously in groups on several 
77enquiries at once #
On mergers, the Monopolies Commission was to be empowered
(at the direction of the. Board of Trade) to inquire into any
proposed, or recently completed, Ktiergor which might result in a
78monopoly or increase the power of an existing monopoly • Wmre 
action was recommtmdcd a completed merger was to be treated in the 
same vmy as a monopoly; where it had not been completed, the 
Government was to be given powers to prohibit it or to attach
7 0
conditions * It was made clear, however, that the Government
had no intention of sacking powers to hold up a proposed merger
while it was being investigated, on the grounds that this might
80"frustrate desirable wargera" •
74. Ibid., para# 8#
75. Ibid., pams 12-15,
76. , paras 16-18,
77. Ibird,, para. 19.
78. Ib:ul#, para# 2i.
79. Ibid.p para « 27.
80. Ibid., para, 25#
*#iy*î>6*itaUn<t‘Kf —
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On the related ieau© of restrictive practices it was proposed
81that the loopholes left by the 1956 Act should be closed ,
particularly those relating to "information agreements" ,
"bilateral agreementa"^^ and "agreements to the like effect"^^.
Whether the supply of services should be brought within the scope
of restrictive practices legislation was left open. A "pragmatic"
approach was to be adopted, whereby the Monopolies Commission was
to be given power to make enquiries in the field of commercial
services but only when requested to do so by the (k^v&ramont* Once
an enquiry was made it would rest with the Government to take
B3
app#opfi&&G action *
The proposals contained in the Government's 1964 White Paper
were to form the basis of Conservative structure of industry policy
ill the years ahead* In the Party's 1964 General Election Manifesto,
under the sub-heading "Modernisation and Competition", some of the main
86points of their policy were reiterated * The Conservatives pledged
that in the next Parliament their first; major Bill would be one
designed to strengthen the Monopolies Goramlsslon, speed up its work
and enlarge the Govemmmit'a powers to implement its recommandations.
Such a Bill, they claimed, would "enable us to deal with any merger or
87takeover hid likely to lead to harmful monopoly conditions" ,
In sum, the incunaistency and relative ineffectiveness of 
competition policies in the 1950s and early 1960s culminating in 
the Government's handling of the ifonopoliea Commission's report on 
the Tobacco industry and ICI'a bid for Courtaulds aroused widespread 
concern about the operation mid adequacy of monopolies and mergers
81* Ibid*, para. 29*
82* Icbld., para. 32*
83* W£d*, para. 36*
84. Ibid*, para. 37*
85.
86.
lo&u*, para. *
Ibid., para. 7&3.
^^ *Proaparity with a Furpoae", In F.M.S. Craig (ed.), British 
General Election Ikmlfastos: 1918-1966, Chichester 1970,
pp,”0CFHïï7 
87. Ibid., p. 218.
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policy# Within tïie Conservative Party, an influential section of
back-benchers expressed dissatisfaction with their Government's 
policy, and a widescale review was put*, in hand. As a consequence, 
towards the end of their term in office, the Conservative Government 
published proposals for important reforms in existing legislation 
governing monox>oliae, mergers and restrictive practices.
One important outcome of these events was that competition had 
re-emerged as a central element in Conservative economic policy. 
During the final years of the Macmillan adiainistration, the liberal 
strand in Conservatism appears to have enjoyed little support in 
Government circles. The preceding ease studies demonstrate that 
more corporatlst measures, such as economic planning and a centrally 
administered incomes policy, were favoured and these were to remain 
the primary components of Conservative economic policy up to and 
during the 1964 Election. However, as the case of structure of 
industry indicates, an alternative, competition, wao already in the. 
process of development^^.
XII. The Conservative Party in Opposition; 1964-1970
I. A Competition Policy
As previously noted, soon after the Conservatives entered
Opposition in October 1964, comj^etltiou emerged as the primary
element in the Party's economic policy. It may be recalled that
the initiative i>n this development t^ as taken by Heath and his
closest aidea^^. Over the next twelve rmnths, under the general
slogan of a "competition policy", a series of policies were evolved
including proposals for reforms in the external structure of 
0() ^
British industry^ . These proposals were designed to fulfill
m. Ibid.
89. Bee above. Chapter Six*
90. HOP 1965, No. 14, 12 July 1965, p. 382; HOP 1966, No. 24,
29 Hecestior 1966, pp. 686-91.
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two principles outlined by the Party’s policy-makers, namely the
encouragement of individual ini and the crea.t:l(>n of a
91competitive industrial environment * They involved action on 
two fronts; first, action to curb monopolistic and restrictive 
practices; and second, action deaihjucd to encourage small 
businesses.
Afi far as monopolies, mergers and restrictive practices v/ere 
concerned5 Conservative Leaders accepted the 1964 White Paper as 
the blueprint for their policy. In this field at least policy 
had already been formulated andg therefore, death did not establish 
a policy group to consider these matters""® Thus when, in March 
1965, the Labour Government introduced a bill on monopolies end 
mergerfig the Conservative Front-Benclx criticised the measure only 
in no far as it departed froxa the proposals contained in the 1964 
White Taper.
The Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965, reorganised and enlarged
tb.e Monopolies Commission, and increased the Government’s power to
act on the Commission’s reports and to call for general reports
93from the Commission on restrictive trade practices • As Allen 
notes, the Act "embodied an almost identical policy" to that 
outlined in the Conservative Government’s 1964 White Paper^^. There 
ware, however, a few ixaportant differences, In soma ways the Act 
want further than the previous Government’s proposals* For 
instance, it gave the Board of Trade power to delay the completioti 
of any merger into which the Ocnaraisslon had beexi afsked to enquire, 
in addition to xxowera to prohibit mergers and dissolve existing
91* Speech by Heath in Inverness reported iu Tiio Timea,
20 September 1965.
92, For a list of the policy study groups established by heath
iu the 1964-66 period, see pp. 74-5 above,
93, The Hvouopolies and Her^|erB Act 1965, c. 50,
94* G.C. Alien, Monopoly and Restrictive Practices, London 1968,
p, 126, Alloa's analysis was supported in the Conservative 
Farty’s Chn>>|:)aign Guide: 1970, CCO, London 1970, p. 246,
95monopolies . Mergers subject to investigation wore those that
involved the takeover of assets exceeding £3 million as well as
96those likely to lead to a monopoly situation * Thus size, as
well as market dominauGOg was now open to question. The Act
97specifically dealt with mergers amongst aewspapers « Moreover
the Board of Trade was given powers,, exercisable on the Commission's
recommendation, to require the publication of price liste and to 
98control prices « Finally, services were brought fully within the 
Commis3ion’s a m b i t T h e  Act did notp however, implement some 
of the previous Conservative Administration’s proposals. In 
particular^ It did not attempt to close the loopholes in the 1956 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act and, more importantly, the Act did 
not provide for the appoinfciasnt of a Registrar of Monopolies.
The Opposition Leaders welcomed the legislation in general
principle, although they criticised the more detailed points of
difference outlined above. In the Second Reading Debate, for
instance, Anthony Barber, speaking from the Opposition Front-Bench,
supported the proposal to enlarge the Monopolies Commission to
twenty-five members and to allow several enquiries to be dealt
with concurrently. Equally he supported the granting of powers
to the Commission so as to enable it t© investigate the provision
of oervicoG^^^. But he could not accept the Government's proposal
for the suspension of mergers before they had taken place, on the
101grounds that it might frustrate "desirable groupings" . He
regretted that there was no provision for the establishment of a
Registrar of Monopolies and that the Government had not taken
10?
measures to deal with restrictive practices" Barber also argued
95. The Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965, op. cit.. Section 3(5)
and (6)g Section 6(7) and (8).
96. Ibid.p Section 6(l)b(ii).
97* Ibicf.a Section 8,
98. Ibid*, Section 3(4)(b) and (c).
99. Ibid.9 Section 5(1)(a).
100. IhCr DnW*. Vol* 709, Col, 1227, 29 March 1965.
101. Ibid., CoA, 1229.
102* ibid., Col. 1231.
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that; entry Into the Comaon Market would require a reatructring of
British industry and he accused the Government of displaying an
X03"almost pathological hostility to big business" ' *
Likewise, other Conservatives objected to the "absolute size"
clause of £5 million net assets contained in the Bill and argued
that the solo criterion for reference should remain actual or
potential market dominance^^^, Opposition members also criticised 
1
Clause 3(3c) which dealt with the publication of price lists
and the control of prices on the grounds that such powers might be
abused^^^. Not all Conservatives, however, were opposed to the
proposal to hold up mergers. Of the five Opposition back-benchers
who spoke in the Second leading Debate on the Bill, for example,
three supported the provision and one indicated that it did not go 
107far enough « Thus the legislation received a warmer welcome on 
the Conservative back-benches than from the Party Leadership, 
although all were agreed that despite its fallings the measure 
should not be opposed and it was passed without a division.
The Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965 inevitably stole some of 
the Conservatives' thunder, but It did not lead to any significant 
change in policy. Instead the Conservative Leaders accepted the 
general provisions of the Act, while emphasising what they considered 
to be its shortcomings. In addition they adopted a proposal, 
previously suggested by Terence Higgins^^^, for the removal of 
protective tariffs from industry in which competition was considered 
inadequate. The policy, thus amended, was set out in the Opposition's
103, Ibid,. Cols 1222-25.
104, SeeTspeeches by Terence Higgins, ibid,, Col, 1307; Charles 
Fletcher-Cooke, ibid,, Col. 1269,
105, This became Section 3(4)(a) in tha Act.
106, Sir John Rodgers, H.C, Debs., op. cit.. Cols 1254-5.
107, Bee speeches by William Bhepherd, @ol. 1282; Rodgers,
tbid.s, Col, 1258; Flatcher-Cooke,%bld., Col, 1271.
108. Terence Higgins, Tha Second McnagerT^ Revolution, CPC 317
April 1965, pp. 16-20.
f&raK policy etatewnt published in October 1965, as on@ of several
"naw meaAuron" designed to create "vigorous competitive conditions"
for British industry* Tba document akatod that*
The Labour Govomment^s monopolies loginlation it in 
many respecta inadequate* Wd would clos# the 
loopholes in the proaunt l&giol&tion dealing with 
restrictive trading agraawentB . * , A Regiatrar of 
Monopollos needa to h# appointed to &p&od wp and 
i;ive Kioto punch to tlie work of the Monopoli#8 
Cosmioaion# In considering c&a&s for reducing 
protective tariff* on apacific item in appropriate 
c&Boe wo would take into account tW recommendation* 
of tha Honopoliea Cotmiaaion#3^*29
In addition to maaauro* danigned to curb monopolistic and 
restrictive pr&ctlcea the Conmorvative# aleo developed a policy 
for amall buAinceaca# Early in 1905 a study group was ostabliahad 
to consider policy in this field and one of it* mambnra, Barnard 
Woa&herill MP, was cant to tha United Gtataa to IwoBtigata the 
working* of tha U6 Small Bualnaaa Bureau, In October 1965, tha 
Party published two propoaala deel&ned to ancouraga email bualnaaaaa, 
First, it wao proposed that a Bmall.Buaineae Development Bureau b@ 
eatabliahad, with the function of providing consultancy earvicec, 
marketiu# information and a general link between email buaineaaaa 
and a "full range of apceialiat aervicea". It wan to have 
centrally placed headquarters and regional officaa staffed by 
paraonnel with buainoaa exparianco, and it was to ha financed by 
Covernment grants'and by charging for the eervicea provided, 
Secondly, it was propoeed that an Industrial Guarentae Corporation 
should h@ cro&t@d to help small companioa raiae capital by &ivin& 
guaranteeQ, on a comiaaio%% baaia, on loena made by existing
financial inetitutiona for the financing of novel proceaeee or
ill)
the manufacture of new type* of product ' .
109, Cutting Britain kight Ahead, CCO, Loudon 1965* NCP 1965,
No* 21, 22 Novadbar 1#&5, p, GOG*
110. NÜH 1965, No* 21, on* cit., p, 609» Tha proposal for an
Industrial Guarantee Corporation tmc recommended by the 
Mdcllffo Comkittco, c w  Oomdttee on the Working of the 
ïkmutary Uyetom, €mki 827^ #10% honfiT 19S¥T Sea alao 
F ë S m ’iflSStlîÆ'ill, Acorns into Oaks, CPC, London March 1969,
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As previously indicated, both the policy for monopolies,
mergers and restrictive practices and the policy for small
businesses formed an important part of an overall competition
policy. By October 1965, with the publication of the Opposition'a
first policy statement, this policy had emerged as the central
111clement in the Conservative economic programme * In this 
document a@ tmll as in the Party's 1966 General Election 
Manifesto, tha departure from the position taken up by the 
previous Conservative Administration tma self-evident, if
119
unstated' ", However, in relation to one aspect of tha 
competition policy, the proposals for monopolies and mergers, a 
continuity of policy development was partially maintained. In 
particular, the guidelines laid down in the 1964 Wtito Paper were 
adhered to and remainod the basis of Conservative policy in this 
field, Follwfing the 1966 Election, in the face of developments 
in the structure of British industry and the consequences of the 
Labour Government's own proposals, those guidelines ware to prove 
inadequate*
2# The Development of the Labour Government's Policy; 1966-1970
In the %>revious section the early stages in the development 
of the Opposition's policies for tho structwre of industry have 
been outlined. The next section contains a two-pa):t analysis of 
the Opposition's critique of the Labour Government's policy: the
first part covers the period from March 1966 to December 1968, and 
the second, the final eighteen months of Opposition. Within each 
part the issues are treated thematically aa well as chronologically, 
and an attempt is made to relate the Labour Government's structure 
of industry measures to the clarification end expansion of 
Conservative policy in the same field.
(1) March 1966 "*■ December 1968
During the first two and three-quarter years of the Labour
111. Putting Britain Bight Ahead, dp, cit.
112. "Action Hot Words", in F.W.8. dral^1970, op. cit., p. 257,
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Government:*3 second term in office the Opposition’s critique of
the Administration’s policy for the structure of industry was
mainly centred upon three developments: the Industrial
Reorganisation Corporation (IRC), the Industrial Expansion Act
and, less importantly, legislation to deal with restrictive
practices. The IRC was established in 1966 to further the
rationalisation of British industries, especially those liable
to result in increased exports or more rapid technological 
113advance . It was granted wide powers of action including
powers to acquire, hold and dispose of securities; to form
bodies corporate; to provide loans and guarantees with respect
to loans made by others; and to acquire and dispose of premises
ab] 
115
and plant, machinery and other e q u i p m e n t T h e  IRC was le
to draw upon Exchequer funds up to a limit of £150 million 
Once a chosen scheme had proven profitable it was assumed that 
the Corporation would dispose of its investments in the concern^^^,
Following its establishment the IRC became involved in some
of the largest regroupings to have taken place in Britain,
117 118
including the mergers of UEC/AEI , BMH/leyland and GEC/English
119Electric . The IRC was most heavily criticised after taking 
part in the operations which led to the purchase, in June 1968, 
by George Kent Limited of Cambridge Instruments Limited and the 
rejection of the bid by the Rank Organisation for the latter company.
113, White Paper, Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, Cmnd 2889, 
IRISO, London 1966.
114, Industrial Reorganisation Corporation Act 1966, Ch, 50, 
Sections 2(1), (^" "and (3),
115, Ibid., Section 7.
116, For an outline of the establishment and operation of the IRC, 
see William Davis 1970, op. cit., pp, 132-48; Stephen Young 
and A,V, Lowe, Intervention in the Mixed Economy, London 1974, 
pp, 39-120.
117, For a detailed outline of the IRC’s role in the GEC/AEI 
merger, see Anthony Vice, The Strategy of Takeovers, 
Maidenhead, Berkshire 1971, pp. 17-19; William Davis, 
ibid,, pp. 72-74,
118, Anthony Vice, ibid,, pp. 35-36; William Davis, ibid., p. 99,
119, William Davis, ibid., pp. 81-2; Anthony Vice, ibid,, p, 21,
This result was achieved aliter bids, coimtor-bida, and considerable
ahara xairchaaea by the
The Conservative Front-Bench criticised tfia legislation
establishing the IRC on the grounds that, in the words oi; Anthony
Barber, it was "designed to cripple iireo enterprise through state 
1 '>1
i n t e r v e n t i o n " The Opposition Leaders took ijurfcicular
exce'pfciou to Clause Two ot the Bill, in which the powers of the
IRC were outlined: these they regarded as "too wide" and "too
arbitrary", and coneera was expressed that the use of these
3 22
powers was not to be subject to the approval of Parilament 
However, many Conservatives did see some merit iu the proposal. 
John Hott indicated that ho X'?oiild have supported the measure, if 
the Corporation had been granted powers to advance fixed interest 
capital and had not been given equity powers'" ". Furthermore, 
of the nine Conservatives who participated in the Second Reading 
Debate on the IRC Bill, six, including two Front-Heneh spokesmen, 
supported the films of the legislation, their objections being 
solely concerned vjlt'h the m e a n s . Ancl both Ïhront-Bimch 
s^jokeemim suggested that the Opposition would have accepted a 
purely infoir^aitivo and co-ordinating agency and "might even, have 
accepted a catalytic organisation to assisi: the promotion of
1 91j
industrial rationalisation"' «
In général the Gonscrvatlvea* position was that the 
restructuring of industry should be left to market forces with 
the role of government reduced to n purely persuasive capacity, 
although some maintained that a reformed IRC might play a useful
120® "The Campaign Guide: 1970", t.@ p. 243& William Davis,
ibid.. Pi). 13C>'«9.
121. H%CT Deba., Vol. 734, Col. 233, 19 October 1966»
122. iHdlJTlkTl. 240.
123. Col. 327.
124. Hir Arthur Verc-dlarvoy, Cols 250*‘'54% A.GoF, U.a1.l-
Davis, ibj^c, Cols 259-66^ Martin Maddan, , Cel. 238;
John NottT"ibid., Colu 321^9% Anthony Barber, ibid., Colo 
233-241; David Price, ibid., Colo 331-42«
l25o David Price, ibid.- Col. 340; Anthony Barber, ibid., Col. 241.
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function iu this process#
Following the eotnbliuhmaut of tho IRC, opposition to it
I ?6
amongst certain sections of the Conservative Party hardened #
The Party Leadership, however, did not reject the agency outrightj?
Indeed over the nmct few years their attitudes towards it tended
to mellow# Xu 1968, for instance, Sir Keith Joseph, speaking
from the Opposition Front-^Bonch, admitted that the foara expressed
by Conservative spokesman about tha ovicratioa or. the. IRC had not
'127
been wholly fulfilled"' # Two years later ha committed a future 
Conservative Government to retain the XHC In a modified form#
"stripped of its power to iTajjosa Its will on the market; with 
its taxpayers funds reduced; and with îiarrower terms of 
r of ar euce"
The second of the Labour Covemraeut'fj measures in the structure
oi industry field which served as a focus for the Opposition’s
1 pt)
dissent was the Industrial Expansion Act 1968" " # tfncler this
legislation ministorn ware given %)owar@ to provide financial
assistance "for industrial projects calculated to imrirovo
effioioncy, create, expand or sustain productive capacity or
130
promote oi* support technological improvements # « «" « The
financG for these operations was set at an overall limit of 
131
£100 million' and this money was also made, available for schemes
126# Bee the debate on Trade^ Industry and Transport at the 1968 
Party Conferencej, NIJCUA Qtith Ant.u:tal Conference k#)prt, 1968, 
NUCUA, London 1968% pp# 9.9-X0O® Alto, motions Nos 672-746, 
and No. 682 in particular^ in
Programme Froo^dings, HUCUA, London 1968, 153-165#
V ^ " 7 5 7 T ^ l .  1 February 1968#
128# ThnTcdAjlo tha Annual (.leruiral moatiîTtg- of the Young Conservatives 
National Advisory CJoimriittee, 7 March 1970, CCO Seryice, ^
ref. 167/70, p# 22* Bee also, speech by Blr"lCeIth "jcTseph, 
"*^ K^fu?Cp"'lÏ6l;h Annual Conferanca Report^ 1968’% op«_ cit#, p. 100-1#
129. Proposals for an Industrial Expanaion Bill were firsF outlined 
in January 1968 in a hh.ite Paper, Industrial Expansion,
Cmnd 3509, IMSO, London January 1968.
130. Xncmstriai Kxpaïision h£t 196B, Üh. 32, proii.iubXee
131. Ibid.5 Hectiou 4(2?.
oi' general industrial reorganisation, such as mergers and 
132re-groupings *• In addition to these broad measures the Act
contained various specific proposals for expenditure, including
133financial assistance for the development of Concorde , the
134US Queen Elisabeth II , and the acquisition of Beagle Aircraft 
133Company # The Act, through its provisions, extended the 
powers of the National Research Development Corporation and the
The Opposition was totally opposed to the provisions of the
Industrial Expansion Act. Their objections were outlined by
Sir Keith Joseph, and were basically fourfold. First, the
Cppoi-^tion objected to the width of the powers being given to
the Government by way of enabling legislation; secondly, they
objected to the Government being given powers to lend taxpayers*
money without proper Parliamentary sanction; thirdly, they feared
that taxpayers* money might be used to support industrial "lama 
137ducks" ; and finally, they argued that the Act could be used
138to expand the public sector , Far these reasons Sir Keith
committed the Conservatives to opposing tha measure and further
promised that it would be repealed when his Party returned to 
13Q
power • He stressed that in the exceptional case where a scheme 
required support, and both the market and existing agencies 
were unable to help, Chen the specific proposals should be brought 
forward as a Bill, so that each subvention could be properly 
scrutinised by Farliament^^^»
132, Ibid.. Section 2(1)(a),
133, XbTd%, Section 8,
134, Ibid,, Section 9,
133. , Section 12(a),
136, J6id,, preamble.
137, As far as tha author can ascertain, this is the first recorded
Instance of the term "industrial lame ducks" being used by
a member of the Conservative Party Leadership during the 1964 
to 1970 Opposition period,
138, a.C. Debs,. Vol. 757, Cols 1600-3, 1 February 1968,
139, Ibp%, Col. 1605.
140, Ibid'., Col, 1605.
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In addition to the Industrial Expansion Act, in 1968 the 
Labour Government introduced a Restrictive Trade Practices Bill*
This legislation made it possible to exempt certain agreements 
designed to promote efficiency or productive capacity and agreements 
to hold dox*m prices. In addition an attempt was made to close 
some of the loopholes left by previous legislation* Conservative 
spokesmen expressed concern about Clause 5 of the Bill which 
covered information agreements. This went further than they 
would have wished, by including agreements relating to quantities, 
descriptions, costs, proceeses, customers, areas,
Apart from this one minor point of disagreement. Conservatives 
welcomed the Bill and gave it their full support.
}A9
The 1968 Restrictive Trade Practices Act " brought 
information agreements within the scope of existing legislation 
for the first time. By so doing it fulfilled one of the key 
proposals contained in the Conservative Government * s 1964 White 
Paper and one of the main points of the Opposition's own policy.
Thus the Act did not serve as a major target of Opposition 
dissent. In contrast the IRC and the Industrial Expansion Act 
wore vigorously contested by the Conservatives. Moreover, in 
addition to the detailed points of criticism already outlined. 
Opposition Loaders argued that both measures reflected an important 
alteration in the Labour Government's structure of Industry 
policy*
To the Conservative Leadership, the IRC and the Industrial
Expansion Act were representative of a newly conceived, and quite
deliberate. Government doctrine of "selective" intervention in
143support of specific industries and chosen companies ‘ • Opposition
141. SBC speeches îsy Fatsrlck Jenkln, H.C* Debs., Vol. 763, Cola
1022-28, 30 April 1968; A.C.F. Hafl-D'ovirs, ibid.. Cols
1032-1040.
142. The Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1968, Ch. 66.
143. gpeach by Heath, The Times, 4 baptember 1967*
spokesmen argued that eucU "eelective" iuterMoutioix lu the day-to-
day affaira of Industry v?aa unjuatlfiod^ and that instead government
should limit itaolf to getting the "general pressures right" so
that* "within a framework of civilised laws and Institutions"*
competitive free enterprise might flourlsh^^^. Furthermore,
they argued that the Government's policy reflected an "absurd
145prejudice in favour of giant firms" * and had directly resulted 
in the growing trend towards large industrial unlta^^^. For the 
Conservatives, Sir Keith Joseph pledged that hla Party would 
accept "no trend towards giants" and he indicated a preference 
for a balanced industrial structure, containing firms of all
Sir Keith's attack upon what he regarded as the Labour 
Government's deliberate attempt to encourage the formation of 
largor industrial units suggested that an laiportant alteration 
had taken place in the Opposition's own position. At the beginning 
of the Opposition period it was the Conservative,-Leadership who 
had argued in favour of greater Industrial concentration* It 
may be recalled that during the Second Reading Debate on the 
Monopolies and Mergers Bill in 1965, Barber had accused the 
Labour Government of displaying an "almost pathological hostility 
to big busineso"^^^* Equally, In the Second Reading Debate on 
the IRC Bill, David Price, speaking from the Opposition Front-Bench, 
commented that the only value of tîie Bill was th© recognition by 
the Government of the Importance of mergers^^^. Furthermore,
144* Speech by Sir Keith Joseph at a Greater London Trade Union
Advisory Committee meeting, 24 January 1970, CGÜ Kews Service, 
ref 46/70, p$ 9 and p* 2,
145* S p e e c h S i r  Keith Joseph, "KUCUA, 86th Annual Conference 
Report, 1968", op. cit., p. 100.
146* Speech by Sir Ke£th Tjroseph, H.C* Debs., Vol. 791, Cola 93-94,
10 November 1969.
147. "MUCUA, 86th Annual Conference Report, 1968", ' P# 1(%).
148. H.C* Debs.. Vol. 709, Cola 1222-25, 20 March 1965.“
149. U.C. Debs., Vol. 734, Col. 337, 19 October 1966*
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this generally favourable attitude to roBtructériug was rol'lactad
150
on the Oppoültion Bnck-Benchea ' • Yet, as the Labour
Administration appeared pirogreoaiveXy more favourable to big
buainesa, the Opposition responded by placing greater ompbaeie
cqjon the problems of small nnd middle level businesses, and charged
151the Government with discrim?,nating against thora ' * Xn doing ao
the Opposition reflected the growing press and parliamentary
152concern about the pace and shape of merger activities , while,
at the same time, responding to the strong support for small and
153medium firms amongst their oxm rank and file ,
ThÊï apparent shift in both Parties' positions on the
question of industrial concentration did not mean that the
Conservatives had become totally opposed to the creation and
existence of large industrial units; rather that the Opposition,
in order to criticise the Government's policy effectively
emphasised those aspects of its own policy which were mainly
concerned with the problems of small and medium ai&ed firms.
Behind this tactical shift in emphasis the attitudes of the
Conservative Leadership towards, first, industrial concentration,
and second, merger policy, rermilsied consistent throughout the
Opposition period. In the former case they argued that firms
could be either too small or too big and that there were no 
154absolutes , The same crltoriem was applied to mergers, namely
150. H.C. Debs., Vol. 709, Cols 1244-308, 29 March 1965; Vol. 734, 
ColTBcPsog, 19 October 1966.
151. Speech by Sir Keith Joseph, "HUCUA, 86th Annual Conference 
Report, 1968", cit., p. 100,
152. See Section Xi ^^ (î^ icrnl Background and Introduction" above.
153. This was reflected in the series of motions submitted on the 
issue of small businesses at the 1967, 1968 and 1969 Party 
ConferencesSee Conference Handbook and Programme of
R U K A | | Hill p 1 1 W W » j  '' " # '3 #
Proceedings, MUCUA, London 1907, motions Wos 600, 601; xbid», 
MUCIM, London 1968, motions Nos 717-19, 720, 722, 723, 724, 
seven in ào&al; Ibid., RliCUA, London 1969, motions Mos 1058-70, 
twelve in total. See also HUCUA, Central Council Meeting,
Handbook, April 1970, lootiona Nos 72,  '827 ' W % c m ,
Central Council Minutes Book", MiîCüA, London.
154. Speech by David Price, H.C. Dabs., Vol. 734, Col. 337,
19 October 1966,
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that there wore no absolutes, no hard or fast rules by which they
could be aesfâssed, and that, except for those which threatened
mrkeu dominance, moat could be left to the arbitration of market 
1 S5
forces’ .
In 8wa, during the period from March. 1966 until Decmaber 1968, 
three aspects of the Labour Goverimieut'a structure of industry 
policy particularly concerned members of the Conservative 
Opposition. These were, the IRC, the Industrial Expansion Act 
and the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, the latter was 
favourably received by the Opposition and it effectively removed 
one of the main points of the Conservative's structure of 
industry policy. The lEC and the Industrial Expansion Act, 
on the other band, were strongly criticised by Opposition 
personnel, and Party Leaders pledged that under a future 
Conservative Government the former would bo maintained only in 
a much modified form, and the latter repealed. In addition. 
Opposition Leaders considered that both measures reflected a 
nex^  Government policy of "selective" Intervention and that this 
contained an unjustified prejudice In favour of larger groupings. 
Their criticism of the "trend towards giants" aeomad to suggest 
that the Opposition Leadership had ctimuged their position since 
1966. beyond the rhetoric of party debate, however, Opposition 
policy remined in cott£om5*ty with traditional British practice^ 
Zkmiely, in the fields of monopolies and mergers, there wore no 
absolutes, no bard or fast rules.
(11) January 1969 *• June 1970
During the last eighteen mouths of the Labour Government*f3 
second term in office, membero of the Opposition concentrated 
their criticisms upon four aspects of the Administration's 
structure of industry policy. First, its policy in relation to 
cangloi'iicrate mergers; secondly, its policy for the textile
155. speech by Sir Keith Joseph, H.C. Babe#, Vol. 791, Cols 93-4, 
10 November 1969.
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industry; thirdly, the apparent lack of clarity and consistency 
in the application of Government policy; and finally, the 
Government's proposed Commission for Industry and Manpower, X
have chosen, for the sake of clarity, to deal with each issue 
separately, although there is considerable chronological overlap 
between them#
In January 1969, Anthony Crosland, President of the Board of
Trade, referred the proposed mergers of Unilever/Allied Breweries
156and Rank Organisation/De La Rue to the Monopolies Commission #
Neither of these appeared to threaten market dominance but both
were conglomerate in nature# In the following June the Government
accepted the Monopolies CoRmiission's recommendations to allow the
Unilever/Allled Breweries merger to proceed and to oppose the
137merger of Rank Organisation with Do La Rue # In the latter
case the Commission opposed the merger on the general grounds that
the efficiency and trading volume of De La Rue would be adversely
158affected and that this might harm the public interest • More
particularly, the Commission argued that if the merger proceeded
the SBuior management of De La Rue xfould resign and that
consequently some trading relations with foreign outlets would
be jeopardised with a subsequent risk to exports and the balance 
159of payments • In the case of Unilever/Allied Breweries, the 
Commission argued that "marginal gains" in efficiency were likely 
and that there were no clear "indications of likely damage to 
the public interest"^^^. In both cases the leain criterion of
156. The Times, 29 January 1969*
157. The Times, 3 June 1969, 12 June 1969.
158. The Monopolies Commission, The Rank Organisation Limited and 
the De La Rue Company Limited; A Report on the Acquisition of 
^le De iJii Rue Company Limited and General Observations on 
Mergers, li.G. Paper 298, June 1969, pV 29, par^ 1^, "
159. Ibid., Chapter 4, pp. 12-22, especially paras 42-44 and 
‘^Conclusion", paras 104-5.
160. The Monopolies Commission, Unilever Limited and Allied 
Breweries Limited: A Report on the Proposed Merger and 
General Observations on Mergers, H.C* Paper 297, June 1969, 
p. 28, para. 124.
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assessment was efficiency, not si%e or market dominance; and this 
marked a departure from the traditional guidelines generally 
followed by the Monopolies Commiesion and the Board of Trade.
Conservative Leaders ware critical of the decision to refer
conglomerate mergers to the Monopolies Commission# Sir Keith
Joseph accused the Adminiatration of leaving the operation of
mergers policy to the "arbitrary decision" of the Commission or 
3 61
Ministers' , and ho made it clear that in the eyes of the
Conservative Leadership conglomerates xjere "neither inherently 
162good nor bad" # He was vjilling to accept that there was a
danger that if too many took place the result would be a "corporate
state" with industry controlled by a few men, but emphasised that
163such a situation had not yet emerged , If, hoxmver, the«pace 
towards conglomerates accelerated. Sir Keith conceded that there 
XTOuld then be a case for referring some mergers to a tribunal#
Such a tribunalg ho went on to say, would need to take into account 
"whether the particular conglomerate under consideration, added to 
such other conglomerate laargers as had occurred, threatened the 
knoxai fabric of social, political or econoWc life'«,164
The Opposition were also concerned about the Labour
Government's handling of the textile industry's problems# In
February 1969, Crosland, after preventing a bid by Courtaulds
for English Calico, established a committee, under the chairmanship
of Edmund Dell, Minister of State at the Board of Trade, to revlox?
165the structure of the textile industry • In July 1969, the 
Government, in line with the recomiuendations of the Dell Committee, 
imposed a standstill on mergers between the five major textile 
«lEmufacturers^^ # Five months later ICI announced a bid for
161. H.C. Debs#, Vol. 791, Col# 99, 10 November 1969.
162. Ibid., Col# 94.
163. Ibiff., Col. 95,
164. Did., Col. 98.
165. TÎIe"'Times, Leader, 7 February 1969; The Guardian, 7 February 
1969.
166. The Economist, 3 July 1969.
•»-nwwr fTr-wli<«i<*a»u3WMw •
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Viyella with a view to a merger with Carrington and Dewlmret# In
response to this the Government appointed a further committee,
under Harold Lover, to look into the relations between fibre and
167
textile producers and to consider the ICI bid ' . Thla donimittee
recomended that the freeze on mergers should continue, but that 
tîic proposed ICI bid for Viyclla should be allowed to proceed 
subject to the undertaking that ICI xm&ld reduce its share In 
the combined company to 35 per cent and tjould not use Its 
shareholding to influence the two companies in their choice of 
fibreo^ '^ ^. The Government accepted these rccoimnendations, and 
were sharply criticised by the Opposition for doing so. Sir Keith 
Joseph questioned the legal basis for the freeze on mergers 
imposed after the Dell Committee's findings, and suggested that 
the Government was acting in an arbitrary mid secretive manner 
in its dealings with the textile industry. Conservatives would, 
he claimedp have referred ICI's bid to the Monopolies Commission, 
while leaving the restructuring of the textile Indust?:y to the 
adjudication of market forcoo^^^.
The reference of the proposed mergers of Unilover/Allied
Breweries and Rank Organlsatlon/De La Rue, the prevention of
Gourtauld's bid for English Calico, and the subsequent establishment
of tÎKï Dell Committee, all contributed, to widespread speculation
in the national press about the nature and objectives of the
Labour Administration's policy# In particular, it was suggested
that these developments were indicative of a radical change In
170
Government thinking on mergers and industrial restructuring *
In June 3.969, Crosland seemed to confirm this analysis by revealing
167. The 2 January 1970.
168. Statmaent by Harold Lever, H.C. Debs», Vol. 798, Cols 1432-1441,
25 March 1970. The proposa'3% 'aToo""contained a provision that 
there should be only one ICI director on the new board.
169. Ibid., Cola 1435-6.
170. The Times, 30 January 1969, 19 February 1969; The Guardian,
'Z7 February 1969. *"*”
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Chat he no longer accepted chat size was a guarantee of 
171efficiency . To some this apparent alteration in Board of
Trade attitudes left mergers policy in a confused and undefined
state, and demands were made, in the press and Parliament, for
172& clarification of government practice ’ In July 1969, in
an attempt to clarify the situation, the Board of Trade published
173a handbook entitled Mergers? A Guide to Board of Trade Practice ,
The Guide contained four main sections? first, an outline
of existing legislatlon^^^; secondly, an outline of the matters
taken into account by the Board of Trade in deciding whether or
175not a merger should be referred to the Monopolies Commission ;
tMrdly, a description of the Board ' a procedures in considering
mergera^^^; and finally, an analysis of the réle of the
177Monopolies Commission in relation to mergers • In addition,
a number of Annexes were attached, including the Monopolies 
Commission's previously published General Observations on 
Mergers , the texts of a series of speeches delivered in the
.■■■I ^ lÉMi ninlitrfrfni — *
179
first half of 1969 by Anthony Crosland , and the City Code on 
takeovers and mergers^
Basically the authors of 'the Guide' conformed with the
171, . Speech to British Chambers of Commerce, The Economiet,
28 June 1969; Board of Trade, Mergers; A GuI3e""to"'Sard 
of Trade Praeticeg BMSO, I.ottdoTrTsFu97*Am
172, The LeaJer, 3 March 1969; "Looking for Yardsticks
lîTthiT'Wrgers Qarae", The Times, 29 April 1969; "Urgent 
Meed for a Conglomerate Foïïc^, Times, 21 May 1969; 
Oral question by Peter Emery to PresWwFof the Board of 
Trade, E,C, Debs.. Vol. 777, Cols 1308-9, 12 February 1969.
173, HMSO, LonSon“T?i9, op.^  cit.
174, Ibid., Chapter 2,
173. "Xbl^ ., Chapters 3 and 4.
176, Ibid., Chapter 5.
177, Ibid., Chapter 7.
178, Ibid., Annex 4; op. cit., 1969,
179, Guide to Mergers,“l)pT"cIt., Annex 5.m. f !■ ■» i ■I MW ■l«lMI*lmrTWL —
180, Ibid., Annex 6.
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traditional British "pragmatic" approach to structure of industry
questions. For example, they argued that "there is no one right
181structure which would he equally applicable for all industries" •
They made it clear that a "pragmatic" approach aould lead to some
confusion about policy aims* but maintained that the Government
182was pursuing a consistent policy . Crosland, in his contribution, 
elaborated this point. He argued that in relation to each 
merger the same questions were poseds however, the nature of
183each merger differed and the answers were not always the same .
The view that the Government was pursuing an inconsistent and
ambiguous policy was forcefully articulated by some membars of the
Opposition. In March 1969, John Osborn, secretary of the 1922
Committee, asked why the proposed mergers of Unilever/Allled
Breweries and Rank/De La Hue had been referred to the Monopolies
Commission, while the comparable Cadbury/Schweppes merger had
not^^^. In June 1969, the House debated a motion introduced by
Keith Stainton which lamented the "lack of a clear Government lead
in relation to recent reports of the Monopolies ComBdseioii and 
185related auitters" . The Conservative Leader added his weight to 
this back-bench pressure when, in February 1970, he expressed 
dissatisfaction with the Government's decision to refer the 
proposed merger between Burmah Oils and Laporte to the Commission, 
while deciding not to refer the Reed Paper Group's bid for 
In each instance Conservatives demanded a clarification of 
Government policy on monopolies and mergers. At the same time, 
however, other Conservative back-benchers were critical of the 
lack of a clear lead from their own party leaders. In November
181, Ibid., p. 1, para. 1.
182. 1 0 % , para. 2.
103. Ibid., Annex 5, p. 61.
184. oFaT question, H.C. Debs., Vol. 780, Cols 469-70, 19 March 1969
185. H..C. Debs., Vol. 786, Cols 98*104, 30 .funa 1969.
186. The'TSes, .27 February 1970. For the background to the
ReSTlHf"Venture sea "Rise and Fall of XFG", in Anthony Vice 
1971, op. cit., pp. 46-62, asp. p. 54.
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1969* for exmapla, Peter Hordarxi, joint vice-chairman of the 
Conservative Members' Finance Gomitteo, demanded a clear 
statement of Conservative policy on xaonopoXieo and mergers and 
added, "we have been waiting a long time for . His
request was not answered.
The final development which served as a focus for Opposition 
dissent was the Government's plan to reform and reorganise the 
machinery of monopolies and mergers policy. In part, reform was 
required in order to clarify the overlapping functions shared by 
various departments * From 1968 until 1969, for example, no less 
than four ministries were concerned with merger policy. These 
were the Department of Employment and Productivity which sponsored 
the National Board for Prices and Xncomeo, the Board of Trade 
which was responsible for the Monopolies Comïu.asion and the 
Restrictive Practices Court, the DBA which sponsored the IRC, 
and the Ministry of Technology which was mainly responsible for 
the Industrial Expansion Act. Tn November 1968, The Times 
carried a report of a Cabinet fight over the future of the 
Monopolies Commission: It stated that Barbara Castle (DEP),
Peter Rhore (DEA), and Anthony Wedgwood Benn (Min. Tech.) were 
in favour of abolishing the Commission and transferring its 
functions, in revised form, to the HBPÎ. This view was opposed . 
by Crosland (BÛT) and the Treasury^^^. A month later the sam 
newspaper reported that an inter-departraental committee under 
Cabinet Office chairmanship had recoiiwiended that the Monopolies 
Goimisoion should he regained and strengtbened^^^. In March 
1969, Crosland acted to strengthen the Commission by appointing 
seven new members, and in July he announced 95 per cant pay 
increases for the seventeen part-time members of the Commission^^^, 
Despite these defensive moves, in October 1969, the responsibility
187, H.C. Debs., Vol. 701, Col. 104, 10 November 1969.
18b. The Times, 5 November 1968.
189. Th^Tajoes’, 23 December 1968.
190. TliTHmm, 6 March 1969, and 22 July 1969.
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for monopolies, mergers and restrictive practices was removed from 
the Board of Trade to the DBF, At the same time the Government 
announced their intention to rationalise the work of the 
Monopolies Commission and the fïBPI and combine them In a new 
body.
The Opposition voted against the transfer of functions from 
the Board of Trade to the BEP, Sir Keith Joseph argued that the 
BEP was the wrong place lor an agency whose main function was to 
protect the public from abuses of mrket power* Moreover, 
because of its experience in company structures, Sir Keith felt 
that responsibility for monopolies was best left with the Board
SUÎ
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of Trade "* . Other Opposition speakers supported the views
expressed by their Front-Bcuch spokesmen
In January 1970 the Government published a "consultative 
document" setting out their proposal to amalgamate the Monopolies 
Commission with the NBPX in a new body to be known as the 
Commission for Industry and Manpower* This agency, it was 
argued, would bo capable of considering both the public interest 
and induDtrial efficiency, while at the same time allowing an 
integrated view of productivity, prices, incomes and competition# 
The Commission was to be advisory in nature, acting upon matters 
referred to it by the Government, with a full-time chairman, 
nineteen other conmissioners and a full-time Secretariat# The 
criterion of reference outlined in the document included all public 
'#a#ter matters, monopolies, all major firms with net assets of 
more than £10 million, price reviews, pay settlements, and 
restrictive practices in the provision of services# In addition, 
it was proposed that the merger provisions of the Monopolies and 
Mergers Act 1963 should be extended to allow the Commission more 
effectively to review the résulta of regroupings some, months, or
191, H.C, Debs#, Vol. 792, Colo 1635-41, 3 Uecember 1968.
192. by Charles Fletchor-Cooke and David Howell,
Ibid., Cols 1642-4 mid Cols 1649-50, respectively.
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even years, after they had taken place" ',
Despite strong opposition from the CBX* who regarded the
Government's scheme as a veiled attempt to restrain prices,
legislation was introduced in March to enact the proposals
outlined in January 1970# The Commasion for Industry and
Manpower Bill, in addition to the points outlined in the Green
Paper* involved the granting of important powers to the Government,
including the power to demand from individual firms and
dag^
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enterprises information about price lists, financing^^^, price
increases* dividends, pay elaims, and settlements'
The Opposition criticised the CIH proposal as a further
example of unjustified "state intervezitiou" and as a further
196episode in the "Government's ill-fated incomes policy" •
Robert Carr pledged that his party, if returned to office, would
197create "a more powerful and effective Monopolies Commission” 
and indicated that Conservatives objected to four of tlie broad 
proposals contained within the Hill# First, they considered 
that; the process of reference to tlic. Monopolies Commission placed 
too much power in the hands of Ministers, and, in keeping with 
established party policy, Carr advocated instead the appointment 
of an independent Registrar of Monopolies^^^# Not: all 
Conservatives were, however, in agreement with this proposal.
Sir Hamar HicholXs, a member of tlia 1922 Committee Executive* 
interrupted Carr and pointed out that: some Conservative back-benchers 
held strong reservations about the idea of a Registrar# They
193. CoBEuissloii for Industry and Manpower. Department of Employment
and Broduetivity, #180, London January 19/0,
194# GGitimisalon for Industry and Manpowers Explanatory and
F a ^ a n c i 0 T , H.C# Bills, Session 1969-70, No# 123, 
Clauses 13 and 14.
195. Ibid.»■ Clauses 38-45.
196. Speech by Robert Carr, H.C. Debs., Vol. 799, Col. 582,
8 April 1970#
197. Ibid., Col. 583.
198. "10%., Col. 585.
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were* he maintained* particularly troubled by the question of. hlfi
power and his accountability^^^. Carr's second objection related
to the criteria of reference. He made it clear that Conservatives
disliked the idea of size being used as a criterion, and argued
that the only valid test for reference remained "market power and
200limited competition" " • Thirdly, he stated that Conservatives
wore opposed to the proposal for follov;-up enquiries on 
201
mergers • Finally, Carr a#gued that the Opposition were
concerned about the powers of ministers under the Bill, which
he maintained wore "too wide, too loosely defined and too 
202arbitrary" " . Despite these criticisms no pledge was ïnade to
abolish the CIH at a future date and the Opposition simply
9Q3
committed itself to "radically overhauling the Bill's provisions"'” •
During the final eighteen months of their period in 
Opposition, three features of the Conservatives' attack upon the 
Labour Government's structure of industry policy were particularly 
noteworthy. First* the criticisms Outlined by Opposition 
spokesman of the Government'a handling of conglomerate mergers 
and the restructuring of the textile industry conformed closely 
to their position as previously outlined in relation to the IRC 
and the Industrial ixpansion Act. Namely that selective 
intervention in the day-to-day affairs of specific companies 
was unjustified, and tliat instead, wherever possible, government 
intervention should aim at affecting the overall industrial 
framework %mthin which all companies operate..
In addition, the Government’s activities in relation to
199. Ibid., Cols 388-9.
200. As proposed in the Green Paper the CÎH Bril contained a 
proposed criterion for reference of £10 million net assets. 
See speech by Dudley Smith, ibid., Cols 664-3.
201. Ibid., Col.588.
202. Col, 389.
203. ïïofâêch by Dudley Smith, ibid.. Col. 669.
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conglomerates and Che texcilo industry sugge&ced to many Conservatives 
that the Adaiinistration was pursuing an inconsistent policy.
Although this was firmly denied by member6 of the Government who 
claimed to be following a traditional and accepted pragmatic 
policy* Opposition personnel continued to press the Government 
for a clear outline of policy aims.
Finally* the Opposition's attack upon the Labour Government's 
proposals to establish the CIM* reflected* in part* the fear that 
one of the major componeiito of the machinery of a competition 
policy (the Monopolies Commission) was about to be integrated 
within the ambit of the Government's prices and incomes policy.
To the Conservative Leaders this seemed the wrong a*pproaeh and 
they emphasised instead their* desire to create an independent and 
streamlined Monopolies Commission.
In concluding this account of the Opposition's critique of 
the Labour Government * s policy during the period from 1966 to 1970, 
it may be said that the Conservatives were able to clarify their 
attitudes towards certain specific issues, such as the IRC, the 
Industrial Expansion Act and the GXH. The general aims and 
objectives of Conservative policy remained, howaver, somewhat 
confused. Party spokesmen had, for instance, rejected any trend 
towards giants; they had also made it clear that at some future 
date conglomerates might require to be investigated by some fom 
of special tribunal. Moreover, they had accepted that in certain 
cases, where the market or existing agencies proved Inadequate, 
Government involvements in the day to day affairs of industry, 
properly sanctioned by Parliament, was justified, Ilow gould these 
specific objectives be balanced with the Conservatives' rejection 
of selective intervention and their advocacy of a policy of 
general pressures affecting all companion alike?
The nature and operation of the machinery of Conservative 
policy on monopolies and mergers also remained ill defined. In 
part* the Party Leaders continued support for the traditional
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British "pragmatic" approach meant that Opposition spokesmen, like 
their Labour counterparts, were unable to specify precisely what 
criteria they would follow in dealing with individual cases.
Yet* even if allowance is made for this explanation* certain 
aspects of Gonsarvative policy remained unnecessarily ambiguous.
Most iraportautlya as far as some Conservative back-benchers were 
concerned. Conservative Leaders had not dealt adequately with the 
role and function of the proposed Registrar of Monopolies* nor 
had they outlined in any detail tltelr plans for reforming and 
streamlining the Monopolies Commission.
Thus, altliough Conservative attitudes towaxds specific aspects 
of the Labour Government's programme were clearly Articulated, the 
general objectives and the nature of the Conservative alternative 
remained undefined. Precisely how Conservative personnel 
approached these problems of policy clarification and the extent 
to which they managed to resolve them is outlined in the final 
section of this chapter,
3, The Conservative Alternative
The following analy.sis forms a continuation of the argument 
developed in Chapter Six and a previous part of this chapter under 
the heading "A Competition Foliey", of which throe points may foe 
recalled. First, a significant alteration in the emphasis of 
Conservative policy prioritioa took place in 1965, and this was 
reflected In the presentation of vvhat may be termed a competition 
policy, Secondly, this change in policy emphasis was initiated 
and largely carried through by a small section of the Party 
Leadership with the assistance of certain members of the Party 
bureaucracy. Finally, despite the change in policy emphasis, as 
far as monopolies and mergers were concerned Opposition spokesman 
continued to support the policy laid dowi in the 1964 White Faper^^^.
204. CUriîid 2294, op, cit.
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Following tlio 1966 Gcmoral Election the isisun of induotrial
policy was hotly debated within the Conservative Party. From
within the Shadow Cabinet, Fowe.lI outlined a critique of what ha
termed "intervontionism". He argued that govemnent ohouXd not
be immlved In industry because it was not competent to judge or
asaeao matters pertaining to industry. Further* the effect of
Intervention was inevitably the creation and sustenance of an
evfrr growing bureaucracy which served to limit individual freedom,
stifle Initiative and ran contrary to the workiags of a free
market;. His solution was a cutback in government involvement
and a wide scale reduction of the public sector by denationalisation^^^,
Within the Parliamentary Party some MPa appeared sympathetic to
Powell's viewpoiat^^^, but it was among the rank and flic that he
was to enjoy the greatest support# At the 1967* 1968 and 1969
Party Coaforences motions were submitted by constituency party
members which called for a cutback in the public sector and a
207prograTWiie of wholesale denationalisation" ,
In line with the intra-party demands for the development of 
a more overtly antl-intesp/eutionisfc policy* the Leadership 
established a study group to consider the operation of state 
industries and the viability of schei-ies for denationalisation.
The study group submitted its report to the Shadow Cabinet in 
July 1968 and recommended that steel, the civil airlines* British 
Eoad Services mid certain bus services should bô.denationalised;
205, J, Enoch Powell, Freedom and Reality, London 1969, pp, 42-71 
and pp, 85-100,
206, tSee speeches by Nicholas Ridley, H,C, Debs, Vol. 757» Cols 
1651-56, I February 1968; Peter Hordern, ibid,. Vol. 791,
CoIb 99-104, 10 November 1969; John Osborn, il^i., Vol. 734, 
Cols 277-8* 9 October 1966.
207, NÜCIÎA, Conference Handbook and Programme of Proceadingo, London 
1967, pp. 116-8; NÜCUA, Conference Handbook and Programme of 
Procoedrngs, London 1968, p p 0 j o n s  Nos 681-4, 687, 
GrCTlLC693, 698, 700, 703, 716, 715; NUCUA, Conference 
Handbook and Programme of FroceedrngSo XjOîidon 1969* pp. 121-41,
im fc ii'ifi ml iiM# WWW>1*11» I# nrr'iTcrt iiioinnrymwii)»wi—K*iW*—*i*<—>*»>"»»f in  ^
motions Hog 409-550; îlÜClîA* Central Council Handbook, NUGÜA, 
"Central Council Minute Book", Harch 1969, London 1969, 
resolutions 66-68, calling for denntionalisation.
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that there should be no further nationalisation; that an end should
be brought to Labour's "creeping nationalisation" through such
bodies as the IRC and such measures as the Industrial Ex^jansion
Act; and that state indtisfcries should be rim on a more efficient
208
and profitable basis' .
Party Leaders agreed with the study group's findings that
the scope for denationalisation was limited* but Powell continued
to articulate strong feelings within the Mass Party by emphasising
the practicability of wholesale denationalisation^^^. At the
same time, both Powell and du Gann called for the fomulation of
more distinctive Conservative policies of a more overtly free 
920
enterprise nature*"' . In response* heatli made it clear that he 
would not be forced into adopting an extreme anti-interventionist 
position. It was* he maintained* a fact of econoraic life that
governments must intervene in economic affairs simply because they
211ware responsible for half the economy .
Thus g during the Opposition's second term the development of 
Conservative attitudes towards industrial questions was 
characterised by at least two features. First* the scope of 
the debate altered, in tetmo of the personnel involved, Most 
notably it spread beyond the confines of the ^relatively small 
group which had initiated and carried through the major re-asseaament 
of party policy in the preceding two years* Secondly* the 
substance of the debate altered* in terms of the issues Involved.
In particular, amoxigst certain sections of the Party, a strong 
reaction was articulated against the idea of any but the most 
limited form of government involvement in the affaire of industry.
208. The Times, 19 September 1968.
209. Interview on BBC radio, ib&d.
210* September 19ÏÏS’*
2X1. S^Qch at Keith* Banffshire, The Times, 11 September 1968; 
sea also article by Ian Trethowan, The Times# 26 Soptember 
1968,
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In sum, tho consequences arising fvom the wldescslc cimngea
in the scale and nature of British hulustry during the 1960a and
tha measures carried through by the Labour Government (reviewed
in earlier sections of this chapter), plus the strongly anti-
interventionist position adapted in Opposition by some uiembera of
tiie Conservative Party, all formed the background against which
the Opposition's post-1966 structure of industry proposals were
developed. The task of fomiilatâng\l5.Gso proposals vras primarily
the responsibility of Sir Keith Joseph* v/ho in February 1967 had
bean appointed Chief Opposition Front-Bench Spokesman on Trade and
212
Steel in succession to Anthony Barber**" \
To assist in his task* Sir Keith could call upon the 
help of a team of Conservative HFg and party officials. With 
him on the Front-Bench were Dir John Eden, who from X968 was 
spokesman on Bower with special responsibility for heavy 
industries, tmd David Price, who combined hla role as spokesman, 
on Science and Technology with practical experience as an ICI 
executive and industrial consultant* They ware joined by 
Nicholas Ridley, who became Opposition Spokesman on Technology 
and Trade in 1969, and Simon Wingfield Digby, who wao Opposition 
B'pakesman, and chairman of the Conservative Hembers' Sub-committee 
on Shipping and Shipbuilding. Sir Keith could also call upon 
the help and advice of key members of the relevant Parliamentary 
Party Committees, such ac Michael Shaw and' Charles Flatcixer-Cooke, 
joint vice-chairmen of the Conservative Members',Trade Committee, 
Sir, harry Legge-Bourke and John Osbom, joint vice-chairman of 
the Conservative Members' Teehnology and Science Committee, and 
Peter Kmery, joint vicc-chalman of the Conservative Members'
Power Committed. Others included Alfred IlaXX-Bavls and Peter 
Blakar, Joint secretaries of the Conservative Heimbors' Trade 
Committee, and David Howell, who an Director of the Conservative
212# Sir Keith was later given an extended title as Chief 
Opposition iront;-Bench Spokesmmi on Trade» Technology 
and Power,
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Public Sector Research Unit was much concerned with science and
technology questions* In addition to this team of Parliamentarians
Sir Keith was able to use the services of the Party's Research
Department, and had first call upon three members of the
213Department's economic section •
Soon after his appointment. Sir Keith Joseph outlined his
general approach to the problems of industry. He developed tvio
themes : first, that Conservative philosophy was the belief that,
within the right framework of law and competition, the private
enterprise system was the best way to serve the needs of the
comnunlty; and secondly, that successive Conservative Governments
since the war had failed to let the free enterprise system work 
214properly , He went on to argue that only a much more vigorous 
private enterprise economy, with more rewards for success and
more penalties (for example, bankruptcies) for failure, could
715alter the standard of living substantially" * Furthermore, the 
creation of such an economy xvould entail government action, 
specifically in the form of intervention in the interests of a 
free market^^^.
Sir Keith further elaborated his approach to structure of 
industry problems at the Party's Annual Conference in October 
1968, At this Conference a motion mie debated calling upon the 
Conservative Party to state "its intentions to reverse the
717
increasing trend of State infiltrations into British industry" . 
Demands were made for a cutback in the public sector and an end
213. In terms of ito responsibilities. Sir Keith's team represented. 
In embryo form, the departmental organisation of the 
Department of Trade and Industry established by the 
Conservative Government in October 1970.
214. Speech at Reading, The Times, 27 April 1967.
215. Letter from Sir Keith Joseph, The Time», 22 May 1967.
216. Ibid. "
217. HUCUA 86th Annual Conference Report, 1968, NUGUA, London
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218to the Labour Government'a policy of "concealed interventionism" .
In reply Sir Keith reiterated the Gonservativea* commitments to
repeal the Industrial Expansion Act, and he made it clear that,
ii: returned to office, the Conservatives would reform both the IRC
719and the Monopolies Commission" and "would re-introduce risk
capital and the management disciplines that automatically go with
220it into some part oi; the public sector" . This latter point 
followed the Party Leader*a pledge, delivered at the same 
Conference, that the next Conservative Covernmont would begin
the réintroduction of private ownership to the nationalised
721
industries * •
The general themes outlined by Sir Keith and the various 
commitments that had been made by Conservative spokesmen were 
organised into a comprehensive policy for industry. This policy 
was outlined in detail by Sir Keith in a series of speeches 
delivered during the months from January to March 1970. Ho 
began by arguing that government and industry could not be 
partners, because their functions were different. On the one 
hand, Industry, under the guidance of effective management, was 
concerned with the creation of wealth, while, on the other,
government was concerned with creating the "right climate" in
222
which industry could most effectively fulfill its task * . Thus
the choice was one "between intervention and general pressures"
designed to create a competitive cnvironraent in which industry
might flourish. Sir Keith made it clear that Conservatives
223
firmly chose the latter" .
218. Speeches by Idris Owen (Stockport North), ib^., p. 991 and 
John llannam (ISxater), ibid », p. 96.
219. Ibid., p. 100.
2 2 0. Ibid., p. 101.
221. Speech by Edward Heath, ibid., p. 128,
222. Speech to Greater LondonT Area Trade Union Advisory Committee,
24 January 1970, GGO Hews Service, ref? 46/70, pp. 7-8,
223. Speech to AGM of the Young Conservatives National Advisory 
Committee, 7 March 1970, COO Haws Service, ref; 167/70.
p. 4.
282
He ntresBfôd, however, that there were at least two reasons 
why a policy of "general pressures" did not mean a XaisBea-faire 
approach to industrial affairs. First, because he was not
advocating "perfect competition in any textbook sense; but
Jhi
225
A
workable competition""' . That is, a fom of competition w ch
comes somewhere between a pure market and a monopoly situation 
Secondly, because, he argued, the creation and maintenance of 
workable competition "calls for deteminad, tireless government
actioa"22G,
Sir Keith pledged a future Conservative Govenmcnt to adopt
as instruments of their policy? first, company law refoiTîi,
including greater disclosure; secondly, tariff reductions;
thirdly, public sector buying practices; and firmlly, a
strengthened and streamlined Monopolies Commission and Restrictive 
227Practices Court . Furthemmre, a future Conservative
Government would reduce the public sector by transferring its
228functionsjj wheresver "practicable", into private enterprise •
As on previous occasions, Sir Keith stated that D^iere a situation 
of actual of probable mtrket dominance did not exist, the size 
of firm was irrelevant since, where there was competition, big
224. Ref: 46/70, op. cit., p. 12.
225. This is the general usage of the term 'workable competition*. 
According to Shockley the concept was first outlined by 
John M. Clark in 19&0. Clark recognised the impossibility 
of achieving perfect competition and argued that : (1) some 
unavoidable departures from the competitive norm may justify 
other departures; (2) potential competition and the 
competition of substitutes may force sellers to behave like 
competitora; (3) unrestrained competition in periods of weak 
demand which forces prices down to marginal costs may prove 
disastrous iu the long run* George W. 8to.eking, Workable 
Competition and Antitrust Policy, Nashville 1961, p. 28.
SIf{ the notion cornea between a pure Ktarket and a monopoly 
situation* However, as Stocking notes, the. "concept is vague 
and the standard of performance by which it is to be determined 
is Imprecise", ibid., p. 30.
226. Refs 46/70;
227. Ibid., p. 13.
228. Tbid., p. 16.
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229companies could not imposa their will’ # /md, following from
this, he argued that governments should not encourage
restructuring, but; should let it take place spontaneously as
230a product o£ market forces ' , Finally, Sir Keith reiterated
the. series of commitments already mde hy Conservative spokesman
including the repeal ox the Industrial Expansion Act, tighter
terms of reference and less powers and taxpayers* funds for the
231
IRC, and help for small businesses •
Sir Keith's speeches aroused widespread speculation in the
national press. Some commentators argued that they were
"revolutionary" in nature and represented o "break with the past"
232and a "fundamental change in Conservative priorities" . In
addition, Peter Jenkins, writing in The Guardian, claimed that, in
comparison to the official policies of his party and its leader,
Sir Keith had taken a laucli more radically free enterprise line.
Thus, he argued, Sir Keith's outline could not in any sense be
233regarded as official Conservative policy ' «
The final statement o£ Conservative policy for the structure 
of industry published prior to the end of the Opposition period 
was contained in the Party's 1970 General Election Manifesto. In 
this document the Conservatives pledged to pursue, a "vigorous 
competition policy", emphasised that they rejected the "detailed 
intervention of RocialisDi", and preferred, instead, "a system of 
général prossures"^^^# The Manifesto revealed an important
229. Xbid., p. 14*
230. Tipecch at Esher, 7 February 1970, CCO News Service, Ref: 87/70,
p. b.
231. Ibid., p. 13; Refs 167/70, op. cit., p. 22; Speech to West 
Midlands Young Conservatives Conference, 21 February 1970,
CCO News Service, Ref; 132/70, p. 7.
232. Anthony H a m s ,  "The Uncositortable Revolution , The Guardian,
26 January 1970; Nicholas Faith, "How Many VoteG**In“““
Enterprise?", TTta Sunday Times, 8 March 1970; Maurice Gorina,
"Setting Industry Fre^, The Times, 9 March 1970,
23$. "The Real Right îioad", 20 Februa:? 1970.
234. A Better Tomorrow, GGO, London 1970, pp. 13-14.
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alteration in the Party's policy for small btir>ineeoea. The
235proposal to establish a Small Business Office' and an Industrial
Guarantee Corporation was not included* In its place the
Conservatives promised that they would re-assess their policy
for small businesses in the light of the findings of the Bolton
Committee which had been established by the Labour Government In
2361969 to consider the problems of small firms ' * Apart from 
this single instance* all other points of Conservative policy 
for Industry already outlined by either Sir Keith or other 
Opposition spokesmen^ were reproduced unamended in the Manifesto*
In sum, the development of Conservative policy for the 
structure of industry in the period following the 1966 General 
Election took place against the background of general alterations 
in the British industrial structure, the nature and consequences 
of the J.,abour Goversmient's policy, and movements of opinion 
within the Conservative Party. Throughout most of the period 
the main responsibility for the evolution and articulation of 
the Conservatives* proposals was held by Sir Keith Joseph, who 
presented a comprehensive, outline of the Conservative alternative 
in speeches delivered during the early months of 1970* Some 
commentators questioned the continuity of Conservative policy 
and the status of Sir Keith's ^pronouncements. His proposals 
were, however, reproduced in full in the Party's 1970 General 
Election Manifesto *
In the light of evidence already presented in earlier 
flections of this chapter and the preceding analysis of the 
evolution of Conservative policy for the structure of industry 
during the Party's final term in Opposition, one point may be 
noted* Despite press comments to the contrary. Conservative 
priorities did not undergo a "fundamental" change in the early
233. The term Bureau had been dropped at the request of CPC 
participants. Interview 10*
236. A Better Tomorrow, op. cit.» p. 13.
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months of 1970,% Sir Keith's remarks may be roro roalieticolly 
regarded as an elaboration and extension of the competition policy 
formulated in 1965# Thus, as suggested in Chapter Six* the 
fimdauiental change In Conservative thinking took place* not in 
1970, but five years earlier* when the Party Leadership decided 
to place emphasis upon priorities distinctly different from 
those which were being pursued by tlie Labour Government or which 
had been followed by the previous Conservative .Mmlniatratlon.
In the years following that decision the structure of British 
industry underwent wide changes* and the actions of the Labour 
Government introduced nmf issuer, into the debate. Both these 
developments meant that by 1969 the detail© of the Opposition's 
earlier policy were no longer adequate and required to be extended 
and elaborated, Throughout most of the Opposition period* 
however* the general philosophy and purpose, of Conservative 
policy for the structure of industry had remained constant: that
was* the creation of a competitive environment in which industry 
could flourish,
IV, Conclusion
III contrast to the preceding case studies* in tiie structure 
of industry field the Conservative Party as Opposition did not 
retreat from the policy position maintained by it in office* 
Although the guidelines outlined in the 1904 White Paper implied 
an extension in the degree of state intervention in the affairs 
of industry, the aim of this intervention was the creation of a 
more competitive industrial structure and this objective was 
closely in keeping with the liberal policy stance emphasised 
during the Opposition period. In addition, the approacli outlined 
iu the 1964 White Paper appears to have been vjidaly supported 
within the Party, and was generally accepted as both necessary 
and desirable. Thus, the issue does not appear to have been a 
matter of great controversy amongst Conservatives, Moreover, in 
the period following the 1964 G©moral Election the Conservatives 
were able to watch the Labour Government pursuing policy proposals
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substantially the same as those which they had advocated while in 
office* Thisdi.d not lead the Conservatives to forego their 
previous position, however, but it effectively removed some of 
the main points from their programme. On both these counts 
structure of industry appears to differ from the previous case 
studies.
Other aspects of the structure of industry case study, however, 
conform more closely to the patterns discerned in relation to prices 
and incomes, economic planning and regional development. In the 
first place, the Conservative Opposition's policy for the structure 
of industry took the form of a statement of general aims plus a 
series of commit-ments to repeal or reform certain aspects of the 
Labour Government *s programme in the event of the Conservatives 
being returned to office. Mith the exception of the Party's 
proposals for nationalised Industries and for small businesses, 
at no point was the Conservative alternative spelt out in any detail. 
For example, the exact nature and functions of a reformed and 
"streamlined" Monopolies Commission, or th© precise role of the 
proposed Registrar of Monopolies, remained ill-defined. Moreover, 
these issues were a matter of some concern within the Party, Thus, 
when the Conservatives returned to office in June 1970, their policy 
for the structure of industry still required extensive development 
and clarification before it could over be carried out in the for»i 
of a legislative prograrimto.
Secondly, the Conservative approach was presented as distinct 
froai that being pursued by the governing party, For example, the 
1963 Monopolies and Mergers Act substantially conformed to 
Conservative proposals but in criticising It the Opposition 
emphasised those, aspects of their otm policy \mich they considered 
to have, been neglected, while their policy for smul 1 businesses 
provided a further point of contrast with the. Labour Government's 
approach. Iu addition, while tJte Conservatives originally attacked 
Labour's "hostility" to big buai-ness, later, as the Government's
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approach appeared to alter, they criticised the iidiuiuiat rat ion's 
"prejudice" in favour of giant firms. Finally, the Conservatives 
developed a general critique of what they tcvmed "interventionism" 
and they were able to contrast this with their own policy of 
general pres sureb $
The development of mi inter vent ionic t position, however, may 
have caused problems for policy-makers. In particular, it may 
have helped to create the misleading impression that Conservatives 
were opposed to any form of Government involvement in industrial 
niEitters, Yet, as heath and Joseph pointed out, a "competition" 
policy implied that government must intervene in the workings of 
the economy so as to create and maintain a competitive situation.
Thus the real argument was not about intervention per se but about 
the purposes of intervention. Moreover, micli an Impression may have 
served f:o encourage those Conservatives who were opposed to any 
but the most limited form of government Involvement iu the affairs 
of industry. For both these, reasons, by condmmiug the Labour 
Government's policy as Interventionist, the Conservative Leaders 
were in danger of overstating the issue and, by so doing, restricting 
their own freedom of manoeuvre in policy formation.
Finally* the case study reveals certain pointa about the 
role played by party influences upon the development of Conservative 
policy in the structure of industry field. The proposals produced 
by the Conservative Government In 1964 were closely in line with 
some of the recomaendations contained in the Poole Report. In 
addition. Conservative bach-benchers, primaxily through the medium 
of the Parliamentary Party's Trade and Industry Committee, were 
deeply concerned about the adequacy of Government policy and vaade 
a nufflbe?: of suggestions for reform. Thus, in Government, In 
contrast to prices and incomes * economic planning and regional 
dovolopmontp party influences appear to have played a significant 
part in the development of structure of industry policy. In 
Opposition* although Party Leaders depended on party personnel for 
assistance and .advice» existing policy was, for the first two years.
288
more or lenn rotainod intact. Wo roviær i?aa initiated and the 
initiative in policy dovelopment anpearn to have been maintained 
by the Party Leadership« After 1966, however, party pressures 
appear to have been m&^e effective. In the face of. strong anti* 
interventioniot demanda from certain individualo and groups within 
the Parliamentary and Hass sectiono of the Party, the Leadership 
appears to have adopted a îrîore radical approach a Horeover, in 
attempting to formulate an alternative;, Sir Keith Joseph appears 
to have d r a w  primarily upon the advice end assistance of party 
personnel «
In sump the case of structure of industry appears to run
counter to the propositions outlined In hypothesis 3, thats
As Opposition a party will forego or retreat from 
policy positions isalntainod by it as Government 
which (a) have been, or are liable to be, controversial 
in terms of party ideology, and which (b) are adopted 
and maintained by its successors in office.
however, because Che monopolies and mergers policy adopted prior to
th.8 1964 General Election was not a matter of deep controversy
within the Party, the cas® does not, contrary to original
expectations, appear relevant to the first of the tw"o postulates
contained in Che hypothesis. Thus, it may be claimed that the
evidenco presented in the case study doe® not invalidate the
original proposition. The case of structure of Industry provides
strong support for hypotheses 2 and 5, however, and is suggestive
on 4, Finally, it may be noted that, although the analysis does
not necessarily conflict with hypothesis 1, it does not confirm
that Party policy produced in Opposition conforms more closely to
Party opinions than policy produced in Government* In general, as
far as the original hypotheses are concerned, structure of industry
appears to be less of a clear cut ease than the other policy areas
chosen for analysis.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Tim CONSERVATIVES IN GOVERNMENT: 1970-1974
Xn the 1970 General Election the Conservatives regained power 
and were returned to Parliament with a majority of 31 seats over 
all other parties. This majority was large enough to allow the 
new Government an excellent opportunity to carry through their 
electoral programme. In this chapter I investigate the extent to 
which they were able to do so in relation to the four policy areas 
outlined in the preceding chapters. Was there a continuity of 
policy between the positions adopted in Opposition and those applied 
in GovernsumtV If so, what was the extent and longevity of this 
continuity? Did the pledges, statements and proposals communicated 
In Opposition restrict the freedom of manoeuvre of the Conservative 
Leaders once returned to povmr?
My analysis of the development of the Conservative Government's 
policy is divided into three phasess from June 1970 to February 
1971, from March 1971 to March 1972, and from the latter date until 
February 1974. Within each of these phases X have tried to draw 
out the m£;in policy trends exhibited by the Conservative Government, 
Xn order to avoid excessive detail in the narrative X have inserted, 
in an appendix at the end of the chapter, statistical tables and 
chronologies of the main policy developtiients which took place in the 
various areas chosen for study during the three and a half year 
period «
Phase I: June 1970 to February 1971
Xn the Queen’s Speech of 2 July 1970 the new Conservative 
Government expressed its intention to pursue two primary aims in 
the industrial and regional spheres. First, “liberating industry 
from unnecessary intervention by Government"; and secondly, 
“promoting full employment and an effective regional development
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policy** • By the late Siumuer the first practical implications of 
this approach were revealed when the Government decided to create
o
a "third force" private airline" and refused to prevent the closure
of the Vickers Croup’s ship repair yard by providing continuing 
3subsidies •
The most significant policy initiatives, however, were launched 
in the Autumn of 1970, Initially Government Leaders attempted to 
reform the organisational structure of the Central Administration by 
creating large scale super ministries, r»iost notably the Department 
of Trade and Industry and the Department of the Environment, and a 
"small multi-diaciplinary central policy review staff in the Cabinet 
Office"^ much along the lines originally proposed by the CPSRU,
These, structural reforms were soon followed in November by
a number of important changes in the regional and industrial policy
fields. First, existing investment grants for manufacturing
industries were replaced by depreciation allowances which allowed
for 60 per cent of c3q>endituro to be written off against tax in the
first year and 25 per cent of the reducing balance in successive
years*, Secondly, in Development Areas free depreciation was
introduced for certain fomns of capital expenditure and the rates
of building grants were increased. In addition, service industries
in these areas were granted the normal depreciation allowance and
it was announced that the Regional Employment Premium was to be
6discontinued after September 1974 • Finally, the new Government
1, H.G. Debs., Vol. 003, Gol, 46, 2 July 1970.
2, The^T^ies, 21 August 1970; 22 October 1970,
3, 26 September 1970,
4, The Reorganisation of Central Government, (kwtd 4506, HMSO,
London October 1970, p, 13,
5, Investment Incentives, Grand 4516, UMSO, London October 1970,
p, 2 and pp. B-ll,
6, g>id., pp. 4*5; New Policies for Public Spending, Gmnd 4515, 
liiiSO, Loudon Octuber ''ïV7ü,'''p%''T7'
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annoimced its intcmtion to discontinue certain aspecta of its
predeceoaor’s policy, The scheme to naUioxialise the ports was 
7dropped , and it was announced that both the IRC and the NBPÏ were 
to be dissolved and the latter was to be replaced by three new 
review bodies for salaries in the public sector backed by an office 
of liianpower economics^.
The November policy initiatives and the Oovernment’a 
determination to lessen the scope of govermmnt intervention in 
the day to day affairs of industry set the tone for the development 
of policy during the next few months. In late November 1970 
requests for financial assistance for both the Mersey Docks and
Harbours Board and the development of the British Aircraft
10Corporation*B 3/11 short-to-Kiediumr-haul jet were refused • In
Decauber 1970, the EDCe for paper and board, the Post Office,
11rubber, hosiery and knitwear were wound up • In addition, the 
TilC limit was raised from 5,000 to 10,000 square feet, except in 
the Eastern, London and South East, and the East and Nest Midland 
regions, where the limits were raised from 3,000 to 5,000 square feet
December 1970 also saw the publication of the Coal Industry 
Bill and the Atomic Energy Authority Bill* The former provided
7* As pledged in the Conservatives* 1970 Manifesto, A Better
Tomorrow, CCÛ, London Itay 1970, p, 1$*
8* See**statemant by Robert Carr; H*C* Debs*, Vol. 805, Col* 668,
2 November 1970*
9. In late 1970 the Prime Minister stated that "the Government
will OGok to intervene én or influence the decisions of 
industrial management to a much smaller extent in the future*
This la an integral part of our philosophy of greater 
freedom and responsibility and less government invervention". 
Midland Bank Review, February 1971, p. 27; see also speech 
by Anthony BûJ^er, H*jC* Debs., Vol. 805, Col, 38, 27 October 
1970*
10* The Times, 20 November 1970; 30 November 1970; 3 December 1970*
11. 3 December 1970.
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for aosiQ o£ the Coal Board’s actlvirJ,Q3 to bo asslotod with private
12capital or sold to private buyers , while the latter proponed the
transference of eubatential parts of the Atomic Energy Authority to
two commercially oriented organisationsî British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.
13and Radio Chemical Centre « In January 1971 the Government were
able to reveal two further developments in their policy for the
public sector. First, it was announced that the state management
of the liquor trade in Scotland and Carlisle would be wound up^^,
and secondly, the Government confirmed that Thomas Cook and Sons
and other travel subsidiaries of the Transport Holding Company would
15he sold to private interests .
Parallel to these attempts to curtail the degree of Government
involvement the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry outlined
the measures being taken "to strengthen the machinery for promoting
competition in iudustry"^^. He indicated that the Government were
not, at that time, ready to introduce legislation but would do so
at: the earliest opportunity. In the meantime, he announced
important changes of practice including the widening of the
GouffiilSBion’s terms of reference so ao to enable it to consider
17the operation of publicly owned monopoly enterprises ,
Although the main trend of Government policy during its first 
seven months in office was in line with the Conservative’s 1970
18Election pledge to reduce "government interference in industry" ,
12. Goal Industry Act 1971, g . 15#
13. Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971, c. 11*
14. ICcT'^ebs., written answers. Vol. 809, Cols 274*6,
19 January 1971.
15. The Times, 28 January 1971; H.C. Debs., oral answers,
v5T r m r  cois 1809.10,17 F e i= ^ m i.
16. Statement by John Davies, H.C. Debs., Vol. 808, Cols 1577*80,
17 December 1970.
17. In Hay 1971 the Govermmnt referred gas and electric connection
charges to the Monopolies Coamission. This was the first
time that the activities of a nationalised industry had been 
referred to the Cowaission. The Times* 18 Hay 1971
18. A Better Tomorrow, op. cit., p. 13.
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two developments during the period ran contrary to the Party’a
earlier comaiitment. First, in Decesiber 1970 it was announced that
the British and Northern Ireland Governments were to assume virtual
control of the Harland and Nolft* shipyard In'Belfast while various
re-organisation proposals were evaluated^^. Secondly, and perhaps
more Importantly, the Government became deeply involved in the
affairs of Rolls Royce* In the Autumn of 1970, while engaged in
the development and construction of the engine components for
Lockheed’s lUi-^ ll aircraft. Rolls Royce found itself in severe
financial difficulties. In November the Government imde £42 million
20available towards research and develo%)ment costs • Despite this
injection of capital» in February 1971 the Company went into
voluntary liquidation and the assets of the aero-engine, and the
marine and industrial gas turbine engine divisions of the Company 
21
were nationalised'’ .
The Government’s decision to intervene in the affairs of 
Barland and Molff and Rolls Royce may in part have been prompted by 
a factor which had not been foreseen during the Opposition period, 
namely the rapidly rising rate of unemployment. Between June 1970 
and February 1971 unemployment in Great Britain rose by 150,000 or 
0*7 per cent and, as on previous occasions, the rise was most 
marked In the loss prosperous regions (see Appendix, Table 11.1).
Xn February 1971 the scope of Special, Development Areas were 
extended so as to cover the Tyneside-Hearside area. West Central 
Scotland and parts of Wales, while employïiieiit exchange areas 
covering Edinburgh, Portoballo, Bridlington, Filey, O&wostry, 
Okohauipton and Tavistock ware designated as Intermediate Areas.
19. Thejii^, 10 December 1970.
20. The Baiik^  agreed to provide a further £10 million. The Times, 
12 November 1970.
21. The Timas, 4 and 5 February 1971. In May the Government 
provided a further £130 million of assistance to Rolls 
Royce and agreed to pay £30 million of the £80 million 
increase in prices negotiated with Lockheed; TheJCimes,
6 May 1971.
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At the same time Government expenditure for infrastructural schemes
lu the Northern Region was Increased by about ISO million per
22annum for three years
Thus, in the seven months following the 1970 General Election
the policies pursued by the Conservatives as Government mid the
statements made by Conservative Leaders closely conformed to the
more liberal policy emphasis developed during the previous six
years, Party Leaders carried through important aspects of the
progrmme formulated in Opposition including the eatablishraent of
a Central Policy Review Staff, the introduction of investment
allowances, the abolition of the NBFÏ and the commitment to phase
out REF* In addition, a vigorous attempt was "made to decrease
the degree of Government involvement in the day to day affairs of
industry as exemplified in the Conservative Leaders* refusal to
23"rescue bankrupt companies" .and their attempts to introduce
private capital into the public sector. On the other hand, in
some instances, the Government’s actions exceeded their earlier
commitments as in the case of their decision to abolish investment
24grants and the IRC . Nor was there any evidence that the Government 
had been able to initiate some of the Party’s more ambitious 
proposals such as the creation of a "system of more selective 
investment incentives", a growth points strategy or a streamlined 
and strengthened Monopolies Commission and Restrictive Practices 
Court. As indicated in earlier chapters, when the Party entered 
Government these proposals were still at a formative stage.
Finally, it may be noted that certain policy initiatives, particularly 
those relating to Marland and Wolff and Rolls Royce, appeared to
22. The Times, 19 February 1971.
23. See^HIcholae Ridley, "How the Lame Ducks Came Home to Roost", 
Thn Sunday Times, 20 January 1974.
24. The overextension of Conservative policy In the case of 
investment grants and the IRC was at least partly a 
consequence of the Government’s resolve to fulfill their 
election pledge to reduce public expenditure. See 
Gmncl 4515, op. cit.
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run directly contrary to the main trend of both the Conservative 
Government’s and the preceding Conservative Opposition’s policy* 
Nevertheless, at this stage, these could still be said to be 
abnormal and exceptional special cases. In general there was 
a close degree of continuity between many of the policy guidelines 
developed in Opposition and those applied in Government,
Phase II; March 1971 to March 1972
Despite the Conservative Government’8 efforts to construct 
an "effective regional policy", the rise in unemployment continued 
(see Appendix, Table 11:1), It was against this background of 
rising unemployment that the Government carried out now policy 
initiatives in the regional development field.
The exact sequence of these initiatives is outlined in 
Document 11:1 in the Appendix. It may be noted that the 
Government’s policy broadly adhered to the guidelines originally 
applied in November 1970 and February 1971* As on these 
occasions assistance was either concentrated upon infrastructural 
reforms or, as far as individual companies were concerned, was in 
the form of allowances against tax rather than cash grants.
Daring Phase II, however, the scope and scale of assistance was 
substantially Increased. Newly committed public expenditure 
in the regions totalled at least £198 million, free depreciation 
was extended to sewice industries in the Development Areas and, 
in October 1971, Special Development Area status was granted to 
Livingstone and Glenrothes. These measures did not amount to a 
comprehensive or coherent policy and the tmre selective and 
discriminatory approach broadly hinted at in Opposition was not 
forthcoming.
In addition to unemployment during Phase II, the members of 
the Conservative Government ware faced with the problem of a 
continuing and rapid rise in the level of inflation (see Appendix, 
Table 11:2). As indicated in Chapter Eight the Conservative
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Leaders fought the 1970 Election without a detailed short term
policy to deal with this matter. It m y  he recalled that during
their period in Opposition the Conservatives had failed to
formulate a comprehensive prices and incomes policy, although
they had not totally rejected the concept of a voluntary approach.
Their only commitment prior to June 1970 was to "subject all
proposed price rises In the public sector to the most searching
scrutiny" " . After abolishing the NBFI, the Government acted on
this commitment by reducing and deferring rises in Post Office
charges, delaying coal price increases, halving proposed steel
price increases, and curtailing rises in bus and rail fares. It
was hoped that by so doing the Covernraent would provide an example
for the private sector to follow and in July 1971 the GBX responded
by requesting its members to lirait price increases to S per cent
for a twelve month period. The ÏÜC, however, failed to respond
to the Government’s request to Biake a complementary and "positive" 
26contribution ,
The Government’s attempts to deal with rising unemployment 
and Inflation had important consequences for the further 
development of structure of Industry policy. On the one hand, 
the curtailment of price rises in the public sector necessitated 
increased Government subsidies for the nationalised industries 
(sea Appendix, Document 11:2), On the other, the need to preserve 
employment, particularly in the problem regions, implies a dilution 
In the Government’s non-interventionist approach.
As far as the preservation of employment in the problem 
regions was concerned the case of Upper Clyde Shipbuilder (UCS) 
aptly demonstrated the policy dileimm facing the Government,
After writing off a £10 million loan to UCS, in June 1971 the 
Government decided to let the company go Into liquidation. At
25, A Better Tomorrow, op, cit., p, 12.
26, Statement by Anthony Barber, U.C. Debs., Vol. 821, Col. 1041,
19 July 1971. ---------
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tlïQ oad of July it was announced that two of the three UCS yards
ware to be closed and sold off and that as a consequence 400
27workers would be made redundant . In an area of high unemployment
this decision met with strong opposition and the UCS workforce
28began an occupation of the threatened yards • By February 1972 
the Government revealed that they were prepared to accept the 
proposals of an advisory group which recoiMiended a £35 million
shipbuilding scheme for the Upper Clyde and the nationalisation
29of the Govan and Scotstoun yards for a five year period •
Finally, in April 1972 agreement was reached with the Marathon 
Cotapany upon the future of the Clydebank Yard and an undisclosed 
sum of public money was contributed towards the venture. Thus 
by April 1972 the jobs of most of the workers at UCS had been 
preserved and the Conservative Government had carried through a 
policy which involved further nationalisation and the comdtment 
of at least £40 million in public expenditure to an organisation 
which had previously been considered unviable*
The extension of Government involvement in the financial 
affairs of industry is indicated in Document 11:2 (see Appendix). 
Between March 1971 and March 1972 the amount of public expenditure 
cmmiitted to specific industries and corporations in the form of 
loans and grants reached a total of at least £643.5 million and, 
although this Is only a very rough calculation, it may b© noted 
that it is considerably more than the sum involved in Phase 1. 
Moreover, of the Phase XI total at least £195 million was expended 
on tB-m companies, Rolls Roy ce and UCS, which had been brought into 
the public sector since the 1970 Election. Of the remainder, 
£434*5 million went to the nationalised industries partly to assist
27. Statement by John Davies, H.C. Debs., Vol. 822, Cols 791-4,
29 July 1971.
28. The Times, 31 July 1971.
29. Assistance to Industry; Shipbuilding on the Upper Clyde,
Crand 4918, HMSO, London March 1972; speech by John Davies,
H.C. Debs., Vol. 832, Cole 50*52, 28 February 1972.
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price restraint and partly to further long term capital investment 
proj acts.
In contrast to the above, four other aspects of the
Conservative Government’s structure of Industry policy reiaained
broadly in line with the position outlined in Opposition and the
non-interventionist approach emphasised during Phase I. First,
in April 1971, in keeping with their previous commitment, the
Government repealed Sections 1-7 of the Labour Administration’s
Industrial Expansion Act which entitled the Government to Involve
30themselves in industrial investment schemes , Secondly, after
authorising the British Steel Corporation (BSC) to proceed with
capital expenditure of £225 million and after raising its borrowing
limits to £650 million, the Government announced, in the Autumn of
1971, that the Corporation had agreed to sell at "realistic" prices
assets relating to the making-of building bricks, tools, tool
steel m â  bright bars, its interests in stamping and industrialised
31housing and a small engineering works' . Thirdly, in November
321971, following the publication of the Bolton Committee’s report ,
a special small firms division was established at the Department
of Trade and Industry under the control of a Minister# This was
soon followed by the creation of a now advisory and information
service for small firms based on local centres within the Department’s 
33ten regions . Finally* in i!arch 1972 further inforiaation about 
the Government’s plans to strengthen and streamline the Monopolies 
Commission was revealed* This included a proposal tltat the 
Commission should be empowered both to collect information on its 
o\m initiative and to propose subjects for enquiry# No legislation 
to this effect was introduced during Phase II, however, and
30. Industry Act 1971, c. 17.
31. Statement by John Davies, B.C. Dobs., Vol. 820, Cols 33-41,
28 June 1971* The Times, 19 October 1971.
32. Small Firms: fche~E#pbr~t of the Cpmilttee of Inqt.ii.ry on Small
London November 1971»
33. Speech by John Davies, H.C. Debs», Col. 825, Cols 188-190,
3 November 1971#
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34presumably the policy was still in the process of formulation ,
In Phase II the continuity of policy developiaent between the 
Government and Opposition periods was not as sustained as in the 
previous phase, However, no clear or dominant pattern emerges.
On the one hand, there ware indications of a break away from some 
aspects of the Party’s earlier position; on the other, some 
semblance of continuity remained in several areas. In the case 
of prices and incomes policy the Conservative headers by attempting 
to restrain price and x-?age rises in the public sector conformed to 
their election commitment, but the CBX’s Initiative and the approach 
to the TUG in July 1971 marked the tentative beginnings of an 
attempt to formulate a voluntary national prices and incomes 
policy involving Government and both sides of industry. This 
latter development, although not rejected, had nevertheless never 
been officially accepted during the Party’s tenure in Opposition. 
Moreover, it may be recalled that any attempt to control prices 
had been rejected by the Conservatives prior to 1970 because it 
was felt that prices "are beyond control".
Likewise, in the case of policy for the structure of industry, 
the Conservatives carried through parts of their electoral programme, 
but the emphasis upon non-intervention in the day to day affairs 
of industry and isore selective public support for individual 
companies and organisations was severely undermined by the UCS 
and Rolls Eoyec affairs. In addition, the total of Government 
assistance given to particular industries and corporations rose 
markedly, while the formulation of a comprehensive coBipetition 
policy involving a reformed Monopolies Coissmission and Restrictive 
Practices Court had not been concluded.
34. Monopolies and Mergers Acts 1948 and 1965, Annual Report 
by the Department of Trade and Industry for the year
ended 31 December 1971, HCT 149, miSO, London îlarch 1972.
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Finally, as far as regional policy was concerned much the 
same pattern emerges: the scope and scale of Government assistance
were extended and concentrated upon infrastructural reforms and 
tax allowances. This was broadly in line with the position 
adopted in Opposition, No attempt was made, however, to develop 
either a growth points strategy or a more selective system of 
investment incentives as had been suggested prior to 1970*
Thus, Phase II may be regarded as a transitional period*
In some areas policy continuity was maintained; in others, most 
noticeably structure of industry, a distinct break with earlier 
policy positions may be discerned. It should be notedj however, 
that neither trend was dominant*
Phase III: March 1972 to February 1974
During the final 23 months of the Conservative Government’s 
term of office Important changes were made in the Administration’s 
approach to regional development, the structure of industry and 
prices and incomes. The detailed policy initiatives are outlined 
in Documents 11:1, 11:2 and 11:3, and in the remainder of this 
section I shall attempt to draw out and clarify some of the mjor 
trends of policy development.
By March 1972 miemployîaent in Great Britain had reached a total 
of 4*1 per cent. This was a record post war level and it was 
against such a background that in the some month the Conservative 
Government created a new post of Minister of Industrial Development 
and launched a wide ranging series of policy initiatives in the 
form of an £800 million programme designed to assist industrial 
expansion and modernisation. This programme entailed a significant 
alteration in the Government’s approach to both regional development
35
and the structure of industry .
35. The new programme was outlined in a White Paper, Industrial and 
Regional Development, Camd 4942, #180, London March’*TTf^T**'™See 
also speeches by Anthony Barber, B.C. Dobs#, Vol. 833, Cols 
1366-70, 21 March 1972; John D a v i e s , , Cols 1537-35,
22 March 1972; and Christopher Chataway,%ew Deal for Industry, 
CPC No. 315, London October 1972.
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Xïi the regional development: field the new progratmïîe involved
the re-introduction of investment grants in Development Areas at
a basic rate of 20 per eeiit, the establishment of an Industrial
Development Executive (IDE) to administer them, a wide extension
in the scope of Intermediate Areas, and, fer the latter, a 20 per
36cent buildings grant * These proposals did not necessarily run
contrary to the position outlined by the Conservatives while in
Opposition. On all these issues the Leadership had maintained
an aaiibiguouB and flexible position. For instance, it could be
argued that through the agency of the IDE the Conservatives were
fulfilling their proposal to introduce a more selective system of
investment incentives, or that, by making 20 par cent building
grants available in the Intoin^ediate Areas, they had carried through
their promise to "strengthen the grey areas". However, although
it is perhaps too early to judge the work of the IDE and
particularly its role iu the allocation of investment grants,
what research has been done suggests that it has not been
37particularly selective or discriminating in its approach * In 
addition, the Conservative Opposition did not pledge to extend the 
scope of the Intermediate Areas, By doing so in office it could 
be argued that they had created a situation in which the jam had 
been spread too thinly, or which might lead to the creation of a 
new category of inter-intermediate areas. Both these criticisms 
had been levelled by the Conservative Opposition against the 
Labour Government's policy. Moreover, the Conservative 
Government’s new proposals shifted the balance of public expenditure 
away from infrastructural reforms towards the provision of cash 
incentives, and this was directly contrary to the position adopted
36, Cmud 4942, op. cit., pp. 1-2 and 5.
37, See Industry Act 1972, Annual Report by the Secretary of 
State for Trade and^ndustry for the period ended 31 March 
1973, HGF 429, MSO, London September 1973; Expenditure 
CoGimltfcee (Trade and Industry Sub-Committee), Regional 
Development Incentives, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, 
HCP 327, HMSO, London 16 March 1973, pp. 96-179, pp. 204-31 
and pp. 448-63.
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in Opposition* Finally* the re-imtroduction of investment grants 
represented a complete reversal of the Conservative Government’s 
position as outlined in November 1970* In anm* in largo part the 
new regional policy measures of March 1972 marked a return to 
the kind of policy previously pursued by the 1966 to 1970 Labour 
Government; an approach which had been extensively criticised by 
the Conservative Opposition*
In the structure of industry field the Government'a March
1972 proposais involved the provision of special aid for
shipbuilding and machine tools* the eetabliahmeut of an
Industrial Development Board (lOB) to consider cases for
selective assistance, and the granting of powers enabling the
Government to take temporary equity interests in companies with 
3Btheir consent” • These provisions were further clarified in
the Industry Act 1972 which fixed the upper limit for assistance
at £150 million, capable of being extended by Orders in Council
qg
to a mMiïïifM of £SSO million •
The proposals outlined in March 1972 and the provisions 
contained in the Industry Act represented a significant 
alteration in the Conservative Government’s policy and a 
complete break with the approach adopted in Opposition, In 
some features the XDB was closely akin to the IRC, while the 
equity provision# of the Industry Act were not unlike the 
repealed sections 1-7 of the Industrial Expansion Act* Moreover, 
the proposals effectively marked the end of the Conservative 
Government *9 non-inter vent loni a t approach for, as Document 11)2 
demonstrates, the passage of the Industry Act marked the beginning 
of a period of widescale Government investment in both the public 
and private sectors of industry,
Ao in the oases of regional development and structure of
38. Cïïmd 4942, op* cit., pp.,. 5-6.
39, Industry Act 1972, c* 63, Sect, 8(7)*(mum. 01 ÊiWÉ ■ .i i ii llfc,É.‘i ■ i„*1* if ml li hé il
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indiî£Jtryt> a break with aarlior policy poaltlotto im& alao dcioonsferated 
In relation to prices and incomes * Throughout 1972 inflation 
continued to gather momentum and the Conservative Government, 
slowly and tentatively at first» began the task of formulating a 
policy to deal with it. Initially attempts were made to establish 
a voluntary national prices and incomes policy involving the 
co-operation of Government and both sides of Industry *^ *^ This 
failed to gain the support of the TUG and, in November 1972, the 
Government introduced a statutory policy in three stages. The 
first consisted of a 90 day "freeae", the second Involved less 
stringent controls, and the third allowed further relaxation 
(see Appendix, Document Ils3). Xn addition, the Government
established a Fay Board and Price Commis gion to oversee the operation 
of stages Two and Three* Tho maeiiinory and codes of practice 
relating to these two lattor stages wore given statutory effect 
in the Counter Inflation Act 1973.
It may be recalled that a statutory prices and incomes policy 
had been completely rejected by the Conservative Party during 
their period in Upposition^^. Moreovor, the Party had pledged 
to abolish the NBPI and had in fact done so soon after entering 
office. Thus the Conservative Government’s counter inflation 
policy, involviitg statutory controls tuid the establishment of pay 
and price monitoring bodies, was completely at variance with the 
Party’s stand in Opposition and the proposals contained iu its 
Election Manifesto. By late 19?) the preservation of the 
Goverïuaeiït’a statutory policy had becomo a major concern of the 
Conservative Leadership and the refusal of the National Union of 
Hinevrorkers to abide by its provisions contributed to the Prima 
Minister’s decision to call an Election in February 1974^ '^.
imwir»
40* See Eric Jacobs, ^Heath’s Forbidden Laud was Point of Ho Return",
The Sunday Times, 5 November 1972; Victor Keegan, "The Icy 
Path from Downiing Street", The Guardian, 4 November 1972.
41. A Batter Tomorrow, op. cit.* p. 11.
42. See "The Secret Miner*¥1SeaI that Failed" and "Mhy Heath Went
Over the Top",- The Sunday Times, 3 and 10 February 1974
respectively.
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In contxast to the three substantial breaks itx policy
continuity outlined above, one development during this final
phase was at least partially in keeping with the policy adopted
in Opposition* In December 1972 the Government published a
Fair Xradin[5 Bill» The subsequent Act provided for the creation
of a new office of Director General of Fair Trading whose
responsibility it would be to review monopoly and uncompetitive
situations and rcstrictice practices, and to give Information
and make roconmiendation® for action on monopolise to a renamed
Monopolies and Mergers CoMalssion* The Act altered the previous
definition of a monopoly situation in relation to the supply of
goods by reducing the relevant market share from a third to a
quarter^^. In the case of mergers, the Act gave the Secretary
of State the sole power of reference to the Cortmiissiou, subject
to the advice of a newly constituted Mergers panel^^, and
45enabled Itim to prevent a merger taking place . In addition, 
new guidelinee were outlined to assist the Commission including 
matters relating to economies of scale and the desirability of 
competition #
The Fair Trading Act appeared to be in line with some aspect# 
of the competition approach .outlined In Opposition and, in 
particular, with Sir Keith Joseph’s oïiiphasia upon a policy of 
"general pressures*'* In addition, the idea of a Registrar of 
Monopolies had been discussed, although not agreed, in Opposition. 
However, it may be recalled that Opposition policy in this field 
remained ambiguous and to a large extent unfinalised and, 
therefore, it is impossible to compare the detailed provisions 
of the Act with tb.e position taken in Opposition. Nevertheless, 
it may be noted that two important innovations contained in the 
Act, the definition of & monopoly ixi relation to the supply of
43* Fair Trading Act 1973, o. 41, Sect. 41<6),
43* ' Fair Trading* Ac^ • {? / , / s s44* m rrs tr74 t* yAuw).
45. Ibid., Sect. 74%*
46. 5 3 ‘A»9 Secto 84
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goods ond t W  granting of powor® to the Secretary of State eo 
aa Co enable him Co prevent mergers taking place, were not 
extensively discussed or agreed in Dppoaitlou* Fkxreovor, at 
least tmlf the Act dealt with conaimer affaire and this matter 
had not played a prominent part In the Opposition programme* 
Finally, although certain aapacto of the Act can be traced to 
certain general poaitiona adopted In Oppoaition, no attempt to 
formulate a detailed policy began until after the Conoervacivea 
were in Government^^* So that, to a large extent, the Act 
reflects other* poet: Opposition, policy inputs, and these nay 
have ahapod the final policy more substantially than any legacy
AM
of the 1964 to 1970 period .
Thus, during the final phase of the 1970 to 1974 Conservative 
Administration, with the possible exception of the Pair Trading 
Act, the continuity of policy development betimen Opposition and 
Government warn almost completely broken. In the case of regional 
development, the policy guidelines laid down in Opposition were 
substantially altered while, as far as structure of industry and 
prices end Inccmca were concorncd, the Party’® previous policy 
positions were wholly reversed* In these three policy areas the 
Conservative Ck»vemment adopted policies which were remarkably 
similar to those which had been pursued by their Labour predecessors 
and which had been eriticisad, and in some cases rejected, by the 
Conservatives as Opposition.
Conclusion
At loaot two problems arise in attempting to answer the 
questions posed at the beginning of this chapter. First, it may
47. See speech by Sir Geoffrey Howe, W.C, Debs., Vol. 848,
Cols 453-69* 13 December 19/3; Current Low Statutes, 19/3, 
part 6, 41»
48. See Granada Television, The State of tlia Nation, London 
19/3, pp. 38-39; Sg|uar0 Deal for CQmumGra@ CPC No. 510, 
London SeptCQ ibcr
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be recalled that. In the four policy areas studied, the Conservative 
Opposition tended to avoid formulating detailed proposals and 
concentrated instead upon outlining statements of general Intent 
plus some specific commitments to reform or repeal certain 
aspects of the Labour Government’s programme. The ambiguous 
nature of tîia policy produced by the Conservatives as Opposition 
means that the guidelines and criteria on which an assessment of 
policy continuity may be based are liable to he few In number and 
In some eases open to a variety of interpretations* Secondly, 
policy continuity is liable to vary across issues* Some policies 
mgy be dropped quickly, others may prove more persistent* So 
the problem becomes one of assessing the overall balance or the 
predominant trend of policy development during a particular period*
Hence, generally speaking, the preceding outline of the three 
phases of the 1970 to 1974 Conservative Government's policy 
development reveals a fairly clear pattern* In Phase One, the 
first seven SHJnths, the continuity of policy between Opposition 
and Government was fairly close. Rolls Boyce and ïMrland and 
Wolff were exceptions to this general trend but do not appear as 
significant. Moreover, by abolishing investment grants and 
dissolving the IRC, the Government went beyond, although not 
contrary to, the approach outlined in Opposition. In Phase Two, 
March 1971 to March 1972, there were some Indications of continuity 
and other indications, particularly in the structure of industry 
field, of a break with previous patterns. This may be regarded 
as a watershed period and it is probably within these twelve 
months that the critical break with the past imy be located* Phase 
Three, the final two years of the Conservative Administration, is 
clearer* During this period, in the case of regional policy, 
prices and Incomes policy and policy for the structure of industry, 
there was an almost complete break with the policies adopted and 
maintained during the Opposition years.-
In sum, at a îüinlaaim the pélicy continuity between Government 
and Opposition lasted about seven months, and at a maximuïa about
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nineteen months. In the structure of industry field the break 
may really have come with Rolls Royce or, as Nicholas Ridley 
suggests, with Likewise, &Iargaret Laing suggests that
the critical change in Conservative policy took place in response
to rising unemployment sometime between October 1971 and March
50 .1972 . Xn the incomes policy field, a significant alteration
may have been signified in July 1971. The exact date may prove
impossible to determine, but the main point is apparents namely
that in Government the Conservatives moved a%fay from the policy
positions outlined in Opposition and adopted policies which lu
some important aspects were not unlike those pursued by the previous
Labour Government.
To what estent did the policy formulated In Opposition serve 
to restrict the freedom of manoeuvre and flexibility of the 
Conservative Leadership once returned to power? Before attempting 
to answer this question two points may be noted. First, as 
already indicated, certain aspects of the Conservatives electoral 
programme were, because of their ambiguity, open to a variety of 
interpretations. They were, therefore, unlikely to impose 
precise restrictions upon the flexibility of the Conservative 
Government. Secondly, the student cannot know precisely what 
considerations predominated iu the minds of policy-makers, 
particularly in relation to events which have recently taken place 
and for which there is little background information available.
Both the above considerations imply that the question posed 
in the preceding paragraph cannot be given a precise answer. It 
may reasonably be suggested, however, that those aspects of 
Opposition policy which were in the form of specific pledges or 
commitments were, in the areas to which they applied, liable to
49. Ridley 1974, op.cit.
50. Margaret Laing, &-;ard Heaths Prime Minis ter, London 1972,
pp. 246-7,
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lilmit the number of policy choices available to the Conservative
Government* For instance» the Conservative Opposition's approach
to the IRC, the Industrial Expansion Act and ii short term prices
and incomes policy» may have severely restricted policy making in
these areas once the Party returned to office. For the sake of
Its reputation, no party entering Government can immediately
forego the policy positions previously adopted in Opposition and»
as the controversies surroundiiig the passage of the 19/2 Industry
Act and the Counter Inflation Act illustrate, even after some
years in office a reversal of policy may still arouse criticism
51and dissension both within the Party and beyond ,
Before concluding this account of the development of certain
aspects of the 1970 to 1974 Conservative Qovermaant's policy, it
may be noted that of the four policy areas investigated in
previous chapters one of them, national economic planning, did
not figure prominently during the post 1970 period. As indicated
in Chapter Seven» from 1966 onwards national economic planning
was accorded a more modest status and ceased to be a major issue
of public or party debate* This trend appears to have survived
into the 1970s. For instance, during the three and a half year
period no attempt was made to revive the case for a national plan
along the lines of the 1963 or 1906 prototypes, and even the form
of national économie planning established in 1969 aroused little
5?interest and little public comment
In this chapter I have attempted to establish that there was 
some measure of continuity between the policies formulated by the 
Conservatives in Opposition and those implemented by them in 
Government. I have, argued that initially a high degree of policy
51. See David McKie, "Mavericks with the Crucial Votes", The 
Guardian, 7 February 1973; and the same author's "The 
TlwoTrT-k Committee Room 10", The Guardian, 21 February 1973.
52, A Green Paper wa® published xn 19/Os Econome Fros|X 
1972s A Revised Assessment, lîtîSO, London 1970.
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continuity was discernible but» that after eome time in office a 
significant break with earlier policy positions took place.
Moreover* I have suggested tlmt. at this point policies were adopted 
which were in a number of important respects similar to those 
pursued by the 1964 to 1970 Labour Government» and which* prior 
to 1970, had been criticised, or rejected, by the Conservative 
Party,
The analysis I have presented appears to bear a close 
similarity to the pattern discerned in the earlier case studies, 
particularly those relating to national economic planning and 
incomes policy. It may be recalled that in these two policy 
areas, the Conservative Party withdrew from its previous position 
formulated In Government soon after entering Opposition,
Likewise, within about two years of regaining office in 1970, 
the Party's stances on income# policy, regional development and 
structure of industry had been reversed and brought more closely 
into line with cither the Conservâtivo's position prior to 1964 
and/or with the Labour Government's stance in the 1964 to 1970 
period. Why was there, in certain policy areas during the 1962 
to 1974 period, such a marked degree of similarity between the 
positions adopted by successive Governments regardless of their 
political complexion? Why» in some instances, did the Conservatives 
as Opposition break away from the policies which they had previously 
supported as Government? And why, after they had returned to 
office, did they adopt policies similar to those which they had 
previously criticised or rejected in Opposition? These questions 
are briefly considered in the following and concluding chapter.
310
CHAPTER ELEVEN: APPENDIX
TABLE 11:1
Percentage Unemployment : Males and Females:
Great Britain and the Problem Regions (1970-1973)
Great
Britain
South
West
Yorks & 
Humberside
North
West
North
Region Wales
Scotland
1970
Jun 8 2.3 2,4 2.6 2.5 4.2 3.4 3.8
Sep 14 2.5 2.6 2.9 2,8 4.7 3.8 4.3
Dec 7 2.6 3.0 2,9 2.8 4,6 4.0 4.6
1971
Mar 8 3.1 3.3 3,4 3.5 5,2 4.2 5.5
Jun 14 3,1 2.8 3.6 3.6 5.3 4,0 5.5
Sep 13 3.6 3,3 4,2 4,4 6,4 4.8 6.2
Dec 6 3.9 4.0 4,4 4.7 6.5 5.0 6.6
1972
Mar 13 4.1 3.9 4.6 5.1 6,7 5.3 7.0
Jun 12 3.4 3.0 3.8 4.5 5.7 4.3 6.0
Sep 11 3,8 3.1 4,3 5.1 6.7 5.0 6.6
Dec 11 3.3 3.1 3.6 4.4 5,8 4.5 5.9
1973
Mar 12 3.0 2.9 3.3 4,2 5.2 4,0 5.4
Jun 11 2.4 2,1 2,6 3,4 4.4 3,1 4.4
Sep 10 2.4 2,2 2.7 3,4 4.5 3,3 4.1
Dec 10 2,1 2.2 2,3 2,8 4.0 3.2 3.7
Source: Department of Employment Gaaette
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TABLE 11î2 
Indices o£ Inflation
A, United Kingdoms General Index of Retail Prices 
June 1970 - December 1973
16 January 1962 - 100
All Items Food All Items Food
1970 1972
Jun 16 139.9 141.6 Mar 21 160.3 166.0
&®p 22 141.5 140.6 Jun 20 163.7 169.2
Dec 15 145.0 144.1 Sep 19 166.4 172.4
Dec 12 170.2 176.9
1971 1973
Mar 16 149.0 149.4 Mar 20 173.4 187.1
Jun 22 154.3 158.5 Jun 10 178.9 194.3
Sep 21 155.5 157.6 Sep 18 181.8 198.5
Dec 14 158.1 162.8 Dec 11 188.2 210.5
Source: Department of Employment Gazette
Index of Average Earnings; 
Seasonally adjusted 
June 1970 - November 1973
January 1970 - 100
All Employees (monthly enquiry)
1970 1972
June 106.3 March 128.1
September 109.3 June 131.7
December 113.1 September 138.1
December 143.1
1971 1973
March 114.5 March 143.9
June 117.9 June 151.9
September 121.1 September 156.3
December 123.7 November 160.0
Source: Department of Employment Casette
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BPÜUMNT XI: I
The Conservative Govemmont’s Regional Oevelo|^ment Policy,Y^ Yi' -  Tn-^nf-f--i r-,ïi 'i ■' ,.„rmnTr'-rm^T-n,
Fhaae II: March 1971 - March 1972
May 1971 Government proposes timt private investoent in Development
Areas eligible for free depreciation should be offset
against Corporation Tax liability for the previous three 
years, à further £46m made available for improvement grants 
for older homes in Development and Intermediate Areas,
Jul 1971 £102m imblic works programme announced for Development
and Intermediate Areas for the period up to April 1973.
Free depreciation for immobile plant in use in the
Development Areas extended to service industries.
Oct 1971 Further ESOm expenditure on public works programme in
Development and Intermediate Areas authorised. Capital 
grants offered for public works In West.Central Scotland, 
special Development Area status granted to Livingstone 
and Glenrothes.
Phase XXX; March 1972 - February 1974
Mar 1972 Hew post of Minister of Industrial Development created.
White Paper, Industrial and Regional Development,
Cimid 4942, revëaTml''''Yiiat'''gran Areas
were to be re-introduced at a basic rate of 2D per cent; 
Special aid was to be given to shipbuilding end iKiachine 
tools; Intermediate Arena extended to cover the North 
West, the Yorkshire and Humberside area, and non-designâtad 
areas of Wales; Intermediate Areas were to qualify for 
the 20 per cent grant in respect of buildings only; and 
an Industrial Development Executive was to foe established 
to administer the grants.
Jul 1972 XDC limit raised from 5,000 to 10,000 eq, ft, in London 
and the South East and to 15,000 in rest of England,
Scotland and Wales. In Development ami Special
Development Areas IDGs were no longer required.
Jan 1973 Announcement of Oovernnmnt financed £6.5m programme of 
advanced factory building in the regions.
Jun 1973 Assistance towards rent and cash grants, of £800 per
employee moved, offered to service industries and company 
offices moving to assisted arena.
Sep 1973 First Annual Report on the Industry Act. Revealed that 
in the fire* 8 months of its operation over 5,500 
applications for regional Development grants had been 
received covering aosie £126m of capital expenditure.
Nov 1973 Special assistance granted to industries helping to
create jobs in assisted areas; Interest relief grants 
raised by X| per cant to ll| per cunt and later by a 
further I per cent in January 1974.
Dec 1973 Government announces its intention to issua no further
Office Development Permits for London and the South East 
in the foreseeable future.
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DÜGUMNÏ 11S 2
Government Loans and Grants to Speexüic Industries and Corporations: 
June 1970 •" February 1974 (encludin^ regional development grants)
Recipient(s) Amount and Circumstances
«.*ui»a>m*#e*#MCiww-*S*ee¥SUi*BUseeiri
Date
«WWil*D«A*FWztfciku.J
Rov 70 Rolls Royce &42m* banks provide a further £18m
Dec 70 Kational Goal Board ElOOm increase in accumulated deficit
fetal newly committed in Government grants and loans E42m
 ^  —                    - •- "
masa II
Har 71 bpper Clyde Sh.ipB*ld*s
May 71 Harland and Wolff
'* ” Rolls Roy ce
Jun 71 BEA
** " Nat Film Finance.
Jul 71 British Steel Corp
Sep 71 Fort Authorities 
Jan 72 British Rail 
P ” National Bus Company 
Feb 72 Upper Clyde
£10m loan written off
£4m loan from N,I, Government
£130m plus £30m of £80m increase in price
of ÜB211 engine as agreed with Lockheed
£13.5m loan
Lira loan
Authorised to proceed with capital 
expenditure of £225m, borrowing limits 
raised from £500-£650m 
10 year loans authorised. Grand 4794 
£27m grfint) to enable price increases 
£7m grant ) to be limited to 5%
Government accepted proposals for £35m 
shipbuilding schema
Total newly committed in Government grants and loans £643.Sm
ewieyiB5sje«tinw6otiUi«ue6--r —    "i" ri—ir #—rr-Tfi iif~irrr-Tdiinmri»fir*rTTTnrT--«-ii»iiinii*ii riiriiiMniniirii»r>»-imi.miiigiiii>nn>in—
Phase III
Apr 72 Gamme11 Laird 
May 72 Harland and Wolff 
Jul 72 International Comp Ltd 
” ** Macîiine Tool Xrid
72 Short Bros & Harland
£3m 
£4 9m 
£14.2m 
£6m
£X,9ra in outstanding interest owing to 
the (Government waived 
£17m 
£35m
£225m loan for the continuance of Concorde 
£540m in eiischeqHor payments and grants up 
to March 1976. Board also released from 
its debt of £475m to the Government 
Government approves Corporation's £3,000m 
ten year expansion plans 
Mar 73 Birmingham Small Arms Co £4.8m to prevent liquidation 
" " Mersey Docks & Harbours Board £4m
£15m 
E26m
£62.3m loan
£40m investment in HS"-146jet; recoverable 
through a levy on sales
£146ra granted under Statutory Corporations 
(Financial Provisions) Bill as compensation 
for price restraint exercised from 1970 to 
the beginning of 1973, further compensation 
not exceeding £500m was provided for in 1973 
and 1974
£9ÛÜm investment over next five years 
" " ” ” £120ra loan to finance the rail link
between London and the Channel Tunnel 
Dec 73 Sunderland ShipB'ld's £9m loan plus £4m regional dev, grant 
Total newly committed in Government loans and grants' " fl^  ^   .
Aug
Sep 72 Caimell Laird 
" " Harland and Wolff
Nov 72 British Aircraft Corp 
Dec 72 National Goal Board
” British Steel Corp
Jun 73 Wool Textile Ind 
Jul 73 XCL 
" " Rolls Royce (1971) Ltd
73 Hawker SiddeleyOct
Nov 73 CEÜB, Post Office 
and Gas Industry
” British Rail
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DOCUMENT 11:3
The Conservative Government's Prices and Incarnes Policy; March 1971’ 
e^bruar;
Phase II: March 1971 - March 1972
July 1971. CBI requests 200 largest companies to limit, wherever 
possible, increases in prices over the next twelve months to no,
more than 5%. Chancellor of the Exchequer requests the TUG to
make a "positive contribution" in relation to wages,
January 1972, Government grants of £27m and £7m respectively made 
available to British Rail and the National Bus Company so as to
enable price increases to foe limited to 5%g 
January 1972, Government accept Wilberforce Tribunal's reconimendations 
on mineworkers pay claim,
March 1972, VHiite Paper, Loans from the National Loans Fund 1972-1973, 
(Cmnd 4936), Revealed that loans to uatTonaiised IndustTi^ 
expected to increase substantially during the year as a result of 
price restraint and other factors.
Phase III: March 1972 - February 1974
26 September 1972, After meeting representatives of the TUG and the 
CBI, the Prime Minister proposed a £2 per week limit on all pay 
rises and 5% peg on prices for twelve months on a voluntary basis.
27 September 1972. TUG General Council rejected Prime Minister's 
proposals, but authorised renewal of talks with the Government 
and CBÏ,
31 October 1972, Prime Minister indicated that failing agreement on 
voluntary controls, legislation would be introduced to curb pay 
and prices,
2 November 1972, Breakdown of t:ri“partite talks on anti-inflation policy, 
6 November 1972. White Paper, A Programme for Controlling Inflation:
The First Stage, Cmnd 5125: proposed a*"*9b day ^freeze' on increases 
in"pay, prices, dividends and rents,
17 January 1973, I-'Jhite Paper, The Programme for Controlling Inflation: 
The Second Stage, Cmnd 52 0 5 T " * f " t o  lio^inue until the end of 
April; the Government preparing a Bill to allow further controls 
to be imposed for a period of three years; pay rises limited to a 
maximum of £250 p.a. or £1 per week plus 4%; pay and price 
monitoring bodies to be established and a code to be published 
for their guidance,
19 January 1973, TUG decided not to cooperate with the Government,
26 February 1973, Green Paper, The Price and Pay Code: A Consultative 
Document, Cmnd 5247, In addition to pa^guidelines outlined in 
Cimd 5205, price increases allowed only if they were a consequence 
of allowable increases in raw material or manufacturing costs.
Limits imposed^on profit margins, and increases in ordinary 
dividends limited to 5%,
22 March 1973, Counter Inflation Act 1973, received the Royal Assent,
26 March 1973, VJtiite Paper, The Counter Inflation Programne: The 
Operation of Stage Two, Cmnd 5267, Reiterated proposals contained 
in Cmnd 5205 and February preen Paper.
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1 April 1973. Pay Board established,
29 April 1973, Price Goraraission established,
July 1973, The Government initiated discussion with TUG and CBI 
about &t#ge XXI of its counter inflation policy,
8 October 1973. Miite Paper, The Price and Pay Code for Stage Three, 
Cmnd 5444; controls on prices to be relaxed but dividend and 
business rent control to remain in force. On pay, maximum of 
£2,25 per week or 7% or £350 p,a. The Code also contained 
various allowances and a threshold safeguard guaranteeing a 
40p per week increase for each 1% rise in the retail price index 
above 7%.
January 1974, Pay Board Advisory Report; The Problems of Pay 
Relativities, Cmnd 5535 published. Suggested a Four Stage 
procedure for altering the relative pay of groups of workers.
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PART FOUR
CONCLUSION
In this section I attempt to draw together some of the 
main points outlined in previous chapters in order to reach 
Some conclusions about what effects Opposition status might 
be said to have upon the policy positions of a major British 
political party. The discussion begins with a brief review 
of the approach adopted in the course of this study and 
proceeds to an assessment of the material presented in Part 
Three and its relevance to the hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter One, This is followed by a consideration of some 
possible explanations of the findings which have emerged, 
with particular attention being given to the consequences of 
Opposition status. The section ends with an evaluation of 
the main conclusions outlined and some suggestions for further 
inquiry.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
THE EFFECTS OF OPPOSITION STATUS UPON MAJOR PARTY POLICY POSITIONS
It may be recalled that in Chapter One five interconnected 
hypothasea about party policy^makxES in Opposition were outlined.
In the remainder of this study an attempt liaa been made to test 
these by concentrating analysis upon the policy-making activities 
of the 1964 to 1970 Conservative Opposition in relation to four 
policy areas. Each policy area has been chosen because it appears 
to be an area in which (a) in the early 1960s important policy 
innovations were introduced by the Conservative Government which 
were to some extent at variance with certain aspects of Conservative 
thinking, and (b) there was some continuity of policy development 
and debate in the following years of Labour Government, In Part 
Three the evolution of these four policy areas has been traced 
during the Conservatives' period in office prior to 1964, during 
their subsequent period in Opposition, and during the three and a 
half years following their return to power in June 1970,
Parts One and Two contain analyses of the development of 
constitutional Opposition in the United Kingdom and the nature of 
the Conservative Opposition’s policy process. Before considering 
some of the points which have arisen in these sections it will be 
necessary to examine the outcome of the subsequent case studies, 
and to assess their relevance to the central hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter One, Thus, in the next few pages, each hypothesis is 
reiterated and evaluated in the light of the material presented In 
Fart Three,
The First Hyiaothesis
Policy-making in a party aa Opposition will be different 
from policy-making in the same party as Government, In 
particular, policy-makers (party leaders) will be more 
attentive to party opinions and policy content will 
conform more closely both to these opinions and to the 
party's ideology.
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As noted in Chapter Five thlo hypothesis can be broken clown 
into tî'X) elements; the first relating to opinions, and the second 
to Ideology, It may he briefly recalled that in thio study 
opinions are regarded as being orientated towards particular 
issues, l-Jliereas ideology denotes the underlying belief system 
which is coirmionly said to be shared by members o.i: a political 
party. This distinction will bo maintained in the following 
section so that each element^ opinions and ideology, is considered 
separately.
There are, as I have indicated at the beginning of Chapter 
Four, considerable problems involved in attempting to examine and 
determine actual influences upon policy content. In a study of 
this scope, covering the development of four policy areas over a 
fourteen year period, it is not possible to reach any exact 
conclusions about who actually influenced whom in making this or 
that decision. The picture which emerges is inevitably broader 
than such precise calculations require. In a more general sense, 
however, the material presented in the case studies provides some 
evidence to suggest that during the 1964 to 1970 Opposition period 
Conservative Leaders were more attentive to, and policy content 
conformed more closely with, the opinions expressed by their 
followers than had been the case during the Party's preceding 
period in Government,
In relation to prices and Incomes and economic planning, for 
example, during the Party's period in Opposition major policy 
statements made by Party Leaders very often followed, and at times 
confirmed, alterations of opinion which had already taken place 
amongst some sections of the Party, Heath's Bolton speech, Carr's 
proposals for a productivity board, and the Leadership's approach 
to the 1965 National Plan may be cited as examples, Moreover, in 
relation to each policy area. Party Leaders often made concessions 
on particular points of policy after demands had previously been 
articulated among their followers: as in the case of the EDCs, the
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NBPI, XDGs, the Intermediate Areas and the Party's proposals for 
denationalisation. In addition, it often appeared that remarks 
made by Party Leaders were intended mainly for consumption within 
the party arena and were designed to placate some of the more 
extreme deiiiands of their followers. The Party Leader's Carshalton 
speech, his and Sir Keith Joseph's statements relating to the 
purposes of Government intervention, and Macleod'a speeches on 
prices and incomes and economic planning may usefully be recalled 
here. Finally, the production of policy proposals was at times 
subordinated to considerations of party performance. In 
particular. Party Leaders appeared unwilling, or unable, to pursue 
certain issues which appeared likely to damage or undermine Party 
cohesion. This tendency was moat apparent in the cases of prices 
and incomes and economic planning, but the failure to define the 
role and powers of the proposed registrar of monopolies and to 
clarify the Party's position on growth points and regional incentives 
may be quoted as further exam%)le8.
In contrast, during the% Party's period in Government prior to 
1964, in the cases of prices and incomes policy and economic 
planning, policy initiatives announced by Party Leaders did not 
follow idie movement of party opinion. Indeed, in both these areas 
Party Leaders appeared more responsive to the opinions of 
representatives of both sides of industry rather than the views 
of their own supporters* In the case of regional policy. 
Conservative MPs, particularly those from the problem regions, 
expressed concern about rising unemployment and the Government's 
failure to deal with it but, in developing a long-term strategy.
Party Leaders adopted proposals akin to those originally suggested 
by extra-party agencies, ouch as the North Kast Development 
Council, the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) and 
the NLDC. However, an exception should be allowed in the case 
of structure of industry. In this area Conservative MPs not only 
criticised existing policy but also, through the medium of the 
Conservative Members* Trade and Industry Committee and the Poole
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Committee, suggested detailed proposals for reform, some of which 
were later carried through into the 1964 White Paper, Yet all 
the case studies are alike in suggesting that In Covernmient policy 
was not modified greatly in response to partisan thinking. Thus, 
despite growing Intra-party hostility, the Government proceeded 
with its policies for national economic planning and prices and 
incomos control. In addition, detailed proposals, involving a 
growth points strategy, were formulated for the North East and 
Central Scotland imd the Conservative Leaders pushed ahead with 
their plan to abolish resale price maintenance in the face of strong 
opposition from within their own party.
Did the content of policy produced in Opposition coïiform more 
closely Co the Party's ideology than would have been the case in 
Government? As argued in Chapter Five, Conservative ideology is 
not capable of being reduced to a single philosophical position. 
Because of the long history of their party, modem Conservatives 
are hairs to a deep and wide-ranging tradition which appears 
capable of providing justifications and precedents for almost any 
form of state activity or inactivity. This poses a problem, for, 
if Conservatism is so flexible and wide-ranging, then it follows 
that any attempt to assess degrees of deviance from, or continuity 
with, party ideology is liable to prove difficult if not impossible.
I have noted, however, that two broad ideological tendencies 
m y  be said to co-exist within modern Conservatism, namely a 
liberal conception and a tory conception, and some elements of 
each may be discerned in the statements of modern Conservatives.
Thus the problem becomes one of assessing which of these tendencies 
was predominant during the Opposition period and whether, in 
comparison with the preceding period in Government, its predominance 
signified an alteration in the emphasis of Conservative proposals.
Survey material produced In Chapter Five suggests that during 
the 1964 to 1970 period in particular the majority of Conservative
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partisans (votera, parliamentary oaiiclidates and MPs) held opinions 
which can be broadly elaaaified as veering towards the liberal 
viewpoint. This generalisation is broadly supported by the 
evidence presented In Fart Three of this study. As noted in 
Chapter Six, for example, during the Opposition period the overall 
party programme revealed a strong bias towards the liberal 
tendency, and, in contrast to the Party Leaders' position prior 
to the 1964 General Election, this represented a major change in 
policy emphasis. This alteration in policy emphasis is reflected 
in each of the case studies. It implied a modification in the 
Party's positions on incomes policy and economic planning. It 
provided a rationale for the Opposition's attacks upon the Labour 
Government's restructuring policies and its proposals on investment 
grants. Office Devolopment Certificates and the REP, It was 
reflected in the Party Leadership's emphasis upon a policy of 
"general pressures" and their calls for less government 
intervention and a more competitive industrial structure.
Moreover, the more overtly liberal position adopted after 1964 
appears to have been broadly supported by the majority of 
Conservatives. Indeed, many, such as Powell, Biffen, Ridley, 
du Gann and a number of speakers at the Party's Annual Conference#, 
favoured a more extreme position than that adopted by the majority 
of Party Leaders, Others, such as Kenneth Lewis, Maudling and 
members of PEST appeared less enthusiastic, but this group was 
small in numl>er and in general the Leadership's adoption of a more 
liberal policy emphasis was in harmony with the opinions of most 
Conservât: ives »
In sum, the material presented in Part Three offers some 
support for the view that, in Opposition, Party Leaders will be 
more attentive, and policy content will conform more closely,to 
party opinions than would be the case in Government. As far as 
the second element is concerned (that in Opposition policy content 
will conform more closely to party Ideology than would be the case 
in Government), it would seam that the nature of Conservative ideology
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is such as to preclude any attempt at validation. It may be noted, 
however, that during the 1964 to 1970 period. Conservative policies 
reflected a liberal bias which, in contrast to the period prior to 
1964, represented a significant alteration in policy emphasis and 
which appears to have been broadly supported by the. majority of 
Conservâtives•
The becQud hypothesis
As Opposition a party will attempt to make its policies 
appear distinctly different from those being pursued by 
the governing party.
To some extent any major party, be it in Opposition or in 
Government, is liable to attempt to differentiate Its omi approach 
from that of its opponente, This may, as some observers maintain^, 
be a normal outcome in any competitive two-party sya tarn. One 
point which emerges from the case studies is that the party as 
Opposition seldom holds the initiative in political debate.
Generally spealclng it is the governing party which establishes 
the main issues involved and the Opposition is forced to adopt a 
position in relation to these . Each case study suggests, however, 
that In responding to governmental initiatives an Opposition party 
will attempt to differentiate its omi approach from that established 
by its opponents,
A number of illustrations may foe dra’s-m from the case studies 
in support of this proposition,  ^The inclusion of a more liberal
policy emphasis in the Party's overall programme enabled Conservatives 
to distinguish their general approach from that of the Labour 
Government• In narrower areas, other and more specific distinctions
1. L,D, Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, London
1967, i)p, 262-66;""'~lAnthon^
Democracy, New York 1957, pp, 53, 98,
2* For a similar view in relation to the 1945 to 1951 period of
Conservative Opposition, see J*D, Hoffman, Tlte Cons orvativa 
Party in Opposition: 1945^1951, London 1964,"pTI); R.M,
Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition, London 1973, p, 389,
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were drawn out. The Conservative's policy of "general pressures" 
was contrasted with the Labour Government's "iuterveutioa" in the 
day to day affairs of industry. In criticising the absolute sise 
clause contained in the 1965 Monopolies and Mergers Bill,
Conservatives emphasised Labour's "hostility" to big business.
Later, when Labour appeared more sympathetic to large scale 
regroupings. Conservatives criticised the Government's apparent 
"prejudice" in favour of giant firms. In relation to regional 
policy Conservatives contrasted Labour's policies for Development 
Areas and inves tment grants with their own approach based on 
growth pointe,g infrastructural reform and tax allowances. In the 
case of economic planning Conservatives attempted to distinguish 
their own approach from that embodied in the National Flan by 
placing emphasis upon a version of planning primarily designed to 
facilitate the flow of information and to increase the degree of 
co-ordination between government and both sides of industry.
Later, when both parties appeared to support ranch the same approach, 
the differences were brought out by a skilfull use of language 
and presentation. Finally, in relation to prices and incomes 
policy Conservatives, while unable to fortmlate their otm approach, 
did, nevertheless, attempt to distinguish their position from 
that of the Government: initially they questioned the Government's
chances of success, later they attacked the statutory nature of 
its policy and its conséquences for industrial relations and 
inflation. These and many other examples can be drawn from the 
case studiea in support of the original hypothesis.
The Third Hypothesis
As Opposition a party will forego or retreat from policy 
positions previously maintained by it as Government which 
(a) have been, or are liable to be, controversial in 
terms of party ideology, and which Cb) j&Ba adopted and
maintained by its successors in office.
This proposition is most clearly substantiated in the cases 
of prices and incomes and economic planning, Both touched on
the fundamentala of party beliefs and were matters of deep controversy
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within the Party. Both wore to a considerable extent adopted and 
maintained by the 1964 to 1970 Labour Government. Finally, in 
both areas, an Opposition, the Conservatives retreated from the 
firm policy stance they had previously supported as (Government,
The case of regional policy also offers some confirmation 
for the hypothesis. Like prices and incomes and economic planning 
it touched on the fundamentals of party beliefs and was a matter 
of some controversy within the Party. In addition, certain 
aspects of the approach developed by the Conservative Government 
were adopted and extended by the Labour Government xdien they came 
to xmwer, such as the notion of wider development areas in which 
a variety of inducements, including grants, would be available.
In Opposition;the Conservatives retreated from these positions 
while emphasising those aspects of thoir oim policy which they 
felt wore being neglected by their successors: infrastructural
reform, growtli points and tax allowances.
An exception may again be allowed, however. In the case of 
structure of industry. In this area, the Conservative Opposition 
did not forego or retreat from the position it had maintained as 
Governmentp even tliougli certain aspects of their policy were 
continued by their Labour successors. As argued in Chapter Ten, 
the example of structure of industry policy does not necessarily 
invalidate the hypothesis. The monopolies and mergers aspect of 
the policy developed by Heath at the Board of Trade appears to 
have been generally welcomed within the Party and was not a matter 
of deep controversy. Moreover, it conformed closely with the 
more overtly liberal policy stance adopted in Opposition, and, as 
previously indicated, this alteration in the general trend of policy 
appears to have been supported by most Conservatives. Thus, 
contrary to original expectations, the development of Conservative 
policies in the structure of industry field did not prove to be 
deeply controversial in terms of party ideology.
In sum, three of the case studies offer some support for the
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view that a party as Opposition will forego policy positions 
previously maintained in GovexTiment which are both matters of 
ideological controversy within the Party and are adopted by their 
successors in office* One ease study, structure of industry, 
does not support this contention, but, it may be argued, does not 
necessarily invalidate the hypothesis because, contrary to 
original expectations, the Party's policy in Uovernment was not, 
and did not become, a matter of controversy amongst Conservatives*
The Fourth hypothesis
After returning to Government policy positions previously 
adopted in Opposition will, in certain instances, prove 
either (a) impracticable or unpalatable, or (b) will limit 
the freedom of manoeuvre and flexibility of policy-makers.
This hypothesis has been considered in Chapter Eleven and 
the argument outlined at that point may usefully be reiterated.
It may be recalled that, in relation to the four policy areas, 
the degree of continuity between the proposals formulated during 
the Conservatives* 1964 to 1970 period of Opposition and those 
applied during the Party's subsequent period as Government was 
investigated, and the conclusion dram that at a minimum policy 
continuity between Opposition and Government lasted about seven 
months and at a maximum about nineteen months. Moreover, it was 
noted that in Government, in the ease of each policy area except 
national economic planning, the Conservatives moved away frooi the 
positions outlined in Opposition and adopted policies which in 
some important respects were not unlike those pursued by the 
previous Labour Government. As far as economic planning was 
concerned, the issue remained, as it had become in Opposition, a 
matter which aroused little public interest, debate or controversy.
An attempt was also made to examine whether policy proposals 
formulated in Opposition may later serve to limit the flexibility 
of party policy-makers once returned to office, and it was argued 
that no precise conclusion could be drama on this mtter. The
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suggestion was made, however, that specific pledges or commitments 
made in Opposition might serve to limit the number of policy choices 
available to policy-iiiakers once returned to office* Thus, the 
material presented in Chapter Eleven provides some confirmation for 
the first part of the original hypothesis* In relation to the 
second part, however, the evidence is inconclusive#
The Fifth Hypothesis
Policy made in Opposition will generally be non-explicit 
in nature and party policy-makers will avoid, whenever 
possible, making precise commitments to future action#
The evidence presented in each of the case studies appears to 
confirm this postulate. Xu the case of prices and incomes policy 
no guidelines were in fact formulated and reliance was placed upon 
more general, long-term proposals* In each of the other three 
areas policy generally took the form of an outline of general aims 
plus a number of commitments to repeal or reformi certain aspects of 
the Labour Government's programme in the event of the Conservatives 
being returned to office. In none of the four areas was policy 
formulated in detail in preparation for office. Moreover, the 
commitments that were made were generally imprecise: only in three
cases, the rejection of statutory controls over incomes, the 
Industrial Expansion Act and the REF, ware precise pledges made. 
Others iwre usually qualified as in the cases of the HBFI, the IRC 
and the pledge to introduce private capita*! into the nationalised 
industries.
The original hypothesis!,, however, requires some clarification* 
There were some policy areas, although not those chosen for study, 
in which Conservative policy-makers formulated detailed plans in 
preparation for office. For example, considerable work was done 
on Che Farty's taxation proposals , Immigration policy, industrial 
relations policy and plans to re-organise the social services^* In
3. Niget Fisher, Iain Macleod, London 1973, pp. 271, 301.
4. See above, ChaplTeF''FoiïrV'' P* 62; Furmctt 1973, op. cit., 
pp. 206-207.
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these areas policy was ready for almost immediate application when 
the Party returned to power. The policies which were formulated 
In detail in preparation for office were, considering the number of 
policy groups originally established, relatively few in number, and 
in most cases they were never made known to the public* So that, 
although Party Leaders in Opposition may avoid making detailed public 
pronouncements on policy matters, they may, in certain areas, 
formulate specific proposais in private.
In sum, the material presented in Part Three appears broadly 
to support the main points of the original hypotheses. There are, 
as has been noted, some variations and these need to be borne in 
mind. In particular, the case of structure of industry does not 
appear relevant to the third hypothesis and does not provide strong 
support for the first hypothesis. Moreover, the utility of the 
concept of ideology, particularly in relation to the Conservative 
Party, is open to question and the term may most usefully be deleted 
from the first hypothesis. Further amendments are required in the 
case of the fourth hypothesis. The proposition contained therein, 
that policy positions previously adopted in Opposition will, in 
some instances, limit the freedom of manoeuvré and flexibility df 
party policy-makers once returned to office, remains unconfiimied and 
may, therefore, be removed from the original hypothesis. Finally, 
the fifth hypothesis requires amendment so as to allow for the fact 
that detailed policies may be formulated, and commitments made, in 
private. Thus, in the light of the case studies the original 
hypotheses may be restated as follows:
1. Policy-making in a party as Opposition will be different 
from policy-making in the same party as Government, In 
particular, policy-makers (party leaders) will be more 
attentive to, and policy content will conform more 
closely to, party opinions.
2. As Opposition a party will attempt to make its policies 
appear distinctly different from those being pursued by 
the governing party.
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As Opposition a party will forego or retreat from 
policy positions previously maintained by it as 
GoveTOBieut which (a) have been, or are liable to 
be, controversial in terms of party ideology, and 
which (b) are adopted and maintained by its 
successors in office.
4. After returning to Government policy positions
previously adopted in Opposition will, in certain 
instances, prove impracticable or unpalatable.
5. Policy made and publicised in Opposition will 
generally be non-explicit in nature and party 
policy-makers will avoid, whenever possible, making 
precise public commitmants to future action.
Wliat explanations can be offered for the way in which policy stances 
developed and altered during the 1964 to 1970 period of Conservative 
Opposition? Xo what extent might such developments be regarded as 
a product of Opposition status? These questions are considered in 
the following section.
As indicated in Chapter One, one of the loain problems in a 
study of this nature is that of Isolating the influence of Opposition 
status from the effects of other variables. In addition to 
considerations relating to the constitutional context of party 
action, policy-making is liable to be shaped by other factors, such 
as the personalities and beliefs of the actors involved (especially 
when, as in this case, there is a toajor change in leadership) and 
the general pattern of events.
As far as the personalities and beliefs of policy-makers are 
concerned, it may be argued that the adoption of a more overtly 
liberal policy stance was primarily the consequence of Heath's 
appointment as the Party's policy chief in October 1964, and hia 
subsequent election SB Party Leader in July 1965. Additionally, it 
might be suggested that the failure to produce proposals in relation 
to prices and incomee was mainly a reflection of Hacleod's lack of
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interest in the topic, while the Party's policies for structure of 
industry and regional development could be said to be mainly the 
outcome of the attitudes and ideas of their main exponent, Sir Keith 
Joseph.
A more sophisticated approach might be to consider the
consequences of alterations in the composition of Conservative
policy-making personnel. As might be expected, during the Party's
six years in Opposition new men rose to prominence, while some
older, more established figures retired or dropped out of active 
5politics • The new policy-makers were, perhaps to a greater extent 
than ever before, drawn from the worlds of industry and finance^, 
and it could be argued that to some extent they reflected the 
prejudices of these worlds with a belief in a free enterprise system 
and limited government intervention in the affairs of industry.
Hence, it might be stated that the idiosyncracies and experiences 
of these men provide a possible explanation of the shift to a more 
liberal policy emphasis and the development of a distinctive policy.
As previously indicated, the overall pattern of events during 
the period under study may provide a further set of explanations.
For Instance, in the case of economic planning, the experience of the 
1965 National Plan led to a widescale reassessment of existing 
planning procedures and techniques, and this was reflected within 
both Government and Opposition circles. Likewise, the experience 
of the Labour Government's prices and incomes policy led to a 
questioning amongst trade unionists and industrialists of the 
feasibility of attempts to apply detailed controls in the fields 
of prices and incomes. This debate was also reflected In Government 
and Opposition circles. In the case of structure of industry, 
broad changes in the pattern and nature of industrial re-groupings 
took place throughout the later 1960s and affected Opposition and
5. See Punnett 1973, op. cit., pp. 158-60 and 170,
6, Anthony King, 'New Stirrings on the Right", New Society, 
14 October 1965,
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Government policy-makers alike. Equally, in relation to regional 
development, the growing awareness of the problems of the 
"intermediate areas" and the publication of the Hunt Report, 
introduced new factors into the debate. Finally, the post-1970 
Conservative Government's incomes, structure of industry and 
regional initiatives may in part have been prompted by developments 
unforeseen in Opposition, namely rising unemployment and rapid 
inflation. Consequently, it may be concluded that alterations in 
the subject matter of each particular policy area can offer some 
explanation for the apparent tendency of party policy-makers to 
forego or retreat from policy positions which they had previously 
supported.
Clearly, both the personalities and beliefs of policy-makers 
and the. consequences of unforeseen and unexpected events may help 
to explain a number of the policy developments recorded in the 
preceding case studies. Moreover, as I noted in Chapter One, the 
adoption of a case study approach has allowed consideration to be 
given to these and other variables in the course of the narrative.
It would seem, however, that both variables have only a limited 
explanatory value and, even if taken together, do not fully explain 
the policy developments noted in Part Three.
For instance, any attempt to explain events solely as a 
consequence of the personal beliefs and idiosyncracies of the actors 
involved is liable to lead to superficial and misleading conclusions. 
As has already been argued in this study, policy-makers are unlikely 
to formulate proposals in isolation from, or with total disregard to, 
the attitudes of their colleagues and the interests of their 
supporters. The policy positions adopted by Party Leaders are 
thus liable to reflect, at least in part, the outcome of factors 
other than their own beliefs and values, such as the opinions of 
other informed and influential actors and considerations relevant 
to the Party's prospects and future performance.
Likewise, alterations in the composition of Conservative
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policy-making personnel, although capable of explaining the shift to 
a more liberal policy emphasis and the development of a distinctive 
policy, cannot explain the series of policy reversals and 
reassessments catalogued in the case studies. It may be recalled 
that policy changes did not necessarily follow alterations in the 
complexion of the Party Leadership, Moreover, while important 
personnel changes did take place, a basic continuity remained 
throughout the period. So that many of those who advocated liberal 
solutions when in Opposition had previously supported and, in some 
cases, implemented the more overtly tory policies introduced by the 
Macmillan Government• Equally, substantially the same set of 
Conservative policy-makers who had been prominent during the 1964 
to 1970 period, subsequently, in the post-1970 period of Government, 
affected major alterations in the policy guidelines previously 
established by them in Opposition, Nor can alterations in the 
composition of the Party Leadership explain other aspects of the 
Conservative Opposition's policy activities, such as the failure to 
formulate policy in detail or the tendency on the part of policy­
makers to pay more attention to partisan opinions than had previously 
been the case in Government#
Factors relevant to the general pattern of events during the 
period under study also fail to provide a comprehensive explanation. 
In the first place, both Conservative and Labour policy-makers were 
subject to the same sequence of events, yet their responses, in 
terras of policy outcomes, were different. It would seem, therefore, 
that the general pattern of events can provide only a partial 
explanation and that, if it is to have real explanatory value, 
this factor needs to be supplemented by considerations relevant to 
matters of party strategy and the attitudes and perceptions of party 
policy-makers. In addition, as in the case of the personalities 
and beliefs of policy-makers, the overall pattern dfoevents cannot 
explain why, in each of the four policy areas, detailed proposals 
were not produced and why, when in Opposition, Conservative policy­
makers appeared more attentive to the opinions of their followers 
than had previously been the case in Government,
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In sum, the personalities and beliefs of policy-makers and the 
changing pattern of events, are not on their own capable of 
offering a comprehensive explanation of the way policy stances 
altered and developed during the Conservatives* 1964 to 1970 period 
as Opposition. Although other variables are important. Opposition 
status also has explanatory power. The mechanisms of its 
influence are described below under three headings: namely, the
policy-making structure, the policy-making responsibilities and the 
goals of the party as Opposition.
(i) The Policy-Making Structure of the Party as Opposition
In Chapter Four I defined a Party's policy-making structure as 
"the sum of the various policy channels which have access to the 
party's key policy-making centre" . The material presented in tlaat 
chapter and the following case studies suggests that in Britain the 
policy-making structure of a political party as Opposition is likely 
to differ from that of a political party as Government in at least 
twm ways. First, in terms of the number and nature of the policy 
channels involved, and secondly, in terms of the relative importance 
of each channel.
Drawing on the Conservative experience during the 1964 to 1970 
period, it may be suggested that when a political party enters 
Opposition the individuals who constitute?the party’s policy-making 
centre cease to maintain formal contacts with some of the policy 
channels which fulfilled a prominent role in the policy-making 
structure of the same party as Government. Most importantly, 
party leaders, on relinquishing their ministerial responsibilities, 
can no longer depend upon Civil Service personnel and members of 
other governmental agencies as sources of policy advice and 
assistance. Moreover, the structure of formal contacts which the 
various ministries maintain with a broad spectrum of organised 
groups and interests is also terminated. So that, in the Opposition
7. See above, pp. 47-8.
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situation, neither of these extra-party elements are involved in 
the formal machinery of policy-making to the same extent or in the 
same way as they are in Government* Civil Servants and organised 
groups may, of course, be consulted on an informal basis, but the 
Conservative experience suggests that in Opposition such 
consultations are, for reasons of mutual convenience, less frequent 
and more one-sided than in Government* In the absence of these 
policy channels, policy-makers in Opposition maintain closer contact 
with channels drawn either from amongst members of their o m  party 
or from groups or agencies closely associated with it.
Thus, in Opposition, the opportunities that are available to 
intra-party agencies and personnel to influence the content of 
party policy are heightened and the likelihood that party opinions 
may predominate in the formulation of party policy is increased.
In other words, the policy-making structure of a political party as 
Opposition, and consequently the nature of the policy produced, is 
liable to be more partisan than that of a political party as 
Government, One may go further and suggest tiiat this conclusion 
may be applied to either major British political party as Opposition, 
although the precise meaning of the term partisan will, of course, 
vary according to the nature of the Opposition group and the 
attitudes of the key personalities involved.
Upon re-entering Government, however, party leaders move into 
a policy-making structure which is fundamentally different: the policy
channels which have access to them change, their number and nature 
alter. Party Leaders adjust to their new role as ministers and to 
their working relationships with civil servants, pressure groups and 
other agencies. Thus, in Government, party policy-makers break away 
from the more partisan context of Opposition and are open to 
different channels of advice and information. In this new situation, 
policy positions formulated in Opposition may well prove unpalatable 
or impracticable.
334
(ii) The Policy-Making Responsibilities of the Party as Opposition
Hot only do the policy-making structures of the party as 
Opposition and the party as Government differ, but so also do their 
policy-making responsibilities or functions. For example, the 
party as Government is faced with the task of governing and is 
expected to fulfill the obligations and responsibilities that this 
implies. Policy, must, at least in part, conform to the demands of 
a parliamentary timetable and legislative programme and must, 
therefore, be outlined in detail, be capable of being immediately 
applied and of enjoying the support, not only of party members, but 
also of many of those who are liable to be involved in administering 
it, such as civil servants and organised interests.
In contrast, the party as Opposition is not required to produce 
policy which can be immediately applied. Moreover, Opposition 
policy-makers work on a different tiraescale to that pertaining to 
their governmental counterparts, for they cannot know the exact time 
when, and the circumstances in which, the outcome of their 
deliberations may be put into practice. Thus, the party as 
Opposition not only lacks the responsibilities of initiative and 
despatch held by the party as Government, but also faces a situation 
in which there is a wide divorce between the formulation and the 
application of policy. Consequently, policy produced by a party 
as Opposition does not need to either be formulated in detail or be 
capable of immediate practical application. Furthermore, because 
in Opposition party leaders do not necessarily need to produce firm 
and final policy decisions, difficult or controversial decisions can 
to some extent be glossed over or simply avoided. In a sense this 
means that party policy-makers in Opposition enjoy a greater degree 
of flexibility than those in Government, As I shall attempt to 
show in the following section, however, a party’s policy-making 
responsibilities are closely related to, and limited by, the nature 
of the party’s goals,
(ill) The Goals of the Party as Opposition
In Fart One I argued that the dorainaiit and persistant goal of
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tho Conservative Party as Opposition was to regain the power, prestige 
and status of a governing party* I have suggested that the 
Conservative Opposition attempted to achieve this goal mainly by 
adopting two roles of Opposition In roughly equal proportion.
First, a ’critical* role wxis adopted, whereby the Conservative 
Opposition, aimed at discrediting the Xuabour Government by attacking 
its activities and personnel, and by so doing attempted to undermine 
the cohesion oi: the governing party and its support xiraongst the 
electorate, Secondly, an ’alternative government* role was 
favoured, wdiereby the Conservative Opposition aimed at presenting 
itself as a real, responsible and viable alternative to the
SKin
ele<
ing aximini St ration, xmd by go doing attempted to gain
8oral support for its omi programme *
la contrast to the above, the dominant xmd persistent goal of 
the party as Government is not to regain the power, prestige and 
status of a governing party, but to retain them and this implies 
the adoption of roles which are different from those pursued by the 
party as Opposition. For, although in pursuing their goal a 
government may* in response to indications of Opposition popularity, 
attempt to discredit its opponents, it is unlikely to he concerned 
with presenting itself as an alternative pimply because the Government 
is the ixicuoihexit and as such serves as the fixed point around which 
an alternative may he constructed. Moreover, it is primarily on 
the basis of its performance in office that a governing party may 
expect to be judged and upon which the achievement of its goals may 
depend. Thus, if e governing party wishes to maintain itself in 
power, the tried calibre of its perocmnel, the outcome of its 
legislative programme, and its general competence ixi 'managing the 
country's affairs are all liable to he of vltxiX importance.
Thus, X have argued that the doDdtiant and persistent goal of 
the party in Opposition is qualitatively different from thxit of the
8. Os© above. Chapter Three, pp. 42-44,
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party in office* In the former case emphasis is placed upon the 
regaining of power, while, in the latter, emphasis is placed upon 
the maintenance of power. These different goals require the 
formulation of distinct strategies of action as a means to their 
realisation. Most importantly, the Opposition may expect to be 
judged according to its success in effectively criticising the 
Government and presenting itself as a real, responsible and viable 
alternative, whereas the Goverimient, as the incumbent, may expect 
to be judged primarily on the basis of its performance in office.
Political parties, whether in Opposition or in Government, 
are alike, however, in being policy producing organisations.
Moreover, policy is, I would suggest, one of the major resources 
which a political party can mobilise in order to achieve its goal. 
This statement has two implications,. First, the content and the 
formulation of a party's policy are liable to be significantly 
influenced by the nature of its goals. Secondly, and following 
from the previous point, to the extent that party goals vary 
according to the context of party action, then policy made by a 
party es Opposition is liable to be distinctly different from that 
made by the same party as Government, Some indication of the 
possible outcome in policy temis of the goals pursued and roles 
adopted by the party as Opposition may be adduced from the 
Conservatives* experience during the 1964 to 1970 period.
In order to achieve its goal of regaining power an Opposition 
party will in formulating policy need to balance at least three 
considerations, not all of which would be relevant to the same, or 
another, party as Government, In the first place, if an Opposition 
party wishes to oppose an administration effectively or to present 
itself as a real alternative it should attempt to do at least: two 
things. First, it should provide a stance from which to attack its 
opponents, and secondly, it should provide a basis for the 
presentation of an alternative. As The Times pht it, an "Opposition 
needs to develop a large and elastic theme into which *ad hoc*
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criticiaffis can ba fitted and which lends itself to suHimry slogans 
like ’Tory stagnation* or *Socialist auBterity*"^, This 
consideration implies that a party as Opposition should attempt 
to outline iifOliciaa which to soma extant appear as distinct from 
those being pursued by the governing party, even if this means 
breaking away from some of the policy positions previously supported 
by it as Government.
There are, however, dangers inherent in the process of 
creating a real alternative. On the one hand, it may lead to an 
exaggeration of the differences between parties and blur any areas 
of overlap and agreement which exist between the®. As a consequence, 
when and if the party return® to power either the desires and 
expectations of it© supporters may be frustrated or the party may 
become a prisoner of its own rhetoric generated during a period of 
Opposition# On the other hand, it may result in emphasis being 
placed upon extreme policies which in turn imdermin© the Opposition’s 
support in the centre ground of electoral polities and thus decrease 
its chances of returning to power#
Secondly, in order to present itself as a responsible alternative 
an Opposition may seek to avoid outlining and publicising policies 
which are so extreme in nature that they threaten the party's 
electoral support, and which are so specific in content that they
j Q
would limit a future Government’s freedom of action , An Opposition 
is, however, faced with a dilemma in balancing this requirement with 
that of presenting a real and distinctive alternative outlined above.
One way in which the party out of office may overcome this dilemma, is 
by avoiding, whenever possible, publicising specific commitments and 
detailed policy proposals and concentrating Instead upon presenting
9# "Tories In a New World", The Times, 28 December 1964, 
lO, See speech by Maudling at"the Party Conference, HUCUA 
83th Annual Conférence Report 1967, MUCUA, London 1967, 
p. 12b; speech by Barber at 1968 Party Conrerenoe, NUCÜA
86th Annual Conference Report 1968, NUCUA, London 1968,
 — —      —------
p, 26.
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policy in general outline. Thus, in addition to its policy-making 
responsibilities, strategicconsiderations may also contribute to 
the apparent ambiguity and generality of policy produced by the 
party as Opposition.
For the Conservative Leadership the need to appear as a
responsible alternative by avoiding the foriBulation of extreme
policies proved problematic. Certain tll?s seemed to believe that
their party would never win an election unless it presented
distinctively ’right wing* policies* As Butler and Pinto-
Duschitisky note, the Party Leadership was faced with a conflict
between arguments of electoral prudence which urged them to play
for the centrep and the pressure of elements within their own party
11which demanded that they abandon it , My own case studies 
appear to support this observation and suggest that, in such a 
situation, perhaps the best tactic is, as in the case of prices 
and incomes policy, to avoid whenever possible the discussion of 
contentious matters.
On the other band, any attempt to avoid specific policy
commitments may produce problems about how policy should be
formulated and presented* Within the Conservative Leadership,
for example, there appear to have been basically two points of
view; some believed that policy should, be worked out only in broad
outline and that the details should be fitted in later, while
others contended that in the key areas work ought to be done in
detail in preparation for office. In general, the latter approach 
12 ,was accepted '. There is also, however, the problem of publicising 
policy. If policy is too detailed it may be difficult for the 
ordinary voter to grasp and thus, its impact may be minimised. 
Additionally, as already noted, detailed policies may obstruct the
11. D. E, Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General 
Election of 1970, London 1971, p. 65.
12, In t erv r ew 6.
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flexibility of policy-makers once returned to power. In part the 
Conservative Leaders may have overcome these problems by not 
publishing and thereby committing themselves to mtach of the detailed 
policy which they produced.
The final consideration relates to matters of party performance.
The majority of the Conservative Leadership subscribed to the
view that If an Opposition wished to oppose an administration
effectively or to present itself as a viable alternative it must
act in a disciplined and united manner. They held that a divided
Opposition would not attract votes nor would it be able to attack
13the Government with much effect ,
In order to maintain party unity Conservative Leaders were 
able to use at least four devices, each of whicli may have had some 
consequence for the nature and content of party policy. In the 
first place, the structural arrangements of the party in Opposition 
increased the degree of co-ordination and contact between the 
Party Leaders and their followers, and brought intra-party channels 
closer to the centre of the policy-making structure. Secondly, 
some party leaders appear to have made strenuous efforts to avoid 
the discussion of any matters which related to the fundamentals of 
party beliefs. Potentially divisive issues were to some extent 
excluded from the arena of intra-party debate and, consequently, 
certain areas of policy were left undefined* Thirdly, policy, when 
declared, was often outlined in an ambiguous manner which seemed 
likely to please most and offend none. Finally, by concentrating 
their attention upon attacking the Government, the Opposition 
Leaders may have provided a diversion from issues liable to load 
to intra-party strife.
The problem of maintaining party unity was reflected in each 
of the case studies, but is perhaps best illustrated in relation to
13, See above. Chapter Three, p. 33 and p. 37
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prices and Incomes policy. The issue was a potentially divisive 
one and some sections of the Party Leadership avoided discussion of 
the matter. When pressures within the Party built up, a statement 
was produced which made concessions to one. vicvTpoint while not 
totally excluding the opposing one. It may be recalled that at 
this juncture policy was defined in terms of minimum rather than 
maximum scope and, thereafter, the matter was effectively shelved 
and a specific conmitment avoidedi In addition, the statutory 
nature of the Government’s prices and incomes policy provided a 
diversion and a focus around which the Opposition could unite.
Thus, in order to achieve their goal of regaining power, party 
policy-makers in Opposition may be obliged to fulfill three conditions, 
First, in order that their party may appear as a real alternative 
and is capable of criticising the Government effectively, theymiay 
be obliged to adopt policy positions which are distinct from those 
of their opponents and which may be contrary to those previously 
maintained by them in office. Moreover, in order that their party 
should appear as a responsible alternative, policy-makers may be 
obliged to produce policies which are non-committal and non-explicit 
in nature. Finally, in order that their party may appear as a 
viable alternative, policy-makers may be obliged to maintain closer 
contacts with intra-party channels and avoid the discussion of 
controversial matters. As a consequence of fulfilling these three 
conditions, not all of which are applicable to the Party as 
Government, the policy produced by party policy-makers in Opposition 
may prove to be different from that formulated in earlier periods of 
Government and may also prove impracticable or unpalatable when the 
Party is returned to power.
Suimiary and Conclusion
In this chapter the material presented in Part Three has 
been examined in relation to the hypotheses presented at the 
beginning of this study. Generally speaking, the original 
propositions have been broadly supported, but some modification has
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proved necessary. Thus, it may be stated that the example of the 
Conservative Party during the 1964 to 1970 period suggests that:
(1) policy produced in Opposition conforms more closely 
to party opinions than policy produced in Government;
(2) a party as Opposition will attempt to make its policies 
appear distinctly different from those of the governing 
party;
(3) those of its policies which are publicised, will generally 
be non-committal and non-explicit in nature;
(4) in some instances, a party as Opposition may forego 
policy positions maintained by it as Government which 
are both matters of controversy within the party and 
which are adopted by their successors in office;
(5) certain policies produced in Opposition may, after the 
party returns to power, prove unpalatable or impracticable.
Three possible explanations of the way policy stances altered 
and developed during the Conservatives 1964 to 1970 period as 
Opposition have been examined. Initially the factors of personality 
and the overall pattern of events have been considered. IsHiile 
not denying the validity of these approaches, it has been argued 
that factors relevant to the Opposition situation also liave 
explanatory force and consequently deserve consideration. In the 
light of this proposition, the policy consequences of three features 
of the party as Opposition have been analysed, namely its policy- 
making structure, its policy-making responsibilities, and its 
dominant and persistent goal.
The analysis presented in this study suggests'.that policy 
formulated in Opposition may be most validly perceived, not as a 
commitment to future action or as a response to governmental 
initiatives, but primarily as a tool of persuasion, or as a means 
of bidding for support in the pursuit of power^^. Thus, policy
14. For a theoretical outline of the same point, see Do\ms 1957, 
op, cit., p. 298.
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statements produced In Opposition may not offer a reliable means of 
judging or predicting the behaviour of a political party when, and 
if, it returns to power* In Government the party operates in a 
different context of party action and in different historical 
circumstances from those, pertaining during an Opposition period.
Its policy-making structure is different, it fulfills different 
policy-making responsibilities and pursues different goals. 
Consequently, in the changed circumstances of Government a 
political party may find it difficult to conform to a set of 
objectives previously formulated by It as Opposition.
This does not mean that, in Opposition, party policy-makers 
never foraiulate policies in order to provide guidelines for the 
work of a future government: the evidence suggests that they may
well do so. Moreover, as Chapter Eleven demonstrates, no political 
party can immediately forego its programme once it returns to 
office. The main point is, however, that before an Opposition can 
carry out its policies, it must first regain power and, in order 
to do 80, it may find it necessary to indulge in activities which 
militate against the production of policies relevant to the 
governmental context. The need to balance these two conflicting 
objectives poses one of the most difficult problems facing Opposition 
po1icy-maker s *
In questioning the conventional theory of party government,
Richard Rose has suggested that the apparent failure of parties to
carry through their programme once elected to office is in part
a consequence of their inability to control fhe machinery of
government, and that one solution to this problem may lie in an
increase in the number of party personnel appointed to government 
15positions , Alternatively, as Punnett has suggested, policy-makers 
in Opposition should be provided with better resources and facilities
15. Richard Rose, "The Variability of Party Government ; A Theoretical 
and Empirical Critique", Political Studies, Vol. ICVII, N o . 4, 
1969,. pp, 441-445,-
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and greater access to government information^'^* My omi analysis
implies, however, that the apparent "divorce between party and 
17policy" ' is to some extent a product of the institutional and 
political conditions which characterise British Opposition politics 
itself* Thus, in part, the remedy may lie in the conduct of the 
Opposition group which, although it may usefully prepare for office 
by formulating detailed proposals in private, should avoid 
publicising a precise alternative programme and concentrate 
instead upon its traditional role of criticising the Government 
in a responsible and constructive manner.
These speculations, although interesting, should be treated 
with caution* It may be argued tîiat the conclusions I have reached 
are particular to the Issues studied and the activities of the 
Conservative Party during the 1964 to 1970 period, I would submit, 
however, that to the extent that the features of Opposition politics 
which I have noted are common to all major British political parties 
as Opposition, then the conclusions I iiave reached may îiave a wider 
relevance. The hypotheses require clarification and amendment 
through further inquiry. For instance, other aspects of the 1964 
to 1970 Conservative Opposition’s policy-making activities might 
usefully be analysed, such as industrial relations, defence and 
education* In addition, the activities of the 1951 to 1964 and 
1970 to 1974 Labour Oppositions offer further scope for inquiry, 
while the experience of other Oppositions in similar constitutional 
and legislative systems, such as Australia, Canada, and the Republic 
of Ireland, might provide a cross-national dimension. Thus, 
although the present study cannot claim to be conclusive, it may, 
hopefully, arouse discussion and help to point the way for further 
research.
16. See Punnett 1973, op. cit., pp. 366-400.
17, Enoch Powell, "Reducing Parliament to a Charade", The Times,V —^ ,1 I. I.»,! « llill. I»
11 March 1974,
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